Respondent filed a bill in equity in an Alabama state court to
enjoin certain picketing activities, wholly peaceful, carried on by
petitioner labor organizations. The court forthwith issued a
temporary injunction. Subsequently, a motion by petitioners to
dissolve the temporary injunction was denied by the trial court,
and its order was affirmed by the State Supreme Court.
Held: The judgment of the State Supreme Court was not a
"final" judgment within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, and
therefore was not reviewable by this Court. Pp.
344 U. S.
179-181.
(a) The fact that, as long as a temporary injunction is in
force, it may be as effective as a permanent injunction, and that
appeals from interlocutory judgments have for that reason been
authorized by state legislatures and, in some circumstances, by
Congress does not give interlocutory judgments the aspect of
finality required by 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Pp.
344 U. S.
180-181.
(b) Since there was no final judgment of the State Supreme Court
reviewable here, the writ of certiorari which was granted in this
case is dismissed as improvidently granted. P.
344 U. S.
181.
Writ of certiorari dismissed.
Page 344 U. S. 179
MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent filed a bill in equity in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County, Alabama, to enjoin certain picketing activities,
wholly peaceful, carried on by the petitioners, labor
organizations. Upon the sworn bill and without notice, the court
issued forthwith a "Temporary Writ of Injunction." The petitioners
appeared and filed an answer and a motion to dissolve the
injunction on numerous grounds. Subsequently, the petitioners
withdrew their answer and most of the grounds assigned for
dissolution of the injunction, and filed new grounds therefor. The
motion to dissolve was denied, and from this order of the court,
the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, which
affirmed the order of the trial court. 256 Ala. 678,
57 So. 2d
112,
rehearing denied, 256 Ala. 689, 57 So. 2d 121.
Certiorari was sought here, and granted, 343 U.S. 962.
At the very threshold, we are presented with a question of
jurisdiction. This Court may grant certiorari from a judgment or
decree of the Supreme Court of Alabama, the highest court in the
State, only if the judgment or decree is final. 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
Was this a final judgment or decree?
Page 344 U. S. 180
From the earliest days, this Court has refused to accept
jurisdiction of interlocutory decrees, such as is involved in this
case. In
Gibbons v.
Ogden, 6 Wheat. 448, the first case presenting this
issue to this Court, an injunction had been granted by a Chancery
Court of the New York. The defendant answered and moved to dissolve
the injunction. The court denied the motion to dissolve, and the
defendant appealed to the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and
Correction of Errors, which affirmed. The appeal to this Court was
dismissed because there was no final decree in the court of last
resort for this Court to review.
The provision of § 1257 that only "Final judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could
be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . " has been
carried in almost identical language since the Judiciary Act of
1789, 1 Stat. 85, § 25.
"This requirement is not one of those technicalities to be
easily scorned. It is an important factor in the smooth working of
our federal system."
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.
S. 120,
326 U. S.
124.
The distinction between a preliminary or temporary injunction
and a final or permanent injunction was elementary in the law of
equity. The classical concept was at once recognized and applied in
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra. There is no room here for
interpretation. The rule remains unchanged.
True, as long as a temporary injunction is in force, it may be
as effective as a permanent injunction, and, for that reason,
appeals from interlocutory judgments have been authorized by state
legislatures and Congress. But such authorization does not give
interlocutory judgments the aspect of finality here, even though we
may have inadvertently granted certiorari.
Baldwin Co. v. R. S.
Howard Co., 256 U. S. 35,
256 U. S. 40.
Page 344 U. S. 181
It is argued that, if this is not held to be a final decree or
judgment and decided now, it may never be decided, because to await
the outcome of the final hearing is to moot the question and to
frustrate the picketing. However appealing such argument may be, it
does not warrant us in enlarging our jurisdiction. Only Congress
may do that. Furthermore, the interlocutory decree could have been
readily converted into a final decree, and the appeal could have
proceeded without question as to jurisdiction just as effectively
and expeditiously as the appeal from the interlocutory injunction
was pursued in this case.
Since there was no final judgment of the Supreme Court of
Alabama for review, the writ of certiorari must be dismissed as
improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs,
dissenting.
The question presented is the power of the state court to issue
a temporary injunction in this kind of labor dispute. If
petitioners had sought mandamus or another appropriate state writ
directed against the judge who issued the temporary injunction, I
should have no doubt that it would be a final judgment which we
would review.
See Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court,
284 U. S. 8,
284 U. S. 14.
Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.
S. 549,
331 U. S. 565.
I see no difference of substance between that case and this. The
mischief of temporary injunctions in labor controversies is well
known. It is done when the interlocutory order is issued. The
damage is often irreparable. The assertion by the state court of
power to act in an interlocutory way is final. Whether it has that
power may be determined without reference to any future proceedings
which may be taken. Unless the rule of finality is to be
Page 344 U. S. 182
purely mechanical, which to date it has not been,
see Radio
Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120,
326 U. S. 124,
we should determine now whether the National Labor Relations Act
permits a state court to interfere with a labor controversy in a
way which, though interim in form, irretrievably alters the status
of the dispute or, in fact, settles it.
*
* This "practical," rather than "technical," construction is as
necessary here as it is in cases involving appeals from "final
decisions" in the federal system.
See Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541,
337 U. S.
545-546.