An agreement between a railroad and an employee injured by its
negligence, which limits the venue of any action thereafter brought
by the employee under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and
deprives him of his right to bring an action in any forum
authorized by the Act is void as conflicting with the Act. Pp.
338 U. S.
263-266.
321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W.2d 120, reversed.
In a suit brought by a railroad company in a state court of
Michigan to enjoin petitioner from prosecuting a Federal Employers'
Liability Act case against it in Illinois, the trial court held
that a contract restricting the choice of venue was void, and
dismissed the suit. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. 321 Mich.
693, 33 N.W.2d 120. This Court granted certiorari. 3 37 U.S. 923.
Reversed, p.
338 U. S.
266.
PER CURIAM.
In issue here is the validity of a contract restricting the
choice of venue for an action based upon the Federal Employers'
Liability Act. [
Footnote 1]
Petitioner was injured in the course of his duties as an employee
of respondent railroad in November, 1946. Twice during the
following month, petitioner was advanced fifty dollars by
respondent. On each of these occasions, petitioner signed an
agreement
Page 338 U. S. 264
stipulating that, if his claim could not be settled and he
elected to sue,
"such suit shall be commenced within the county or district
where I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or in the
county or district where my injuries were sustained and not
elsewhere. [
Footnote 2]"
Although this provision defined the available forum as either
the Circuit Court of Calhoun County, Michigan, or the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, petitioner
brought an action in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois.
To enjoin petitioner's prosecution of the Illinois case, respondent
instituted this suit. The Michigan Circuit Court held that the
contract restricting the choice of venue was void, and dismissed
the suit. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, 321 Mich. 693, 33
N.W.2d 120 (1948).
Certiorari was granted, 337 U.S. 923 (1949), because the federal
and state courts which have considered the issue have reached
conflicting results. [
Footnote
3] We agree with
Page 338 U. S. 265
those courts which have held that contracts limiting the choice
of venue are void as conflicting with the Liability Act.
Section 6 of the Liability Act provides that,
"Under this Act, an action may be brought in a district court of
the United States, in the district of the residence of the
defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such
action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under
this Act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
States, and no case arising under this Act and brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of
the United States."
It is not disputed that respondent is liable to suit in Cook
County, Illinois, in accordance with this provision. We hold that
petitioner's right to bring the suit in any eligible forum is a
right of sufficient substantiality to be included within the
Congressional mandate of § 5 of the Liability Act:
"Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever the
purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to
exempt itself from any liability created by this Act shall, to that
extent, be void. . . ."
The contract before us is therefore void.
Any other result would be inconsistent with
Duncan v.
Thompson, 315 U. S. 1 (1942).
That opinion reviewed the legislative history and concluded that
"Congress wanted Section 5 to have the full effect that its
comprehensive phraseology implies." 315 U.S. at
315 U. S. 6. In
that case, as in this, the contract before the Court was signed
after
Page 338 U. S. 266
the injury occurred. The court below, in holding that an
agreement delimiting venue should be enforced if it was reached
after the accident, disregarded
Duncan.
The vigor and validity of the
Duncan decision was not
impaired by
Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U.
S. 625 (1948). We there distinguished a full compromise
enabling the parties to settle their dispute without litigation,
which we held did not contravene the Act, from a device which
obstructs the right of the Liability Act plaintiff to secure the
maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his cause.
[
Footnote 4] And nothing in
Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55
(1949), affects the initial choice of venue afforded Liability Act
plaintiffs. We stated expressly that the section of the Judicial
Code there involved, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
"does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted in § 6 of
the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular
district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or
federal, in which it might have been brought previously."
337 U.S. at
337 U. S.
60.
The right to select the forum granted in § 6 is a substantial
right. It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act to sanction defeat of that right by the
device at bar.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON concur in the
result, but upon the grounds stated by Chief Judge Hand in
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 at 560
(1949).
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51.
[
Footnote 2]
The agreement also provided that the sums advanced would be
deducted from whatever settlement or recovery petitioner finally
achieved. As to this, the proviso in § 5 of the Liability Act
specifies
"That in any action brought against any such common carrier
under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, such
common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed or
paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have
been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on
account of the injury or death for which said action was
brought."
Referring to this provision, and interpreting a contract similar
to the one here involved, at least one federal court has held that
"[t]he contract to waive the venue provisions is of no effect . . .
, because there was no consideration for it."
Akerly v. New
York Cent. R. Co., 168 F.2d 812, 815 (1948).
[
Footnote 3]
In accord with the decision below are:
Roland v. Atchison,
T. & S.F. R. Co., 65 F. Supp.
630 (1946);
Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp.
903 (1945);
Clark v. Lowden, 48 F. Supp.
261 (1942);
Detwiler v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.
Co., 15 F. Supp.
541 (1936);
Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 188,
269 N.W. 367, 369, 107 A.L.R. 1054, 1059 (1936). In conflict with
the ruling before us are:
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
174 F.2d 556 (1949),
petition for certiorari denied this day,
see post, p. 866;
Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co.,
168 F.2d 812 (1948);
Fleming v. Husted, 68 F. Supp.
900 (1946);
Sherman v. Pere Marquette R.
Co., 62 F. Supp.
590 (1945);
Peterson v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot
Co., 110 Utah 573, 175 P.2d 744 (1946);
cf. Porter v.
Fleming, 74 F. Supp.
378 (1947).
[
Footnote 4]
See Krenger, supra, note 3 174 F.2d at 558; 174 F.2d at 561 (concurring
opinion of L. Hand, C.J.);
Akerly, supra, note 3 168 F.2d at 815;
Peterson,
supra, note 3 110 Utah at
579, 175 P.2d at 747.