1. The question as to when the period of limitations begins to
run against a receiver's claim upon an assessment levied by the
Comptroller of the Currency on stockholders of an insolvent
national bank is a federal question, and, in the present case, the
question was duly raised and preserved by appropriate exceptions
and assignments of error. P.
317 U. S.
220.
2. It is within the authority of the Comptroller of the Currency
to extend from time to time the date fixed for payment of
assessments against stockholders of insolvent national banks.
Nothing in the pertinent legislation, 12 U.S.C. §§ 63, 64, 66, 191,
192, prevents such extension. P.
317 U. S.
220.
3. The receiver of an insolvent national bank did not have a
complete and present cause of action to enforce the liability of a
deceased stockholder until the date finally fixed by the
Comptroller of the Currency, after extensions of dates previously
fixed, for payment, and, in this view, the receiver's claim against
the stockholder's estate was not barred by §§ 8225 and 8604 of the
Tennessee Code.
Pufahl v. Estate of Parks, 299 U.
S. 217, distinguished. P.
317 U. S.
220.
4. The desirability of closing decedents' estates speedily does
not warrant limiting the power of the Comptroller of the Currency
to extend the time for payment of an assessment against
stockholders of insolvent national banks. P.
317 U.S. 221.
25 Tenn.App. 230, 155 S.W.2d 882, reversed.
Upon a petition for rehearing, an earlier order of this Court
denying certiorari, 316 U.S. 691, was vacated, and certiorari was
granted, 316 U.S. 707, to review a decree of an intermediate state
court which affirmed a decree of the state Chancery Court barring,
on the ground of limitations, a claim by the receiver of an
insolvent national bank upon a stockholder's assessment. The
highest court of the State denied a petition for a writ of
certiorari.
Page 317 U. S. 218
MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In
Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, we
decided that state statutes of limitations govern the time within
which to enforce the liability imposed upon stockholders of
insolvent national banks by assessments levied by the Comptroller
of the Currency; that the question as to the time when a complete
and present cause of action arises in the receiver to enforce that
liability by suit is a federal question; that nothing in the
applicable statutes, 12 U.S.C. §§ 63, 64, 191, 192, prevents the
Comptroller, in making an assessment, from fixing a later date for
payment; and, that suit cannot be instituted prior to the date
fixed for payment, and a state statute of limitations does not
begin to run until that date. In this case, the Comptroller
extended the time for payment beyond the date originally set, and
we must decide whether time runs from the first or the final date
fixed for payment.
Petitioner is the successor to the original receiver for the
insolvent First National Bank of Chattanooga. On April 19, 1934,
the Comptroller of the Currency levied an assessment against the
Bank's stockholders for 100% of the par value of their shares,
payable on May 26, 1934. [
Footnote
1] By successive orders entered on May 17, 1934, June 19, 1934,
June 22, 1934, and March 11, 1935, the original maturity date of
May 26, 1934, was extended to make the assessment
Page 317 U. S. 219
payable on April 15, 1935. Notice of the assessment was given to
all stockholders on March 13, 1935.
Respondent, as successor to the original executrix, represents
the estate of C.C.Nottingham, which held stock of the Bank to the
extent of $138,000 par value at the time of the assessment. No
steps were taken to enforce against the estate the liability
imposed by the assessment until August 2, 1935, when petitioner's
predecessor filed an answer and a cross-bill in an action commenced
on July 24, 1935, in the Chancery Court for Hamilton County,
Tennessee, by the original executrix to require all creditors to
appear and establish their claims.
The Chancery Court held that petitioner's assessment claim
accrued on the date first fixed for payment, May 23, 1934,
[
Footnote 2] and that the claim
was barred by § 8225 of the Tennessee Code, [
Footnote 3] fixing a period of "six months from
the date the cause of action thereon accrued" within which to
enforce previously unmatured claims against decedents. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, relying upon § 8604 of the Code, [
Footnote 4] as well as § 8225.
Nottingham
v. Kent, 155 S.W.2d 882. The Supreme Court of the State denied
a petition for writ of certiorari. The importance of the question
in the administration of insolvent national banks [
Footnote 5] and a conflict with the decision
in
Strasburger v. Schram, 68 App.D.C. 87, 93 F.2d 246,
caused us to grant certiorari.
Page 317 U. S. 220
Our starting point, of course, is
Rawlings v. Ray,
supra. That case adequately disposes of respondent's
contention that no federal question is presented by this case;
whether petitioner's cause of action was complete on May 26, 1934,
or April 15, 1935, is a federal question, 312 U.S. at
312 U. S. 98,
which was duly raised and preserved by appropriate exceptions and
assignments of error. And, even as we found nothing in the
applicable statutes to question "the authority of the Comptroller
in making an assessment to fix a later date for its payment," 312
U.S. at
312 U. S. 99, we
see nothing in the pertinent legislation, 12 U.S.C. §§ 63, 64, 66,
191, 192, forbidding the Comptroller to extend the date fixed for
payment within reasonable limits from time to time. Such extensions
seem to be in accord with a long established practice designed to
achieve the desirable result of avoiding excessive and unnecessary
assessments. [
Footnote 6]
See Strasburger v. Schram, 68 App.D.C. 87, 93 F.2d 246,
248.
Compare Korbly v. Springfield Institution for
Savings, 245 U. S. 330,
where, in upholding the power of the Comptroller to withdraw one
assessment and levy a later one, we emphasized the desirability of
a large measure of administrative discretion and flexibility in the
adjustment of assessments to the "exigencies of each case." P.
245 U. S.
333.
Since the Comptroller has power to extend the time for payment,
respondent was not required to pay until April 15, 1935, and, prior
to that time, suit could not be instituted against her.
Rawlings v. Ray, supra, 312 U.S. at
312 U. S. 98.
While the receiver enforces the liability created by the
assessment, 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, he does so subject to the
direction of the Comptroller,
Kennedy v.
Gibson, 8 Wall.
Page 317 U. S. 221
498,
75 U. S. 505.
So petitioner did not have a complete and present cause of action
until April 15, 1935. Since the words "from the date the cause of
action thereon accrued" as used in § 8225 of the Tennessee Code,
seem to have their usual meaning and refer to the time when suit
may be instituted, [
Footnote 7]
it follows that petitioner's claim, filed on August 2, 1935, was in
time.
Respondent stresses § 8604 of the Code. [
Footnote 8] But, as pointed out above, petitioner had
no right to demand payment before April 15, 1935, so, even if §
8604 applies, it does not bar petitioner's claim.
Respondent mistakenly relies upon
Pufahl v. Parks'
Estate, 299 U. S. 217,
which has no application, because, in that case,
"we were not considering or deciding the question of the
application of a statute of limitations to a suit against a
stockholder upon an assessment made by the Comptroller where
payment was not required before a specified date, prior to which no
suit could be maintained."
Rawlings v. Ray, supra, 312 U.S. at
312 U. S.
99.
We are not unmindful that it is desirable to close decedents'
estates speedily, but there is no warrant in the federal
legislation for allowing that consideration to limit the power of
the Comptroller to extend the time for payment of an
assessment.
The judgment below is reversed, and the cause remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
This is the date given in the pleadings. However, the opinions
of the courts below refer to May 23, 1934, as the first date fixed
for payment.
[
Footnote 2]
See Note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 3]
Michie's Tennessee Code of 1938, Annotated.
[
Footnote 4]
"Sec. 8604.
Time runs from accrual of right, not
demand. When a right exists, but a demand is necessary to
entitle the party to an action, the limitation commences from the
time the plaintiff's right to make the demand was completed, and
not from the date of the demand."
[
Footnote 5]
The double liability feature of national bank stock has been
eliminated where there has been compliance with the provisions of
the statute, but this does not apply to banks in difficulty prior
to July 1, 1937, except as to stock issued after June 16, 1933. 12
U.S.C. § 64a.
[
Footnote 6]
The record does not disclose the reason for the extensions of
time here, but it appears that they were made at the request of a
stockholders' committee which protested the necessity of a 100%
assessment and asked for a reappraisal of the Bank's assets.
See Coffey v. Fisher, 100 F.2d 51, 52, involving the same
assessment here considered.
[
Footnote 7]
See Jones v. Whitworth, 94 Tenn. 602, 616, 30 S.W. 736;
Gillespie v. Broadway National Bank, 167 Tenn. 245, 249,
68 S.W.2d 479;
City of Knoxville v. Gervin, 169 Tenn. 532,
544, 89 S.W.2d 348.
[
Footnote 8]
See Note 4
supra.