Petitioner, who claims to be a conscientious objector, was
convicted of violating § 12(a) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act by refusing to be inducted into the armed forces.
He claims that he was denied due process of law in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, because (1) at a hearing before a hearing officer
of the Department of Justice, he was not permitted to rebut
statements attributed to him by the local board, and (2) at the
trial, he was denied the right to have the hearing officer's report
and the original report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as
to his claim.
on the record in this case, the administrative
procedures prescribed by the Act were fully complied with;
petitioner was not denied due process; and his conviction is
sustained. Pp. 364 U. S.
(a) Petitioner was not denied due process in the administrative
proceedings, because the statement in question was in his file, to
which he had access, and he had opportunities to rebut it both
before the hearing officer of the Department of Justice and before
the appeal board. Pp. 364 U. S.
(b) Petitioner was not entitled to have the hearing officer's
notes and report, especially since he failed to show any particular
need for them and he did have a copy of the Department of Justice's
recommendation to the appeal board. Pp. 364 U. S.
(c) Petitioner was not entitled, either in the administrative
hearing at the Department of Justice or at his trial, to inspect
the original report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, since
he was furnished a resume of it, did not challenge its accuracy,
and showed no particular need for the original report. Pp.
364 U. S.
269 F.2d 613 affirmed.
Page 364 U. S. 60
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a prosecution for refusal to be inducted into the armed
services, in violation of the provisions of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 604, 622, 50 U.S.C.App. §
462(a). Petitioner, who claims to be a conscientious objector,
contends that he was denied due process both in the proceedings
before a hearing officer of the Department of Justice and at trial.
He says that he was not permitted to rebut before the hearing
officer statements attributed to him by the local board, and,
further, that he was denied at trial the right to have the
Department of Justice hearing officer's report and the original
report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as to his claim --
all in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The trial judge decided
that the administrative procedures of the Act were fully complied
with, and refused to require the production of such documents.
Petitioner was found guilty and sentenced to 15 months'
imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 269 F.2d 613. We
granted certiorari in view of the importance of the questions in
the administration of the Act. 361 U.S. 899. We have concluded that
petitioner's claims are controlled by the rationale of Gonzales
v. United States, 348 U. S. 407
(1955), and United States v. Nugent, 346 U. S.
(1953), and therefore affirm the judgment.
Petitioner registered with Local Board No. 9, Boulder, Colorado,
on March 17, 1952. His answers to the classification questionnaire
reflected that he was a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses, employed
at night by a sugar producer. He claimed IV-D classification as a
minister of religion, devoting a minimum of 100 hours a month
Page 364 U. S. 61
preaching. On November 13, 1952, he was classified in Class I-A.
On November 22, 1952, he wrote the Board, protesting this
classification. He again stated that he was "a regular minister";
that he was "devoting an average of 100 hours a month to actual
preaching publicly," in addition to 50 to 75 hours in other
ministerial duties, and that he opposed war in any form.
Thereafter, he was classified I-O. On April 1, 1953, after some six
months of full-time "pioneering," petitioner discontinued devoting
100 hours a month to preaching, but failed to so notify his local
board. In a periodic review, the local board on July 30, 1953,
reclassified him I-A and upheld this classification after a
personal appearance by petitioner, because of his willingness to
kill in defense of his church and home. Upon administrative
approval of the reclassification, he was ordered to report for
induction on June 11, 1956, but failed to do so. He was not
prosecuted, however, and his case was subsequently reopened, in the
light of Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.
(1955). He was again reclassified I-A by the
local board. There followed a customary Department of Justice
hearing at which petitioner appeared. In his report to the Attorney
General, the hearing officer suggested that the petitioner be
exempt only from combatant training and service. On March 21, 1957,
however, the Department recommended approval of the I-A
classification. Its ground for this recommendation was that, while
petitioner claimed before the local board on August 17, 1956 (as
evidenced by its memorandum in his file of that date), that he was
devoting 100 hours per month to actual preaching, the headquarters
of the Jehovah's Witnesses reported that he was no longer doing so
and, on the contrary, had relinquished both his Pioneer and Bible
Student Servant positions. It reported that he now devoted only
some 6 1/2 hours per month to public preaching and from 20 to 25
hours per month to church activities. His claim was therefore
Page 364 U. S. 62
highly exaggerated," the Department concluded, that it "cast
doubt upon his veracity and, consequently, upon his sincerity and
good faith." The appeal board furnished petitioner a copy of the
recommendation. In his answer thereto, he advised the Board that he
had made no such statement in 1956, and asserted that his only
claim to "pioneering" was in 1952. The appeal board, however,
unanimously concurred in the Department's recommendation. Upon
return of the file to the local board, petitioner was again ordered
to report for induction, and this prosecution followed his failure
to do so.
Petitioner first contends that the Department denied him
procedural due process by not giving him timely opportunity, before
its final recommendation to the appeal board, to answer the
statement of the local board as to his claim of devoting 100 hours
to actual preaching. But the statement of the local board
attributing this claim to petitioner was in his file. He admitted
that he knew it was open to him at all times, and he could have
rebutted it before the hearing officer. This he failed to do,
asserting that he did not know it to be in his file. Apparently he
never took the trouble to find out. Nevertheless he had ample
opportunity to contest the statement before the appeal board. After
the recommendation of the Department is forwarded to the appeal
board, that is the appropriate place for a registrant to lodge his
denial. This he did. We found in Gonzales v. United States,
that this was the controlling reason why copies of the
recommendation should be furnished a registrant. We said there that
it was necessary
"that a registrant be given an opportunity to rebut [the
Department's] recommendation when it comes to the Appeal Board, the
agency with the ultimate responsibility for classification."
348 U.S. at 348 U. S. 412
We fail to see how such procedure resulted in any prejudice to
petitioner's contention, which was considered by the appeal board
and denied by it. As was
Page 364 U. S. 63
said in Gonzales,
"it is the Appeal Board which renders the selective service
determination considered 'final' in the courts, not to be
overturned unless there is no basis in fact. Estep v. United
States, 327 U. S. 114
348 U.S. at 348 U. S.
But there are other contentions which might be considered more
difficult. At his trial, petitioner sought to secure through
subpoena duces tecum
the longhand notes of the
Department's hearing officer, Evensen, as well as his report
thereon. Petitioner also claimed at trial the right to inspect the
original Federal Bureau of Investigation reports to the Department
of Justice. He alleged no specific procedural errors or evidence
withheld; nor did he elaborate just what favorable evidence the
Federal Bureau of Investigation reports might disclose.
Section 6(j) of the Act, as we have held, does require the
Department's recommendation to be placed in a registrant's file.
Gonzales v. United States, supra.
But there is nothing in
the Act requiring the hearing officer's report to be likewise
turned over to the registrant. While the regulations formerly
required that the hearing officer's report be placed in the
registrant's file, this requirement was eliminated in 1952.
Moreover, the hearing officer's report is but intradepartmental, is
directed to the Attorney General, and, of course, is not the
recommendation of the Department. It is not essentially different
from a memorandum of an attorney in the Department of Justice, of
which the Attorney General receives many, and to which he may give
his approval or rejection. It is but part of the whole process
within the Department that goes into the making of the final
recommendation to the appeal board.
It is also significant that neither this report nor the hearing
officer's notes were furnished to the appeal board. Hence, the
petitioner had full opportunity to traverse the only conclusions of
the Department on file with
Page 364 U. S. 64
the Board. Petitioner knew that the Department's recommendation
was based not on the hearing officer's report, but on the statement
of the local board in his file. Having had every opportunity to
rebut the finding of the local board before both the hearing
officer and the appeal board, petitioner cannot now claim that he
was denied due process because he did not succeed. [Footnote 1
It appears to us that the same reasoning applies to the
production of the hearing officer's report and notes at the trial.
In addition, petitioner has failed to show any particular need for
the report and notes. While there are now allegations of the
withholding of "favorable evidence developed at the hearing" and a
denial of a "full and fair hearing," no such claim was made by
petitioner at any stage of the administrative process. Moreover,
his testimony at trial never developed any such facts. In the light
of these circumstances, as well as the fact that the issue at trial
in this respect centered entirely on the Department's
recommendation, which petitioner repudiated but which both the
appeal board and the courts below found supported by the record, we
find no relevancy in the hearing officer's report and notes.
Finally petitioner says that he was entitled to inspect the FBI
report during the proceedings before the hearing officer, as well
as at the trial. He did receive a resume of it -- the same that was
furnished the appeal board -- and he made no claim of its
inaccuracy. Even now, no such
Page 364 U. S. 65
claim is asserted. He bases his present contention on the
general right to explore, indicating that he hopes to find some
discrepancy in the resume. But this is fully answered by United
States v. Nugent, supra.
There, we held
"that the statutory scheme for review, within the selective
service system, . . . entitles [conscientious objectors] to no
guarantee that the FBI reports must be produced for their
346 U.S. at 346 U. S. 5
Even if we were not bound by Nugent,
petitioner here would
not be entitled to the report. The recommendation of the Department
-- as well as the decision of the appeal board -- was based
entirely on the local board file, not on an FBI report.
As to the production of the report at the trial, it is true
that, while that issue was raised in Nugent, [Footnote 2
] the Court gave it no separate
treatment. However, it would be an act of folly not to require the
production of such reports before the appeal boards, whose actions
"are final" and to be overturned "only if there is no basis in fact
for the classification," Estep v. United States,
327 U. S. 114
327 U. S. 122
(1946), and subsequently to require their production at the trials
in the District Courts. We note that the Courts of Appeals have
uniformly rejected such claims. This is not to say that there might
not be circumstances in a particular case where fairness in the
proceeding would require production. No such circumstances, as
foundation for a claim of actual unfairness, are before us.
Contrariwise, the resume fully set out petitioner's statement
before the local board as to his ministerial activity. Since this
is not disputed, and since the Department's recommendation was
based on a disparity between petitioner's representations before
Page 364 U. S. 66
board -- not on the FBI report -- it follows that the reasoning
Petitioner raises other points, such as the fact that the
prosecutor did not call the members and clerk of the local board to
testify at his trial. We find no substance in any of them.
Petitioner could have subpoenaed any witnesses he wished at the
trial. It was he who was challenging the classification. The
Government relied only on the record in the file, all of which was
available to petitioner. He makes much of the identity of the
language of the statement he is found to have made before the local
board on August 17, 1956, as to his ministerial activity, and his
earlier letter to the Board in 1952. But all of this was before the
appeal board. Moreover, he could have called witnesses to bring out
the circumstances surrounding the statement and the letter; the FBI
files would have been to no avail. He contented himself, however,
with offering only his own denial. The appeal board resolved this
issue against him. It found that his claim as to ministerial
activity was exaggerated, and cast doubt on his sincerity. Both
courts below have found "that the record is not without evidence to
support these conclusions." We will not set aside their findings
Petitioner points out that the regulations, as we have said, at
one time required copies of the hearing officer's report to be
placed in the registrant's file. He attributes congressional
approval thereto because the selective service laws were reenacted
and amended in 1951 and 1952. The same reasoning would apply,
however, to the repeal of the regulation. As we noted, it was
stricken by the Attorney General in 1952, and Congress has amended
the Act three times subsequently -- in 1955, 1957, and 1958. Still
it has failed to indicate any objection to the repeal of the
Joint Brief for Respondents, p. 181; United States v.
Nugent, 346 U. S. 1
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join, dissenting.
I cannot agree with the decision of the Court, for I believe
that petitioner has been deprived of a right which is his by
statute and regulation -- the right to a full hearing. The facts of
this case not only indicate a miscarriage of justice, but also
underline the significance of the hearing rights which petitioner
was never accorded.
Petitioner, a youth of 18 at the time, first claimed exemption
as a minister of Jehovah's Witnesses in 1952,
Page 364 U. S. 67
describing the extent and nature of his religious activities in
a detailed letter to the local selective service board. The board,
however, classified him 1-A, and, after an unsuccessful appeal, he
was ordered to report for induction. Although he refused to comply
with the order, his case was reopened after our decision in
Sicurella v. United States, 348 U.
. [Footnote 2/1
He renewed his claim for exemption, asserting that he was a
minister and a conscientious objector, but again the local board
ruled adversely. On appeal, the case was referred to the Department
of Justice, and petitioner appeared before a hearing officer.
The hearing officer's report, as summarized by the Department of
Justice, was as follows:
"The Hearing Officer reported that registrant gave the
appearance of being sincere and firm in his beliefs, and that he
appeared to be well versed in the scriptures. He found that
registrant's objections are based upon his religious training and
beliefs, but concluded that he is not opposed to participation in
war in any form. He further concluded that registrant was opposed
to combatant training and service, but not opposed to noncombatant
training and service. He therefore recommended that registrant be
exempt from combatant training and service only."
This was hardly an astonishing recommendation, inasmuch as the
summaries of two FBI investigative reports were entirely -- and, in
my judgment, conclusively -- favorable. At the time of the first
report in 1954, petitioner's grade school teachers related that he
had been "very cooperative [and] mannerly," and that he had
Page 364 U. S. 68
"refused to salute the flag on religious grounds." His former
employers "found him an excellent worker, very serious about his
religion, and sincere and fair in his dealings." His neighbors
stated that he was "a quiet and orderly young man whose character
and reputation are good," that he was a "very active" member of
Jehovah's Witnesses, and that they considered him to be "sincere in
his beliefs." Petitioner's references and his fellow members in the
sect said that he was "a very active, sincere member," and that
they believed he was "in good faith in his conscientious objector
claim." The second report, dated 1956, incorporated the first and
added the following: Petitioner's employer regarded him as "an
excellent worker, completely reliable, dependable and of excellent
morals, character and associates." His acquaintances, neighbors and
religious associates "all spoke favorably concerning [his]
character and reputation, conduct and morals," and reported that he
was "very active in . . . church affairs . . . and . . . very
devoted to his religious beliefs." They stated that he "lives up to
the teachings of the church and is considered to be sincere in his
religious beliefs and in his conscientious objector claim." The
hearing officer was understandably impressed.
However, the Chief of the Conscientious Objector Section of the
Justice Department, who reviewed the file, took a contrary view. He
fastened upon a single item in the file -- a matter which had
neither been mentioned by the hearing officer nor, for all that
appears, relied upon by the local board -- and recommended to
petitioner's appeal board that the claim not be sustained. The item
in question was the local board's summary of petitioner's
appearance before it in 1956, which the section chief interpreted
to state that petitioner at that time had claimed he was still
devoting 100 hours a month to preaching, as his 1952
Page 364 U. S. 69
letter to the board had stated. [Footnote 2/2
] Since the investigative reports indicated
that petitioner's status as a Jehovah's Witness "Pioneer" had
terminated in 1953, and that, from 1954 to 1956, he had devoted
only six and one-half hours
Page 364 U. S. 70
a month to preaching, the section chief concluded that
"claim as to the amount of his religious activities is so highly
exaggerated . . . as to cast doubt upon his veracity and,
consequently, upon his sincerity and good faith."
Petitioner was informed of this recommendation, and wrote to the
appeal board as follows:
". . . I would like to state that I did not at such a time [in
1956] make such a statement or any statement implicating the same.
The only time I submitted such information was when I was
pioneering, that was in the period of October 1, 1952 to April 16,
1953. . . . I would like to make it plain that I in no manner ever
exaggerated my report concerning my activities. The reason being
more than just my respect for mere man, but, as a Christian and
Bible Student, I realize I stand before the Higher Authorities
Jehovah God and Jesus Christ, I am also fully aware of the
consequences to liars as stated at Proverbs 6:16, 17, 19 showing
God hates a lying tongue. I also realize that for one to lie would
make void his Christian conduct and worship. So please consider the
information here submitted, I am sure the record stands behind it
This statement, set against the background of the information of
record regarding petitioner's character, has the ring of truth.
Moreover, it is corroborated by the inherent improbability that
petitioner's oral statement in 1956 would have been a word-for-word
and sentence-for-sentence carbon copy of the written statement he
Page 364 U. S. 71
four years before, down to the request for a personal appearance
which he was at that very minute receiving. [Footnote 2/3
] And it should be emphasized that the only
evidence that petitioner made such a statement was the board
memorandum, set forth in 364 U.S.
fn2/2|>note 2, supra.
The most likely explanation
is that the local board merely intended to say that petitioner had
repeated his basic claim to exemption, and that the board utilized
petitioner's prior letter on the assumption that it described that
claim. But, so far as appears, no one in the Department took the
trouble to ask the local board precisely what its memorandum
Although the Department's recommendation was based upon this
dubious foundation, the appeal board followed that recommendation.
Before the date scheduled for petitioner's induction, he informed
the local board that his wife was pregnant, but the board told him
that the notification came too late. Petitioner refused to be
inducted, was prosecuted, and was convicted.
The striking thing about this case -- aside from the dishonoring
of petitioner's claim -- is that he never once received a real
opportunity to persuade any Department or selective service officer
face to face that he had not lied to the local board, for the
accusation was never made until petitioner's opportunity for oral
response had passed. The hearing officer never adverted to the
matter, and the Department's recommendation was made on grounds
entirely different from the matters which had been explored at the
hearing. It is true, as I have indicated, that petitioner was
allowed to file a rebuttal before the appeal board; but that
rebuttal was written,
not oral. See
32 CFR §
1626.25(e). Since the issue was one of credibility, it can hardly
be maintained that this afforded
Page 364 U. S. 72
petitioner a fair opportunity to meet an accusation
determinative of his case.
Nor can it be said that the Department's recommendation, and the
basis therefor, has no significance. On the contrary, the statute
makes the Department proceeding an integral and important part of
the classification process; for every appeal must be referred to
the Department, and, although the appeal board is not bound to
follow the Department's recommendation, it is admonished by the
statute to "give consideration to" it. [Footnote 2/4
] The fact appears to be that these
recommendations are followed in over 90% of the cases. [Footnote 2/5
] Moreover, the selective
service classification which is given administratively cannot
effectively be contested in a criminal proceeding in court, in view
of the extremely restricted judicial review of that classification.
See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.
. These factors reveal the critical importance of
the Department's recommendation, and, in turn, of the inadequate
procedures under which petitioner was permitted to present his
claim to the Department.
Congress fully recognized the significance of the Department of
Justice stage of the proceeding, for it directed that every appeal
be referred to the Department "for inquiry and hearing," and
commanded the Department, "after appropriate inquiry," to "hold a
hearing with respect to the character and good faith of the
objections of the person concerned." An adverse recommendation is
to be made only when, "after such hearing, the Department of
Justice finds that his objections are not sustained." [Footnote 2/6
] The regulations are in
accord. 32 CFR § 1626.25.
Page 364 U. S. 73
In requiring a hearing, Congress did not mean, in my opinion,
that a guessing contest would suffice. It is true enough that,
prior to the hearing, petitioner could have searched the files and
discovered the local board memorandum; but this opportunity hardly
measures up to the traditional concept of a hearing as involving
notice of charges. And I think it is not amiss, in considering this
matter, to note that, at the time of his appearance before the
local board and the hearing officer, petitioner, a laborer with but
an eighth-grade education, was a youth of 22 years of age and was
unrepresented by counsel. I doubt that anyone would maintain that
there would be a hearing in any true sense of the word if such a
person were told by the Department that he could appear and say
whatever he wished, but that the Department would not indicate to
him what it considered pertinent -- indeed, what it considered
conclusive unless rebutted. Yet, in substance, this is exactly what
happened here. I cannot believe that this procedure comports with
Nor can I reconcile the Court's decision with precedent. In
Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1
Court held a government rate order void because the stockyards
commission men who were affected by it were not given the "full
hearing" required by the pertinent statute. There was no question
of these individuals not being allowed to argue their case. In
fact, there had been a full and lengthy proceeding for the
introduction of evidence, and in addition the parties had been
granted an oral argument before the Acting Secretary of
Agriculture. But this Court nonetheless found that there had not
been a hearing within the meaning of the statute, and phrased its
holding in language which is uniquely a propos
"The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present
evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of
the opposing party and to meet
Page 364 U. S. 74
them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity;
otherwise, the right might be but a barren one. Those who are
brought into contest with the Government in a
-judicial proceeding aimed at the control of their
activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government
proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its
at 304 U. S.
I do not believe that the claim of Raymond Gonzales to a full
hearing is less worthy of consideration than the rights of the
stockyards commission men in Morgan.
In sum, I am unwilling to attribute to Congress any intent other
than one which would guarantee to persons like petitioner every
procedural safeguard which appears reasonably designed to insure a
fair determination of their claims. We must remember that we are
dealing here with a system of universal military service which
touches, directly or indirectly, practically every person and every
family in this country. When the people are thus brought into
contact with the Government, the importance to the commonweal of
insuring their confidence in the justness of the program cannot be
overemphasized, for to them it is not merely the fairness of a
program which is involved, but the fairness of their Government.
The sensitivity of Congress to this need is nowhere better
demonstrated than in the statutory provisions concerning the
treatment of persons claiming exemption as conscientious objectors.
As Congress has recognized, one of the most fundamental aspects of
our national ethic is a recognition of the worth of the person,
acting according to the dictates of his own conscience. And thus it
is that, even in formulating legislation deemed to be of prime
importance to the very existence of the Nation, Congress refrained
from impressing into military service those who by religious
conviction find war an affront to God and morality. The
Page 364 U. S. 75
desire of Congress that such beliefs be respected is further
reflected by its unwillingness to entrust to a local board the
final authority to pass upon the claims of conscientious objectors.
Instead, Congress provided for an appeal within the selective
service system, together with a hearing in the Department of
Justice. In determining what Congress intended by these statutory
provisions, we must not forget the nature of the program with which
we are dealing, nor must we forget that most of the subjects of
governmental action in these cases are inexperienced youths, many
only 18 years of age, often unrepresented by attorneys. I am
unwilling to give to a statute conceived in such a context a
construction which results in a young man of unblemished
reputation, who claims religious scruples, being sent to prison for
15 months without having received a full and fair consideration of
his case. I say this with assurance that Congress did not intend
that these humanitarian benefits of the Act be accorded
which involved a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses, we held that the petitioner's willingness to fight in
defense of his "ministry, Kingdom Interests, and . . . his fellow
brethren" was not, under the circumstances, a sufficient basis upon
which to deny him exemption as a conscientious objector.
The local board memorandum reads in full as follows:
"When asked by the members of Local Board No. 9, Boulder,
Colorado, if he thought he was entitled to any other classification
than that of I-A, Mr. Gonzales replied, 'I am a minister, and, as
such, should be classified 4-D. Also, a minister is automatically
classified as a conscientious objector.' The board replied that
this statement was in error."
"Mr. Gonzales then went on to say that he had always made the
claim that he was a minister, even at the very beginning of his
registration. He still made the statement that, if I am a minister
I am a conscientious objector."
"When asked if he would participate in the conscientious
objector work program, he stated definitely not."
"Mr. Gonzales stated"
"I am a regular minister as defined under section 16 G part
II of the laws and regulations set out by Selective Service Act of
1948. At present, I am devoting an average of 100 hours a month to
actual preaching publicly and from house to house, and an
additional 50-75 hours in preparation for ministerial duties such
as preparation for home bible studies; calling back on good-will
persons; attending congregational meetings, as well as training
students to become ministers. I also serve as Stock Servant for the
local congregation. As you perhaps already know that the Selective
Service National Headquarters has determined that Jehovah's
Witnesses and the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society constitutes a
recognized religious organization, and that all Jehovah's Witnesses
who are regularly and customarily teaching and preaching the
doctrines and principles of the Bible as advocated by Jehovah's
Witnesses as a vocation and not incidentally are entitled to
exemption as ministers of religion. These are some of the reasons I
request a 4-D classification, so I would like for you to further
consider my case as a minister of the gospel or would like to
appear in person before the local board members for further
consideration or discussion in regard to my case.
"When asked by the board if he had any further information to
submit, he stated he submitted no new evidence except what was
stated above, but would like to submit a certificate of marriage as
the only new matter to be brought before the board."
The italicized portion repeats the statement petitioner made in
his 1952 letter to the local board. The significance of this
repetition is discussed infra.
the italicized portion of the board's memorandum,
fn2/2|>note 2, supra.
62 Stat. 613, as amended, 50 U.S.C.App. § 456(j).
Smith and Bell, "The Conscientious Objector Program
-- A Search for Sincerity," 19 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 695, 702.
fn2/4|>Note 4, supra.