The United States sued in a Federal District Court to condemn
any outstanding mining claims on certain public lands needed for
the construction of a dam, in order to obtain immediate possession,
and the complaint asked that the United States be allowed to
reserve authority to have the validity of the mining claims
determined in administrative proceedings before the Bureau of Land
Management of the Department of the Interior. After being granted a
writ of possession, the Government instituted such administrative
proceedings for a determination as to the validity of respondents'
unpatented mining claims. Respondents thereupon sued to enjoin
conduct of the administrative proceedings, but an injunction was
denied.
Held: institution of the condemnation suit in the
District Court was an appropriate way of obtaining immediate
possession; it was not inconsistent with the administrative remedy
for determining the validity of the mining claims, and the District
Court acted properly in holding its hand until the issue of the
validity of the mining claims has been resolved by the agency
entrusted by Congress with that task. Pp.
371 U. S.
334-340.
293 F.2d 553 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States sued in the District Court to condemn certain
property needed for the construction of the
Page 371 U. S. 335
Trinity River Dam and Reservoir in California, [
Footnote 1] to obtain immediate possession of
it, and to secure title to it, the complaint asking that the United
States be allowed to reserve authority to have the validity of
mining claims determined in administrative proceedings before the
Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the Interior. The
District Court allowed the United States a writ of possession, but
no other issues in the action have been determined.
See
185 F. Supp. 290.
The United States later instituted a contest proceeding in the
local land office of the Bureau seeking an administrative
determination of the validity of respondents' mining claims
[
Footnote 2] and alleged that
the land embraced within respondents' claims is nonmineral in
character, and that minerals have not been found within the limits
of the claims in sufficient quantities to constitute a valid
discovery. Respondents, who had 30 days to answer the
administrative complaint or have the allegations taken as
confessed, [
Footnote 3] brought
the present suit to enjoin the officials of the Department of the
Interior from proceeding with the administrative action. The
District Court granted summary judgment for the United States. 185
F. Supp. 290. The Court of Appeals reversed, 293 F.2d 553. The case
is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted. 368 U.S.
983.
We deal here with a unique form of property. A mining claim on
public lands is a possessory interest in land that is "mineral in
character" and as respects which discovery "within the limits of
the claim" has been made.
Cameron v. United States,
252 U. S. 450,
252 U. S. 456.
The discovery must be of such a character that
"a person of
Page 371 U. S. 336
ordinary prudence would be justified in the further expenditure
of his labor and means, with a reasonable prospect of success, in
developing a valuable mine."
Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455, 457;
Chrisman v.
Miller, 197 U. S. 313,
197 U. S. 322;
Cameron v. United States, supra, p.
252 U. S. 459.
A locator who does not carry his claim to patent does not lose his
mineral claim, though he does take the risk that his claim will no
longer support the issuance of a patent.
United States v.
Houston, 66 L.D. 161, 165. It must be shown before a patent
issues that at the time of the application for patent "the claim is
valuable for minerals," worked-out claims not qualifying.
United States v. Logomarcini, 60 L.D. 371, 373.
Respondents' mining claims are unpatented, the title to the
lands in controversy still being in the United States. The claims
are, however, valid against the United States if there has been a
discovery of mineral within the limits of the claim, if the lands
are still mineral, and if other statutory requirements have been
met. [
Footnote 4]
Cameron
v. United States, supra. The determination of the validity of
claims against the public lands was entrusted to the General Land
Office in 1812 (2 Stat. 716) and transferred to the Department of
the Interior on its creation in 1849. 9 Stat. 395. [
Footnote 5] Since that time, the Department
has been granted plenary authority over the administration of
public lands, including mineral lands, and it has been given broad
authority to issue regulations concerning them. [
Footnote 6]
Cameron v. United States,
supra -- an opinion written by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who,
as Assistant Attorney General for the Interior Department from 1897
to 1903, did more than any other person to give character
Page 371 U. S. 337
and distinction to the administration of the public lands --
illustrates the special role of the Department of the Interior in
that field. Cameron claimed a valid mineral discovery on public
lands. His claim was rejected in administrative proceedings.
Cameron, however, would not vacate the land, and the United States
sued to oust him. The Court said:
"By general statutory provisions, the execution of the laws
regulating the acquisition of rights in the public lands and the
general care of these lands is confided to the Land Department, as
a special tribunal, and the Secretary of the Interior, as the head
of the department, is charged with seeing that this authority is
rightly exercised to the end that valid claims may be recognized,
invalid ones eliminated, and the rights of the public preserved. .
. ."
"A mining location which has not gone to patent is of no higher
quality and no more immune from attack and investigation than are
unpatented claims under the homestead and kindred laws. If valid,
it gives to the claimant certain exclusive possessory rights, and
so do homestead and desert claims. But no right arises from an
invalid claim of any kind. All must conform to the law under which
they are initiated; otherwise they work an unlawful private
appropriation in derogation of the rights of the public."
"Of course, the Land Department has no power to strike down any
claim arbitrarily, but, so long as the legal title remains in the
government, it does have power, after proper notice and upon
adequate hearing, to determine whether the claim is valid, and, if
it be found invalid, to declare it null and void."
252 U. S. 252 U.S.
450,
252 U. S.
459-460.
Page 371 U. S. 338
"Due process in such case implies notice and a hearing. But this
does not require that the hearing must be in the courts, or forbid
an inquiry and determination in the land department."
Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372,
157 U. S. 383.
If a patent has not issued, controversies over the claims "should
be solved by appeal to the land department, and not to the courts."
[
Footnote 7]
Brown v.
Hitchcock, 173 U. S. 473,
173 U. S. 477.
And see Northern Pacific R. Co. v. McComas, 250 U.
S. 387,
250 U. S.
392.
The Court of Appeals wrote nothing in derogation of these
principles. It concluded, however, that, since the United States
went into the District Court to condemn these property interests
and to get immediate possession, the validity of the claims was, of
necessity, left to judicial determination. Its conclusion rested
primarily on Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That
Rule, after describing the way in which the issue of compensation
shall be determined, concludes with the sentence, "Trial of all
issues shall otherwise be by the court."
Yet courts that try issues sometimes wait until the
administrative agency that has special competence in the field has
ruled on them. The controversies within the Court over the
appropriateness of that procedure in given situations is well
known, though there is no dispute over the soundness of the
Abilene doctrine, adumbrated by Chief Justice White in
Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
204 U. S. 426. It
is difficult to imagine a more appropriate case for invocation of
the jurisdiction of an administrative agency for determination of
one of the issues involved in a judicial proceeding.
Cf.
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.
S. 478;
Thompson v.Texas Mexican R. Co.,
328 U. S. 134,
328 U. S.
146-151.
Page 371 U. S. 339
Congress has entrusted the Department of the Interior with the
management of the public domain, and prescribed the process by
which claims against the public domain may be perfected. [
Footnote 8] The United States, which
holds legal title to the lands, plainly can prescribe the procedure
which any claimant must follow to acquire rights in the public
sector.
Respondents protest, saying that, if they are remitted to the
administrative proceeding, they will suffer disadvantages in that
the procedures before the District Court are much less onerous on
claimants than those before the Department of the Interior.
[
Footnote 9] We express no
views on those contentions, as each of them can appropriately
be
Page 371 U. S. 340
raised in the administrative proceedings and reserved for
judicial review.
The United States is not foreclosed from insisting on resort to
the administrative proceedings for a determination of the validity
of those claims. It may take property pursuant to its power of
eminent domain, either by entering into physical possession of the
property without a court order or by instituting condemnation
proceedings under various Acts of Congress.
United States v.
Dow, 357 U. S. 17,
357 U. S. 21.
Title to the property passes later, though the entry into
possession marks the taking, gives rise to the claim for
compensation, and fixes the date as of which the property is to be
valued.
Id., p.
357 U. S. 22.
Institution of suit is one way to obtain immediate possession; and
we see nothing incompatible between the use of that means to obtain
possession and the use of the administrative proceedings to
determine title.
Cf. United States v. 93.970 Acres,
360 U. S. 328. No
purpose would be served by forcing the United States to abandon
that orderly procedure in favor of physical seizure, leaving the
claimant to a suit under the Tucker Act.
See United States v.
Dow, supra, p.
357 U. S.
21.
We conclude that the institution of the suit in the District
Court was an appropriate way of obtaining immediate possession,
that it was not inconsistent with the administrative remedy for
determining the validity of the mining claims, and that the
District Court acted properly in holding its hand until the issue
of the validity of the claims has been resolved by the agency
entrusted by Congress with the task.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See S.Doc. No. 113, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 120, stating
that the project will require 10,000 acres.
[
Footnote 2]
See Appeals and Contests Regulation of the Bureau of
Land Management, 43 CFR, 1962 Supp., § 221.67.
[
Footnote 3]
Id., § 221.64.
[
Footnote 4]
30 U.S.C. §§ 21, 22, 26; General Mining Regulation of the Bureau
of Land Management, 43 CFR §§ 185.1-185.3.
[
Footnote 5]
See 5 U.S.C. § 485; 43 U.S.C. § 2.
[
Footnote 6]
See 30 U.S.C. § 22, 43 U.S.C. § 1201.
[
Footnote 7]
Claimants today may appeal the Examiner's decision to the
Director of the Bureau (43 CFR, 1962 Supp., § 221.1), from him to
the Secretary (
id., § 221.31), and from there to the
courts.
Foster v. Seaton, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 271 F.2d
836.
[
Footnote 8]
We are told that nine hearing Examiners are assigned to mining
claim cases, that mining claims comprise from 75% to 85% of their
hearings, and that, in the fiscal year 1960-1961, 322 mining law
cases (involving 1,162 separate claims) were brought before the
hearing Examiners. Of these, 81 cases (343 claims) were closed on
procedural grounds without a hearing; in 241 cases (involving 819
claims), hearings on the merits were held and decisions rendered by
the hearing Examiner; in 90 of these cases, appeals were taken to
the Director of the Bureau of Land Management.
In the fiscal year 1961, there were a total of 27,228 mining
claim adjudication cases closed during the year. These included
7,457 title transfer cases (
e.g., patent applications and
land disposition conflicts), and approximately 20,000 mining claim
investigations by the Bureau's mining engineers for the purpose of
determining validity or invalidity.
See Annual Report,
Director, Bureau of Land Management, 1961, pt. 4, pp. 86-120
(Statistical Appendix).
[
Footnote 9]
Respondents say (1) that in the District Court value would be
determined as of the time of the taking, while, before the agency,
value is determined as of the date of the hearing before the
Examiner; (2) that the strictures on proof of "discovery" in the
administrative proceedings are so great that they could not be
satisfied unless the Trinity Basin Reservoir were drained; (3)
that, in the District Court, value could be established by a
showing of valuable deposits of gold, while, before the Examiner, a
claim could be established only on proof that mines were actually
operating at a profit.