Under a statute authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to lease
naval lands under revocable leases, he leased a naval airfield in
Illinois to a private operator. The lease contained a preamble
stating that it was considered essential to retain the field in a
stand-by status for use "in connection with Naval Aviation
activities" and a substantive provision that "this lease will at
all times be revocable at will by the Government" upon giving
certain notice. Subsequently, the Army desired to use the land for
an aerial defense missile site, and the Secretaries of the Army and
Navy jointly served notice of revocation on the lessee. The lessee
declined to leave the land, claiming that the lease could be
revoked only when the land was needed for "Naval Aviation
activities." In order to obtain possession as soon as possible, the
Government sued to condemn whatever possessory interest the lessee
might be adjudicated to have; but the Government maintained that it
had validly revoked the lease.
Held:
1. The Government's right to revoke the lease was not restricted
to occasions when it desired to use the land for aviation purposes,
and the revocation was valid and effective. Pp.
360 U. S.
331-332.
2. The doctrine of "election of remedies" did not require the
Government to abandon its right to revoke the lease in order to
exercise its right to obtain immediate possession under the
condemnation law. P.
360 U. S.
332.
3. Since essential interests of the Federal Government are here
involved and Congress has not made state law applicable, federal
law governs, even if the doctrine of election of remedies is a part
of the law of Illinois. Pp.
360 U. S.
332-333.
258 F.2d 17, reversed.
Page 360 U. S. 329
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, delivered the opinion of the Court.
The basic question presented in this case is whether the United
States can have adjudicated under one complaint (1) the claim by a
third person of a valuable possessory interest in government
property and (2) condemnation and value of that interest, if any.
In 1947, the United States leased an airfield to respondent
Illinois Aircraft Services & Sales Co. The preamble to the
lease stated that, because of the strategic value of the field, the
Government considered it essential to retain it "in a stand-by
status for post-war use in connection with Naval Aviation
activities. . . ."{1} One paragraph of the lease provided:
"It is understood and agreed that this lease will at all times
be revocable at will by the Government upon presentation of notice
of cancellation to the Lessee, in writing, sixty (60) days prior to
such termination, . . . in event of a national emergency and a
decision by the Secretary of the Navy that such revocation is
essential. "
Page 360 U. S. 330
In 1954, the Army wanted to use the property for an aerial
defense missile (NIKE) site. Timely notice of revocation was
delivered to respondent under the signatures of the Secretaries of
the Army and Navy, stating that a national emergency declared by
the President in 1950 was still in effect, and that both
Secretaries deemed revocation of the lease essential. Respondent
declined to leave the land, claiming that the Government had gone
beyond the authority granted by the lease in attempting to revoke
it for use by the Army, rather than in connection with Naval
Aviation activities mentioned in the preamble to the lease.
In order to obtain possession and use of the land as soon as
possible -- and without waiting to try out the validity of the
prior revocation in a separate action or actions -- the Government
filed a complaint to condemn whatever possessory interest
respondent might be adjudicated to have. Although the Government's
complaint alleged that it had revoked the lease and, in effect,
that respondent had no compensable interest in the property taken,
the District Court ruled that, by suing for condemnation, the
United States had "elected" to abandon its prior revocation. On
this basis, the court found that respondent had a compensable
interest, and let a jury determine its value. Under instructions
that the lease was revocable only if needed for "aviation purposes"
and that a NIKE site was not such a purpose, the jury returned a
$25,000 verdict for respondents. On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed this verdict by a
divided court. 258 F.2d 17. It held (1) that the doctrine of
"election of remedies" applied and barred consideration of the
revocation whether state or federal law governed, and (2) that the
lease could only be validly revoked under its terms if the
Government planned to use the land for "aviation purposes." To
review the
Page 360 U. S. 331
severe restrictions the court's holding places on the ability of
the United States to get, quickly, land it may need for government
purposes, we granted certiorari. 358 U.S. 945.{2}
We cannot agree that the lease permitted revocation only if the
Government wanted the land for "aviation purposes." It is true that
the preamble to the agreement states that the airfield was leased,
rather than sold, because it was needed in stand-by status for
naval aviation activities. It is also true that, immediately
following the preamble, there is a statement, common in many
contracts, that "Now Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing,
and of the covenants hereinafter mentioned, the Government" leases
the airport. There is no indication, however, either in the lease
itself or, as far as we have been shown, in the history of the
agreement, that this preamble and the formal legal statement
immediately following it meant to limit the express and unequivocal
clause of the lease allowing revocation at the will of the
Secretary of the Navy in the event of a national emergency.
Instead, the preamble can be easily understood, in view of the
Surplus Property Act of 1944, which required all
surplus
property to be disposed of, as a mere statement of why the property
was not considered surplus.{3} In addition, the statute which
authorized the airport lease provided that such leases shall be
revocable
"at any time, unless the Secretary shall determine that the
omission of such provision from the lease will promote the national
defense or will be in the public interest. In
Page 360 U. S. 332
any event, each such lease shall be revocable by the Secretary
during a national emergency declared by the President.{4}"
Under the circumstances, we cannot and will not assume that an
explicit revocation clause in the lease means any less than it
seems to mean. We therefore hold that the revocation was valid and
effective.
It follows necessarily from this that application of the
doctrine of "election of remedies" would put the Government in an
impossible situation. For, under the doctrine, the Government must
choose either to abandon its power to revoke the lease or to give
up its right to immediate possession under condemnation law, a
right which is not here questioned. We see no reason either in
justice or authority why such a Hobson's choice should be imposed,
and why the Government should be forced to pay for property which
it rightfully owns merely because it attempted to avoid delays
which the applicable laws seek to prevent. Such a strict rule
against combining different causes of action would certainly be out
of harmony with modern legislation and rules designed to make
trials as efficient, expeditious and inexpensive as fairness will
permit.{5}
Respondents argue, however, that election of remedies is part of
the law of Illinois, and that Illinois law applies here. We cannot
agree with this view. Condemnation involves essential governmental
functions.
See Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
367. We have often held that where essential interests
of the Federal Government
Page 360 U. S. 333
are concerned, federal law rules unless Congress chooses to make
state laws applicable.{6} It is apparent that no such choice has
been made here.{7}
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
The preamble reads:
"Whereas, because of its strategic value, it is considered
essential that the said airfield and the facilities thereon,
comprising the said United States Naval Outlying Airfield, be
retained in a stand-by status for post-war use in connection with
Naval Aviation activities; and"
"
* * * *"
"Whereas, the use of the airfield and facilities by the Lessee
will in no wise be detrimental to the present activities of the
Navy Department, but is on the contrary deemed to be in the best
interest of the Government."
The decision of the court below is also in apparent conflict
with
United States v. San Geronimo Dev. Co., 154 F.2d 78
(C.A. 1st Cir.) and
United States v. Turner, 175 F.2d 644
(C.A. 5th Cir.).
58 Stat. 766, 767-770, 777, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. (1946 ed.)
§§ 1612(e), 1613, 1620, 1632.
61 Stat. 774, 34 U.S.C. § 522a. The current version of this
statute is found in 10 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 2667. We assume without
deciding that this statute is applicable, although an argument can
be made for the applicability of a prior statute. That law provided
that leases must be "revocable at any time." 39 Stat. 559, 34
U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 522.
Cf. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S. 41,
355 U. S. 48.
See also Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. rules 1, 2, 18.
See, e.g., Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S.
367,
91 U. S. 374;
United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369,
317 U. S. 380;
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.
S. 363;
Bank of America Nat. T. & S. Assn. v.
Parnell, 352 U. S. 29.
Respondents rely on 26 Stat. 316, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 171,
which provided that condemnation proceedings like the one here
involved were
"to be prosecuted in accordance with the laws relating to suits
for the condemnation of property of the States wherein the
proceedings may be instituted."
But it is settled that this language required conformity in
procedural matters only.
See United States v. Miller,
317 U. S. 369,
317 U. S.
379-380 (citing 25 Stat. 94);
Kanakanui v. United
States, 244 F. 923;
Nebraska v. United States, 164
F.2d 866,
affirming United States v. 19,573.59 Acres of
Land, 70 F. Supp. 610. And, insofar as it required such
procedural conformity, it was clearly repealed by Rule 71A, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure at the time this suit was brought. It
follows that federal law was wholly applicable to this case. In
reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion on the possible
effect on other cases of the reenactment of this conformity clause
in 70A Stat. 148, 10 U.S.C. (Supp. V) § 2663(a) (1956), or its
subsequent repeal, retroactive to the time of reenactment, by the
Act of September 2, 1958. 72 Stat. 1565, 1568.