Labor Board v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950)
U.S. Supreme CourtLabor Board v. Pool Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 577 (1950)
National Labor Relations Board v. Pool Manufacturing Co.
Argued April 18, 1950
Decided May 15, 1950
339 U.S. 577
In December 1943, the National Labor Relations Board certified a union as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees of respondent, a corporation engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. In August, 1946, the Board ordered respondent to cease and desist from its refusal to bargain with the union and to offer reinstatement and back pay to employees who had gone on strike. In February, 1949, the Board petitioned for enforcement of this order. Respondent moved for leave to adduce additional evidence, alleging that it had bargained unsuccessfully with the union since the date of the order; that the union had made no effort to bargain since early in 1948, and that, after the record in the case was closed, facts had come to respondent's attention which caused respondent to question whether the union retained the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit. The Court of Appeals ordered the case referred back to the Board with directions to take evidence and report whether the order had been complied with; if so, whether the matter should not be dismissed as moot; and, if not, what recommendations the Board had to make.
Held: the order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and enforcement of the Board's order must be decreed pursuant to § 10(e), unless "extraordinary circumstances" are pleaded which justify respondent's failure to urge its objections before the Board. Labor Board. Mexia Textile Mills, ante, p. 339 U. S. 563. Pp. 339 U. S. 578-582.
(a) In this case, the fact that the Board waited two and one-half years before seeking enforcement of its order was not fatal, and cannot save the order entered by the Court of Appeals. Pp. 339 U. S. 579-582.
(b) A strict judicial time limitation of the duration presented in this case would frustrate the deliberate purpose of Congress in permitting, but not requiring, resort to an enforcement decree. P. 339 U. S. 580.
(c) Those intent upon violating the Act may not escape through the use of delaying tactics in negotiation, culminating in the filing of motions for leave to adduce evidence when enforcement is sought, thus effectively frustrating the Board's order. P. 339 U. S. 582.
The case is stated in the opinion. The opinion of the Court of Appeals is reported in 24 L.R.R.M. 2147. The order of the Court of Appeals is vacated, p. 339 U. S. 582.