After the railroads operating in and out of Chicago had for many
years utilized an old motor carrier to transfer interstate
passengers and their baggage between different railroad terminals
in the City, the railroads terminated that arrangement and engaged
a newly organized motor carrier to provide the same service. The
City then amended its municipal code so as to require, in effect,
that the operator of any new transfer service must obtain a
certificate of convenience and necessity from the Commissioner of
Licenses and the approval of the City Council before it could
lawfully transfer any passengers for the railroads. The new motor
carrier refused to apply for a certificate of convenience and
necessity, and the City threatened to arrest and fine its drivers
if they operated unlicensed vehicles. The new motor carrier and the
railroads then sued in a Federal District Court for a judgment
declaring the city ordinance either inapplicable or invalid. The
old motor carrier intervened as a defendant. The District Court
dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
that the city ordinance, as applied, was repugnant on its face to
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Held: the judgment is affirmed. Pp.
357 U. S.
78-79.
1. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was a proper subject of
an appeal to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), since it held a
state statute invalid as repugnant to the Constitution and laws of
the United States, and it was a "final" judgment within the meaning
of that section. Pp.
357 U. S.
82-83.
2. The old motor carrier had standing to secure review of the
judgment below by appeal, since the case involved an actual
controversy and it had a direct and substantial personal interest
in the outcome. Pp.
357 U. S.
83-84.
Page 357 U. S. 78
3. There being no ambiguity in the city ordinance and no doubt
that it applied to the new motor carrier, the courts below properly
passed upon its validity without awaiting its interpretation by the
state courts. P.
357 U. S.
84.
4. The city ordinance, as applied to the new motor carrier, is
repugnant on its face to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, because the City has no power to decide whether the new
motor carrier can operate a transfer service between terminals for
the railroads, which is an integral part of interstate railroad
transportation authorized and subject to regulation under the
Interstate Commerce Act. Pp.
357 U. S.
84-89.
5. Since the city ordinance is completely invalid insofar as it
applies to the new motor carrier, that company was not obligated to
apply for a certificate of convenience and necessity and submit to
administrative procedures incident thereto before bringing this
action. P.
357 U. S.
89.
240 F.2d 930 affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Chicago is one of the Nation's great rail centers. Each day,
thousands of railroad passengers travel through that City on
continuous journeys from one State to
Page 357 U. S. 79
another. Since the lines of all railroads which carry passengers
into and out of Chicago come to an end in one of that City's eight
terminals, through passengers frequently arrive at a station
different from the one where they are to board their outgoing
train, and must transfer with their baggage in order to continue
their trip. Because of the serious problems of scheduling and
passenger convenience involved in this interchange, the railroads,
as a group, have long provided for the transfer of through
passengers from one station to another by a systematic and highly
organized motor carrier operation. Generally the passengers receive
a coupon covering this transfer service, without special charge, as
part of their through ticket.
For many years, the railroads had an arrangement with Parmelee
Transportation Company under which it carried through passengers
between stations. Apparently finding its service no longer
desirable, the railroads notified Parmelee in June, 1955, that they
would discontinue using its transfer vehicles as of October 1,
1955. Subsequently, they engaged Railroad Transfer Service, a
corporation specially organized at their request for that purpose,
as their exclusive transfer agent for a five-year period commencing
with the termination of Parmelee's service.
At the time the railroads gave Parmelee their notice, the City
of Chicago had in effect a detailed plan for the regulation and
licensing of public passenger vehicles for hire. Among other
things, operation of any public passenger vehicle, including a
vehicle engaged in the transfer of passengers between railroad
stations, was prohibited unless it had been licensed by the City.
Any person who operated one of these vehicles without a license was
subject to arrest and punishment.
After the railroads announced they intended to use the
facilities of Railroad Transfer Service instead of those of
Page 357 U. S. 80
Parmelee, the City Council proceeded to amend the Municipal Code
so as to effect certain important changes with regard to the
licensing of transfer vehicles. A new section, 28-31.1, was added.
In substance, it provided that no license for a transfer vehicle
would issue unless the City Commissioner of Licenses first
determined that public convenience and necessity required
additional inter-terminal service. In that event, the City Council
reserved final discretion to determine how many, if any, new
licenses were to be issued. In making his determination, the
Commissioner was authorized to consider public demand for the
proposed additional transfer service, its economic feasibility,
public safety, and, generally, any other facts he might think
relevant. [
Footnote 1] If §
28-31.1 validly
Page 357 U. S. 91
applied to Railroad Transfer Service, that company was required
to secure a certificate of convenience and necessity from the
Commissioner, plus the approval of the City Council, before it
could lawfully transfer any passengers for the railroads. On the
other hand, Parmelee was permitted to continue operating without
leave from the City, since an exception in § 28-31.1 provided that
no certificate was necessary for the renewal of an existing
license. Parmelee's vehicles were all licensed, of course, at the
time the section became effective.
As scheduled, Transfer began to carry passengers between
stations on October 1, 1955. [
Footnote 2] However, it refused to apply for a certificate
of convenience and necessity, taking the position that § 28-31.1
was either inapplicable to its vehicles or, if applicable, invalid.
The City rejected this contention, and threatened to arrest and
fine Transfer's drivers if they operated unlicensed vehicles.
Transfer and the railroads then filed this suit in United States
District Court asking for a judgment declaring § 28-31.1 either
inapplicable or invalid. The complaint asserted that the city's
requirement of a certificate of convenience and necessity was
inconsistent with the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, as
well as the Commerce Clause of the Constitution insofar as it
applied to vehicles transferring interstate passengers from one
railroad station to another under agreement with the railroads. The
City filed no answer, but moved for a summary judgment. Parmelee
was permitted to intervene as a defendant.
Page 357 U. S. 82
The district judge, pointing out that there were no genuine
issues of fact, granted the city's motion and dismissed the
complaint. But the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 240 F.2d 930. It agreed with the District Court that §
28-31.1 applied to Transfer's operation, but held that the section,
as so applied, was repugnant on its face to the Constitution and
laws of the United States. We granted the City's petition for
certiorari, 353 U.S. 972, but postponed assuming jurisdiction on an
appeal by Parmelee until further consideration at the hearing on
the merits, 353 U.S. 971. Counsel for Parmelee and Transfer were
asked to discuss the following jurisdictional questions:
"1. Whether Parmelee Transportation Co. has standing to seek
review here on appeal or by writ of certiorari."
"2. Whether the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 'final' so
as to permit review by way of appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2).
Cf. Slaker v. O'Connor, 278 U. S. 188,
278 U. S.
189;
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v.
Flemming, 351 U.S. 901."
First. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is the
proper subject of an appeal. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), this Court
may review cases on appeal where a Court of Appeals has held a
state statute invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States. In
Slaker v. O'Connor,
278 U. S. 188,
278 U. S. 189,
the Court construed the substantially identical predecessor of §
1254(2) [
Footnote 3] as
requiring a "final" judgment in a case before an appeal could be
taken. The
Slaker case was followed without comment, as to
§ 1254(2) itself, by the per curiam opinion in
South Carolina
Electric & Gas Co. v. Flemming, 351 U.S. 901. Counsel for
Parmelee, relying
Page 357 U. S. 83
on the language and legislative history of § 1254(2) and its
predecessor, forcefully argue that the requirement of finality
announced in the
Slaker case is erroneous, and should be
overruled. We find it unnecessary, however, to pass on this
contention here, because we are convinced that the judgment below
was "final" by any relevant standard.
By its decision, the Court of Appeals resolved all disputed
questions between the parties. From the beginning, the only issues
in the case were whether § 28-31.1 was applicable to Transfer and,
if applicable, whether that section was consistent with federal
law. The Court of Appeals held the section applied to Transfer, but
was unconstitutional. There was nothing more to litigate; all that
remained for the District Court on remand was to formally enter
judgment for the plaintiff.
Compare Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 345 U. S. 379,
345 U. S.
381-383.
Second. Parmelee has standing to secure review of the
judgment below by appeal. It is enough, for purposes of standing,
that we have an actual controversy before us in which Parmelee has
a direct and substantial personal interest in the outcome.
Undoubtedly it is affected adversely by Transfer's operation.
Parmelee contends that this operation is prohibited by a valid city
ordinance, and asserts the right to be free from unlawful
competition. Transfer, on the other hand, suggests that Parmelee
has no standing, because the city ordinance is invalid and
Transfer's operation is lawful. It argues that a party has no right
to complain about lawful competition, citing
Alabama Power Co.
v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, and
Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority, 306 U. S. 118. We
do not regard either of these cases as controlling here. It seems
to us that Transfer's argument confuses the merits of the
controversy with the standing of Parmelee to litigate them.
Cf.
Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678.
Parmelee's standing could hardly depend on whether
Page 357 U. S. 84
or not it is eventually held that Transfer can lawfully operate
without a certificate of convenience and necessity. [
Footnote 4]
Third. There is still another preliminary point which
must be decided. The City argues that the courts below should not
have passed on the validity of § 28-31.1 until state courts had
authoritatively ruled that Transfer's terminal vehicles came within
its provisions. The City asks that we vacate the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and remand to the District Court with directions
to hold the case until efforts to obtain an adjudication in the
state courts have been exhausted. Under the circumstances, we do
not believe this procedure is warranted.
After full argument on that point, both the District Court and a
unanimous Court of Appeals held that § 28-31.1 applied to Transfer.
That was the position of the city in both courts, and it made no
move there to have the matter remitted to the state courts. After
referring to the provisions of § 28-31.1, the City declared in its
brief in the Court of Appeals: "A more accurate description of the
business engaged in by Transfer would be hard to find." We think
this is a fair summarization. We see no ambiguity in the section
which calls for interpretation by the state courts.
Cf. Toomer
v. Witsell, 334 U. S. 385.
Remission to those courts would involve substantial delay and
expense, and the chance of a result different from that reached
below on the issue of applicability would appear to be slight.
Fourth. We agree with the Court of Appeals that §
28-31.1 is invalid insofar as it requires Transfer to secure a
certificate of convenience and necessity before it can operate. By
its terms, § 28-31.1 gives the City Commissioner of Licenses, and
ultimately the City Counsel itself, virtually unlimited discretion
to determine who
Page 357 U. S. 85
may transfer interstate passengers and baggage between railroad
terminals. Although counsel for the City denies that it will use
this power to exclude proposed transfer operations wholly or
primarily because of economic considerations (
cf. Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307), it
is clear that the City claims at least some power under § 28-31.1
to decide whether a motor carrier may transport passengers from one
station to another. In our judgment, the provisions of the
Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 379, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq., preclude the City from exercising any veto power over such
transfer service when performed by the railroads or by their chosen
agents.
Section 1(4) of that Act reads:
"It shall be the duty of every common carrier subject to this
chapter . . . to establish reasonable through routes with other
such carriers . . . [and] to provide reasonable facilities for
operating such routes and to make reasonable rules and regulations
with respect to their operation. . . ."
Section 3(4) provides:
"All carriers subject to the provisions of this chapter shall,
according to their respective powers, afford all reasonable,
proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between
their respective lines and connecting lines, and for the receiving,
forwarding, and delivering of passengers or property to and from
connecting lines. . . ."
Complementing these provisions, § 15(3) specifically empowers
the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish reasonable through
routes whenever necessary or desirable in the public interest.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 357 U. S. 86
As we understand these sections, they not only authorize the
railroads to take all reasonable and proper steps for the transfer
of persons and property between their connecting lines, but impose
affirmative obligations on them in this respect.
See United
States v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 323 U.
S. 612;
Central Transfer Co. v. Terminal Railroad
Association of St. Louis, 288 U. S. 469,
288 U. S. 473,
note 1. Although the railroads may not be obligated to furnish
transfer service between terminals in every instance, it seems
apparent that such service would often be necessary if the
statutory requirements were to be observed. On this basis, the
Interstate Commerce Commission has held that it has authority to
require motor service between terminals.
See Cartage, Rail to
Steamship Lines at New York, 269 I.C.C. 199. Here, the
railroads have furnished transfer facilities for the heavy flow of
traffic between the numerous Chicago terminals for more than a
century. It is agreed that transportation by motor vehicle is now
the only practical means of moving this traffic from terminal to
terminal. We think the transfer service involved is at least
authorized, if not actually required, under the Act as a reasonable
and proper facility for the interchange of passengers and their
baggage between connecting lines.
Moreover, § 302(c) of the Act provides that motor vehicle
transportation between terminals, whether performed by a railroad
or by an agent or contractor of its choosing, shall be regarded as
railroad transportation and shall be subject to the same
comprehensive scheme of regulation which applies to such
transportation. [
Footnote 6]
While
Page 357 U. S. 87
the Interstate Commerce Commission has not yet adopted special
regulations for inter-station transfer service, it obviously can do
so at any time under this section. In the meantime, many of the
Commission's regulations which generally govern railroad
transportation apply to this service. And, even without Commission
action, a number of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act
itself are self-executing in their application.
The various provisions set forth above manifest a congressional
policy to provide for the smooth, continuous, and efficient flow of
railroad traffic from State to State subject to federal regulation.
In our view, it would be inconsistent with this policy if local
authorities retained the power to decide whether the railroads or
their agents could engage in the inter-terminal transfer of
interstate passengers. We believe the Act authorizes the railroads
to engage in this transfer operation themselves or to select such
agents as they see fit for that purpose without leave from local
authorities.
National, rather local, control of interstate railroad
transportation has long been the policy of Congress. It is not at
all extraordinary that Congress should extend freedom from local
restraints to the movement of interstate
Page 357 U. S. 88
traffic between railroad terminals. Serious impediments to the
efficient and uninterrupted flow of this traffic might well result
if the City could deny the railroads the right to transfer
passengers by their own vehicles or by those of their selected
agents. For example, the railroads here undoubtedly have a better
understanding of how to handle the transportation problems involved
in expeditiously moving thousands of passengers from station to
station each day than do local officials. Because of close time
schedules, the great volume of traffic, and its irregular ebb and
flow, the railroads obviously need a cooperative and dependable
transfer operator with suitable equipment who is willing to work in
close harmony with them. The railroads have rejected as unsuitable
the only transfer service now licensed to operate by the City. If
local officials can prevent them from providing this service by
some other means a breakdown in the organized transfer of
passengers could result. At a minimum, they would be forced to deal
once again with the rejected operator. Moreover, it seems clear
that, if the City could deny a license to one operator, it has the
power, at least so far as the Interstate Commerce Act is concerned,
to deny a license to all.
We are fully aware that use of local streets is involved, but no
one suggests that Congress cannot require the City to permit
interstate commerce to pass over those streets. Of course, the City
retains considerable authority to regulate how transfer vehicles
shall be operated. It could hardly be denied, for example, that
such vehicles must obey traffic signals, speed limits, and other
general safety regulations. Similarly, the City may require
registration of these vehicles, and exact reasonable fees for their
use of the local streets.
Cf. Fry Roofing Co. v. Wood,
344 U. S. 157;
Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.
S. 542. All we hold here, and all we construe the Court
of Appeals as holding, is that the City has no
Page 357 U. S. 89
power to decide whether Transfer can operate a motor vehicle
service between terminals for the railroads, because this service
is an integral part of interstate railroad transportation
authorized and subject to regulation under the Interstate Commerce
Act.
Cf. Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, 348 U. S.
61.
Fifth. Since we hold that § 28-31.1 is completely
invalid insofar as it applies to Transfer, that company was not
obligated to apply for a certificate of convenience and necessity
and submit to the administrative procedures incident thereto before
bringing this action.
See Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.
S. 553,
283 U. S. 562;
Public Utilities Commission of California v. United
States, 355 U. S. 534,
355 U. S.
539-540.
Cf. Staub v. City of Baxley,
355 U. S. 313,
355 U. S.
319.
Affirmed.
* Together with No. 104,
Parmelee Transportation Co. et al.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. et al., on
appeal from, and petition for certiorari to, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, argued March 6, 1958.
[
Footnote 1]
In full, the section read:
"28-31.1. Public Convenience and Necessity. No license for any
terminal vehicle shall be issued except in the annual renewal of
such license or upon transfer to permit replacement of a vehicle
for that licensed unless, after a public hearing held in the same
manner as specified for hearings in Section 28-22.1, the
commissioner shall report to the council that public convenience
and necessity require additional terminal vehicle service and shall
recommend the number of such vehicle licenses which may be
issued."
"In determining whether public convenience and necessity require
additional terminal vehicle service, due consideration shall be
given to the following:"
"1. The public demand for such service;"
"2. The effect of an increase in the number of such vehicles on
the safety of existing vehicular and pedestrian traffic in the area
of their operation;"
"3. The effect of an increase in the number of such vehicles
upon the ability of the licensee to continue rendering the required
service at reasonable fares and charges to provide revenue
sufficient to pay for all costs of such service, including fair and
equitable wages and compensation for licensee's employees and a
fair return on the investment in property devoted to such
service;"
"4. Any other facts which the commissioner may deem
relevant."
"If the commissioner shall report that public convenience and
necessity require additional terminal vehicle service, the council,
by ordinance, may fix the maximum number of terminal vehicle
licenses to be issued not to exceed the number recommended by the
Commissioner."
Chicago Municipal Code, c. 28, § 28-31.1.
[
Footnote 2]
In accordance with its agreement with the railroads, Transfer's
operation is limited exclusively to transporting through passengers
from one railroad station to another. It carries no other
passengers.
[
Footnote 3]
240(b) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 939.
[
Footnote 4]
Since No. 104 is properly here on appeal, the petition for
certiorari in that case is denied.
[
Footnote 5]
Section 12 generally authorizes and requires the Commission "to
execute and enforce" all of the provisions of the Act.
[
Footnote 6]
In pertinent part, § 302(c) reads:
"Notwithstanding any provision of this section or of section 303
of this title, the provisions of (Chapter 8 of the Act regulating
motor carriers) . . . shall not apply --"
"(1) to transportation by motor vehicle by a carrier by railroad
. . . incidental to transportation or service subject to
[regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission under Chapter 1
of the Act as railroad transportation or service] . . . in the
performance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or
delivery services; but such transportation shall be considered to
be and shall be regulated as transportation subject to chapter 1 of
this title when performed by such carrier by railroad. . . ."
"(2) to transportation by motor vehicle by any person (whether
as agent or under a contractual arrangement) for a common carrier
by railroad subject to chapter 1 of this title . . . in the
performance within terminal areas of transfer, collection, or
delivery service; but such transportation shall be considered to be
performed by such carrier . . . as part of, and shall be regulated
in the same manner as, the transportation by railroad . . . to
which such services are incidental."
49 U.S.C. § 302(c).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE
BURTON join, dissenting.
In my opinion, the Court has acted prematurely in striking down
this Chicago ordinance as it relates to Transfer. I accept the
premise that the railroads have the right to choose whom they
please to perform the transfer services, subject only to the City's
right to regulate how transfer vehicles shall be operated.
Nevertheless, the validity of the ordinance should not be
determined until Transfer has applied to Chicago for a "terminal"
license and the local authorities have had an opportunity to act on
the application. Not until then will it be known whether the
ordinance, as it may be applied to Transfer's operations,
trespasses upon paramount federal concerns. Proper regard for the
City's legitimate interests in enforcing this local enactment
entitles Chicago to that opportunity.
Cf. Public Utilities
Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.
S. 534,
355 U. S. 546
(dissenting opinion).
Page 357 U. S. 90
No provision of the Interstate Commerce Act purports to preempt
Chicago's power to apply its ordinance to one in the position of
Transfer. This is therefore not a case where particular provisions
of federal and local legislation conflict in such a way that they
cannot logically or practically stand together,
cf. Cloverleaf
Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U. S. 148;
First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 328 U. S. 152, nor
one where there is such overall similarity between federal and
state regulation that a congressional purpose to displace state
action in its entirety can fairly be deduced.
Cf. Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52;
Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497. And
because Transfer does not hold a certificate of necessity from the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and seemingly cannot get one,
see Status of Parmelee Transportation Co., 288 I.C.C. 95,
no conflict appears between federal and local regulatory policies
respecting those performing transfer services.
Cf. Castle v.
Hayes Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U. S. 61. The
sole question is thus whether the ordinance must be struck down,
when applied to Transfer's operations, as "inconsistent" with the
policy of the Interstate Commerce Act to foster efficient
interstate transportation.
In determining whether Chicago's ordinance should now be
annulled, it must be borne in mind that local authorities are not
foreclosed from regulating matters of local concern merely because
there may be some incidental, but not burdensome, effect on
interstate commerce. At least since
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, it has been
recognized that, because regulation of local incidents of
interstate transportation is, as a practical matter, beyond the
effective reach of Congress, there would frequently be an
undesirable absence of needed regulation unless states and
municipalities were free to act.
See California v.
Thompson, 313 U. S. 109;
see also H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S.
79;
Eichholz
v.
Page 357 U. S. 91
Public Service Comm'n of Missouri, 306 U.
S. 268. So much indeed is recognized by the Court today
when it says that Chicago, as part of its "considerable authority"
to regulate the operation of transfer vehicles, may exact fees for
their use of the city streets, and may require them to meet with
safety regulations and to be registered with the City. And, of
course, the Court's examples do not exhaust the scope of local
regulatory power to insure safe transportation. Nor can I perceive
why the City should not be permitted to exercise such power before
permitting unlicensed vehicles to travel on its streets. On the
other hand, I would agree that Chicago, under the guise of
promoting safe and proper transportation, could not validly limit
on "economic" grounds those with whom the railroads may contract to
carry its interstate passengers through the City.
Cf. Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307.
We do not yet know how Chicago will apply the ordinance. If it
should grant Transfer a license, that will end the present
controversy. If a license is denied, it will then be time enough to
determine whether the basis for denial runs afoul of federal
transportation policy. It is true that the ordinance gives the City
broad authority, but that does not justify the assumption that such
authority will be exercised beyond permissible bounds, especially
since Chicago has acknowledged that it could not properly withhold
a license "solely or even primarily" because existing transfer
facilities were adequate, or because additional licenses would
adversely affect the competitive situation. Only by refraining from
passing on the ordinance until Chicago has had a chance to act
under it do we respect the longstanding tradition of this Court not
to interfere prematurely with the administration of state and local
enactments.
See, e.g., Alabama Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U. S. 450;
Public Service Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.
S. 237.
Page 357 U. S. 92
Cf. Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin,
323 U. S. 101.
The fact that this course of action would involve some further
delay and expense does not, in my judgment, justify bypassing the
municipal authorities. Transfer accepted the risk of such a result
when it failed to apply for a license in the first instance. And if
it is said that this course will expose the transfer operations to
hazards in the interval, the answer is that the Federal District
Court in Chicago possesses ample authority to prevent any
interference with Transfer's activities pending final adjudication
of the matters in controversy.
Some years ago, in a situation closely analogous to the one
before us, this Court approved the decision of a three-judge
District Court declining to entertain a complaint attacking the
constitutionality of a Missouri statute which prohibited interstate
carriers from using state highways without obtaining a permit from
the State, on the ground that the complainant had not applied for
such a permit.
Columbia Terminals Co. v.
Lambert, 30 F. Supp.
28; 309 U.S. 620. I believe that
Columbia Terminals
provides the guiding principle for the appropriate disposition of
premature challenges to the validity of local ordinances. However,
in view of the posture of the present litigation, I would follow a
somewhat different course here, and would vacate the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court. Our
mandate should enable the District Court to stay the operation of
Chicago's ordinance and to retain jurisdiction over this case,
pending Transfer's prompt steps to initiate license proceedings
before the local authorities and the outcome of such
proceedings.