CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. STATE OF
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356 U.S. 906 (1958)
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U.S. Supreme Court
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. v. STATE OF , 356 U.S. 906 (1958)
356 U.S. 906
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL AND PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., appellant,
STATE OF ILLINOIS et al.
Supreme Court of the United States
March 17, 1958
Messrs. Edwin R. Eckersall, Edwin O. Schiewe, R. K. Merrill and J. P. Reedy, for applicant. Messrs. Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. and H. R. Begley, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents State of Illinois and others. Messrs. S. Ashley Guthrie and Francis D. Fisher, for respondent Milwaukee Road Commuters' Association.
The application for supersedeas presented to Mr. Justice CLARK and by him referred to the Court is denied.
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice BURTON, Mr. Justice HARLAN, and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER join, dissenting. 'The public interest, justice between the litigants, and the protection of our own appellate jurisdiction seem to me to require that petitioner's application for a supersedeas in this case be granted. The dispute underlying the application involves intrastate commuter fares on petitioner's Chicago suburban service. The Interstate Commerce Commission, in proceedings under 13(4) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 Stat. 383, as amended, 41 Stat. 484, 49 U. S.C. 13(4), 49 U.S.C.A. 13(4), found that existing intrastate fares caused undue discrimination against interstate commerce, and in order to remove such discrimination prescribed fares higher than those authorized by the state commission. The District Court set aside the order, enjoined its enforcement, and remanded the case to the Commission. State of Illinois v. U. S., D.C., 146 F.Supp. 195. On appeal to this Court, we found that the Commissioner's order lacked 'findings which reflect the commuter service deficit in the totality of intrastate revenues ....' Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300, 308, 309. The District Court's judgment was modified to provide for a remand to the Commission for proceeding not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.
It was noted in the opinion that the injunction of the District Court had been 'stayed pending the hearing of the appeal to this Court. The excess fares are being impounded under a provision of the stay order providing for their refund to the persons who paid them in the event the judgment appealed from is affirmed.' 355 U.S. at page 302, n. 2, 78 S.Ct. at page 306. In the District Court petitioner moved for a stay of that court's original decree requiring refund of the excess fares, pending the further proceedings before the Commission contemplated by the judgment of this Court. On February 28, 1958, the motion was denied, and petitioner was ordered to being distributing the impounded fund immediately. A notice of appeal from this order was filed on March 3, 1958, and the District Court denied a stay of its order pending a determination of the appeal.
It can hardly be denied that the contention raised by petitioner's appeal from the order of February 28 is substantial: that if after further proceedings before the Commission a valid order is entered to the same effect as the order earlier set aside, petitioner will be entitled to the impounded funds. Reliance on Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, gives force to the argument that such is present law. In that case the order of the Commission raising the intrastate rates was set aside 'solely upon the ground that the facts supporting the conclusion were not embodied in the findings.' 295 U.S. at page 311, 55 S.Ct. at page 717. After the want of proper findings had been remedied and a new order sustained on appeal, the carrier was allowed to retain the monies collected under the first order of the Commission. The final result of the litigation, as the Court summed it up in United States v. Morgan 307 U.S. 183, 195, was that the railroads were permitted to collect and retain the higher rates for a period during which there was no lawful order of the Commission superseding the state commission rates. [356 U.S. 906 , 908]