An employee was injured in Wisconsin while working under an
Illinois contract of employment and while both he and his employer
were residents of Illinois. He applied to the Wisconsin Industrial
Commission for adjustment of claim, and, shortly thereafter,
applied to the Illinois Industrial Commission, stating that the
general nature of the dispute was "[w]hether Illinois or Wisconsin
has jurisdiction in my case." A settlement contract expressly
reserving any right the employee "may have" under the Wisconsin Act
was filed with the Illinois Commission, which approved it and
issued a formal settlement order. After full payment of the amount
awarded in Illinois had been made, the Wisconsin Commission awarded
the employee certain benefits, less the amount received under the
Illinois award.
Held: the Illinois award is final and conclusive only
as to rights arising in Illinois, and Wisconsin is free, under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, to award additional compensation in
accord with its own laws.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U. S. 430,
distinguished. Pp.
330 U. S.
626-630.
(a) The fact that the Illinois statute expressly applies to
persons whose employment is outside the State (where the contract
of employment is made in Illinois) and precludes recovery under any
"common law or statutory right" did not preclude recovery under the
Wisconsin statute, because the Illinois statute had been
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Illinois as abolishing rights
of action against the employer under the Illinois common law or
under the Illinois Personal Injuries Act and contained nothing to
indicate that it was completely exclusive, or was designed to
preclude any recovery under proceedings in another state for
injuries received there in the course of an Illinois employment.
Pp.
330 U. S.
627-628.
(b) The provision in the settlement contract saving the rights
of the employee in Wisconsin became a part of the Illinois award,
which had become final. Therefore, the Illinois award did not
foreclose an additional award under the laws of Wisconsin. Pp.
330 U. S.
628-630.
248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522, reversed.
Page 330 U. S. 623
An employee injured in Wisconsin while working under an Illinois
contract of employment and while both he and his employer were
residents of Illinois accepted settlement under the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act, reserving any rights he might have
under the Wisconsin Compensation Act, and later obtained an award
for additional benefits under the Wisconsin Act. A Wisconsin court
set aside the Wisconsin award, and this action was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522. This Court
granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 696.
Reversed, p.
330 U. S.
630.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.
S. 430, this Court had occasion to consider the effect
of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the
United States, U.S.Const. art. 4, § 1, where awards are sought
under the workmen's compensation laws of two states. This case
presents another facet of that problem.
The facts are undisputed. Leo Thomas Kopp worked as a bricklayer
for E. E. McCartin. Both were residents of Illinois. Pursuant to a
contract made in Illinois, Kopp worked for McCartin on a building
job in Wisconsin. He drove back and forth between his home in
Illinois and his work in Wisconsin. While thus employed in
Wisconsin, Kopp suffered an injury to his left eye. On June 7,
1943, he filed an application for adjustment of claim with the
Industrial Commission of Wisconsin. McCartin and his insurance
carrier entered an objection to the jurisdiction
Page 330 U. S. 624
of the Wisconsin Commission to hear the claim. Then, on July 20,
1943, Kopp filed an application for adjustment of claim with the
Industrial Commission of Illinois in which the general nature of
the dispute was given as "Whether Illinois or Wisconsin has
jurisdiction in my case."
Under date of October 11, 1943, the Wisconsin Commission wrote
the insurance carrier that Kopp had been informed that, so far as
Wisconsin law was concerned, he was entitled to proceed under the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, §§
138-172) and thereafter claim compensation under the Wisconsin
Workmen's Compensation Act (Wis.Stat. 1945, Ch. 102), with credit
to be given for the amount paid him pursuant to the Illinois Act. A
copy of this letter was sent to Kopp. Counsel for the insurance
carrier replied on November 3, 1943. It was there stated that the
insurance carrier understood that, if payments were made by it to
Kopp under the Illinois statute, credit would be given for those
payments in the event an award was made to Kopp under the Wisconsin
Act, and, with that understanding, the insurance carrier was
proceeding to pay Kopp compensation under the Illinois statute.
On November 3, 1943, a settlement contract was signed by Kopp
and McCartin. The parties therein agreed that the sum of $2,112 was
to be paid to Kopp in full and final settlement of any and all
claims arising out of Kopp's injury by virtue of the Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act. The contract also stated: "This
settlement does not affect any rights that applicant may have under
the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Wisconsin."
The settlement contract and a petition by Kopp that the amount
due be paid to him in a lump sum were filed with the Illinois
Commission on November 29, 1943. A hearing was held before a
Commissioner on December 3,
Page 330 U. S. 625
in the course of which attention was called to the reservation
of rights in Wisconsin. The presiding Commissioner informed Kopp
that he did not know what effect the reservation had, or what
Kopp's rights were under the Wisconsin statute. Kopp replied that
he would appreciate receiving the lump sum under the Illinois law,
and that he would "take chances on Wisconsin." Following the
hearing, the Commissioner approved the settlement contract and the
petition for a lump sum payment. Kopp received payment on December
7 in the amount specified in the settlement contract plus a small
additional sum for temporary disability. Thereafter, on January 10,
1944, a formal order was entered by the Illinois Commission
directing payment of the lump sum of $2,112. The circumstances of
the entry of this later order, after payment had been made in fact,
are not disclosed. No petition to review the settlement contract or
lump sum payment was filed, and no action to secure a review of the
formal order was taken.
In the meantime, on December 20, 1943, this Court's decision in
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, was rendered. The
Wisconsin Commission then held a hearing on February 20, 1944, on
Kopp's application before it. McCartin and the insurance carrier
filed an amended answer, contending that, under the full faith and
credit clause, the Wisconsin proceedings were barred by the award
and payment under the Illinois Act; reliance was placed upon the
Magnolia Petroleum Co. case. The Commission overruled this
objection, and ordered the payment to Kopp of certain benefits,
after giving credit for the sums paid under the Illinois Act.
The Circuit Court for Dane County, Wisconsin, set aside the
Wisconsin Commission's order on the authority of the
Magnolia
Petroleum Co. case. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
affirmed the lower court's judgment
Page 330 U. S. 626
on the same authority.
McCartin v. Industrial
Commission, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522. We granted certiorari
to determine the applicability of the full faith and credit clause,
as interpreted in the
Magnolia Petroleum Co. case, to the
facts of this case.
It is clear, in the absence of a prior award in Wisconsin, that
the compensation paid to the employee under the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act was constitutionally proper from the full faith
and credit standpoint. Illinois was the state where the parties
entered into the employment contract, and its legitimate concern
with that employer-employee relationship permitted it to apply its
own statute even though the injury occurred elsewhere.
Alaska
Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.
S. 532;
Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,
330 U. S. 469. At
the same time, in view of the fact that the accident took place in
Wisconsin, any full faith and credit questions that might have been
raised had compensation first been awarded under the Wisconsin
Workmen's Compensation Act are answered by
Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.
S. 493. The troublesome problem that arises here is
whether the compensation paid under the Illinois statute raises a
full faith and credit bar to a subsequent award in Wisconsin for an
additional amount.
If it were apparent that the Illinois award was intended to be
final and conclusive of all the employee's rights against the
employer and the insurer growing out of the injury, the decision in
the
Magnolia Petroleum Co. case would be controlling here.
The Court there found that the compensation award under the Texas
Workmen's Compensation Law, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St.Art. 8306
et
seq., was made explicitly in lieu of any other recovery for
injury to the employee, precluding even a recovery under the laws
of another state.
See Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U. S. 145,
286 U. S. 153.
And since the Texas award had the degree of finality contemplated
by the full faith and credit clause, it was held that Louisiana
Page 330 U. S. 627
was constitutionally forbidden from entering a subsequent award
under its statute. But we do not believe that the same situation
exists in this case, the Illinois award being different in its
nature and effect from the Texas award in the
Magnolia
case.
The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act was concededly
applicable under the circumstances of this case. Section 3 of that
Act provides that it shall apply automatically and without election
to all employers and employees engaged in businesses or enterprises
such as those involving the erection or construction of any
structure. At the time when he was injured, Kopp was doing mason
work for his employer in connection with the erection of houses.
Section 5 then provides that the term "employee" includes those
persons "whose employment is outside of the Illinois where the
contract of hire is made within the Illinois." Kopp was such an
employee, having been hired in Illinois and injured while employed
in Wisconsin.
Section 6 states that
"No common law or statutory right to recover damages for injury
or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his
duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided,
shall be available to any employee who is covered by the provisions
of this act. . . ."
This section has been interpreted to mean that, in situations to
which the Act applies, the right of action against the employer
under the Illinois common law or under the Illinois Personal
Injuries Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1943, Ch. 70, §§ 1, 2) has been
abolished.
Mississippi River Power Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 289 Ill. 353, 124 N.E. 552;
Faber v.
Industrial Commission, 352 Ill. 115, 185 N.E. 255. To that
extent, the Act provides an exclusive remedy.
But there is nothing in the statute or in the decisions
thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive -- that it
is designed to preclude any recovery by proceedings
Page 330 U. S. 628
brought in another state for injuries received there in the
course of an Illinois employment.
Cf. Bradford Electric Light
Co. v. Clapper, supra; Cole v. Industrial Commission, 353 Ill.
415, 187 N.E. 520. And, in light of the rule that workmen's
compensation laws are to be liberally construed in furtherance of
the purpose for which they were enacted,
Baltimore &
Philadelphia Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.
S. 408,
284 U. S. 414,
we should not readily interpret such a statute so as to cut off an
employee's right to sue under other legislation passed for his
benefit. Only some unmistakable language by a state legislature or
judiciary would warrant our accepting such a construction.
Especially is this true where the rights affected are those arising
under legislation of another state and where the full faith and
credit provision of the United States Constitution is brought into
play.
See Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler Co., 289 U.
S. 439.
We need not rest our decision, however, solely upon the absence
of any provision or construction of the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act forbidding an employee from seeking alternative or
additional relief under the laws of another state. There is even
stronger evidence that the employee is free to ask for additional
compensation in Wisconsin. That evidence is in the Illinois award
itself -- an award which is acknowledged to have been made in
compliance with the Illinois statute.
Here, the employer and the employee entered into a settlement
contract fixing the amount of compensation to which the employee
was entitled under the Illinois statute, thereby avoiding the
expense and delay of litigating the matter. This contract, together
with the employee's petition for a lump sum payment, was approved
by one of the Commissioners of the Illinois Industrial Commission.
By that approval, the agreement became, "in legal effect, an
award."
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 320 Ill. 544, 151 N.E. 495, 496;
Michelson
v.
Page 330 U. S. 629
Industrial Commission, 375 Ill. 462, 31 N.E.2d 940.
Under Illinois law, such awards are described as
res
judicata on the matters thus adjudicated and agreed upon,
precluding the Commission from subsequently reviewing the awards or
setting them aside.
Centralia Coal Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 297 Ill. 451, 130 N.E. 727;
Stromberg Motor
Device Co. v. Industrial Commission, 305 Ill. 619, 137 N.E.
462;
Lewin Metals Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 360 Ill.
371, 196 N.E. 482;
Trigg v. Industrial Commission, 364
Ill. 581, 5 N.E.2d 394.
One of the provisions in the settlement contract which became
the award was the statement that "[t]his settlement does not affect
any rights that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the Wisconsin." That statement was made a part of the
contract at the request of the employee, who had been informed by
the Wisconsin Commission that he was entitled to claim an
additional amount of compensation in Wisconsin after recovering in
Illinois.
See Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 203 Wis. 466, 234 N.W. 889;
Salvation Army v.
Industrial Commission, 219 Wis. 343, 263 N.W. 349;
Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission,
222 Wis.194, 268 N.W. 134. The employer's insurance carrier was
likewise informed, and all the parties proceeded on the assumption
that the employee was attempting to recover compensation under the
statutes of both Illinois and Wisconsin, with credit to be given in
Wisconsin for any sum recovered in Illinois. In furtherance of this
common understanding, the above statement was inserted in the
Illinois settlement contract, and was brought to the attention of
the Industrial Commissioner before he approved the contract. The
Commissioner confessed that he did not know the meaning of this
provision, but he did not order it stricken. Rather, he approved it
for whatever it was worth.
Page 330 U. S. 630
This contract provision saving the rights of the employee in
Wisconsin thus became part of the Illinois award, an award which
has achieved finality in the absence of a timely appeal. This
provision means more than might be implied in the case of an
ordinary judgment or decree. Any party, of course, has the right to
seek another judgment or decree, however inconsistent or futile
such an attempt might be, and it takes no reservation in the
original judgment or decree to give him that right. But when the
reservation in this award is read against the background of the
Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, it becomes clear that the
reservation spells out what we believe to be implicit in that Act
-- namely, that an Illinois workmen's compensation award of the
type here involved does not foreclose an additional award under the
laws of another state. And, in the setting of this case, that fact
is of decisive significance.
Since this Illinois award is final and conclusive only as to
rights arising in Illinois, Wisconsin is free under the full faith
and credit clause to grant an award of compensation in accord with
its own laws.
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, supra, thus
does not control this case.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concurs in the result.