While oil was being unloaded from a ship in a New Jersey port by
an independent contractor engaged by the consignee, one of the
contractor's employees went aboard to repair a pump furnished by
the contractor, and he slipped on spilled oil and fell to his
death. His widow and administratrix brought suit in admiralty
against the ship and its owners to recover damages for his death,
alleging unseaworthiness of the vessel and negligent failure to
provide the decedent with a reasonably safe place to work. The
District Court dismissed the suit, but the Court of Appeals set
aside that judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Held:
1. Since the decedent was not a seaman and his death did not
occur on the high seas, there is no applicable federal statute, and
the right of recovery depended entirely on the New Jersey Wrongful
Death Act, which may be applied by a court of admiralty. Pp.
358 U. S.
590-591.
2. When admiralty adopts a State's right of action for wrongful
death, it must enforce that right as an integrated whole, with
whatever conditions and limitations the creating State has
attached. Pp.
358 U. S.
591-594.
3. The New Jersey Wrongful Death Act embraces a claim for death
negligently caused, and the law imposed on the ship and its owners
a duty to exercise ordinary care to provide the decedent with a
reasonably safe place to carry on his work of repairing the pump.
P.
358 U. S.
594.
4. In the circumstances of this case, this Court will not
disturb the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court of
Appeals, sitting en banc, that a claim for unseaworthiness is
encompassed by the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act as a matter of
state law, notwithstanding the fact that the New Jersey courts have
not passed on the question. Pp.
358 U. S.
595-596.
5. Decedent was within the class protected by the warranty of
seaworthiness as developed by federal maritime law.
Pope &
Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U. S. 406. P.
595, n. 9.
252 F.2d 14, affirmed.
Page 358 U. S. 589
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the evening of December 5, 1952, the motor vessel
Tungus docked at Bayonne, New Jersey, with a cargo of
coconut oil in its deeptanks. El Dorado Oil Works had been engaged
by the consignee to handle the discharge of this cargo, and, for
the next several hours, the work of pumping the oil ashore was
carried on by El Dorado employees, using a pump and hoses furnished
by their employer. Two officers and two crew members of the
Tungus remained aboard, the latter specifically assigned
to assist in the discharge operations. Shortly after midnight, the
pump became defective, resulting in the spillage of a large
quantity of oil over the adjacent deck area. The pump was stopped,
and the oil cleaned from its immediate vicinity. Efforts to restore
the pump to normal operation were unsuccessful, and Carl Skovgaard,
an El Dorado maintenance foreman, was therefore summoned from his
home to assist in the repair work. After arriving on board he
walked through an area from which the oil had not been removed and,
in attempting to step from the hatch beams to the top of the partly
uncovered port deep tank, he slipped and fell to his death in eight
feet of hot coconut oil.
His widow and administratrix, the respondent here, commenced
this suit in admiralty against the ship and its owners to recover
damages for his death, alleging unseaworthiness
Page 358 U. S. 590
of the vessel and a negligent failure to provide the decedent
with a reasonably safe place to work. [
Footnote 1] The District Court dismissed the libel,
holding that a wrongful death action for unseaworthiness would not
lie, and that the petitioners owed no duty of exercising ordinary
care to provide the decedent a safe place to work. 141 F. Supp.
653. The Court of Appeals set aside this decree and remanded the
case for further proceedings, a divided en banc court deciding that
the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act embraces a claim for
unseaworthiness, and also that the District Court had erred with
respect to the scope of the petitioners' duty to exercise
reasonable care for the decedent's safety. 252 F.2d 14. The court
did not decide "what defenses, if any, might be available," leaving
that question for the District Court to determine. Certiorari was
granted primarily to consider the relationship of maritime and
local law in cases of this kind. 357 U.S. 903.
We begin, as did the Court of Appeals, with the established
principle of maritime law that, in the absence of a statute, there
is no action for wrongful death.
The Harrisburg,
119 U. S. 199.
Although Congress has enacted legislation, notably the Jones Act
[
Footnote 2] and the Death on
the High Seas Act, [
Footnote 3]
providing for wrongful death actions in a limited number of
situations, [
Footnote 4] no
federal
Page 358 U. S. 591
statute is applicable to the present case; Skovgaard was not a
seaman, [
Footnote 5] and his
death occurred upon the territorial waters of New Jersey. [
Footnote 6] The respondent's rights in
this suit depended entirely, therefore, upon the New Jersey
wrongful death statute, and the long settled doctrine that,
"where death . . . results from a maritime tort committed on
navigable waters within a State whose statutes give a right of
action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts
will entertain a libel
in personam for the damages
sustained by those to whom such right is given."
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.
S. 233,
257 U. S.
242.
The primary issue in this case, therefore, as the Court of
Appeals unanimously saw it, was whether the New Jersey statute
giving a right of action where death is caused "by a wrongful act,
neglect or default" is broad enough to encompass an action for
death caused by the unseaworthiness of a vessel. [
Footnote 7] It was upon this issue --
construction of the state statute -- that the court divided.
The respondent asks us to uphold the interpretation which the
majority in the Court of Appeals has put upon the New Jersey
statute. Failing that, a much broader alternative argument is
advanced -- that a court in a case
Page 358 U. S. 592
such as this may disregard completely the conditions which the
State has put upon the right it has created, and may apply instead
the full
corpus of the maritime law, free of any
qualifications imposed by the State. If death occurs upon navigable
waters within a State, the argument runs, the law should seize only
upon the blunt fact that there is some kind of state statute
providing some kind of a right of action for death caused by some
kind of tortious conduct. That, it is said, is enough to fill the
"void" in the maritime law, which then becomes applicable in all
its facets, without further inquiry as to what it is that the State
has actually enacted.
This broad argument must be rejected. The decisions of this
Court long ago established that, when admiralty adopts a State's
right of action for wrongful death, it must enforce the right as an
integrated whole, with whatever conditions and limitations the
creating State has attached. That is what was decided in
The
Harrisburg, where the Court's language was unmistakable:
". . . [I]f the admiralty adopts the statute as a rule of right
to be administered within its own jurisdiction, it must take the
right subject to the limitations which have been made a part of its
existence. . . . The liability and the remedy are created by the
same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to
be treated as limitations of the right."
119 U. S. 119 U.S.
199, at
119 U. S. 214.
That is the doctrine which has been reiterated by the Court through
the years. [
Footnote 8]
See
The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398;
La
Bourgogne,
Page 358 U. S. 593
210 U. S. 95;
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.
S. 233;
Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.
S. 648;
cf. Just v. Chambers, 312 U.
S. 383.
"[A]dmiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights rooted in
state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the
substantive law of the State."
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.
S. 239,
317 U. S. 245.
The policy expressed by a State Legislature in enacting a wrongful
death statute is not merely that death shall give rise to a right
of recovery, nor even that tortious conduct resulting in death
shall be actionable, but that damages shall be recoverable when
conduct of a particular kind results in death. It is incumbent upon
a court enforcing that policy to enforce it all; it may not pick or
choose.
It is manifest, moreover, that acceptance of the respondent's
argument would defeat the intent of Congress to preserve state
sovereignty over deaths caused by maritime torts within the State's
territorial waters. The legislative history of the Death on the
High Seas Act discloses a clear congressional purpose to leave
"unimpaired the rights under State statutes as to deaths on waters
within the territorial jurisdiction of the States." S.Rep. No. 216,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3; H.R.Rep. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3.
The record of the debate in the House of Representatives preceding
passage of the bill reflects deep concern that the power of the
States to create actions for wrongful death in no way be affected
by enactment of the federal law. 59 Cong.Rec. 4482-4486.
Page 358 U. S. 594
There is no merit to the contention that application of state
law to determine rights arising from death in state territorial
waters is destructive of the uniformity of federal maritime law.
Even
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, which fathered the
"uniformity" concept, recognized that uniformity is not offended by
"the right given to recover in death cases."
244 U. S. 244 U.S.
205, at
244 U. S. 216.
It would be an anomaly to hold that a State may create a right of
action for death, but that it may not determine the circumstances
under which that right exists. The power of a State to create such
a right includes, of necessity, the power to determine when
recovery shall be permitted and when it shall not.
Cf.
Caldarola v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155.
We hold, therefore, that the Court of Appeals was correct in
viewing the basic question before it as one of interpretation of
the law of New Jersey. It is within that frame of reference that we
consider the issues presented.
The negligence claim needs little discussion. Obviously, the New
Jersey wrongful death statute embraces a claim for death
negligently caused. The majority in the Court of Appeals pointed
out that the officers and crew of the
Tungus remained in
over-all control of the vessel, and that they were well aware of
the existence of the oil spill and of the danger created by it for
approximately an hour before Skovgaard arrived on board. Upon these
facts, it was concluded that the law imposed upon the petitioners a
duty of exercising ordinary care to provide Skovgaard with a
reasonably safe place to carry on his work of repairing the pump.
In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in
Broecker v. Armstrong Cork
Co., 128 N.J.L. 3, 24 A.2d 194. We find no reason to question
the disposition of this branch of the case.
Page 358 U. S. 595
As to the other issues, a majority of the Court of Appeals
concluded that a claim for unseaworthiness is encompassed by the
New Jersey Wrongful Death Act as a matter of state law. [
Footnote 9] The three dissenting
members of the court reached the opposite conclusion. Apparently
because the trial court had made no finding as to the decedent's
contributory negligence or assumption of risk, the Court of Appeals
refrained from deciding what effect state law would give to such
findings, leaving that question to be decided if it arose on
retrial.
In a case such as this, it is incumbent upon the admiralty to
enforce the New Jersey statute just "as it would one originating in
any foreign jurisdiction."
Levinson v. Deupree,
345 U. S. 648,
345 U. S. 652.
Yet the fact is that the New Jersey courts have simply not spoken
upon the question of whether, in a case such as this, maritime law
or common law is applicable under the State's Wrongful Death Act.
In sum, there is no way of knowing whether New Jersey would impose
uniform legal standards throughout its jurisdiction, or would apply
in this case rules different from those that would govern if,
instead of meeting his death aboard the
Tungus, Skovgaard
had been killed on the adjacent dock. An effort to resolve that
question here, no less than the effort of the Court of Appeals,
could be nothing but a prediction, a prediction that might tomorrow
be proved wrong by the courts of New Jersey, which alone have power
to render an authoritative interpretation.
Page 358 U. S. 596
In view of these considerations, it might plausibly be argued
that the judgment should be vacated, and the case remanded to the
District Court to be held until the parties can secure from the
courts of New Jersey a decision upon the controlling and seriously
doubtful question of state law. Under traditional principles of
equitable abstention, this Court has often followed such a course
for the limited and obviously wise purpose of avoiding unnecessary
resolution of constitutional issues.
Railroad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496;
Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.
S. 168;
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 323 U. S. 101;
American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.
S. 582;
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States,
352 U. S. 220.
Cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.
S. 478.
Before deciding to dispose of a case like the present one in
that way, however, important and competing jurisdictional
considerations would have to be thoroughly evaluated.
See
Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472,
337 U. S.
486-489;
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.
S. 228. This case has not presented the occasion for
full exploration of these jurisdictional questions. [
Footnote 10] The Court of Appeals, en banc,
has given careful consideration to the meaning of the state
statute. We cannot say that its conclusion is clearly wrong.
Therefore, despite the inherent uncertainties involved, we will not
disturb that court's interpretation of the New Jersey law. Such a
course is consistent with the practice that has been followed in
the past.
Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.
S. 701,
335 U. S.
707-708;
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co., 337 U. S. 530,
337 U. S. 534;
General Box Co. v. United States, 351 U.
S. 159,
351 U. S.
165.
Affirmed.
Page 358 U. S. 597
[
Footnote 1]
The libel also asserted a claim, presumably under the New Jersey
survival statute, N.J.Stat.Ann. 2A:15-3, for damages sustained by
the decedent prior to his death. This claim has been abandoned.
[
Footnote 2]
41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688.
[
Footnote 3]
41 Stat. 537
et seq., 46 U.S.C. § 761
et
seq.
[
Footnote 4]
See also the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1424
et seq., 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq. In the present case, the record shows that the
respondent was awarded compensation under the New Jersey
compensation act upon a finding that her decedent's death occurred
in the "twilight zone."
See Davis v. Department of Labor,
317 U. S. 249.
[
Footnote 5]
The Jones Act applies "in case of the death of any seaman. . .
."
[
Footnote 6]
The Death on the High Seas Act creates a right of action only
for a "wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State. . . ." 46
U.S.C. § 761.
[
Footnote 7]
The relevant text of the New Jersey statute is as follows:
"When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default, such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the person injured to maintain an action for damages resulting from
the injury, the person who would have been liable in damages for
the injury if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured and
although the death was caused under circumstances amounting in law
to a crime."
N.J.Stat.Ann. 2A:31-1.
[
Footnote 8]
That this is the law has been generally understood by the other
federal courts.
Halecki v. United New York and New Jersey Sandy
Hook Pilots Ass'n, 251 F.2d 708 (C.A. 2d Cir.),
judgment
vacated and cause remanded, post, p.
358 U. S. 613;
Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246
(C.A. 4th Cir.);
Graham v. A. Lusi, Ltd., 206 F.2d 223
(C.A. 5th Cir.);
Lee v. Pure Oil Co., 218 F.2d 711 (C.A.
6th Cir.);
Klingseisen v. Costanzo Transp. Co., 101 F.2d
902 (C.A. 3d Cir.);
The H.S., Inc., No. 72, 130 F.2d 341
(C.A. 3d Cir.);
Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (C.A. 6th
Cir.);
Curtis v. A. Garcia y Cia., 241 F.2d 30 (C.A. 3d
Cir.);
O'Brien v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 293 F. 170 (C.A. 2d
Cir.);
Quinette v. Bisso, 136 F. 825 (C.A. 5th Cir.);
The A. W. Thompson, 39 F. 115 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.);
but cf.
Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296 N.Y. 402, 73 N.E.2d 718;
Kuhn v. City of New York, 274 N.Y. 118, 8 N.E.2d 300;
O'Leary v. United States Line Co., 215 F.2d 708 (C.A. 1st
Cir.).
[
Footnote 9]
The Court of Appeals also determined that the decedent was
within the class protected by the warranty of seaworthiness as
developed by federal maritime law, which it found the New Jersey
statute had incorporated. This subsidiary determination is clearly
correct. The decedent's status is practically indistinguishable
from that of the plaintiff in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U. S. 406, the
only difference being that the cargo here was oil instead of grain,
and was being unloaded instead of loaded.
[
Footnote 10]
Indeed, such a disposition has not even been suggested by
counsel.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, concurring in the opinion of the Court.
*
Deeming the proper determination of the substantive issues of
admiralty law of such controlling importance, I abstain from
stating my strong conviction, heretofore expressed, that, in
situations like the present, the construction of state law should
not, as a matter of the wise administration of law, be made
independently by the lower federal courts, but its authoritative
construction should be sought, under readily available state
procedure, from the state court while the case is held in the
federal court.
See my opinions in
Sutton v. Leib,
342 U. S. 402,
342 U. S.
412-414 (concurring opinion), and
Propper v.
Clark, 337 U. S. 472,
337 U. S.
493-497 (dissenting opinion), in connection with
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.
S. 496,
312 U. S. 500;
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.
S. 478,
309 U. S.
484.
Where an issue is solely concerned with diversity jurisdiction,
as was the situation in
Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U. S. 228, a
different consideration may become relevant. "For purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, a federal court is,
in effect, only
another court of the State.'" Angel v. Bullington,
330 U. S. 183,
330 U. S.
187.
[NOTE: This opinion applies also to No. 56,
United New York
and New Jersey Sandy Hook Pilots Assn. v. Halecki, post, p.
358 U. S.
613.]
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE
BLACK, and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
It should be clear from the Court's statement of facts that the
respondent's decedent Skovgaard, was at the time of the accident
aboard the
Tungus in order to assist in repairing the pump
used in discharging its cargo of oil -- in unloading the vessel.
While he was not a member of the crew, but rather an employee of an
independent
Page 358 U. S. 598
contractor, he was unquestionably one to whom the vessel owed
the duty of seaworthiness.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U. S. 406,
346 U. S.
412-413. This means that there was, as it is often put,
a "warranty," or more precisely stated, an obligation, a duty owed
to certain persons, that the vessel and its equipment,
appurtenances and crew met a certain standard. For any breach of
that duty, any failure to meet that standard, on the part of the
vessel, which gave rise to injury to a person to whom that duty was
owed, the vessel and its owner were bound to respond in damages. If
that duty was in breach here, and Skovgaard's fall, occasioned
thereby, had injured him short of death, there would be no doubt
that federal law would afford him a remedy for the injury, and that
free of any defense imposed by the law of the State in whose
territorial waters the accident took place. [
Footnote 2/1]
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
supra, at
346 U. S.
409-410. But Skovgaard's injuries were almost
immediately fatal, and, as is evident from the record, the
principal, if not the sole, claim for damages arising out of the
alleged breach of the duty of seaworthiness must be for the damages
caused by his death. It was decided in
The Harrisburg,
119 U. S. 199,
that the federal maritime law did not afford a remedy for the death
of a human being even where the death arose out of a tortious
breach of maritime duty.
In the light of this holding, the Court addresses itself to the
problem whether the New Jersey Wrongful Death Act can be utilized
to furnish a remedy for the breach of the federally defined duty
owed to Skovgaard. In reaching its solution of this problem, I fear
that it has posed the wrong question. The Court takes the view that
it is
Page 358 U. S. 599
a question of state law whether the respondent can utilize the
New Jersey Act to supply a remedy for the breach of the duty of
seaworthiness charged here. It accepts the answer of the Court of
Appeals to this question. The problem to the Court is one of
construction of the State Act to determine whether it
"incorporates" the maritime standard. This is also the view taken
by the lower courts of what the basic question in this case is. I
think it is wrong, and I shall state my reasons why.
I
First. I have developed that Skovgaard was entitled to
the duty of seaworthiness at the time of the accident, and that
there would be no concern at all with state law in this regard if
he had been injured short of death. But the holding of
The
Harrisburg, supra, denies the existence of a federally created
remedy for wrongful death arising out of maritime torts. Though
this holding was far from being at one with the results that had
been reached in the lower admiralty courts prior to it, and was
based largely on an application of the harsh common law principle,
then rather lately evolved, [
Footnote
2/2] that, in the absence of an appropriate statute, there was
no civil remedy for wrongful death, the holding has become part and
parcel of our maritime jurisprudence. But its harshness was averted
by the practice in admiralty of drawing on the state wrongful death
statutes to furnish remedies for fatal maritime torts. To an
extent, this practice antedated
The Harrisburg, as the
cases cited in that opinion illustrate.
See, e.g., The
Garland, 5 F. 924. It was continued thereafter, and even
extended to torts committed on the high seas, beyond the
territorial waters of any State.
The
Page 358 U. S. 600
Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398. And
after the passage by the Congress of the Death on the High Seas Act
in 1920, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. § 761
et seq., which
established a federal remedy for cases of wrongful death occurring
more than a marine league from shore, state acts continued to be
used by the admiralty, pursuant to the terms of the Act, in the
case of wrongs occurring in territorial waters.
Though the individual statutes vary in terminology and, to an
extent, in concept, all the States have wrongful death acts -- acts
which provide remedies to a decedent's estate, or to certain
specified beneficiaries, for the harm done on account of the
tortious killing of the decedent. While the course of development
of the common law has brought it about that this remedy has always
been embodied in a statutory enactment, the existence of such a
remedy is now a basic premise of the law of torts administered
throughout the country. And, with the Death on the High Seas Act
and the state statutes, the federal admiralty law has available a
remedy to fashion for the fatal breach of a maritime duty anywhere
within its jurisdiction.
Second. Can such a remedy, based on a state statute, be
afforded for breach of the duty, imposed by federal law, to
maintain a vessel in seaworthy condition? I think it can. The
question is viewed by the Court today and by the courts below as
one of interpretation of the statute of a particular State; the
Court of Appeals divided over what intent should be ascribed to the
New Jersey Legislature in enacting that State's Wrongful Death Act.
The process of divining the "intent" of the various state
legislatures in such circumstances is not a completely fruitful
one, as the Court's opinion makes abundantly clear, and, as I have
intimated, I do not believe it is part of the real question the
Court should be asking here. The Court has simply failed to grasp
the important distinction
Page 358 U. S. 601
here between duties and remedies; between the law governing the
details of human behavior and the law governing the specific
application of judicial sanctions for breach of duty. It is vital
to an understanding of this case to recall that the duty claimed to
have been broken here was one grounded in federal law. It would be
a strained statement of the effect of
The Harrisburg to
say that there was no duty imposed by the maritime law not to kill
persons through breach of the duty of seaworthiness. The libel
alleged a condition constituting a breach of a federally defined
duty, and set forth a cause of action under federal law, and this
nonetheless because the breach of the federal duty had resulted in
death, rather than in nonfatal injury. It is the federal maritime
law that looks to the state law of remedies here, not the state law
that incorporates a federal standard of care. This Court plainly
declared in
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, at
346 U. S. 409,
that, even when the injured party seeks to enforce "a state-created
remedy" for the breach of the federally defined duty owing to him,
"federal maritime law would be controlling." The Court today does
not refer to this recent expression, clearly of the greatest
relevance here. Given a federal legal system where the remedy for
wrongful death is as universal as in ours, I think it unwarrantedly
destructive of the uniformity of the federal maritime law,
cf.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205, [
Footnote 2/3]
to make the applicability of a remedy for the breach
Page 358 U. S. 602
of a federally defined duty resulting in death dependent on a
frankly suppositious determination of the intent of the various
state legislatures, generally acting at a time long before a clear
concept of the scope of the federal duty had emerged. And, of
course, this determination will almost invariably be made by the
federal courts.
The Court's solution not only creates potential differences in
the availability of a remedy for breach of the federally created
duty where the victim dies, as opposed to cases where he is injured
short of death; those differences may exist in varying degrees as
to maritime torts occurring in the territorial waters of various
States. I cannot think that any such variation is appropriate or
necessary in the enforcement of the cause of action for
unseaworthiness. The federal duty need not be subject to this
potential diversity of remedies.
Cf. Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255;
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.
S. 239. [
Footnote 2/4]
The existence of a remedy for wrongful death has become almost a
postulate of our legal system, though the remedy was generally
provided by legislation, rather than by the decisional law. It
Page 358 U. S. 603
is against this background that the federal law must look for an
appropriate remedy to enforce its duties in a complete and rational
way.
Cf. Cox v. Roth, 348 U. S. 207,
348 U. S. 210.
Any state statute which generally provides remedies for tortious
death can and should be drawn upon by the maritime law in enforcing
the federal cause of action.
Cf. Just v. Chambers,
312 U. S. 383,
312 U. S.
389.
It is true that, for state-law purposes, these statutes are
frequently spoken of as creating a "new cause of action."
See
Turon v. J. & L. Construction Co., 8 N.J. 543, 556,
86 A.2d
192, 198;
Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 751, 25 So.
2d 213, 215, 216; [
Footnote 2/5]
cf. Seward v. The Vera Cruz, 10 A.C. 59, 67. And so they
do, in the sense that they give remedies where frequently none
existed before, in favor of classes of persons potentially
different from the distributees of a decedent's estate, and in the
large to an extent designed to furnish redress for the death. And
it is further true that not every tort duty imposed by a particular
State's law may be afforded a remedy by them. But, insofar as these
acts have as their purpose the effecting of a general and rough
equivalency between the duties for breach of which a remedy lies in
the case of injuries causing death and those short of it, they can
be proper subjects for the flexibility of the federal maritime law
in fashioning a remedy for breach of the duty of seaworthiness. The
content of the concept of
Page 358 U. S. 604
"cause of action" is a variable and uncertain one, and there is
little point in analyzing the various senses in which it has been
used in connection with the state statutes. In a real sense, the
state acts are remedial, and, as such, they can be used by the
admiralty. Used in this way, for remedial purposes, they would not
interfere with the uniform character of the general maritime law,
cf. Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.
S. 372,
247 U. S. 384,
but, rather, would be an effective method of promoting it.
Of course, there is no objection to using state remedial
incidents to supplement and enforce duties arising under federal
law. The federal courts, of their own initiative, have used state
statutes for remedial purposes when federal duties were concerned.
State statutes of limitation applicable to analogous types of
claims have been utilized to define the limitations of federal
rights of action for which no federal statute of limitations has
been provided.
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.
S. 610;
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.
S. 461;
cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392,
327 U. S. 395;
Hamilton Foundry & Machine Co. v. International Molders
& Foundry Workers Union, 193 F.2d 209, 215. This remedial
incident, tied up with the felt necessity of having some statutory
definition, is drawn upon not because of any intent of the state
legislatures to make their statute applicable to federal claims,
but because it could be rationally utilized through analogy by
courts charged with the enforcement of federal rights and duties
and the construction of a proper pattern of remedies to that end.
It is on such a basis that the federal maritime law here, in my
view, can make use of the New Jersey statute to enforce those
duties that are grounded in federal law.
I am supported in this conclusion by two carefully reasoned
opinions of the New York Court of Appeals.
Kuhn v. City of New
York, 274 N.Y. 118, 8 N.E.2d 300;
Riley v. Agwilines,
Inc., 296 N.Y. 402, 73 N.E.2d 718. Both
Page 358 U. S. 605
cases considered actions brought in the state courts under the
Saving Clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), to redress maritime torts which
resulted in death. The actions were based upon the maritime
theories of negligence and unseaworthiness. The New York Court of
Appeals held that the State's Wrongful Death Statute, Decedent
Estate Law, § 130, afforded only an appropriate remedy for breaches
of duties which were to be recognized as essentially federal in
their source and uniform in their application:
"[W]e must look to the decisions of the Federal courts to define
the liabilities of shipowners for maritime torts, leaving out of
consideration decisions of our own courts or statutes of the State
which conflict with the rules of liability established in the
Federal courts."
Riley v. Agwilines, Inc., 296 N.Y. 402, 405-406, 73
N.E.2d 718, 719. The court clearly viewed the issue of the duties
alleged to have been in breach to be not a matter of interpretation
of the New York Wrongful Death Statute, but to be a question upon
which the federal maritime law was compelling. [
Footnote 2/6]
Cf. O'Leary v. United States
Lines Co., 215 F.2d 708, 711.
Third. I find no reason to reach a contrary result in
the authorities relied upon by the Court, or urged by the
petitioner. It is true that there is language in
The
Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199,
119 U. S. 214,
describing the state Wrongful Death Act enforced by the admiralty
as creating both a liability and a remedy. But the legal source of
the duty sought to be enforced there was not claimed or recognized
to be rooted in federal law. The case was decided long before the
cause of action for unseaworthiness reached its present mature
state, recognized as being federal in its origin and incidents.
Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328
Page 358 U. S. 606
U.S. 85;
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra; Alaska S.S.
Co. v. Petterson, 347 U. S. 396. And
The Harrisburg, on this point, together with
Western
Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, on
which there is also reliance, actually held that, in an admiralty
action using the state Wrongful Death Act, the state statute of
limitations applicable to actions under the state law using the
state act would be utilized. This was a solution to one aspect of
the limitations problem in maritime personal tort actions,
see
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.
S. 221,
357 U. S. 224,
357 U. S.
228-229. The most readily available limitations period
for an action making use of a state Wrongful Death Act was the
period stated therein, and the Court relied on it, rather than the
admiralty rule of laches. In
Levinson v. Deupree,
345 U. S. 648, the
Court was not concerned with a situation in which the duty alleged
to have been broken was as clearly federal as is that in the
instant case, and it was apparently assumed that the right to be
enforced was grounded in state law. The action was not a seaman's
or harbor worker's action at all, but, rather, arose out of a
collision between two motorboats on the Ohio River, fatal to a girl
riding in one of them. And, of course, the holding of the Court
there is of no assistance to the majority, since a state law
procedural incident, alleged to be binding since the admiralty was
making use of the state act, was in fact rejected.
Lindgren v.
United States, 281 U. S. 38, which
held that a seaman's representative could not sue for
unseaworthiness under a state Wrongful Death Act, does not govern
this point at all. The opinion dealt primarily with the effect of
the Jones Act's wrongful death provision in removing the seaman's
right to invoke the remedies of State Death Acts for the identical
gravamen of negligence. And, although the libel did not allege
unseaworthiness, the Court briefly observed that the Jones Act's
death provision would be construed
Page 358 U. S. 607
equally as foreclosing a state statute's use on that count. The
case provides no rule here, since its holding was premised on the
Jones Act, and, to Skovgaard's injury and death, the Jones Act is
not applicable. [
Footnote 2/7]
Finally, there is not presented here any question of the extent to
which a State is required to supply a forum for the enforcement of
the duties here involved.
Cf. Caldarola v. Eckert,
332 U. S. 155,
332 U. S. 158;
[
Footnote 2/8]
but cf. Testa v.
Katt, 330 U. S. 386.
The Court's reasoning that the Death on the High Seas Act is
somehow dispositive of the question presented today appears to me
to continue its confusion between the rights and duties of the
parties and the remedial pattern to be followed in enforcing them.
No one is contending that the state statutes are to be given no
operation in this area; they are an important remedial incident of
the right that respondent seeks to assert here. Of course,
Congress, in the Death on the High Seas Act, was interested in
preserving their availability. There is, however, no suggestion in
the Act or its legislative history that
Page 358 U. S. 608
Congress intended that the substantive law of the States be the
only law applicable in death cases in territorial waters, or that,
in fact, it be applicable at all in particular proceedings. The
effect of Congress' action was to leave the state statutes
available as remedial measures in territorial water death cases. It
offers no guide for any conclusion as to what substantive law is to
apply under the state acts in situations where federally created
rights and duties would have prevailed had the injury not been
fatal. The only concrete examples of what the Congress was
interested in saving to the States given on the floor of the House
were the jurisdiction of the state courts, which was dwelt on at
length, 59 Cong.Rec. 4484-4485, and the maintenance of the state
scheme of beneficiaries,
ibid., which is not challenged
here. It is odd to draw restrictive inferences from a statute whose
purpose was to extend recovery for wrongful death. The legislative
history does not reveal the utmost precision in thought regarding
the role of state law here, but certainly there is no clear basis
in it from which to infer that the Court's anomalous result is a
necessary one.
Clearly, then, neither the decided cases nor legislative
materials foreclose the question of the approach to state Wrongful
Death Acts that should be taken by the federal admiralty law in
fashioning remedies for breach of the federally defined duty with
which we are here concerned. And, as I have indicated, the vital
principles of the admiralty law, as defined by this Court in the
past, point to the result I have indicated. A proper uniformity on
essential matters of maritime cognizance,
see Just v.
Chambers, 312 U. S. 383,
312 U. S. 389,
cannot be reached by making the availability of this remedy
dependent upon exegesis of the statute of each State. It is enough
for me that the State provide such a remedy in a general way; the
remedy is now a universal feature of the common law system in
this
Page 358 U. S. 609
country, and, in its essential features, offers a sufficient
basis for the operation of the general maritime law. While there is
ground for local variation on nonessential matters, on the
essentials, the admiralty may look to uniform features in these
statutes, rather than to the diverse. The Court's anomalous result
that different systems of law govern in determining the tortious
character of conduct, depending on whether it kills or merely
injures its victim, is a conscious choice of a nonuniform solution
on an essential matter, and, as such, contrary to one of the basic
principles of admiralty law.
It might be contended that the contours of the various state
remedies are so diverse in the varying lists of statutory
beneficiaries they provide that the area becomes one in which
uniformity cannot, in any event, be attained, and accordingly it
could be said to be inappropriate to seek uniformity even in the
content of the duty to be enforced. I cannot find such a contention
persuasive. The distribution of funds accruing to a decedent's
representatives by reason of his death is a matter, in our federal
system, peculiarly within the competence of the States. Certainly
it is not a matter more destructive of the uniform character of the
maritime law than were the state statutes of limitations enforced
in
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, supra. And it is no more
disturbing to the maritime law whether the state distributional
scheme is one provided generally by its law or one peculiar to its
Wrongful Death statute. [
Footnote
2/9]
Page 358 U. S. 610
II
Petitioner contends that, on the respondent's negligence claim,
the Court of Appeals improperly applied federal law to the
determination of the question whether a duty to furnish a
reasonably safe place to work was owed the decedent by the
respondent vessel and its owner. On this aspect of the case, the
Court of Appeals, citing both New Jersey and federal cases,
indicated that such a duty existed, and that it would have been
tortious for the respondent negligently to have failed to provide a
safe place. It remanded the case to the District Court for findings
on the issue of negligence and on any defenses on that issue that
might be available to the petitioner. Petitioner contends here that
New Jersey law applies to the question whether such a duty was
owed, alleging that the New Jersey precedents are contrary to the
result reached by the court below. Although it believes that the
Court of Appeals properly applied New Jersey law, the Court accepts
the contention that state law applies here. In view of what I have
said above, I cannot agree. In
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn,
supra, at
346 U. S. 409,
it was made clear that the duty imposed by the theory of negligence
to act in accordance with a standard of reasonable care, when
coupled with the duty to maintain a seaworthy ship, owed to a
person in Skovgaard's status, was a federally created duty.
Cf.
The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1,
137 U. S. 14-15.
The factual circumstances involving proof of negligence and of
unseaworthiness, where both are claimed, are generally intertwined.
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, supra, at
346 U. S.
416
Page 358 U. S. 611
(concurring opinion);
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 357 U. S. 221,
357 U. S.
224-225.
Cf. Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Philips,
274 U. S. 316. My
view is that it is plain that, in enforcing the related duty
imposed by the obligation not negligently to inflict harm, the
federal courts must look to state Wrongful Death Acts in the same
light as I have indicated it is appropriate to look at them in
enforcing the duty to maintain a seaworthy vessel. The basis for
the holding that New Jersey law applies is the Court's acceptance
of a distinction in primary legal duties in respect to maritime
accidents causing fatal as opposed to nonfatal injuries. As I have
developed above, I cannot view any such distinction as tenable.
Since the Court of Appeals' holding on the negligence issue was
correct as a matter of federal law, its judgment should be affirmed
on this point, except to the extent that it directed the District
Court to determine what defenses were available as a matter of New
Jersey law.
III
Admiralty law is primarily judge-made law. The federal courts
have a most extensive responsibility of fashioning rules of
substantive law in maritime cases.
See Wilburn Boat Co. v.
Fireman's Fund Inc. Co., 348 U. S. 310,
348 U. S. 314;
cf. The John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113,
170 U. S.
126-127. This responsibility places on this Court the
duty of assuring that the product of the effort be coherent and
rational. Admiralty law is an area where flexibility and creativity
have been demonstrated in accomplishing this. Today, the Court
announces the strange principle that the substantive rules of law
governing human conduct in regard to maritime torts vary in their
origin depending on whether the conduct gives rise to a fatal or a
nonfatal injury. I have demonstrated that it does so under no
compulsion of binding precedent here, or of
Page 358 U. S. 612
Act of Congress. Its anomalous result is purely of its own
making. Certainly the responsibility incumbent upon this Court in
this area demands more by way of fulfillment than the Court has
furnished today. [
Footnote
2/10]
For the reasons I have stated, I concur in the judgment
affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, except to the
extent I have just indicated.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Clearly so where the action was pursued in admiralty. In other
forums, and in some circumstances, there might arguably be some
room for the application of such defensive features of state
remedial law as statutes of limitations.
See McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221,
357 U. S. 224,
note 5.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The principle was finally settled for the federal courts sitting
at law, under the regime of
Swift v. Tyson,
16 Pet. 1, by
Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U. S.
754.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The Court's citation of
Jensen as lending some support
to its position is not well taken. The language quoted, 244 U.S. at
244 U. S. 216,
says no more than that the state statutes are allowed to perform a
function in this area, which everyone concedes is correct. I fear,
too, that, in its somewhat deprecatory reference to the
Jensen case, the Court may be ignoring the basically sound
and enduring principle of that decision, the necessity that the
federal maritime law exhibit independence of the varying rules of
state law. Of course, there is more warranted criticism of
Jensen for the unfortunate practical results it created in
its own specific area of application.
Cf. Gilmore and
Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 1-17.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Court's quotation from
Garrett,
"[A]dmiralty courts, when invoked to protect rights rooted in
state law, endeavor to determine the issues in accordance with the
substantive law of the State,"
made in support of its conclusion, is a patent begging of the
question at issue here. The issue is what system of law gives rise
to the rights and duties here involved. No one would doubt that the
federal law gives rise to the substantive standards by which the
conduct of the parties here involved would have been judged if
Skovgaard's injuries had not been fatal. The question is whether
his rights, and those of his representatives in respect to the
conduct that injured and killed him, remain rooted in federal law
here, where the suit is for damages for his death. The Court's
confusion of rights and duties with remedies is apparent again
here.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The
Ake case, like others, suggests that there may
possibly be two "rights" infringed by a tort causing death -- one
of the injured party and the other of his beneficiaries. But this
is not an analytically helpful way of viewing the situation. The
measure of the duty of conduct owed the injured party is typically
the limit of the substantive liability of tortfeasor and of the
"right" enjoyed by the beneficiaries. It is clear that what is
meant by the "right" of the beneficiaries is a special and distinct
remedial incident attributable to a single breach of duty.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in
Guerrini v. United
States, 167 F.2d 352, 354, took the view that the New York
cases were decided as compelled by the federal law, as is amply
evident from the opinions themselves.
[
Footnote 2/7]
The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398,
cited by the Court, only holds that a state-created death remedy
could be applied to a collision on the high seas. It appears from
the opinion that Mr. Justice Holmes considered the general federal
maritime law relevant to a determination of liability under it.
Id. at
207 U. S.
406-407. And, in
La Bourgogne, 210 U. S.
95, where recovery made use of the French death remedy,
liability was found as a matter of substantive law where France
would not have found it. Finally,
The Corsair,
145 U. S. 335,
held that the Louisiana Death Act, LSA-C.C. art. 2315, did not
create a maritime lien. It was not there considered whether the
breach of a federally defined duty could have created such a lien,
even though the breach resulted in death and, in fact, the source
of the duty being enforced through the Louisiana Act was not
discussed.
[
Footnote 2/8]
The New York Court of Appeals did not consider its own decision
in
Caldarola v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 295 N.Y. 463, 68
N.E.2d 444,
aff'd, 332 U. S. 155, as
preclusive of its decision less than a year later in
Riley v.
Agwilines, Inc., 296 N.Y. 402, 73 N.E.2d 718.
See pp.
358 U. S.
604-605, supra.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Despite Judge Learned Hand's initial suggestion in
Puleo v.
H. E. Moss & Co., 159 F.2d 842, 845, quickly retracted in
Guerrini v. United States, 167 F.2d 352, 355, the
Conservation Act, 45 Stat. 54, 16 U.S.C. § 457, is not relevant to
the problem here. That Act makes applicable state death acts (as
well as state personal injury law generally), to torts "within a
national park or other place subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States." The state territorial waters, while within
the cognizance of the federal maritime law, are also subject to the
jurisdiction of the States,
Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U. S. 385,
334 U. S. 393,
and hence one need go no further than its terms to find the Act
inapposite.
[
Footnote 2/10]
I might likewise say that, even if the source of substantive law
here be considered as state law, it hardly would comport with the
responsibility of the federal courts for them to sent the parties
to an admiralty action before them to the state courts to obtain an
adjudication of the legal issues involved. Though the Court does
not make such a disposition here, certain inclinations in this
direction are discernible in its opinion. The words of Chief
Justice Stone in
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.
S. 228, might furnish the lesson here; we must recollect
that jurisdiction creates the duty of decision, and that, like the
diversity, the admiralty jurisdiction "was not conferred for the
benefit of the federal courts or to serve their convenience."
Id. at
320 U. S.
234.