1. It is an offense under § 269 of the Criminal Code to arrest a
person with intent to hold him in peonage. P.
320 U. S.
528.
That the person shall have rendered service in consequence of
the arrest is not an element of the offense.
2. The rules requiring definiteness and strict construction of a
criminal statute do not require distortion or nullification of its
evident meaning and purpose. P.
320 U. S.
529.
50 F. Supp. 607 reversed.
Appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act from a judgment of the
District Court sustaining a demurrer to an indictment.
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
An indictment was returned against the appellee in the District
Court for Northern Florida which charged that he arrested one
Johnson "to a condition of peonage," upon a claim that Johnson was
indebted to him, and with intent to cause Johnson to perform labor
in satisfaction of the debt, and that he forcibly arrested and
detained Johnson against his will and transported him from one
place to another within Florida. There was no allegation
Page 320 U. S. 528
that Johnson rendered any labor or service in consequence of the
arrest. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer, [
Footnote 1] the United States appealed. [
Footnote 2]
The charge is laid under § 269 of the Criminal Code, [
Footnote 3] which is:
"Whoever holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held,
arrested, or returned, or in any manner aids in the arrest or
return of any person to a condition of peonage shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned. . . ."
The District Court held that the statute imposes no penalty for
an arrest with intent to compel the performance of labor or service
unless the person arrested renders labor or service for a master
following the arrest.
We think this was error. Section 269 derives from § 1 of the Act
of March 2, 1867, [
Footnote 4]
which abolished and prohibited the system known as peonage in any
territory or state, nullified any law, ordinance, regulation, or
usage inconsistent with the prohibition, and added criminal
sanctions in the language now constituting § 269. The Act was
passed further to implement the Thirteenth Amendment, and is
directed at individuals whether or not acting under color of law or
ordinance. [
Footnote 5]
The section makes arrest of a person with intent to place him in
a state of peonage a separate and independent offense. It penalizes
"whoever holds, arrests, returns, or causes to be held, arrested,
or returned . . . any person to a condition of peonage." The
language is inartistic. The appropriate qualifying preposition for
the word "holds" is "in." An accurate qualifying phrase for the
Page 320 U. S. 529
verb "arrests" would be "to place in or return to" peonage. But
the compactness of phrasing and the lack of strict grammatical
construction does not obscure the intent of the Act. Years ago,
this Court indicated that the disjunctive phrasing imports that
each of the acts -- holding, arresting, or returning -- may be the
subject of indictment and punishment. [
Footnote 6] We think that view is sound apart from any
consideration of the legislative history of the enactment. But,
when viewed in its setting, no doubt of the purpose of the statute
remains.
The Act of 1867 was passed as the result of agitation in
Congress for further legislation because of the use of federal
troops to arrest persons who had escaped from a condition of
peonage. [
Footnote 7] The first
section abolished and prohibited peonage and made certain practices
in connection therewith criminal. The second section imposed a duty
on all in the military and civil service to aid in the enforcement
of the first, and provided that, if any officer or other person in
the military service should offend against the Act's provisions, he
should, upon conviction by a court martial, be dishonorably
dismissed from the service. [
Footnote 8] It is plain that arrest for the purpose of
placing a person in or returning him to a condition of peonage was
one of the evils to be suppressed.
The appellee invokes the rule that criminal laws are to be
strictly construed, and defendants are not to be convicted under
statutes too vague to apprise the citizen of the nature of the
offense. That principle, however,
Page 320 U. S. 530
does not require distortion or nullification of the evident
meaning and purpose of the legislation. [
Footnote 9]
The judgment is
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
50 F. Supp. 607.
[
Footnote 2]
Pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 682.
[
Footnote 3]
18 U.S.C. § 444.
[
Footnote 4]
14 Stat. 546.
[
Footnote 5]
Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.
S. 207,
197 U. S. 218;
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219,
219 U. S. 241;
United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.
S. 133;
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U. S.
25.
[
Footnote 6]
Clyatt v. United States, supra, 197 U. S.
218-219.
[
Footnote 7]
Cong.Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 74, Pt. 1, pp. 239-241.
Ibid., Vol. 76, Pt. 3, p. 1571. Senate Report No. 156,
39th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 325, 326.
[
Footnote 8]
This section became § 5527 of the Revised Statutes, and was
repealed and reenacted in part by § 270 of the Criminal Code.
See 18 U.S.C. § 445.
[
Footnote 9]
Gooch v. United States, 297 U.
S. 124,
297 U. S. 128;
United States v. Giles, 300 U. S. 41,
300 U. S. 48;
United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540,
302 U. S.
552.
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, dissenting.
We are dealing here with a criminal statute, the penalties of
which circumscribe personal freedom. Before we sanction the
imposition of such penalties, no doubts should exist as to the
statutory proscription of the acts in question. Otherwise,
individuals are punished without having been adequately warned as
to those actions which subjected them to liability.
It is doubtful whether an arrest not followed by actual peonage
clearly and unmistakably falls within the prohibition of § 269 of
the Criminal Code. The court below, at least, felt that the statute
did not cover such a situation. Other judges have expressed similar
doubts.
United States v. Eberhart, 127 F. 252; dissenting
opinion in
Taylor v. United States, 244 F. 321, 332, 333.
And, in order to reach the opposite conclusion, this Court labels
the statutory language as "inartistic," and as lacking in "strict
grammatical construction." It then proceeds to rewrite the statute,
in conformity with what it conceives to have been the original
intention of Congress, so as to penalize "whoever . . . arrests . .
. any person for the purpose of placing him in a condition of
peonage." I cannot assent to this judicial revision of a criminal
law. Congress alone has power to amend or clarify the criminal
sanctions of a statute.
Apologia for inadequate legislative draftsmanship and reliance
on the admitted evils of peonage cannot replace the right of each
individual to a fair warning from Congress as to those actions for
which penalties are inflicted.
Page 320 U. S. 531
Punishment without clear legislative authority might conceivably
contain more potential seeds of oppression than the arrest of a
person "to a condition of peonage."