The criminal provisions of the Smoke Abatement Code of the City
of Detroit are constitutional, as applied to prosecution for the
emission of dense black smoke by appellant's ships while docked at
the Port of Detroit, even though such ships operate in interstate
commerce and have been inspected, approved and licensed by the
Federal Government for that purpose in accordance with a
comprehensive system of regulation enacted by Congress. Pp.
362 U. S.
440-448.
(a) The federal inspection laws, which are designed to afford
protection from the perils of maritime navigation, do not so
preempt the field as to prevent local regulation to protect the
health and enhance the cleanliness of the local community, and the
local regulation here involved does not unconstitutionally burden
the federal licenses issued to these vessels. Pp.
362 U. S.
444-448.
(b) The criminal provisions of the Smoke Abatement Code, as
applied to appellant's ships, do not impose an undue burden on
interstate commerce. P.
362 U. S.
448.
355 Mich. 227,
93
N.W.2d 888, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
This appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Michigan
draws in question the constitutional validity of certain provisions
of Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as applied to ships owned by the
appellant and operated in interstate commerce.
Page 362 U. S. 441
The appellant is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the
manufacture and sale of cement. It maintains a fleet of five
vessels which it uses to transport cement from its mill in Alpena,
Michigan, to distributing plants located in various states
bordering the Great Lakes. Two of the ships, the
S.S.
Crapo and the
S.S. Boardman, are equipped with
hand-fired Scotch marine boilers. While these vessels are docked
for loading and unloading, it is necessary, in order to operate
deck machinery, to keep the boilers fired and to clean the fires
periodically. When the fires are cleaned, the ship's boiler stacks
emit smoke which, in density and duration, exceeds the maximum
standards allowable under the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code.
Structural alterations would be required in order to insure
compliance with the Code.
Criminal proceedings were instituted in the Detroit Recorder's
Court against the appellant and its agents for violations of the
city law during periods when the vessels were docked at the Port of
Detroit. The appellant brought an action in the State Circuit Court
to enjoin the city from further prosecuting the pending litigation
in the Recorder's Court, and from otherwise enforcing the smoke
ordinance against its vessels, "except where the emission of smoke
is caused by the improper firing or the improper use of the
equipment upon said vessels." The Circuit Court refused to grant
relief, and the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, 355 Mich. 227,
93 N.W.2d
888. An appeal was lodged here, and we noted probable
jurisdiction, 361 U.S. 806.
In support of the claim that the ordinance cannot
constitutionally be applied to appellant's ships, two basic
arguments are advanced. First, it is asserted that, since the
vessels and their equipment, including their boilers, have been
inspected, approved and licensed to operate in interstate commerce
in accordance with a comprehensive system of regulation enacted by
Congress, the City of
Page 362 U. S. 442
Detroit may not legislate in such a way as, in effect, to impose
additional or inconsistent standards. Secondly, the argument is
made that, even if Congress has not expressly preempted the field,
the municipal ordinance "materially affects interstate commerce in
matters where uniformity is necessary." We have concluded that
neither of these contentions can prevail, and that the Federal
Constitution does not prohibit application to the appellant's
vessels of the criminal provisions of the Detroit ordinance.
[
Footnote 1]
The ordinance was enacted for the manifest purpose of promoting
the health and welfare of the city's inhabitants. Legislation
designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police power. In the
exercise of that power, the states and their instrumentalities may
act, in many areas of interstate commerce and maritime activities,
concurrently with the federal government.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. l;
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 12 How.
299;
The Steamboat New York v.
Rea, 18 How. 223;
Morgan v. Louisiana,
118 U. S. 455;
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352;
Wilmington Transp. Co. v.
California Railroad Comm.,
Page 362 U. S. 443
236 U. S. 151;
Vandalia R. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 242 U.
S. 255;
Stewart & Co. v. Rivara,
274 U. S. 614;
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S.
79.
The basic limitations upon local legislative power in this area
are clear enough. The controlling principles have been reiterated
over the years in a host of this Court's decisions. Evenhanded
local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest
is valid unless preempted by federal action,
Erie R. Co. v. New
York, 233 U. S. 671;
Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, 270 U. S.
87;
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.
S. 605;
Missouri Pacific Co. v. Porter,
273 U. S. 341;
Service Transfer Co. v. Virginia, 359 U.
S. 171, or unduly burdensome on maritime activities or
interstate commerce,
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.
S. 313;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.
S. 373;
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U. S. 520.
In determining whether state regulation has been preempted by
federal action,
"the intent to supersede the exercise by the State of its police
power as to matters not covered by the Federal legislation is not
to be inferred from the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to
circumscribe its regulation and to occupy a limited field. In other
words, such intent is not to be implied unless the act of Congress
fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of the
State."
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,
225 U. S. 533.
See also Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.
S. 137;
Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.
S. 251;
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U. S. 79;
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598.
In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on
interstate commerce, it must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, when
"conferring upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . .
never intended to cut the States off from legislating on all
subjects relating to the health, life, and safety of their
citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of
Page 362 U. S. 444
the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect
commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a
regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution."
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S. 103;
Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Kentucky,
183 U. S. 503;
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352;
Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Armburg,
285 U. S. 234;
Collins v. American Buslines, Inc., 350 U.
S. 528. But a state may not impose a burden which
materially affects interstate commerce in an area where uniformity
of regulation is necessary.
Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S.
485;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U. S. 761;
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.
S. 520.
Although verbal generalizations do not, of their own motion,
decide concrete cases, it is nevertheless within the framework of
these basic principles that the issues in the present case must be
determined.
I
For many years, Congress has maintained an extensive and
comprehensive set of controls over ships and shipping. Federal
inspection of steam vessels was first required in 1838, 5 Stat.
304, and the requirement has been continued ever since. 5 Stat.
626; 10 Stat. 61; 14 Stat. 227; 16 Stat. 440; 22 Stat. 346; 28
Stat. 699; 32 Stat. 34; 34 Stat. 68; 60 Stat. 1097; 73 Stat. 475.
Steam vessels which carry passengers must pass inspection annually,
46 U.S.C. § 391(a), and those which do not, every two years. 46
U.S.C. § 391(b). Failure to meet the standards invoked by law
results in revocation of the inspection certificate, or refusal to
issue a new one, 46 U.S.C. § 391(d). It is unlawful for a vessel to
operate without such a certificate. 46 U.S.C. § 390c(a).
These inspections are broad in nature, covering
"the boilers, unfired pressure vessels, and appurtenances
Page 362 U. S. 445
thereof, also the propelling and auxiliary machinery, electrical
apparatus and equipment, of all vessels subject to inspection. . .
."
46 U.S.C. § 392(b). The law provides that
"No boiler . . . shall be allowed to be used if constructed in
whole or in part of defective material or which because of its
form, design, workmanship, age, use, or for any other reason is
unsafe."
46 U.S.C. § 392(c).
As is apparent on the face of the legislation, however, the
purpose of the federal inspection statutes is to insure the
seagoing safety of vessels subject to inspection. Thus, 46 U.S.C. §
392(c) makes clear that inspection of boilers and related equipment
is for the purpose of seeing to it that the equipment "may be
safely employed in the service proposed." The safety of passengers,
46 U.S.C. § 391(a), and of the crew, 46 U.S.C. § 391(b), is the
criterion. The thrust of the federal inspection laws is clearly
limited to affording protection from the perils of maritime
navigation.
Cf. Ace Waterways v. Fleming, 98 F. Supp.
666.
See also Steamship Co. v.
Jolie, 2 Wall. 450.
By contrast, the sole aim of the Detroit ordinance is the
elimination of air pollution to protect the health and enhance the
cleanliness of the local community. Congress recently recognized
the importance and legitimacy of such a purpose when, in 1955, it
provided:
"[I]n recognition of the dangers to the public health and
welfare, injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and
deterioration of property, and hazards to air and ground
transportation from air pollution, it is hereby declared to be the
policy of Congress to preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of the States and local governments in
controlling air pollution, to support and aid technical research to
devise and develop methods of abating such pollution, and to
provide Federal technical
Page 362 U. S. 446
services and financial aid to State and local government air
pollution control agencies and other public or private agencies and
institutions in the formulation and execution of their air
pollution abatement research programs."
69 Stat. 322; 42 U.S.C. § 1857. Congressional recognition that
the problem of air pollution is peculiarly a matter of state and
local concern is manifest in this legislation. Such recognition is
underlined in the Senate Committee Report:
"The committee recognizes that it is the primary responsibility
of State and local governments to prevent air pollution. The bill
does not propose any exercise of police power by the Federal
Government, and no provision in it invades the sovereignty of
States, counties or cities."
S.Rep. No. 389, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3.
We conclude that there is no overlap between the scope of the
federal ship inspection laws and that of the municipal ordinance
here involved. [
Footnote 2] For
this reason, we cannot find that the federal inspection legislation
has preempted local action. To hold otherwise would be to ignore
the teaching of this Court's decisions which enjoin seeking out
conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly
exists.
Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501;
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S.
79;
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.
S. 598.
An additional argument is advanced, however, based not upon the
mere existence of the federal inspection standards, but upon the
fact that the appellant's vessels were actually licensed, 46 U.S.C.
§ 263, and enrolled,
Page 362 U. S. 447
46 U.S.C. §§ 259-260, by the national government. It is asserted
that the vessels have thus been given a dominant federal right to
the use of the navigable waters of the United States, free from the
local impediment that would be imposed by the Detroit
ordinance.
The scope of the privilege granted by the federal licensing
scheme has been well delineated. A state may not exclude from its
waters a ship operating under a federal license.
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. A state may not require a local
occupation license, in addition to that federally granted, as a
condition precedent to the use of its waters.
Moran v. New
Orleans, 112 U. S. 69. While
an enrolled and licensed vessel may be required to share the costs
of benefits it enjoys,
Huse v. Glover, 119 U.
S. 543, and to pay fair taxes imposed by its domicile,
Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. S.
273, it cannot be subjected to local license imposts
exacted for the use of a navigable waterway,
Harman v.
Chicago, 147 U. S. 396.
See also Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. 227.
The mere possession of a federal license, however, does not
immunize a ship from the operation of the normal incidents of local
police power, not constituting a direct regulation of commerce.
Thus, a federally licensed vessel is not, as such, exempt from
local pilotage laws,
Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Port of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299, or local
quarantine laws,
Morgan's Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of
Health, 118 U. S. 455, or
local safety inspections,
Kelly v. Washington,
302 U. S. 1, or the
local regulation of wharves and docks,
Packet Co. v.
Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559.
Indeed, this Court has gone so far as to hold that a state, in the
exercise of its police power, may actually seize and pronounce the
forfeiture of a vessel "licensed for the coasting trade, under the
laws of the United States, while engaged in that trade."
Smith v.
Maryland, 18 How. 71,
59 U. S. 74. The
present case obviously
Page 362 U. S. 448
does not even approach such an extreme, for the Detroit
ordinance requires no more than compliance with an orderly and
reasonable scheme of community regulation. The ordinance does not
exclude a licensed vessel from the Port of Detroit, nor does it
destroy the right of free passage. We cannot hold that the local
regulation so burdens the federal license as to be constitutionally
invalid.
II
The claim that the Detroit ordinance, quite apart from the
effect of federal legislation, imposes as to the appellant's ships
an undue burden on interstate commerce needs no extended
discussion. State regulation, based on the police power, which does
not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt
its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand.
Hennington
v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299;
Lake Shore & Mich. South. R. Co. v. Ohio, 173 U.
S. 285;
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service
Comm., 252 U. S. 23;
Milk Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.
S. 346;
Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan,
333 U. S. 28.
It has not been suggested that the local ordinance, applicable
alike to "any person, firm or corporation" within the city,
discriminates against interstate commerce as such. It is a
regulation of general application, designed to better the health
and welfare of the community. And while the appellant argues that
other local governments might impose differing requirements as to
air pollution, it has pointed to none. The record contains nothing
to suggest the existence of any such competing or conflicting local
regulations.
Cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U. S. 520. We
conclude that no impermissible burden on commerce has been
shown.
The judgment is affirmed.
Page 362 U. S. 449
[
Footnote 1]
The Detroit legislation also contains provisions making it
unlawful to operate any combustion equipment in the city without a
certificate, § 2.16, providing for an annual inspection of all such
equipment used in the city, § 2.17, and further providing for the
sealing of equipment in the event that the inspection requirements
are repeatedly ignored, § 2.20. There is nothing in the record to
indicate that the city has at any time attempted to enforce these
provisions with respect to the appellant's ships. Accordingly, we
do not reach the question of the validity of the inspection
sections as they might be applied to appellant, but limit our
consideration solely to what is presented upon this record -- the
enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Code for violation of
the smoke emission provisions.
[
Footnote 2]
Compare Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., where the
Court concluded that "the [Locomotive] Boiler Inspection Act . . .
was intended to occupy the field."
272 U. S. 272 U.S.
605,
272 U. S. 613.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER concurs,
dissenting.
The Court treats this controversy as if it were merely an
inspection case with the City of Detroit supplementing a federal
inspection system as the State of Washington did in
Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U. S. 1. There,
a state inspection system touched matters "which the federal laws
and regulations" left "untouched."
Id. at
302 U. S. 13.
This is not that type of case. Nor is this the rare case where
state law adopts the standards and requirements of federal law and
is allowed to exact a permit in addition to the one demanded by
federal law.
California v. Zook, 336 U.
S. 725,
336 U. S. 735.
Here, we have a criminal prosecution against a shipowner and
officers of two of its vessels for using the very equipment on
these vessels which the Federal Government says may be used. At
stake are a possible fine of $100 on the owner and both a fine and
a 30-day jail sentence on the officers.
Appellant has a federal certificate for each of its vessels --
S.S. John W. Boardman, S.S. S. T. Crapo, and others. The
one issued on March 21, 1956, by the United States Coast Guard for
S.S. S.T. Crapo is typical. The certificate states "The
said vessel is permitted to be navigated for one year on the Great
Lakes." The certificate specifies the boilers which are and may be
used -- "Main Boilers Number 3, Year built 1927, Mfr. Manitowoc
Boiler Wks." It also specifies the fuel which is used and is to be
used in those boilers -- "Fuel coal."
Appellant, operating the vessel in waters at the Detroit dock,
is about to be fined criminally for using the precise equipment
covered by the federal certificate because, it is said, the use of
that equipment will violate a smoke ordinance of the City of
Detroit.
The federal statutes give the Coast Guard the power to inspect
"the boilers" of freight vessels every two
Page 362 U. S. 450
years, [
Footnote 2/1] and
provide that, when the Coast Guard approves the vessel and her
equipment throughout, a certificate to that effect shall be made.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The requirements of the Detroit smoke ordinance are squarely in
conflict with the federal statute. Section 2.2A of the ordinance
prohibits the emission of the kind of smoke which cannot be at all
times prevented by vessels equipped with hand-fired Scotch marine
boilers such as appellant's vessels use. Section 2.16 of the
ordinance makes it unlawful to use any furnace or other combustion
equipment or device in the city without a certificate of operation
which issues only after inspection. Section 2.17 provides for an
annual inspection of every furnace or other combustion equipment
used within the city. Section 2.20 provides that, if an owner has
been previously notified of three or more violations of the
ordinance within any consecutive 12-month period, he shall be
notified to show cause before the Commissioner why the equipment
should not be sealed. At the hearing, if the Commissioner finds
that adequate corrective means have not been employed to remedy the
situation, the equipment shall be sealed. Section 3.2 provides for
a fine of not more than $100 or imprisonment for not more than 30
days, or both, upon conviction of any violation of any provision of
the ordinance, and each day a violation is permitted to exist
constitutes a separate offense.
Thus, it is plain that the ordinance requires not only the
inspection and approval of equipment which has been
Page 362 U. S. 451
inspected and approved by the Coast Guard, but also the sealing
of equipment, even though it has been approved by the Coast Guard.
Under the Detroit ordinance, a certificate of operation would not
issue for a hand-fired Scotch marine boiler even though it had been
approved by the Coast Guard. [
Footnote
2/3] In other words, this equipment approved and licensed by
the Federal Government for use on navigable waters cannot pass
muster under local law.
If local law required federally licensed vessels to observe
local speed laws, obey local traffic regulations, or dock at
certain times or under prescribed conditions, we would have local
laws not at war with the federal license, but complementary to it.
In
Kelly v. Washington, supra, at
302 U. S. 14-15,
the Court marked precisely that distinction. While it allowed state
inspection of hull and machinery of tugs over and above that
required by federal statutes, it noted that state rules which
changed the federal
Page 362 U. S. 452
standards "for the structure and equipment of vessels" would
meet a different fate:
"The state law is a comprehensive code. While it excepts vessels
which are subject to inspection under the laws of the United
States, it has provisions which may be deemed to fall within the
class of regulations which Congress alone can provide. For example,
Congress may establish standards and designs for the structure and
equipment of vessels, and may prescribe rules for their operation,
which could not properly be left to the diverse action of the
States. The State of Washington might prescribe standards, designs,
equipment and rules of one sort, Oregon another, California
another, and so on. But it does not follow that, in all respects,
the state Act must fail."
This case, like
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
272 U. S. 605,
involves the collision between a local law and a federal law which
gives a federal agency the power to specify or approve the
equipment to be used by a federal licensee. In that case, one State
required automatic fire doors on locomotives of interstate trains,
and another State required cab curtains during the winter months.
The Interstate Commerce Commission, though it had the power to do
so under the Boiler Inspection Act, had never required a particular
kind of fire door or cab curtain. The Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Brandeis, said, at
272 U. S. 612-613:
"The federal and the state statutes are directed to the same
subject -- the equipment of locomotives. They operate upon the same
object. It is suggested that the power delegated to the Commission
has been exerted only in respect to minor changes or additions. But
this, if true, is not of legal significance. It is also urged that,
even if the Commission has power to prescribe an automatic firebox
door and a cab
Page 362 U. S. 453
curtain, it has not done so, and that it has made no other
requirement inconsistent with the state legislation. This, also, if
true, is without legal significance. The fact that the Commission
has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent
conferred has no bearing upon the construction of the Act
delegating the power. We hold that state legislation is precluded
because the Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it, was intended
to occupy the field."
Here, the Coast Guard would be entitled to insist on different
equipment. But it has not done so. The boats of appellant,
therefore, have credentials good for any port, and I would not
allow this local smoke ordinance to work in derogation of them. The
fact that the Federal Government, in certifying equipment, applies
standards of safety for seagoing vessels, while Detroit applies
standards of air pollution, seems immaterial. Federal preemption
occurs when the boilers and fuel to be used in the vessels are
specified in the certificate. No state authority can, in my view,
change those specifications. Yet that is, in effect, what is
allowed here.
As we have seen, the Detroit ordinance contains provisions
making it unlawful to operate appellant's equipment without a
certificate from the city and providing for the sealing of the
equipment in case of three or more violations within any 12-month
period. The Court says that those sanctions are not presently in
issue, that it reserves decision as to their validity, and that it
concerns itself only with "the enforcement of the criminal
provisions" of the ordinance. Yet by what authority can a local
government fine people or send them to jail for using in interstate
commerce the precise equipment which the federal regulatory agency
has certified and approved? The burden of these criminal sanctions
on the owners and officers, particularly as it involves the risk of
imprisonment, may indeed be far more serious than a mere
sealing
Page 362 U. S. 454
of the equipment. Yet whether fine or imprisonment is
considered, the effect on the federal certificate will be
crippling. However the issue in the present case is stated, it
comes down to making criminal in the Port of Detroit the use of a
certificate issued under paramount federal law.
Mintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346,
upheld the requirement of a state inspection certificate where a
federal certificate might have been, but was not, issued.
Cf.
California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109,
313 U. S. 112.
Never before, I believe, have we recognized the right of local law
to make the use of an unquestionably legal federal license a
criminal offense.
What we do today is in disregard of the doctrine long accepted
and succinctly stated in the 1851 Term in
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 13 How. 518,
54 U. S. 566,
"No State law can hinder or obstruct the free use of a license
granted under an act of Congress." [
Footnote 2/4] The confusion and burden arising from the
imposition by one
Page 362 U. S. 455
State of requirements for equipment which the Federal Government
has approved was emphasized in
Kelly v. Washington, supra,
in the passage already quoted. The requirements of Detroit may be
too lax for another port.
Cf. People v. Cunard White Star,
Ltd., 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489. The variety of requirements
for equipment which the States may provide in order to meet their
air pollution needs underlines the importance of letting the Coast
Guard license serve as authority for the vessel to use, in all our
ports, the equipment which it certifies.
[
Footnote 2/1]
46 U.S.C. § 392.
[
Footnote 2/2]
46 U.S.C. § 399 provides in part:
"When the inspection of a steam vessel is completed and the
Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard is operating
approves the vessel and her equipment throughout, he shall make and
subscribe a certificate to that effect."
[
Footnote 2/3]
The trial court, in its opinion, said:
"It is agreed it is impossible to prevent emission of the kind
of smoke prohibited by the smoke ordinance if the vessel is
equipped with hand-fired scotch marine boilers. The
Boardman has two boilers, each with two doors and one
steam air jet over each door. The
Crapo has three boilers,
each with two doors and one steam air jet over each door. The steam
jets being installed at the suggestion of Benjamin Linsky, former
Chief of the Bureau of Smoke Abatement for the City."
"Testimony showed also that the plaintiff used a chemical in an
attempt to reduce the smoke. Plaintiff urges it has done everything
that it could possibly do with the equipment it has to prevent the
emission of smoke. It was shown on trial that the fleet is subject
to periodic inspection by the coast guard, which issues a search
[
sic] of inspection. The
Crapo, in 1955, docked
at Detroit twenty-two times for an average docking time of 23.9
hours, and the
Boardman docked at Detroit 25 times that
year, with an average stay of 16.2 hours. Both vessels were
constantly engaged in interstate and foreign commerce during this
period."
[
Footnote 2/4]
Smith v.
Maryland, 18 How. 71, is not to the contrary.
There, a vessel enrolled under the laws of the United States was
allowed to be forfeited by Maryland for dredging for oysters in
violation of Maryland law. But the enrollment of vessels serves
only a limited purpose.
Smith v. Maryland, supra, was
explained in
Stewart Co. v. Rivara, 274 U.
S. 614. The Court said, "The purpose of the enrollment
of vessels is to give to them the privileges of American vessels,
as well as the protection of our flag."
Id. at
274 U. S. 618.
Enrollment, without more, did not give the enrolled vessel a
license to disregard the variety of pilotage, health and other such
local laws which the opinion of the Court in the famous case of
Cooley v. Board of Port
Wardens, 12 How. 299 (written by Mr. Justice Curtis
who also wrote for the Court in
Smith v. Maryland), had
left to the States to be obeyed by all vessels. The local
regulations approved in the
Cooley case never qualified
the license to ply as a vessel, nor penalized its movement on
navigable waters. The federal license in the instant case, however,
specifically describes the only equipment and fuel which these
vessels are allowed to use, and Detroit is permitted to make their
use criminal.