Taylor v. Georgia,
315 U.S. 25 (1942)

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U.S. Supreme Court

Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942)

Taylor v. Georgia

No. 70

Argued December 15, 16, 1941

Decided January 12, 1942

315 U.S. 25


1. Peonage is a form of involuntary servitude, within the meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, is an appropriate implementation of that Amendment. P. 315 U. S. 29.

2. A state statute making it a crime for any person to contract with another to perform services of any kind, and thereupon obtain in advance money or other thing of value, with intent not to perform such service, and providing further that failure to perform the service or to return the money, without good and sufficient cause,

Page 315 U. S. 26

shall be deemed presumptive evidence of intent, at the time of making the contract, not to perform such service held violative of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Act of 1867. P. 315 U. S. 29.

The necessary consequence of such statute is that one who has received an advance on a contract for services which he is unable to repay is bound by the threat of penal sanction to remain at his employment until the debt has been discharged. Such coerced labor is peonage.

191 Ga. 682, 13 S.E.2d 647, reversed.

Appeal from a judgment affirming a conviction for violation of a state statute.

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