1. A decree of a state court fixing the obligation of a divorced
father for the support and education of his minor daughter
held binding, under the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution, on the
Page 290 U. S. 203
courts of another state to which the daughter and the divorced
mother had removed and in which it was sought to force additional
contributions from the father by attachment of his local property.
P.
290 U. S. 208
et seq.
2. By the law of Georgia, a decree in a divorce suit fixing the
permanent alimony that the husband must pay for the support and
education of his minor child may be entered by consent of the
husband and wife before the rendition of the two concurring
verdicts which the law makes necessary for the granting of total
divorce; it becomes unalterable after the expiration of the term at
which the total divorce was granted. P.
290 U. S.
209.
3. The provision which the Georgia law makes for permanent
alimony for the child does not vest a property right in him, but is
an incident of the divorce proceeding. Jurisdiction of the parents
in that suit confers jurisdiction over the minor's custody and
support. P.
290 U. S.
210.
4. Hence, by the Georgia law, a consent (or other) decree in a
divorce suit fixing permanent alimony for a minor child is binding
upon him, although the child was not served with process, was not
made a formal party to the suit, and was not represented by
guardian
ad litem. P.
290 U. S.
210.
5. Appearance of both parents in the divorce proceeding in
Georgia, the domicile of the father, gave the Georgia court
complete jurisdiction of the marriage status and, as an incident,
power to finally determine the extent of the father's obligation to
support the child, though the child was residing in another state
when the judgment was entered. P.
290 U. S.
211.
6. The fact that the child became a resident of the other state
did not enable that state to impose additional duties on the
father, who continued to be domiciled in Georgia. P.
290 U. S.
212.
168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877, reversed.
Certiorari, 289 U.S. 718, to review the affirmance of a judgment
for support, etc., of a minor child.
Page 290 U. S. 204
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
On August 10, 1930, Sadie Yarborough, then sixteen years of age,
was living with her maternal grandfather, R. D. Blowers, at
Spartansburg, South Carolina. Suing by him as guardian
ad
litem, she brought this action in a court of that state to
require her father, W. A. Yarborough, a resident of Atlanta,
Georgia, to make provision for her education and maintenance. She
alleged
"that she is now ready for college and is without funds, and,
unless the defendant makes provision for her, will be denied the
necessities of life and an education, and will be dependent upon
the charity of others. [
Footnote
1]"
Jurisdiction was obtained by attachment of defendant's property.
Later, he was served personally within South Carolina.
In bar of the action, W. A. Yarborough set up, among other
defenses, a judgment entered in 1929 by the Superior Court of
Fulton County, Georgia, in a suit for divorce brought by him
against Sadie's mother. He alleged that, by the judgment, the
amount thereafter to be paid by him for Sadie's education and
maintenance had been determined; that the sum so fixed had been
paid, and that the judgment had been fully satisfied by him. He
claimed that, in Georgia, the judgment was conclusive of the matter
here in controversy; that, having been satisfied, it relieved him,
under the Georgia law, of all obligation to provide for the
education and maintenance of their minor child, and that the full
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. IV, § 1)
required the State of South Carolina court to give to that judgment
the same effect in this proceeding which it has, and would have, in
Georgia. The trial court denied the claim; ordered W. A. Yarborough
to pay to the grandfather, as trustee, $50 monthly for Sadie's
education and support, and to pay
Page 290 U. S. 205
$300 as fees of her counsel. It directed that the property held
under the attachment be transferred to R. D. Blowers, trustee, as
security for the performance of the order. The judgment was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. A petition for
rehearing was denied, with opinion. 168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877. This
Court granted certiorari. 289 U.S. 718.
For some time prior to June, 1927, W. A. Yarborough, his wife,
and their daughter Sadie had lived together at Atlanta, Georgia
where he then was, and ever since has been, domiciled. In that
month, Sadie's mother left Atlanta for Hendersonville, N.C., where
she remained during the summer. Sadie joined her there, after a
short stay at a camp. In September, 1927, while they were at
Hendersonville, W. A. Yarborough brought, in the superior court for
Fulton county at Atlanta, suit against his wife for a total divorce
on the ground of mental and physical cruelty. Mrs. Yarborough filed
an answer and also a cross-suit in which she prayed a total
divorce, the custody of the child, and
"that provision for permanent alimony be made for the support of
the respondent and the minor child above mentioned [Sadie], and for
the education of said minor child."
An order, several times modified, awarded to the wife the
custody of Sadie, and as temporary alimony sums "for the support
and maintenance of herself and her minor daughter Sadie." Hearings
were held from time to time at Atlanta. At some of these, Sadie
(and also her grandfather) was personally present. But she was not
formally made a party to the litigation, she was not served with
process, and no guardian
ad litem was appointed for her
therein.
"Two concurring verdicts favoring a total divorce to plaintiff
having been rendered," [
Footnote
2] a decree of total divorce,
Page 290 U. S. 206
with the right in each to remarry, was entered on June 7, 1929;
the wife was ordered to pay the costs, and jurisdiction of the case
"was retained for the purpose of further enforcement of the orders
of the court theretofore passed." [
Footnote 3] Among such orders was the provision for the
maintenance and education of Sadie here relied upon as
res
judicata. It was entered on January 17, 1929 (after the
rendition of the first verdict), and provided:
"Parties, plaintiff and defendant, having personally and in
writing, consented hereto, and their respective counsel of record
having likewise in writing consented hereto."
"It is considered, ordered, and adjudged that the following
settlement be hereby made the order of the Court, the same being in
full settlement of temporary and permanent alimony in said case,
and in full settlement of all other demands of every nature
whatsoever between the parties."
Then followed, after describing certain mortgages:
"It is considered, ordered and adjudged that said mortgages be,
and they are hereby transferred, sold and assigned by the
plaintiff, W. A. Yarborough to the defendant, Mrs. Susie B.
Yarborough to the extent of One Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty
Dollars ($1,750.00), and the plaintiff, W. A. Yarborough, does
hereby transfer, sell and assign said mortgages to R. D. Blowers,
of Spartansburg, South Carolina, as Trustee for Sadie Yarborough,
minor daughter of plaintiff and defendant, to the extent
Page 290 U. S. 207
of One Thousand, Seven Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,750.00). . . .
The amount to be thus received by R. D. Blowers as Trustee for
Sadie Yarborough, minor daughter of plaintiff and defendant, shall
be expended by him in his discretion for the benefit of the minor
child, including her education, support, maintenance, medical
attention and other necessary items of expenditure."
"Upon compliance with this order by the plaintiff, he shall be
relieved of all payments of alimony and counsel fees in said case
except that the payment due under the prior order of Court of the
sum of Fifty Dollars ($50.00) for the month of January, 1929, (to
Mrs. Yarborough for the support of herself and Sadie) shall be by
him paid in addition to the other amounts hereinbefore named. . .
."
"The provisions of the order of the Court heretofore entered
fixing the times and the places when plaintiff, W. A. Yarborough,
shall have the right to visit and have with him, out of the
presence of the defendant, the said Sadie Yarborough, minor
daughter of plaintiff and defendant, are hereby continued in
force."
W. A. Yarborough complied fully with this order.
By the law of Georgia, it is the duty of the father to provide
for the maintenance and education of his child until maturity.
[
Footnote 4] Willful
abandonment of a minor child, leaving it in a dependent condition,
is a misdemeanor. [
Footnote 5]
The mere loss of custody by the father does not relieve him of his
obligation to provide for maintenance and education, even where the
custody passes to the mother pursuant to a decree of divorce.
[
Footnote 6] If the father
fails to make such provision, any person (including a divorced
wife)
Page 290 U. S. 208
who furnishes necessaries of life to his minor child may recover
from him therefor unless precluded by the terms of the decree in
the divorce suit or otherwise. [
Footnote 7] In case of total divorce, the court is
authorized to make, by its decree, final or permanent provision for
the maintenance and education of children during minority, and thus
fix the extent of the father's obligation. [
Footnote 8] But, even if the decree for total divorce
fails to include a provision for the support of minor children,
they cannot maintain in their own names, or by guardian
ad
litem, or by next friend, an independent suit for an allowance
for education and maintenance. [
Footnote 9]
First. It was contended below in the trial court, and
there held, that the provision of the decree of the Georgia court
directing the payment to R. D. Blowers, trustee, of
Page 290 U. S. 209
$1,750 to be
"expended by him in his discretion for the benefit of the minor
child, including her education, support, maintenance, medical
attention and other necessary items of expenditure,"
was not intended to relieve the father from all further
liability to support Sadie. This contention appears to have been
abandoned. It is clear that Mrs. Yarborough, her husband, and the
court intended that this provision should absolve Sadie's father
from further obligation to support her. That the term "permanent
alimony" as used in the decree of the Georgia court means a final
provision for the minor child is shown by both the legislation of
the state and the decisions of its highest court. [
Footnote 10] The refusal of the South
Carolina court to give the judgment effect as against Sadie is now
sought to be justified on other grounds.
Second. It is contended that the order or decree
providing for Sadie's permanent support is not
res
judicata because it did not conform to the provisions of the
Georgia law. The argument is that the controlling statute required
such an order to be entered after the second or final verdict, and
that, since the order was entered before the second verdict and was
not mentioned in it, the order was unauthorized, and is void. The
Georgia decisions have settled that a consent decree or order
fixing permanent alimony for a minor child, at whatever stage of
the divorce proceedings it may have been entered, has the same
effect as if based upon, and specifically mentioned in, the second
verdict of a jury, [
Footnote
11] and that such an order,
Page 290 U. S. 210
like any other judgment, becomes unalterable after the
expiration of the term. [
Footnote 12]
Third. It is contended that the Georgia decree is not
binding upon Sadie, because she was not a formal party to the suit,
was not served with process, and no guardian
ad litem was
appointed for her therein. In Georgia, as elsewhere, a property
right of a minor can ordinarily be affected by legal proceedings
only if these requirements are complied with. [
Footnote 13] But the obligation imposed by the
Georgia law upon the father to support his minor child does not
vest in the child a property right. This is shown by the fact,
among other things, that the minor cannot maintain in his own name,
or by guardian
ad litem or by next friend, a suit against
his father to enforce the obligation. [
Footnote 14] The provision which the Georgia law makes
of permanent alimony for the child during minority is a legal
incident of the divorce proceeding. As that suit embraces within
its scope the disposition and care of minor children, jurisdiction
over the parents confers
eo ipso jurisdiction over the
minor's custody and support. Hence, by the Georgia law, a consent
(or other) decree in a divorce suit fixing permanent alimony for a
minor child is binding upon it, although the child was not served
with process, was not made a formal party to the suit, and no
guardian
ad litem was appointed therein. [
Footnote 15]
Page 290 U. S. 211
Fourth. It is contended that the order for permanent
alimony is not binding upon Sadie because she was not a resident of
Georgia at the time it was entered. Being a minor, Sadie's domicile
was Georgia, that of her father, [
Footnote 16] and her domicile continued to be in Georgia
until entry of the judgment in question. She was not capable, by
her own act, of changing her domicile. [
Footnote 17] Neither the temporary residence in North
Carolina at the time the divorce suit was begun [
Footnote 18] nor her removal with her
mother to South Carolina before entry of the judgment effected a
change of Sadie's domicile. [
Footnote 19] It is true that, under the Georgia Code, a
minor may acquire a domicile apart from the father if he has
"voluntarily relinquished his parental authority." But the mere
fact that the parents were living separately at the time the suit
for divorce was brought and that Sadie was with her mother does not
establish such relinquishment. [
Footnote 20]
Compare Anderson v. Watt,
138 U. S. 694,
138 U. S. 706.
The character and extent of the father's obligation, and the status
of the minor, are determined ordinarily not by the place of the
minor's residence, but by the law of the father's domicile.
[
Footnote 21] Moreover, this
is not a case where the scope of the jurisdiction acquired by the
Georgia court rests upon the effectiveness of service by
publication upon a nonresident. Mrs. Yarborough filed a cross-bill,
as well as an answer, and in the cross-bill prayed "that provision
for permanent alimony be made for the" support and education of
Sadie. Thus,
Page 290 U. S. 212
the court acquired complete jurisdiction of the marriage status
and, as an incident, power to finally determine the extent of her
father's obligation to support his minor child. [
Footnote 22]
Fifth. The fact that Sadie has become a resident of
South Carolina does not impair the finality of the judgment. South
Carolina thereby acquired the jurisdiction to determine her status
and the incidents of that status. Upon residents of that state it
could impose duties for her benefit. Doubtless, it might have
imposed upon her grandfather who was resident there a duty to
support Sadie. But the mere fact of Sadie's residence in South
Carolina does not give that state the power to impose such a duty
upon the father who is not a resident and who long has been
domiciled in Georgia. [
Footnote
23] He has fulfilled the duty which he owes her by the law of
his domicile and the judgment of its court. Upon that judgment he
is entitled to rely. [
Footnote
24] It was settled by
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S.
1, that the full faith and credit clause applies to an
unalterable decree of alimony for a divorced wife. The clause
Page 290 U. S. 213
applies, likewise, to an unalterable decree of alimony for a
minor child. [
Footnote 25]
We need not consider whether South Carolina would have power to
require the father, if he were domiciled there, to make further
provision for the support, maintenance, or education of his
daughter.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
There was no suggestion that plaintiff would be destitute or
become a public charge. Indeed, her grandfather testified that he
was able and willing to provide $125 a month for her education and
maintenance (the amount sought by plaintiff) if her father was
unable to do so.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 2944 of the Georgia Civil Code 1910 provides:
"Divorces may be granted by the superior court, and shall be of
two kinds -- total, or from bed and board. The concurrent verdict
of two juries at different terms of the court, shall be necessary
to a total divorce."
[
Footnote 3]
Custody of Sadie had been awarded to the mother, and it had been
ordered that the father be
"allowed the privilege of visiting his minor daughter, and of
having her with him, out of the presence of the defendant, on the
second and fourth weekends of each month, from the close of school
hours Friday until Sunday night of said week ends, during school
terms, and at like times during vacation, at which times the
plaintiff shall be entitled to take said minor daughter on pleasure
trips of reasonable distance returning her punctually at the
conclusion of the allotted time."
[
Footnote 4]
Georgia Civil Code 1910, § 3020.
[
Footnote 5]
Georgia Penal Code 1910, § 116;
Jackson v. State, 1
Ga.App. 723, 58 S.E. 272.
[
Footnote 6]
Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712, 715, 64 S.E. 1092.
[
Footnote 7]
Brown v. Brown, 132 Ga. 712, 64 S.E. 1092;
Hall v.
Hall, 141 Ga. 361, 80 S.E. 992;
Hooten v. Hooten, 168
Ga. 86, 90, 147 S.E. 373;
Garrett v. Garrett, 172 Ga. 812,
159 S.E. 255;
Pace v. Bergquist, 173 Ga. 112, 114, 159
S.E. 678.
[
Footnote 8]
The order for permanent alimony for the child is a matter
distinct from that for permanent alimony for the wife.
See
Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Ga. 606, 62 S.E. 1044. The applicable
sections of the Georgia Civil Code 1910 annotated are:
"§ 2981. Alimony for children on final trial. If the jury, on
the second or final verdict, find in favor of the wife, they shall
also, in providing permanent alimony for her, specify what amount
the minor children shall be entitled to for their permanent
support, and in what manner, how often, to whom, and until when it
shall be paid, and this they may also do if, from any legal cause,
the wife may not be entitled to permanent alimony, and the said
children are not in the same category, and when such support shall
be thus granted, the husband shall likewise not be liable to third
persons for necessaries furnished the children embraced in said
verdict who shall be therein specified."
"§ 2982. Judgments, how enforced. Such orders, decrees, or
verdicts, permanent or temporary, in favor of the children or
family of the husband, may be enforced as those in favor of the
wife exclusively."
[
Footnote 9]
Sikes v. Sikes, 158 Ga. 406, 123 S.E. 694;
Hooten
v. Hooten, 168 Ga. 86, 147 S.E. 373.
Compare Maddox v.
Patterson, 80 Ga. 719, 6 S.E. 581;
Humphreys v. Bush,
118 Ga. 628, 45 S.E. 911.
[
Footnote 10]
See note 7 Also
Coffee v. Coffee, 101 Ga. 787, 28 S.E. 977;
Johnson v.
Johnson, 131 Ga. 606, 608, 609, 62 S.E. 1044;
Gilbert v.
Gilbert, 151 Ga. 520, 523, 107 S.E. 490;
Gaines v.
Gaines, 169 Ga. 432, 434, 435, 150 S.E. 645.
[
Footnote 11]
Coffee v. Coffee, 101 Georgia 787, 790, 28 S.E. 977,
978:
"In the present case, the parties dispensed with a jury trial
upon the question of an allowance of permanent alimony, and, by
consent, invoked a decree of the court fixing the allowance upon
the terms stated in the decree. This consent having been approved
by the court in which the cause was pending after the grant of the
divorce, the court loses control over the subject, and the decree
stands as other judgments against the husband."
[
Footnote 12]
See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 146 Ga. 382, 91 S.E. 415;
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 151 Ga. 520, 107 S.E. 490;
Gaines
v. Gaines, 169 Ga. 432, 433, 150 S.E. 645. The decree for the
child's custody is, however, subject to modification at any time.
Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, 115 S.E. 115.
[
Footnote 13]
Groce v. Field, 13 Ga. 24;
Hill v. Printup, 48
Ga. 452, 454.
[
Footnote 14]
See cases in
note
9
[
Footnote 15]
Compare Kell v. Kell, 179 Iowa, 647, 650, 161 N.W. 634;
Snover v. Snover, 10 N.J.Eq. 261, 262;
Marks v.
Marks, 22 S.D. 453, 457, 118 N.W. 694;
Wells v.
Wells, 11 App.D.C. 392, 394.
[
Footnote 16]
Compare Georgia Civil Code (1910), § 2992;
Jackson
v. Southern Flour & Grain Co., 146 Ga. 453, 91 S.E. 481;
Civil Code (1910), § 2184.
[
Footnote 17]
Jackson v. Southern Flour & Grain Co., 146 Ga. 453,
91 S.E. 481.
[
Footnote 18]
McDowell v. Gould, 166 Ga. 670, 671, 144 S.E. 206.
[
Footnote 19]
Compare Taylor v. Jeter, 33 Ga. 195.
[
Footnote 20]
Hunt v. Hunt, 94 Ga. 257, 21 S.E. 515.
[
Footnote 21]
Macdonald v. Macdonald, 8 Bell & Murray 2d 830;
Coldingham v. Smith, [1918] 2 K.B. 90.
Compare Irving
v. Ford, 183 Mass. 448, 67 N.E. 366;
Blythe v. Ayres,
96 Cal. 532, 31 P. 915.
[
Footnote 22]
Schroeder v. Schroeder, 144 Ga. 119, 86 S.E. 224.
Compare State v. Rhoades, 29 Wash. 61, 68, 69 P. 389;
Anderson v. Anderson, 74 W.Va. 124, 81 S.E. 706;
State
ex rel. Shoemaker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047;
Laumeier v.
Laumeier, 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481;
Laumeier v.
Laumeier, 237 N.Y. 357, 143 N.E. 219; 242 N.Y. 501, 152 N.E.
401.
[
Footnote 23]
It appeared that W. A. Yarborough, having married again, invited
Sadie to his home in Atlanta and offered to maintain her there. She
refused.
[
Footnote 24]
To the effect that in civil law countries and the many
jurisdictions which have adopted the civil law the duties of
support are determined by the nationality or the domicile of the
obligor,
see Bar, International Law: Private and Criminal
(Tr. Gillespie, 1883, §§ 102, 105); Fiore, Le Droit International
Prive (4th ed. French tr. Antoine, 1907) §§ 627-629; Makarov,
Precis de Droit International Prive (1933) 409, 410;
Lapradelle-Niboyet, Repertoire de Droit International (1929)
Article: "Aliment" §§ 17-23.
Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397.
[
Footnote 25]
Compare Cowles v. Cowles, 203 App.Div. 405, 196 N.Y.S.
617.
MR. JUSTICE STONE, dissenting.
I think the judgment should be affirmed.
The divorce decree of the Georgia court purported to adjudicate
finally, both for the present and for the future, the right of a
minor child of the marriage to support and maintenance, by
directing her father to make a lump sum payment for that purpose.
More than two years later, after the minor had become a domiciled
resident of South Carolina, and after the sum paid had been
exhausted, a court of that state, on the basis of her need as then
shown, has rendered a judgment directing further payments for her
support out of property of the father in South Carolina, in
addition to that already commanded by the Georgia judgment.
For present purposes, we may take it that the Georgia decree, as
the statutes and decisions of the state declare, is unalterable,
and, as pronounced, is effective to govern the rights of the
parties in Georgia. But there is nothing the decree itself or in
the history of the proceedings which led to it to suggest that it
was rendered with any purpose or intent to regulate or control the
relationship of parent and child, or the duties which flow from it,
in places outside the State of Georgia where they might later come
to reside. It would hardly be thought that Georgia, by judgment of
its courts more than by its statutes, would attempt to regulate the
relationship of parents and child domiciled outside the state at
the very time the decree
Page 290 U. S. 214
was rendered, and, in the face of constitutional doubts which
arise here, it is far from clear that its decree is to be
interpreted as attempting to do more than to regulate that
relationship while the infant continued to be domiciled within the
state. But, if we are to read the decree as though it contained a
clause, in terms, restricting the power of any other state in which
the minor might come to reside, to make provision for her support,
then, in the absence of some law of Congress requiring it, I am not
persuaded that the full faith and credit clause gives sanction to
such control by one state of the internal affairs of another.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Congress has said that the public records and the judicial
proceedings of each state are to be given such faith and credit in
other states as is accorded to them in the state "from which they
are taken." R.S. §§ 905, 906. But this broad language has never
been applied without limitations.
See
M'Elmoyle v.
Cohen, 13 Pet. 312. Between the prohibition of the
due process clause, acting upon the courts of the state from which
such proceedings may be taken, and the mandate of the full faith
and credit clause, acting upon the state to which they may be
taken, there is an area which federal authority has not occupied.
As this Court has often recognized, there are many judgments which
need not be given the same force and effect abroad which they
Page 290 U. S. 215
have at home, and there are some, though valid in the state
where rendered, to which the full faith and credit clause gives no
force elsewhere. In the assertion of rights defined by a judgment
of one state within the territory of another, there is often an
inescapable conflict of interest of the two states, and there comes
a point beyond which the imposition of the will of one state beyond
its own borders involves a forbidden infringement of some
legitimate domestic interest of the other. That point may vary with
the circumstances of the case, and, in the absence of provisions
more specific than the general terms of the congressional
enactment, [
Footnote 2/2] this
Court must determine for itself the extent to which one state may
qualify [
Footnote 2/3] or deny
[
Footnote 2/4] rights claimed under
proceedings or records of other states.
Page 290 U. S. 216
More than once, this Court has approved the doctrine that a
state need give no effect to judgments for conviction of crime or
for penalties procured in a sister state.
See Wisconsin v.
Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265;
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657,
146 U. S. 675;
Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335.
See also Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304,
14 U. S. 330,
14 U. S. 337.
[
Footnote 2/5] And the intervention
of a sister state's judgment will not overcome a local policy
against allowing to foreign corporations the use of local courts in
settling foreign disputes.
Anglo-American Provision Co. v.
Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373.
[
Footnote 2/6]
Compare Kenney
v. Supreme Lodge of Moose, 252 U. S. 411.
[
Footnote 2/7] The state of
matrimonial domicile may preserve to its own resident his rights in
the marriage status where another state has sought to terminate it,
without acquiring jurisdiction of his person,
Haddock v.
Haddock, 201 U. S. 562,
even though terminated within the other state.
Cf. Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U. S. 190.
[
Footnote 2/8] The full faith and
credit clause does not require one state, at the behest of the
courts of another, to surrender its powers to decide what
criminal
Page 290 U. S. 217
penalties it shall impose to circumscribe, within limits, the
classes of disputes to which its courts must give ear, [
Footnote 2/9] or to protect its residents
from undue interference with the marriage relationship.
A statute, record, or judgment of one state establishing the
right of an illegitimate or adopted child to inherit from his
putative parent may be given extrastate effect for many purposes,
but it does not establish his right to inherit land in another
state.
See Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.
S. 611;
Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.
S. 386. Parties who have in one state litigated the
proper construction of a will disposing of realty are not, by the
judgment there, concluded in another state where the testator's
realty is located.
Cf. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.
S. 186. Nor will a divorce decree seeking to apportion
the rights of the parties to realty be conclusive with respect to
land outside the state.
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S.
1. The interest of a state in controlling all the legal
incidents of real property located within its boundaries is deemed
so complete and so vital to the exercise of its sovereign powers of
government within its own territory as to exclude any control over
them by the statutes or judgments of other states.
It would be going further than this Court has been willing to go
in any decision to say that the power of a state to pass judgment
upon the sanity of its own citizen could be foreclosed by an
earlier judgment of the court of some other state dealing with the
same subject matter.
Cf. Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U. S.
16.
Similarly it has been almost uniformly recognized that a divorce
decree which, by its terms or by operation of law forbids
remarriage of one or both of the parties can
Page 290 U. S. 218
have no effect outside the state which rendered it. [
Footnote 2/10] Jurisdictional
requirements being satisfied, the decree is effective to end the
marriage for all states, but enforcement of its prohibition against
remarriage in another state, even though the parties do not take up
their residence there, would infringe upon the interest which every
state has to maintain the stability of a union entered into
according to the laws of the place of celebration. [
Footnote 2/11]
Page 290 U. S. 219
Whatever view may be held of the particular restrictions upon
the operation of the full faith and credit clause in these cases,
the validity of the principle upon which they rest has never been
denied. Its validity is likewise recognized in those cases where
this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment denies to a state
the power of unduly extending its authority beyond its own borders
by the mere expedient of rendering a judgment against one of whose
person or property it has acquired jurisdiction.
New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149;
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397.
Just as due process of law will not permit a state, by its
judgment, to inflict parties "with a perpetual contractual
paralysis" which will prevent them from altering outside the state
their contracts or ordinary business relations entered into within
it,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, supra, 234 U. S. 161,
so full faith and credit does not command that the obligations
attached to a status, because once appropriately imposed by one
state, shall be forever placed beyond the control of every other
state without regard to the interest in it and the power of control
which the other may later acquire.
See
Bradford Elec. Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286
Page 290 U. S. 220
U.S. 145,
286 U. S. 157,
n. 7. Whatever difference there may be between holding that a
judgment is invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment because it is
"extra-territorial" and in holding that it is not entitled to full
faith and credit although it does not infringe the Fourteenth
Amendment is one of degree, or of a difference in circumstances
which may prevent the operation of the latter provision of the
Constitution. The Georgia judgment with which we are now concerned
does not infringe the Fourteenth Amendment, for Georgia had
"jurisdiction" of the parties and subject matter at the time its
judgment was rendered. The possibility of conflict of the Georgia
judgment with the interest of South Carolina first arose when the
minor transferred her domicile to South Carolina, long after the
Georgia judgment was given.
The question presented here is whether the support and
maintenance of a minor child, domiciled in South Carolina, is so
peculiarly a subject of domestic concern that Georgia law cannot
impair South Carolina's authority. The subject matter of the
judgment in each state is the duty which government may impose on a
parent to support a minor child. The maintenance and support of
children domiciled within a state, like their education and
custody, is a subject in which government itself is deemed to have
a peculiar interest and concern. Their tender years, their
inability to provide for themselves, the importance to the state
that its future citizens should be clothed, nourished, and suitably
educated, are considerations which lead all civilized countries to
assume some control over the maintenance of minors. [
Footnote 2/12] The states very
Page 290 U. S. 221
generally make some provision from their own resources for the
maintenance and support of orphans or destitute children, but, in
order that children may not become public charges, the duty of
maintenance is one imposed primarily upon the parents, according to
the needs of the child and their ability to meet those needs. This
is usually accomplished by suit brought directly by some public
officer, [
Footnote 2/13] by the
child by guardian or next friend, or by the mother, against the
father for maintenance and support. [
Footnote 2/14] The measure of the duty is the need of
the child and the ability of the parent to meet those needs at the
very time when performance of the duty is invoked. Hence, it is no
answer in such a suit that, at some earlier time, provision was
made for the child, which is no longer available or
Page 290 U. S. 222
suitable because of his greater needs, or because of the
increased financial ability of the parent to provide for them,
[
Footnote 2/15] or that the child
may be maintained from other sources. [
Footnote 2/16]
In view of the universality of these principles, it comes as a
surprise that any state, merely because it has made some provision
for the support of a child, should, either by statute or judicial
decree, so tie its own hand as to foreclose all future inquiry into
the duty of maintenance, however affected by changed conditions.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Page 290 U. S. 223
Even though the Constitution does not deny to Georgia the power
to indulge in such a policy for itself, [
Footnote 2/18] it by no means follows that it gives to
Georgia the privilege of prescribing that policy for other states
in which the child comes to live. [
Footnote 2/19] South Carolina has adopted a different
policy. It imposes on the father or his property located within the
state the duty to support his minor child domiciled there. It
enforces the duty by criminal prosecution, [
Footnote 2/20]
Page 290 U. S. 224
and also permits suit by the minor child maintained by guardian
ad litem. The measure of the duty is the present need of
the child and the ability of the parent to provide for it. In this
case, the suit was begun by attachment of the father's property in
South Carolina and by personal service of process upon him there.
The court found that the lump sum paid for support of the child
under the Georgia decree had been expended; that she was
justifiably residing with her mother in South Carolina, rather than
with her father in Georgia; that she was then without financial
resources, and that, considering her station in life and the
circumstances of her father, an allowance for the future of $50 a
month for her education, maintenance, and support would be fair and
just, and this amount was ordered to be paid for that purpose from
the attached property.
The opinion of this Court leaves it uncertain whether it is
thought that the Constitution commands that the duty of support
prescribed by Georgia, the domicile of the father, shall be
dominant over that enjoined by South Carolina, the domicile of the
child, in any event, or only after the duty has been defined by a
judgment of Georgia. [
Footnote
2/21] It is attested by eminent authority that the Fourteenth
Amendment at least does not prevent the state of the child's
domicile from imposing the duty, Restatement of Conflict of Laws §
498A, [
Footnote 2/22] a view
confirmed by the uniform rulings that the father is liable to the
criminal process of the state of the child's residence, though
before, and at all times during his failure to conform to the duty
demanded by that state, he has been domiciled elsewhere.
Page 290 U. S. 225
Kansas v. Wellman, 102 Kan. 503, 170 P. 1052;
Ohio
v. Sanner, 81 Ohio St. 393, 90 N.E. 1007. The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enable a father, by the expedient of choosing a
domicile other than the state where the child is rightfully
domiciled, to avoid the duty which that state may impose for
support of his child. The reason seems plain. The locality of the
child's residence must see to his welfare. While it might be more
convenient for creditors of the father to look to the law of his
residence as fixing all his obligations, it would seem that the
compelling interest in the welfare of children, to which
performance of the duties of parentage is a necessary incident,
outweighs commercial convenience; the more so where, as in this
case, the obligation is to be satisfied from the father's property
within the state of the child's domicile.
The conclusion must be the same when the issue is that of the
credit to be given the prior Georgia judgment. Whatever may be said
of the local interest which was deemed controlling in those cases
in which this Court has denied to a state judgment the same force
and effect outside the state as is given to it at home, it would
not seem open to serious question that every state has an interest
in securing the maintenance and support of minor children residing
within its own territory so complete and so vital to the
performance of its functions as a government that no other state
could set limits upon it. Of that interest, South Carolina is the
sole mistress within her own territory.
See Hood v. McGehee,
supra, 237 U. S. 615.
Even though we might appraise it more lightly than does South
Carolina, it is not for us to say that a state is not free, within
constitutional limitations, to regard that interest as fully as
important and as completely within the realm of state power as the
legal incidents of land located within its boundaries, or of a
marriage relationship, wherever entered into but of which it is the
domicile,
Page 290 U. S. 226
or its power to pass upon the sanity of its own residents,
notwithstanding the earlier pronouncements of the courts of other
states.
The case of
Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S.
1, seems to have no bearing on the question presented
here. There, the plaintiff in error procured in the courts of New
York a judgment of judicial separation awarding alimony for herself
and child at a weekly rate. Leave was given to her by the judgment
to apply for such orders as might be necessary for its enforcement
or her protection. Her husband failed to pay the alimony, and she
brought suit against him in the courts of Connecticut for the
past-due alimony which had accrued under the judgment. Upon an
examination of the New York law, this Court concluded that the
judgment was final as to all past alimony, and that the effect of
it was to create a debt in New York, collectible there by
execution, for all past-due installments, and it held that the full
faith and credit clause required the Connecticut courts to render a
like judgment. The Court was careful to distinguish the case from
one where the suit was brought to compel the payment of alimony in
the future.
See p.
218 U. S. 16.
Compare Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183,
181 U. S. 187.
The record discloses that neither party to the suit was domiciled
in Connecticut. The wife relied on the New York judgment, as did
the husband, whose only defenses were based on its effect in New
York as not there conferring on her an unqualified right to the
alimony. The Court was not asked, and did not assume to pass upon,
the duty of the husband to support the wife or children
independently of the New York judgment. No question whether the
enforcement of the New York decree in Connecticut would infringe
the authority of Connecticut to regulate or control the incidents
of a marriage, one or both of the parties to which were then
domiciled in the state, was either raised or considered.
The decision in
Sistare v. Sistare lends no support to
the contention that South Carolina can be precluded by a
Page 290 U. S. 227
judgment of another state from providing for the future
maintenance and support of a destitute child domiciled within its
own borders out of the property of her father also located there.
Here, the Georgia decree did not end the relationship of parent and
child, as a decree of divorce may end the marriage relationship.
Had the infant continued to reside in Georgia, and had she sought
in the courts of South Carolina to compel the application of
property of her father, found there, to her further maintenance and
support, full faith and credit to the Georgia decree applied to its
own domiciled resident might have required the denial of any
relief.
Cf. Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.
S. 520;
Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.
S. 551. But, when she became a domiciled resident of
South Carolina, a new interest came into being, the interest of the
State of South Carolina, as a measure of self-preservation, to
secure the adequate protection and maintenance of helpless members
of its own community and its prospective citizens. That interest
was distinct from any which Georgia could conclusively regulate or
control by its judgment, even though rendered while the child was
domiciled in Georgia. The present decision extends the operation of
the full faith and credit clause beyond its proper function of
affording protection to the domestic interests of Georgia, and
makes it an instrument for encroachment by Georgia upon the
domestic concerns of South Carolina.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO concurs in this opinion.
[
Footnote 2/1]
It may be assumed for present purposes that the child was
sufficiently represented in the Georgia proceedings. But the point
is doubtful.
See Walder v. Walder, 159 La. 231, 105 So.
300;
Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. 453, 88 P. 852. The
reasoning of the opinion of the Court -- that, since Georgia does
not give the child a cause of action, it has no property right and
need not have been represented -- would lead to the conclusion that
what was decided in Georgia was something quite different from that
which was in litigation and decided in South Carolina; that the
child's suit is upon a right afforded only by the law of South
Carolina, and that the Georgia suit, giving no similar right but
only a right to the mother, could have no effect upon the present
litigation.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as
defined by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined,
expanded or contracted by Congress. Much of the confusion and
procedural deficiencies which the constitutional provision alone
has not avoided may be remedied by legislation. Cook, Powers of
Congress under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 Yale Law
Journal, 421; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81
University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 371.
Cf. 33 Columbia
Law Rev. 854, 866. The constitutional provision giving Congress
power to prescribe the effect to be given to acts, records, and
proceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it not been
intended that Congress should have a latitude broader than that
given the courts by the full faith and credit clause alone. It was
remarked on the floor of the Constitutional Convention that,
without the extension of power in the legislature, the provision
"would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among all
Independent Nations." Hunt and Scott, Madison's Reports of the
Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 503. The play which
has been afforded for the recognition of local public policy in
cases where there is called in question only a statute of another
state, as to the effect of which Congress has not legislated,
compared with the more restricted scope for local policy where
there is a judicial proceeding, as to which Congress has
legislated, suggests the congressional power.
[
Footnote 2/3]
M'Elmoyle v.
Cohen, 13 Pet. 312.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe,
137 U. S. 287,
137 U. S.
299.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The extent to which the doctrine may be applied to judgments for
penalties has not been clearly defined. Leflar, Extrastate
Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harvard Law
Rev.193.
Compare 33 Columbia Law Rev. 492, 507.
And
see New York v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 162 A. 872, 10
N.J.Misc. 1161 (New York judgment based on tax claims given full
faith and credit); 42 Yale Law Journal 1131.
[
Footnote 2/6]
See also Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E.
206;
Palmer v. Palmer, 265 Mass. 242, 163 N.E. 879; 42
Harvard Law Rev. 701.
[
Footnote 2/7]
That corporations cannot invoke the privileges and immunities
clause does not explain the difference between these two cases.
Application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, while
more limited when applied to actions based on foreign judgments, is
not altogether precluded. 33 Columbia Law Review 492, 502.
[
Footnote 2/8]
But see Beale, Constitutional Protection for Divorce,
19 Harvard Law Rev. 586;
Haddock Revisited, 39 Harvard Law
Rev. 417.
Compare Harper, Collateral Attack upon Foreign
Judgments, 29 Michigan Law Rev. 661, 679.
[
Footnote 2/9]
Cf. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.
S. 107,
with Union Pacific R. Co. v. Rule, 155
Minn. 302, 193 N.W. 161.
See 39 Yale Law Journal 719.
Cf. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co. v. George,
233 U. S. 354.
[
Footnote 2/10]
In re Estate of Ommang, 183 Minn. 92, 235 N.W. 529;
Bauer v. Abrahams, 73 Colo. 509, 216 P. 259;
Dudley v.
Dudley, 151 Iowa 142, 130 N.W. 785. Sometimes the state
granting the divorce will not recognize the validity of the later
marriage,
Wilson v. Cook, 256 Ill. 460, 100 N.E. 222,
unless the party had changed his domicile before remarrying,
Pierce v. Pierce, 58 Wash. 622, 109 P. 45. Thus, the
divorce proceedings, on the one hand, and the marriage record, on
the other, are denied full credit.
See Beale, Laughlin,
Guthrie and Sandomire, Marriage and the Domicil, 44 Harvard Law
Rev. 501; 16 Minnesota Law Rev. 172. The present case is not
distinguished by arguing that, in the divorce situation, it is a
question of faith and credit to be given to a statute, and not to
judicial proceedings.
Goodwin v. Goodwin, 158 App.Div.
171, 173, 142 N.Y.S. 1102. While it is usually a statute that
prescribes the disability which is to attach to the divorce, it is
the judicial proceedings themselves which are in question as much
as in the present case, where the judgment for support is
unalterable within the state by virtue of the Georgia statute.
Without denying the validity of a marriage in another state, the
privileges flowing from marriage may be subject to the local law.
State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9 (husband and wife of different
races may be prohibited from cohabiting within state though
lawfully married elsewhere); Restatement of Conflicts of Law §
181.
[
Footnote 2/11]
Further examples might be referred to. The policy of the state
in which the foreign judgment is set up fixes the periods of
limitations, and the priority which foreign judgment creditors may
have.
M'Elmoyle v.
Cohen, 13 Pet. 312;
Cole v. Cunningham,
133 U. S. 107,
133 U. S. 112.
A state may, under some circumstances, deny the authority of
foreign officers to deal with things within its territory,
see
Great Western Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U.
S. 561,
198 U. S. 576,
even though the officer's action took place in the foreign state,
Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186,
178 U. S. 194;
Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 613,
103 U. S. 631.
The limitation upon the doctrine of such cases which this Court has
imposed in holding that certain statutory successors to
corporations in a foreign state shall have the privilege of
maintaining suit,
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.
S. 243;
Bernheimer v. Converse, 206
U. S. 526, illustrates the appropriate function of this
Court in balancing the interests of local and foreign sovereign.
The extrastate force given to a voluntary assignment in
receivership, as compared with the more restricted effect of an
assignment which is commanded by court order, further demonstrates
the nature of the full faith and credit mandate.
See Cole v.
Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107,
133 U. S. 129;
Catlin v. Wilcox Silver-Plate Co., 123 Ind. 477, 482, 24
N.E. 250;
Zacher v. Fidelity Trust & Safety-Vault Co.,
106 F. 593; Laughlin, Extraterritorial Powers of Receivers, 45
Harvard Law Rev. 429, 461ff. The problems in relation to the
extrastate consequences of the dissolution of a corporation are
becoming important.
Compare Clark, Receiver v. Williard,
94 Mont. 508, 23 P.2d 959,
cert. granted, post, p. 619,
with National Surety Co. v. Cobb, 66 F.2d 323,
cert.
denied, post,
p. 692.
[
Footnote 2/12]
This control is particularly important in the case of the
children of divorced couples. They are usually young; in Maryland,
over 60 percent are under ten years of age when divorce occurs.
Divorces are often not contested, and the intervention of a
disinterested judge is frequently nominal. Allowances for children
in the divorce court are typically small. Marshall and May, The
Divorce Court, 31, 79, 80, 82, 226-231, 323.
[
Footnote 2/13]
Frequently a criminal statute provides as an alternative penalty
for nonsupport of a child that the guilty party post a bond or
otherwise provide for the future support of the child. Such a
statute exists in South Carolina. Section 1123, South Carolina Code
1932.
Cf. Mason's 1927 Minn. St. § 10136. The state's
special interest in securing the father's liability is emphasized
not only by the frequency of penal measures, but also by the fact
that, in some places, a statute is necessary before any suit can be
maintained against the father.
Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo.App.
308;
Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146.
Cf. Hooten v. Hooten, 168 Ga. 86, 147 S.E. 373.
See Madden, Domestic Relations, 383.
Contra, Doughty
v. Engler, 112 Kan. 583, 211 P. 619.
Cf. Craig v.
Shea, 102 Neb. 575, 168 N.W. 135. Likewise notable is the
extensive repudiation of the view that the duty to support is
correlative with the right to custody and services.
See
Jacobs, cases on Domestic Relations 772.
[
Footnote 2/14]
The duty of support is also enforced through entertaining suits
by third parties to recover for necessaries furnished. However,
conflicting policies make this an unsatisfactory method, for the
courts seek to discourage wrongful action on the part of wives or
minors in leaving their homes, and have consequently gone to some
lengths in refusing to impose liability on the father unless he has
been at fault in breaking up the home.
Baldwin v. Foster,
138 Mass. 449.
See Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107
S.E. 704.
Contra, Maschauer v. Downs, 53 App.D.C. 142, 289
F. 540.
See Birdsong v. Birdsong, 182 Ky. 58, 206 S.W. 22.
Cf. Sanger Bros. v. Trammell, 198 S.W. 1175.
[
Footnote 2/15]
See State v. Miller, 111 Kan. 231, 206 P. 744;
Walder v. Walder, 159 La. 231, 105 So. 300;
People v.
Miller, 225 Ill.App. 150;
Hilliard v. Anderson, 197
Ill. 549, 552, 553, 64 N.E. 326.
See also State v. Moran,
99 Conn. 115, 121 A. 277;
McCloskey v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co., 202 Mo.App. 28, 213 S.W. 538;
State v. Langford,
90 Or. 251, 176 P. 197. An attempt to relieve himself of liability
by a settlement or other contract will normally be ineffectual.
See Harper v. Tipple, 21 Ariz. 41, 184 P. 1005;
Edleson v. Edleson, 179 Ky. 300, 200 S.W. 625;
Michaels v. Flach, 197 App.Div. 478, 189 N.Y.S. 908,
aff'g 114 Misc. 225, 186 N.Y.S. 899;
Von Roeder v.
Miller, 117 Misc. 106, 190 N.Y.S. 787.
Cf. Henkel's
Estate, 13 Pa.Super.Ct. 337. Higher education is properly an
object of a suit for an increased allowance.
Cf. Esteb v.
Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264,
246 P. 27;
Hilliard v. Anderson, 197 Ill. 549, 64 N.E. 326;
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Gillmor, 95 Pa.Super.Ct.
557;
Sisson v. Schultz, 251 Mich. 553, 232 N.W. 253;
Moskow v. Marshall, 271 Mass. 302, 171 N.E. 477.
[
Footnote 2/16]
Hunter v. state, 10 Okl.Cr. 119, 134 P. 1134;
State
v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 P. 215;
Cruger v.
Heyward, 2 Desaus 94, 110;
State v. Constable, 90
W.Va. 515, 112 S.E. 410;
Gulley v. Gulley, 111 Tex. 233,
231 S.W. 97.
Cf. Taylor v. San Antonio Gas & Elec.
Co., 93 S.W. 674. When suit is instituted by the wife,
considerations of equity as between husband and wife may obtrude,
McWilliams v. Kinney, 180 Ark. 836, 22 S.W.2d 1003;
Fulton v. Fulton, 52 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E. 729, unless the
wife is unable to support the child,
State v. Miller, 111
Kan. 231, 206 P. 744;
White v. White, 169 Mo.App. 40, 154
S.W. 872.
[
Footnote 2/17]
Georgia seems to be the only state to do so. 2 Vernier, Family
Laws, 196ff. A similar attempt by the courts of another state has
been held null and void and subject to collateral attack.
See
Walder v. Walder, 159 La. 231, 105 So. 300.
[
Footnote 2/18]
Cf. Laumeier v. Laumeier, 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481.
And there could be no complaint if South Carolina chose to follow
the Georgia determination.
Cf. Laumeier v. Laumeier, 242
N.Y. 501, 152 N.E. 401.
[
Footnote 2/19]
In the custody cases, a very similar situation is presented. As
conventionally stated, the rule has been that the most the full
faith and credit clause can require is that the prior ruling shall
be deemed conclusive in the absence of an asserted change in
circumstances.
See Calkins v. Calkins, 217 Ala. 378, 115
So. 866.
Cf. People ex rel. Allen v. Allen, 105 N.Y. 628,
11 N.E. 143,
aff'g 40 Hun. 611. In one state, a
distinction has been drawn between personal rights of the parents
and the interest of the state in the welfare of the child -- unless
there is an allegation that the best interest of the child requires
a change in custody, the parties will be bound.
Wear v.
Wear, 130 Kan. 205, 285 P. 606.
See In re Bort, 25
Kan. 308, 309. Another state gives credit to the extent that prior
determinations of fact are deemed incontrovertible, but exercises
an independent judgment of the conclusion to be drawn from them.
Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 148 A.
524. In no case has there been such an abject surrender as this
Court now requires of South Carolina. A tendency may be discerned
to give conclusive force to the determinations of the state wherein
the child resides, as long as that residence continues, but that,
upon change of residence, the questions will be open in the state
to which the change is made.
In re Erving, 109 N.J.Eq.
294, 157 A. 161, 164;
Milner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 113,
76 S.E. 860;
Steele v. Steele, 152 Miss. 365, 118 So. 721;
In re Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126;
Griffin v.
Griffin, 95 Or. 78, 84, 187 P. 598;
In re Groves, 109
Wash. 112, 114, 186 P. 300;
cf. Barnes v. Lee, 128 Or.
655, 275 P. 661.
See 80 University of Pennsylvania Law
Rev. 712; 81 University of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 970; Restatement
of Conflict of Laws §§ 153, 156. Reasonable latitude should be
preserved to states where the child is found to take temporary
police measures, even though contrary to the terms of a decree of
the state of residence.
Cf. Hartman v. Henry, 280 Mo. 478,
217 S.W. 987.
[
Footnote 2/20]
Supra, 290
U.S. 202fn2/13|>note 13.
[
Footnote 2/21]
Cf. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.
S. 397,
with Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.
S. 171.
[
Footnote 2/22]
"A state may impose upon one person a duty to support another
person if"
"1. The person to be supported is domiciled within the state,
and the person to support is within the jurisdiction of the state.
. . ."