Pursuant to the provisions of an earlier decree of injunction in
a suit by the United States against a defendant under the antitrust
laws, the defendant petitioned for and was granted leave on certain
conditions to acquire stock of a competitor. The proceeding was
adversary throughout, and neither party appealed. The appellant
here had sought, but was denied, leave to intervene.
Held:
1. Under Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, appellant
was not entitled to intervene as of right. P.
322 U. S.
140.
(a) No statute of the United States conferred an "unconditional
right" to intervene. Clayton Act, § 16; R.C.P. 24(a)(1). P.
322 U. S.
140.
(b) The appellant would not be bound by any judgment in the
action. R.C.P. 24(a)(2). P.
322 U. S.
141.
(c) Appellant had no interest in "a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court." R.C.P.
24(a)(3). P.
322 U. S.
141.
(d)
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co. v. United States,
312 U. S. 502,
distinguished. P.
322 U. S.
141.
Page 322 U. S. 138
2. Upon the entire record, it does not appear that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the appellant leave to
intervene. R.C.P. 24(b)(2). P.
322 U. S.
142.
Where examination of the entire record leading to the court's
final order discloses that the issue were thoroughly explored and
that the parties were adequately represented, the action of the
court denying intervention should not be reviewed.
Appeal dismissed.
Appeal under the Expediting Act from an order of the District
Court denying leave to intervene in an antitrust proceeding.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By a decree, entered February 1, 1916, in a suit by the United
States against National Cash Register Company, the latter was
restrained, pursuant to the antitrust statutes, from acquiring
ownership or control of the business or plant of a competitor
manufacturing or selling cash registers or other registering
devices. The injunction, however, provided that, in case National
should desire such acquisition,
"a petition may be presented to this Court stating the reasons
therefor, and if the Court, upon investigation into all the
circumstances of the case and after notice of not less than sixty
days to the Attorney General, shall determine that such business or
patents or plant so desired to be acquired
Page 322 U. S. 139
will supplement the plant, patents, machines, or facilities of
the defendant corporation and that the acquisition thereof is
desired for that purpose and will not substantially lessen
competition, then jurisdiction is reserved to pass an order
permitting the same upon such terms and conditions as may be
right."
National, desiring to acquire stock of Allen-Wales Adding
Machine Corporation, petitioned for leave and gave the required
notice to the Attorney General. The Government filed an answer
opposing the grant. The matter was set for hearing in the District
Court November 15, 1943. On that day, Allen Calculators, Inc., the
appellant, presented a motion for leave to intervene. The United
States consented to the proposed intervention; National opposed it.
The District Judge granted intervention conditionally and allowed
counsel for the appellant to make an opening statement and to take
some part in the proceedings. Subsequently, but prior to the
closing of the hearing, he ruled that the appellant would not be
allowed to intervene. Before making his ruling, he was advised, in
answer to his inquiry, that the president of the appellant would be
called as a witness by the Government. November 16, he entered a
formal order denying intervention.
The issues, which were tried upon evidence submitted by National
and by the Government, were whether the purported acquisition would
eliminate competition between certain products of National and
Allen-Wales, would eliminate potential competition between other
products of the two companies, and would, in other respects, be
contrary to the purpose of the original decree. The proceeding was
adversary throughout.
December 4, the appellant filed its petition for appeal from the
order denying intervention. December 7, the District Judge entered
findings of fact and an order granting National's petition upon
certain conditions which he
Page 322 U. S. 140
deemed necessary to insure compliance with the original decree
in the suit. Neither party has appealed from that order. December
10, the Judge allowed this appeal with a proviso that allowance
should not operate as a stay of the order granting National's
petition. The appeal is to this court under the Expediting Act.
[
Footnote 1]
Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure [
Footnote 2] is:
"(a)
Intervention of Right. Upon timely application,
anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) When a
statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's
interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3)
when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof."
"(b)
Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application,
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a
statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common. In exercising its
discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties."
The appellant insists that it was entitled to intervene as of
right, but we think that, in the light of the express provisions of
clause (a), the contention must be rejected. No statute of the
United States confers an unconditional
Page 322 U. S. 141
right of intervention, as required by (1). The appellant relies
on § 16 of the Clayton Act, [
Footnote 3] but that section merely authorizes private
parties to sue for relief against threatened damage consequent upon
the violation of the antitrust laws. It grants no privilege, much
less an unconditional right, to intervene in suits under the
Sherman Act brought by the United States. The application did not
fall under (2), for the appellant clearly would not be bound by any
judgment in the action. Nor had it any interest in the distribution
or disposition of property in the custody of the court so as to
come under (3).
The appellant relies upon
Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co. v.
United States, 312 U. S. 502.
That case, however, is to be distinguished. There, the applicant on
whose behalf intervention was asked was named in the original
decree as one who should be heard in respect of its property rights
in the event certain action was taken. Such action was taken and,
despite the terms of the original decree, intervention was denied.
Clearly, as to the intervenor, the action was final. We accordingly
entertained the appeal.
The appellant had standing to invoke the discretion of the
district judge to permit it to intervene under (b)(2) on the ground
that its "claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common." The rule provides that, in exercising
discretion as to intervention of this character, the court shall
consider whether intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. It is common
knowledge that, where a suit is of large public interest, the
members of the public often desire to present their views to the
court in support of the claim or the defense. To permit a multitude
of such interventions may result
Page 322 U. S. 142
in accumulating proofs and arguments without assisting the
court. The record here discloses that the parties produced all data
they and the court thought was available upon the issues in the
case. Moreover, the court invited the Government to call the
appellant's president to testify as to his knowledge concerning the
issues.
The challenged order is but an order in the cause, and not the
final judgment. The exercise of discretion in a matter of this sort
is not reviewable by an appellate court unless clear abuse is
shown, and it is not ordinarily possible to determine that question
except in the light of the whole record. If, in this case,
National's petition had ultimately been dismissed, a review of the
court's denial of appellant's intervention would have been an idle
gesture. Where, as here, examination of the entire record leading
to the court's final order discloses that the issues were
thoroughly explored and that the parties were adequately
represented, the action of the court denying intervention should
not be reviewed. It was,
inter alia, to prevent the delay
of unwarranted appeals by disappointed applicants to intervene,
which would suspend the ultimate disposition of suits under the
antitrust acts, that jurisdiction to review District Court decrees
was not vested in the Circuit Courts of Appeals, but solely in this
court, and that the statute limited the right of appeal to final
decrees. [
Footnote 4]
The record shows that the District Court had entered a final
decree on the merits of National's petition prior to allowing the
present appeal; and, if we treat the appeal as taken from that
final decree, as we think is required by the Expediting Act,
[
Footnote 5] and as attacking
that decree because the appellant had been wrongfully denied
intervention, we should have to affirm the judgment, since
Page 322 U. S. 143
it is not shown that the District Court abused its discretion in
denying intervention. [
Footnote
6]
The appeal is
Dismissed.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY
dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
Act of Feb. 11, 1903, c. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823, as amended
March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 291, 36 Stat. 1167, 15 U.S.C. § 29.
Cf. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, c. 229, § 1, 43 Stat. 938, 28
U.S.C. § 345.
[
Footnote 2]
28 U.S.C. following section 723c.
[
Footnote 3]
15 U.S.C. § 26.
[
Footnote 4]
United States v. California Co-op. Canneries,
279 U. S. 553.
[
Footnote 5]
United States v. California Canneries, supra.
[
Footnote 6]
Id., cases cited p.
279 U. S.
556.