Toomer v. Witsell
Annotate this Case
334 U.S. 385 (1948)
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U.S. Supreme Court
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948)
Toomer v. Witsell
Argued January 13-14, 1948
Decided June 7, 1948
334 U.S. 385
Fishermen who were citizens and residents of Georgia, and an incorporated fish dealers' association, sued in a federal court in South Carolina to enjoin state officials from enforcing statutes of that State regulating commercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off the coast, challenging the statutes as violative of the Federal Constitution.
1. Since the record does not show that enforcement of the statutes would irreparably injure the association of fish dealers, the association has no standing to ask a federal court to enjoin their enforcement. P. 334 U. S. 391.
2. Since the state law permits any taxpayer who believes a tax illegal to pay it under protest and sue in a state court to recover the amount so paid, and since the individual plaintiffs made no showing that they could not utilize that procedure to raise their constitutional objections to a statute imposing upon nonresidents an income tax on profits from operations in the state, it cannot be said that they are without an adequate remedy at law; and equitable relief was properly denied as to that statute. Pp. 334 U. S. 391-392.
3. Since defiance of other statutes defendants were attempting to enforce would involve risks of heavy fines and long imprisonment, and since compliance with them or withdrawal from further fishing until a test case could be litigated to a final conclusion would result in substantial financial losses for which no compensation could be obtained under the laws of the state, the individual plaintiffs sufficiently showed the imminence of irreparable injury for which there was no plain, adequate and complete remedy at law; and, if those statutes were unconstitutional, equitable relief against their enforcement was appropriate. Pp. 334 U. S. 391-392.
4. Since the fact that some of the individual plaintiffs had previously been convicted of shrimping out of season and in inland waters had no relation to the constitutionality of the challenged statutes, this misconduct did not call for application of the clean hands maxim. P. 334 U. S. 393.
5. Since the present case evinces no conflict between South Carolina's regulatory scheme and any assertion of federal power, the State has sufficient interests in the shrimp fishery within three miles of its coast so that it may exercise its police power to protect and regulate that fishery -- within the confines of generally applicable constitutional limitations. Pp. 334 U. S. 393-394.
6. Section 3374, S.C.Code, which imposes a tax of 1/8 a pound on green shrimp taken in the maritime belt, does not tax imports or unduly burden interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, §§ 8 and 10, of the Constitution. Pp. 334 U. S. 394-395.
7. Section 3379, S.C.Code, requiring nonresidents of South Carolina to pay a license fee of $2,500 for each shrimp boat and residents to pay a fee of only $25, violates the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitution. Pp. 334 U. S. 395-403.
(a) The privileges and immunities clause was intended to outlaw classifications based on the fact of noncitizenship unless there is something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed, and, in this case, there is no convincing showing of a reasonable relationship between the alleged danger to the shrimp supply represented by noncitizens, as a class, and the severe discrimination practiced upon them. Pp. 334 U. S. 396-399.
(b) Commercial shrimping in the marginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the privileges and immunities clause. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, distinguished. Pp. 334 U. S. 399-403.
8. Section 3414, S.C.Code, which requires that owners of shrimp boats fishing in the maritime belt off South Carolina dock at a South Carolina port and unload, pack, and stamp their catch (with a tax stamp) before "shipping or transporting it to another state," burdens interstate commerce in shrimp in violation of the commerce clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519, distinguished. Pp. 334 U. S. 403-407.
73 F.Supp. 371, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
A federal district court denied an injunction against the enforcement of certain allegedly unconstitutional South Carolina statutes governing commercial shrimp fishing in the three-mile maritime belt off the coast of that State. 73 F.Supp. 371. On direct appeal to this Court, affirmed in part and reversed in part, p. 334 U. S. 407.