1. Foremen and other supervisory employees are entitled as a
class to the rights of self-organization, collective bargaining,
and other concerted activities assured to employees generally by
the National Labor Relations Act. Pp.
330 U. S.
488-490.
(a) They are "employees" within the meaning of § 2(3). P.
330 U. S.
488.
(b) They are not excluded from the term "employees" by § 2(2)
defining the term "employer." Pp.
330 U. S.
488-490.
2. When a union of supervisory employees has been duly certified
by the National Labor Relations Board as a bargaining
representative, the Act requires the employer to bargain with it.
P.
330 U. S.
490.
3. Where, as in this case, a determination of the National Labor
Relations Board under § 9(b) that a certain union is an appropriate
bargaining representative does not exceed the Board's authority, is
supported by substantial evidence, and is not so arbitrary or
unreasonable as to be illegal, it cannot be set aside by a court in
an enforcement proceeding under § 10(e). Pp.
330 U. S.
491-492.
Page 330 U. S. 486
4. Arguments as to the wisdom of permitting foremen to organize
should be addressed to Congress, not to the courts. Pp.
330 U. S. 490,
330 U. S.
493.
157 F.2d 80 affirmed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals decreed enforcement of an order of
the National Labor Relations Board requiring an employer to bargain
with a union of foremen. 157 F.2d 80. This Court granted
certiorari. 329 U.S. 707.
Affirmed., p.
330 U. S.
493.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether foremen are
entitled as a class to the rights of self-organization, collective
bargaining, and other concerted activities as assured to employees
generally by the National Labor Relations Act. The case grows out
of conditions of the automotive industry, and, so far as they are
important to the legal issues here, the facts are simple.
Page 330 U. S. 487
The Packard Motor Car Company employs about 32,000 rank and file
workmen. Since 1937, they have been represented by the United
Automobile Workers of America, affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. These employees are supervised by
approximately 1,100 employees of foremen rank, consisting of about
125 "general foremen," 643 "foremen," 273 "assistant foremen," and
65 "special assignment men." Each general foreman is in charge of
one or more departments, and under him in authority are foremen and
their assistant foremen. Special assignment men are described as
"troubleshooters."
The function of these foremen, in general, is typical of the
duties of foremen in mass production industry generally. Foremen
carry the responsibility for maintaining quantity and quality of
production, subject, of course, to the overall control and
supervision of the management. Hiring is done by the labor
relations department, as is the discharging and laying off of
employees. But the foremen are provided with forms, and with
detailed lists of penalties to be applied in cases of violations of
discipline, and initiate recommendations for promotion, demotion,
and discipline. All such recommendations are subject to the
reviewing procedure concerning grievances provided in the
collectively bargained agreement between the Company and the rank
and file union.
The foremen, as a group, are highly paid and, unlike the
workmen, are paid for justifiable absence and for holidays, are not
docked in pay when tardy, receive longer paid vacations, and are
given severance pay upon release by the Company.
These foremen determined to organize as a unit of the Foremen's
Association of America, an unaffiliated organization which
represents supervisory employees exclusively. Following the usual
procedure, after the Board had decided that
"all general foremen, foremen, assistant foremen,
Page 330 U. S. 488
and special assignment men employed by the Company at its plants
in Detroit, Michigan, constitute a unit appropriate for the
purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of section
9(b) of the Act, [
Footnote
1]"
the Foremen's Association was certified as the bargaining
representative. The Company asserted that foremen were not
"employees" entitled to the advantages of the Labor Act, and
refused to bargain with the union. After hearing on charge of
unfair labor practice, the Board issued the usual cease and desist
order. The Company resisted, and challenged validity of the order.
The judgment of the court below decreed its enforcement, and we
granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 707.
The issue of law as to the power of the National Labor Relations
Board under the National Labor Relations Act is simple, and our
only function is to determine whether the order of the Board is
authorized by the statute.
The privileges and benefits of the Act are conferred upon
employees, and § 2(3) of the Act, so far as relevant, provides "The
term "employee" shall include any employee. . . ." 49 Stat. 450.
The point that these foremen are employees both in the most
technical sense at common law as well as in common acceptance of
the term is too obvious to be labored. The Company, however, turns
to the Act's definition of employer, which it contends reads
foremen out of the employee class and into the class of employers.
Section 2(2) reads: "The term
employer' includes any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. . .
." 49 Stat. 450. The context of the Act, we think, leaves no room
for a construction of this section to deny the organizational
privilege to employees because they act in the interest of an
employer. Every employee, from the very fact of employment in the
master's business, is required to act in his interest. He
Page 330 U. S.
489
owes to the employer faithful performance of service in his
interest, the protection of the employer's property in his custody
or control, and all employees may, as to third parties, act in the
interests of the employer to such an extent that he is liable for
their wrongful acts. A familiar example would be that of a truck
driver for whose negligence the Company might have to
answer.
The purpose of § 2(2) seems obviously to render employers
responsible in labor practices for acts of any persons performed in
their interests. It is an adaptation of the ancient maxim of the
common law,
respondeat superior, by which a principal is
made liable for the tortious acts of his agent and the master for
the wrongful acts of his servants. Even without special statutory
provision, the rule would apply to many relations. But Congress was
creating a new class of wrongful acts to be known as unfair labor
practices, and it could not be certain that the courts would apply
the tort rule of
respondeat superior to those
derelictions. Even if it did, the problem of proof, as applied to
this kind of wrongs, might easily be complicated by questions as to
the scope of the actor's authority and of variance between his
apparent and his real authority. Hence, it was provided that, in
administering this act, the employer, for its purposes, should be
not merely the individual or corporation which was the employing
entity, but also others, whether employee or not, who are "acting
in the interest of an employer."
Even those who act for the employer in some matters, including
the service of standing between management and manual labor, still
have interests of their own as employees. Though the foreman is the
faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a production
schedule, his interest properly may be adverse to that of the
employer when it comes to fixing his own wages, hours, seniority
rights, or working conditions. He does not lose his right to serve
himself in these respects because he
Page 330 U. S. 490
serves his master in others. And we see no basis in this Act
whatever for holding that foremen are forbidden the protection of
the Act when they take collective action to protect their
collective interests.
The company's argument is really addressed to the undesirability
of permitting foremen to organize. It wants selfless
representatives of its interest. It fears that, if foremen combine
to bargain advantages for themselves, they will sometimes be
governed by interests of their own or of their fellow foremen,
rather than by the company's interest. There is nothing new in this
argument. It is rooted in the misconception that, because the
employer has the right to wholehearted loyalty in the performance
of the contract of employment, the employee does not have the right
to protect his independent and adverse interest in the terms of the
contract itself and the conditions of work. But the effect of the
National Labor Relations Act is otherwise, and it is for Congress,
not for us, to create exceptions or qualifications at odds with its
plain terms.
Moreover, the company concedes that foremen have a right to
organize. What it denies is that the statute compels it to
recognize the union. In other words, it wants to be free to fight
the foremen's union in the way that companies fought other unions
before the Labor Act. But there is nothing in the Act which
indicates that Congress intended to deny its benefits to foremen as
employees, if they choose to believe that their interests as
employees would be better served by organization than by individual
competition. [
Footnote 2]
NLRB v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 113 F.2d
667;
see NLRB v. Armour & Co., 154 F.2d 570, 574.
Page 330 U. S. 491
There is no more reason to conclude that the law prohibits
foremen as a class from constituting an appropriate bargaining unit
than there is for concluding that they are not within the Act at
all. Section 9(b) of the Act confers upon the Board a broad
discretion to determine appropriate units. It reads,
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure
to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the
policies . . . of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
49 Stat. 453. Our power of review also is circumscribed by the
provision that findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported
by evidence, shall be conclusive. § 10(e), 49 Stat. 454. So we have
power only to determine whether there is substantial evidence to
support the Board, or its order oversteps the law.
NLRB v.
Link-Belt Co., 311 U. S. 584;
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.
S. 146.
There is clearly substantial evidence in support of the
determination that foremen are an appropriate unit by themselves,
and there is equal evidence that, while the foremen included in
this unit have different degrees of responsibility and work at
different levels of authority, they have such a common relationship
to the enterprise and to other levels of workmen that inclusion of
all such grades of foremen in a single unit is appropriate. Hence,
the order, insofar as it depends on facts, is beyond our power of
review. The issue as to what unit is appropriate for bargaining is
one for which no absolute rule of law is laid down by statute, and
none should be by decision. It involves, of necessity, a large
measure of informed discretion, and the decision of the Board, if
not final, is rarely to be disturbed. While we do not say that a
determination of a unit of representation cannot be so unreasonable
and arbitrary as to exceed the Board's power, we are clear that
Page 330 U. S. 492
the decision in question does not do so. That settled, our power
is at an end.
We are invited to make a lengthy examination of views expressed
in Congress while this and later legislation was pending to show
that exclusion of foremen was intended. There is, however, no
ambiguity in this Act to be clarified by resort to legislative
history, either of the Act itself or of subsequent legislative
proposals which failed to become law.
Counsel also would persuade us to make a contrary interpretation
by citing a long record of inaction, vacillation, and division of
the National Labor Relations Board in applying this Act to foremen.
If we were obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for
light in finding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of
the Board's decisions would leave us in the dark. [
Footnote 3] But there are difficult questions
of policy involved in these cases which, together with changes in
Board membership, account for the contradictory views that
characterize their history in the Board. Whatever special questions
there are in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for
Page 330 U. S. 493
foremen are for the Board, and the history of the issue in the
Board shows the difficulty of the problem committed to its
discretion. We are not at liberty to be governed by those policy
considerations in deciding the naked question of law whether the
Board is now, in this case, acting within the terms of the
statute.
It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization of
foremen is, from many points, bad industrial policy -- that it puts
the union foreman in the position of serving two masters, divides
his loyalty, and makes generally for bad relations between
management and labor. However we might appraise the force of these
arguments as a policy matter, we are not authorized to base
decision of a question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of
the legislation; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain
provisions.
The judgment of enforcement is
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
61 N.L.R.B. 26.
[
Footnote 2]
If a union of vice-presidents, presidents, or others of like
relationship to a corporation comes here claiming rights under this
Act, it will be time enough then to point out the obvious and
relevant differences between the 1100 foremen of this company and
corporate officers elected by the board of directors.
[
Footnote 3]
The Board had held that supervisory employees may organize in an
independent union,
Union Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B.
961, 44 N.L.R.B. 165, and in an affiliated union,
Godchaux
Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874. Then it held that there was no
unit appropriate to the organization of supervisory employees.
Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733;
Boeing Aircraft
Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67;
Murray Corp. of America, 51
N.L.R.B. 94;
General Motors Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457. In
this case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4, 64 N.L.R.B. 1212; in
L. A. Young
Spring & Wire Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 298;
Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 386, 71 N.L.R.B. 1261, and
in California Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461, the Board
re-embraced its earlier conclusions with the same progressive
boldness it had shown in the
Union Collieries and
Godchaux Sugars cases. In none of this series of cases did
the Board hold that supervisors were not employees.
See Soss
Manufacturing Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 348.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
BURTON concur, dissenting.
First. Over thirty years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis,
while still a private citizen, saw the need for narrowing the gap
between management and labor, for allowing labor greater
participation in policy decisions, for developing an industrial
system in which cooperation, rather than coercion, was the dominant
characteristic. [
Footnote 2/1] In
his view, these were
Page 330 U. S. 494
measures of therapeutic value in dealing with problems of
industrial unrest or inefficiency.
The present decision may be a step in that direction. It at
least tends to obliterate the line between management and labor. It
ends the sanctions of federal law to unionization at all levels of
the industrial hierarchy. It tends to emphasize that the basic
opposing forces in industry are not management and labor, but the
operating group, on the one hand, and the stockholder and
bondholder group, on the other. The industrial problem, as so
defined, comes down to a contest over a fair division of the gross
receipts of industry between these two groups. The struggle for
control or power between management and labor becomes secondary to
a growing unity in their common demands on ownership.
I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the basic
policy questions which underlie the present decision. For, if
foremen are "employees" within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant
managers, superintendents, assistant superintendents -- indeed, all
who are on the payroll of the company, including the president; all
who are commonly referred to as the management, with the exception
of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents applied for
recognition as a collective bargaining agency, I do not see how we
could deny it and yet allow the present application. But once
vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen all are
unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx
than separate factions in warring camps. Indeed, the thought of
some
Page 330 U. S. 495
labor leaders that, if those in the hierarchy above the workers
are unionized, they will be more sympathetic with the claims of
those below them, is a manifestation of the same idea. [
Footnote 2/2]
I mention these matters to indicate what tremendously important
policy questions are involved in the present decision. My purpose
is to suggest that, if Congress, when it enacted the National Labor
Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in industrial
philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmistakable trace of
that purpose. But I find none.
Second. "Employee" is defined to include "any"
employee. § 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. § 152. If we stop
there, foremen are included, as are all employees, from the
president on down. But we are not warranted in stopping there. The
term "employee" must be considered in the context of the Act.
Labor Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.
S. 111,
322 U. S. 124;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.
S. 177,
313 U. S. 191.
When it is so considered, it does not appear to be used in an
all-embracing sense. Rather, it is used in opposition to the term
"employer." An "employer" is defined to include "any person acting
in the interest of an employer." § 2(2). The term "employer" thus
includes some employees. And I find no evidence that one personnel
group may be both employers and employees within the meaning of the
Act. Rather, the Act, on its face, seems to classify the operating
group of industry into two classes; what is included in one group
is excluded from the other.
It is not an answer to say that the two statutory groups are not
exclusive, because every "employee" while on duty -- whether
driving a truck or stoking a furnace or
Page 330 U. S. 496
operating a lathe -- is "acting in the interest" of his
employer, and is then an "employer" in the statutory sense. The Act
was not declaring a policy of vicarious responsibility of industry.
It was dealing solely with labor relations. It put in the employer
category all those who acted for management not only in
formulating, but also in executing, its labor policies. [
Footnote 2/3]
Foremost among the latter were foremen. Trade union history
shows that foremen were the arms and legs of management in
executing labor policies. In industrial conflicts they were allied
with management. Management indeed commonly acted through them in
the unfair labor practices which the Act condemns. [
Footnote 2/4] When we upheld the imposition of the
sanctions of the Act against management, we frequently relied on
the acts of foremen through whom management expressed its hostility
to trade unionism. [
Footnote
2/5]
Third. The evil at which the Act was aimed was the
failure or refusal of industry to recognize the right of workingmen
to bargain collectively. In § 1 of the Act, Congress noted that
such an attitude on the part of industry led "to strikes and other
forms of industrial strife or unrest," so as to burden or obstruct
interstate commerce. We know from the history of that decade that
the frustrated efforts of workingmen, of laborers, to organize led
to strikes, strife, and unrest. But we are pointed to no instances
where foremen were striking, nor
Page 330 U. S. 497
are we advised that managers, superintendents, or
vice-presidents were doing so. [
Footnote 2/6]
Indeed, the problems of those in the supervisory categories of
management did not seem to have been in the consciousness of
Congress. Section 1 of the Act refers to "wage rates," "wage
earners," "workers." There is no phrase in the entire Act which is
descriptive of those doing supervisory work. Section 2(3) exempts
from the term "employee" any "agricultural laborer." But, if
"employee" includes a foreman, it would be most strange to find
Congress exempting "agricultural laborers" but not "agricultural
foremen." The inference is strong that, since it exempted only
agricultural "laborers," it had no idea that agricultural "foremen"
were under the Act.
If foremen were to be included as employees under the Act,
special problems would be raised -- important problems relating to
the unit in which the foremen might be represented. Foremen are
also under the Act as employers. That dual status creates serious
problems. An act of a foreman, if attributed to the management,
constitutes an unfair labor practice; the same act may be part of
the foreman's activity as an employee. In that event, the employer
can only interfere at his peril. [
Footnote 2/7] The complications
Page 330 U. S. 498
of dealing with the problems of supervisory employees strongly
suggest that, if Congress had planned to include them in its
project, it would have made some special provision for them. But we
find no trace of a suggestion that, when Congress came to consider
the units appropriate for collective bargaining, [
Footnote 2/8] it was aware that groups of employees
might have conflicting loyalties. Yet that would have been one of
the most important and conspicuous problems if foremen were to be
included. The failure of Congress to formulate a policy respecting
the peculiar and special problems of foremen suggests an absence of
purpose to bring them under the Act. And the notion is hard to
resist that the very absence of a declaration by Congress of its
policy respecting foremen is the reason the Board has been so much
at large in the treatment of the problem under the Act.
See the cases collected in
note 3 of the opinion of the Court
Fourth. When we turn from the Act to the legislative
history, we find no trace of Congressional concern with the
problems of supervisory personnel. The reports and debates are
barren of any reference to them, though they are replete with
references to the function of the legislation in protecting the
interests of "laborers" and "workers." [
Footnote 2/9]
Page 330 U. S. 499
Fifth. When we turn to other related legislation, we
find that, when Congress desired to include managerial officials or
supervisory personnel in the category of employees, it did so
expressly. The Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. §
151, defines "employee" to include "subordinate official." The
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U.S.C. § 1101
et
seq., which deals with maritime labor relations as a
supplement to the National Labor Relations Act (
see 46
U.S.C. § 1252) defines "employee" to include "subordinate
official." 46 U.S.C. § 1253(c). And the Social Security Act, 49
Stat. 620, 647, 42 U.S.C. § 1301, includes an officer of a
corporation in the term employee. [
Footnote 2/10] The failure of Congress to do the same
when it wrote the National Labor Relations Act has some
significance, especially where the legislative history is utterly
devoid of any indication that Congress was concerned with the
collective bargaining problems of supervisory employees.
Sixth. The truth of the matter is, I think, that, when
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935, it was
legislating against the activities of foremen, not on their behalf.
Congress was intent on protecting the right of free association --
the right to bargain collectively by the great mass of workers, not
by those who were in authority over them and enforcing oppressive
industrial policies. Foremen were instrumentalities of those
industrial policies. They blocked the wage earners' path to fair
collective bargaining. To say twelve years later that foremen were
treated as the victims of that anti-labor policy seems to me a
distortion of history.
Page 330 U. S. 500
If we were to decide this case on the basis of policy, much
could be said to support the majority view. [
Footnote 2/11] But I am convinced that Congress never
faced those policy issues when it enacted this legislation. I am
sure that those problems were not in the consciousness of Congress.
A decision of these policy matters cuts deep into our industrial
life. It has profound implications throughout our economy. It
involves a fundamental change in much of the thinking of the nation
on our industrial problems. The question is so important that I
cannot believe Congress legislated unwittingly on it. Since what
Congress wrote is consistent with a restriction of the Act to
workingmen and laborers, I would leave its extension over
supervisory employees to Congress.
I have used the terms foremen and supervisory employees
synonymously. But it is not the label which is important; it is
whether the employees in question represent or act for management
on labor policy matters. Thus, one might be a supervisory employee
without representing management in those respects. And those who
are called foremen may perform duties not substantially different
from those of skilled laborers.
What I have said does not mean that foremen have no right to
organize for collective bargaining. The general law recognizes
their right to do so.
See American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Council, 257 U. S. 184,
257 U. S. 209;
Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548,
281 U. S. 570.
And
Page 330 U. S. 501
some States have placed administrative machinery and sanctions
behind that right. [
Footnote
2/12] But as I read the federal Act, Congress has not yet done
so.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER agrees with this opinion except the part
marked "First," as to which he expresses no view.
[
Footnote 2/1]
"The greater productivity of labor must not only be attainable,
but attainable under conditions consistent with the conservation of
health, the enjoyment of work, and the development of the
individual. The facts in this regard have not been adequately
established. In the task of ascertaining whether proposed
conditions of work do conform to these requirements, the laborer
should take part. He is, indeed, a necessary witness. Likewise, in
the task of determining whether, in the distribution of the gain in
productivity, justice is being done to the worker, the
participation of representatives of labor is indispensable for the
inquiry, which involves essentially the exercise of judgment."
Brandeis, Business -- A Profession, pp. 52-53.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Foreman Abdicates, XXXII Fortune, No. 3, p. 150, 152;
Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow (1946) ch. VII.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees under the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 Iowa L.Rev. 297; Rosenfarb, The National
Labor Policy (1940) pp. 54-56, 116-120; Twentieth Century Fund, How
Collective Bargaining Works (1942) pp. 512-514, 547, 557-558, 628,
780.
[
Footnote 2/4]
See cases collected in Daykin,
op. cit. supra,
330
U.S. 485fn2/3|>note 3, pp. 298-299.
[
Footnote 2/5]
International Association of Machinists v. Labor Board,
311 U. S. 72,
311 U. S. 79-80;
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Labor Board, 311 U.
S. 514,
311 U. S.
520-521.
[
Footnote 2/6]
It is true that, for many years, some unions included
supervisory employees, Beatrice and Sydney Webb, Industrial
Democracy (1902) p. 546, fn. 2; Union Membership and Collective
Bargaining by Foremen, U.S. Department of Labor Bull. No. 7 5
(1943); Report of Panel of War Labor Board in Disputes Involving
Supervisors (1945) IX; Twentieth Century Fund,
op. cit.
supra, 330
U.S. 485fn2/3|>note 3, pp. 67, 216; Northrup, Unionization
of Foremen, 21 Harv.Bus.Rev. 496. But organization of foremen on a
broad scale is a development of the last few years. Daykin,
op.
cit. supra, 330
U.S. 485fn2/3|>note 3, p. 314; Rosenfarb, Foremen on the
March, 7 Fed.Bar.J. 168; Note, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 606, 607; Comment, 55
Yale L.J. 754, 756; Foremen's Unions, IX Advanced Management
Quarterly J. 110.
[
Footnote 2/7]
Cf. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 146
F.2d 833; Comment, 55 Yale L.J. 754, 767-774; Rosenfarb,
op.
cit. supra, 330
U.S. 485fn2/6|>note 6.
[
Footnote 2/8]
Section 9(b) of the Act provides:
"The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure
to employees the full benefit of their right to self-organization
and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the
policies . . . of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit,
plant unit, or subdivision thereof."
[
Footnote 2/9]
See H.Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No.
972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.;
S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 6-7; Hearings, Senate
Comm'n on Educ. and Labor on S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.;
Hearings, House Comm'n on Labor on H.R. 6288, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess.; Hearings, Senate Comm'n on Educ. and Labor on S.1958, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess.; 79 Cong.Rec. 2371, 7365, 7648, 7668, 8537, 9676,
9713, 9736, 10720.
[
Footnote 2/10]
Cf. Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. § 51, under which the term "any employee of a
carrier" has been applied to foremen.
Owens v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 319 U. S. 715;
Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 329 U.
S. 649.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Daykin,
op. cit. supra, 330
U.S. 485fn2/3|>note 3, p. 313; Rosenfarb,
op. cit.
supra, 330
U.S. 485fn2/6|>note 6; Gartenbaus, The Foreman goes Union,
113 New Republic 563: Comment 55 Yale L.J. 754; Hearings, House
Comm'n on Military Affairs on Bills relating to the Full
Utilization of Manpower, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 299; Northrup,
The Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev. 187;
cf. American Management Association, Relation Between
Management and Foremen in American Industry (1944);
id.,
The Foreman in Labor Relations (1944);
id., Should
Management be Unionized? (1945).
[
Footnote 2/12]
The state laws are discussed in Northrup, The Foreman's
Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev. 187, 199-200.