Ex parte Endo,
Annotate this Case
323 U.S. 283 (1944)
- Syllabus |
U.S. Supreme Court
Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944)
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo
Argued October 12, 1944
Decided December 18, 1944
323 U.S. 283
1. The War Relocation Authority, whose power over persons evacuated from military areas derives from Executive Order No. 9066, which was ratified and confirmed by the Act of March 21, 1942, was without authority, express or implied, to subject to its leave procedure a concededly loyal and law-abiding citizen of the United States. P. 323 U. S. 297.
2. Wartime measures are to be interpreted as intending the greatest possible accommodation between the Constitutional liberties of the citizen and the exigencies of war. P. 323 U. S. 300.
3. The sole purpose of the Act of March 21, 1942, and Executive Orders Nos. 9066 and 9102 was the protection of the war effort against espionage and sabotage. P. 323 U. S. 300.
4. Power to detain a concededly loyal citizen may not be implied from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage. P. 323 U. S. 302.
5. The power to detain a concededly loyal citizen or to grant him a conditional release cannot be implied as a useful or convenient step in the evacuation program. P. 323 U. S. 302.
6. The Act of March 21, 1942 and Executive Orders Nos. 9066 and 9102 afford no basis for keeping loyal evacuees of Japanese ancestry in custody on the ground of community hostility. P. 323 U. S. 302.
7. The District Court having acquired jurisdiction upon an application for habeas corpus, and there being within the district one responsible for the detention and who would be an appropriate
respondent, the cause was not rendered moot by the removal of the applicant to another circuit pending appeal from a denial of the writ, and the District Court has jurisdiction to issue the writ. United States v. Crystal, 319 U.S. 755, distinguished. P. 323 U. S. 305.
On appeal from an order of the District Court denying a writ of habeas corpus, the Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to this Court, which, under Judicial Code § 239, ordered the entire record sent up.