1. Relying upon a Nevada divorce decree, petitioner applied to
Pennsylvania court for revocation of an order for the support of
his wife. The application was denied.
Held: that, upon the record, the Pennsylvania court was
warranted in finding that petitioner did not have a
bona
fide domicil in Nevada when he obtained his decree of divorce,
and the Nevada divorce decree therefore was not denied the full
faith and credit required by the Constitution.
Williams v.
North Carolina, ante p. 226. P.
325 U. S.
280.
2. The claim that the Pennsylvania courts did not afford the
petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the question of domicil is
without support in the record. P.
325 U. S.
281.
348 Pa. 455, 35 A.2d 335, affirmed.
Certiorari, 322 U.S. 725, to review a judgment which sustained
the denial of petitioner's application for revocation of an order
for the support of his wife.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the same problem as that which was considered
in
Williams v. North Carolina, ante, p.
325 U. S. 226.
There are minor variations of fact, but the considerations which
controlled the result in the
Williams case govern
this.
Petitioner and respondent were married in Pennsylvania in 1899.
They separated in 1919, but continued to live there. The wife,
respondent, obtained a support order in the Pennsylvania courts
which was modified from
Page 325 U. S. 280
time to time. Twice the petitioner sought a divorce in
Pennsylvania and failed. In 1941, he went to Nevada, arriving at
Las Vegas on June 23rd. Six weeks later, promptly within the
minimum period allowed by Nevada law, he there filed a suit for
divorce. It was granted September 8th. Shortly thereafter, early in
October, he left Nevada and took up his residence in Cleveland,
Ohio, where he made his home. On February 1, 1943, petitioner filed
an application before the County Court for Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, for total relief from the support order. He did so on
the basis of the decision in
Williams v. North Carolina,
317 U. S. 287,
which had been decided on December 21, 1942. Exemplified copies of
the Nevada proceedings, with other relevant evidence, were
submitted to the County Court, which, after argument, denied the
application. Its decision was affirmed by the Superior Court on the
ground that petitioner did not have a
bona fide domicil in
Nevada when he obtained his decree of divorce. 153 Pa.Super. 69, 33
A.2d 675. This was sustained by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
348 Pa. 455, 35 A.2d 335, and we then granted certiorari. 322 U.S.
725.
Since, according to Pennsylvania law, a support order does not
survive divorce,
Commonwealth v. Parker, 59 Pa.Super. 74;
Commonwealth v. Kurniker, 96 Pa.Super. 553, the efficacy
of the Nevada divorce in Pennsylvania is the decisive question in
the case. The facts relating to domicil are not essentially
different from those set forth in
Williams v. North Carolina,
ante, p.
325 U. S. 226,
except that petitioner, instead of staying in an auto court, lived
in a hotel and did not return to Pennsylvania, his domiciliary
state before he came to Nevada, but went to Ohio.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, Const. Art. 4, ยง 1, placed the
Pennsylvania courts under duty to accord
prima facie
validity to the Nevada decree. The burden is on the litigant who
would escape the operation of a judgment decreed in another
Page 325 U. S. 281
State. Pennsylvania recognized that burden, but its courts were
warranted in finding that the respondent sustained her burden of
impeaching the foundation of the Nevada decree on the
jurisdictional prerequisite of
bona fide domicil. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court rightly indicated that, if merely the
Nevada decree had been in evidence, it was entitled to carry the
day. But the Supreme Court found that, on the entire showing, there
was convincing countervailing evidence to disprove petitioner's
intention to establish a domicil in Nevada. The Pennsylvania courts
have viewed their Constitutional duty correctly. It is not for us
to retry the facts, and we cannot say that, in reaching their
conclusion, the Pennsylvania courts did not have warrant in
evidence and did not fairly weigh the facts.
Petitioner makes a subsidiary claim which need not detain us
long. He asserts that he had no notice that the Nevada domicil was
to be put in issue, and that therefore it was unfair to decide that
question on this record. He points to the fact that, for its
decision, the County Court relied on the Pennsylvania denials of
divorce as
res judicata, whereas the appellate courts
rested their decisions on the issue of domicil. Since the record
does not support the basis of this claim, we are relieved from
considering its legal significance. The issue of domicil was
appropriately pleaded in defense, it was contested at the trial,
and before the Superior Court, petitioner filed a supplemental
brief on that issue. A claim of deprivation of opportunity to be
heard on the question of domicil before the Pennsylvania courts is
without merit.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring.
I think it is important to keep in mind a basic difference
between the problem of marital capacity and the problem of
support.
Page 325 U. S. 282
We held in
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.
S. 287, that a Nevada divorce decree granted to a spouse
domiciled there was entitled to full faith and credit in North
Carolina. That case involved the question of marital capacity. The
spouse who obtained the Nevada decree was being prosecuted in North
Carolina for living with the one woman whom Nevada recognized as
his lawful wife. Quite different considerations would have been
presented if North Carolina had merely sought to compel the husband
to support his deserted wife and children, whether the Nevada
decree had made no provision for the support of the former wife and
children or had provided an amount deemed insufficient by North
Carolina. In other words, it is not apparent that the spouse who
obtained the decree can defeat an action for maintenance or support
in another State by showing that he was domiciled in the State
which awarded him the divorce decree. It is one thing if the spouse
from whom the decree of divorce is obtained appears or is
personally served.
See Yarborough v. Yarborough,
290 U. S. 202;
Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32. But I
am not convinced that, in absence of an appearance or personal
service, the decree need be given full faith and credit when it
comes to maintenance or support of the other spouse or the
children.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714. The problem under the full faith and credit clause
is to accommodate as fully as possible the conflicting interests of
the two States.
See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U. S. 430,
320 U. S. 447
(dissenting opinion). The question of marital capacity will often
raise an irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the two
States.
See Williams v. North Carolina, supra. One must
give way in the larger interest of the federal union. But the same
conflict is not necessarily present when it comes to maintenance or
support. The State where the deserted wife is domiciled has a deep
concern in the welfare of the family deserted by the head of the
household. If he is required to support his former wife, he is not
made a bigamist, and
Page 325 U. S. 283
the offspring of his second marriage are not bastardized. In
that view, Pennsylvania in this case might refuse to alter its
former order of support or might enlarge it, even though Nevada in
which the other spouse was domiciled and obtained his divorce made
a different provision for support, or none at all.
See
Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause, 39
Ill.L.Rev. 1, 28.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins in this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, concurring.
In accordance with the views which I have expressed in
Williams v. North Carolina, ante, p.
325 U. S. 226, I
do not think full faith and credit have been given by the
Pennsylvania courts to the Nevada decree in this case. But, upon
the basis of the Court's decision in that case, made applicable
also in this one, I concur in the result. In doing so, however, it
is appropriate to indicate my agreement with the views expressed in
the concurring opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS that the
jurisdictional foundation for a decree in one state capable of
foreclosing an action for maintenance or support in another may be
different from that required to alter marital status with
extraterritorial effect.