An order of the bankruptcy court vacating an earlier order
restraining the prosecution by the alleged bankrupt of a suit in a
state court, in which suit, it was alleged, counterclaims in excess
of the amount claimed by the alleged bankrupt were filed is, under
§ 24(a) of the Chandler Act, appealable to the Circuit Court of
Appeals. P.
317 U. S.
212.
Reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 608, to review a decree
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction an appeal from an
interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court dissolving a
restraining order.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner filed an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against
respondent, who answered denying the allegations of the petition.
Prior to adjudication, the bankruptcy court entered an
ex
parte order on petition of the same creditor restraining the
prosecution by respondent or its agents of a suit in the Illinois
state courts on a claim against one Fisher in which suit, it was
alleged, Fisher had filed counterclaims which would exceed the
amount of the respondent's claim. Thereafter, on petition of
respondent and after notice to all parties and a hearing, the
bankruptcy court vacated the restraining order. This likewise was,
so far as appears, prior to an adjudication.
Page 317 U. S. 212
Petitioner appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal "for lack of jurisdiction." The case is here on
certiorari.
Sec. 24(a) of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 854, 11 U.S.C. § 47,
gives the Circuit Courts of Appeals appellate jurisdiction from
courts of bankruptcy "in proceedings in bankruptcy, either
interlocutory or final." An order of the bankruptcy court vacating
a restraining order against prosecution of a suit in a state court
is, like a stay order itself, a proceeding in bankruptcy.
See
Harrison Securities Co. v. Spinks Realty Co., 92 F.2d 904;
Taylor v. Voss, 271 U. S. 176,
271 U. S. 181.
The amendments to § 24(a) made by the Chandler Act practically
abolished the distinction between appeals as of right and by leave.
S.Rep. No.1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 4.
And see Dickinson
Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan, 309 U.
S. 382,
309 U. S.
385-388. Whatever may still be the possible limitations
on the reviewability of interlocutory orders (
see In re Hotel
Governor Clinton, Inc., 107 F.2d 398;
Federal Land Bank v.
Hansen, 113 F.2d 82, 84, 85), no reason appears why this one
cannot or should not be reviewed. Nor does it appear from the
record which is before us that the issue is moot. We intimate no
opinion on the merits. The judgment is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the Circuit Court of Appeals for proceedings in
conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.