1. A suit against a single interstate carrier to recover damages
resulting from a negligent failure to deliver a package shipped
interstate by express is a suit arising under a law regulating
commerce,
viz., under the Carmack Amendment, as amended --
of which the District Court has jurisdiction irrespective of the
amount involved. Jud.Code § 24(8). P.
316 U. S.
352.
2. Whether a suit arises under a law of the United States must
appear from the plaintiff's pleading, not the defenses which may be
interposed to, or be anticipated by, it. A pleading that adequately
discloses a present controversy dependent for its outcome upon the
construction of a federal statute satisfies this requirement. P.
316 U. S.
353.
14 F.2d 430 reversed.
Certiorari, 315 U.S. 793, to review a judgment sustaining a
dismissal by the District Court for want of jurisdiction of an
action against the express company for nondelivery.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner brought this suit in the District Court for the
Western District of Texas, alleging that respondent, known to be an
interstate carrier, had negligently failed to deliver to the
addressee in California a package shipped from Waco, Texas, and
claiming damages in the sum of $750,000. The trial court ordered
petitioner to attach to his complaint a copy of the express receipt
which he received
Page 316 U. S. 351
upon delivering the package to respondent. This receipt
contained a $50 valuation. Thereupon the court granted respondent's
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the amount in
controversy was less than the $3,000 necessary to sustain
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 41(1), Jud.Code § 24(1). The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari to
inquire whether the suit could be maintained under 28 U.S.C. §
41(8), Jud.Code § 24(8), granting the district courts jurisdiction
"Of all suits and proceedings arising under any law regulating
commerce," irrespective of the amount involved.
The pertinent act of Congress is 49 U.S.C. § 20(11), originally
the Carmack Amendment of 1906, 34 Stat. 593, since amended several
times to its present form. The section requires an interstate
common carrier receiving property for shipment to issue a receipt
or bill of lading. The carrier is made liable to the holder "for
any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it" or
connecting carriers. If the injury does not occur on the initial
carrier's line, but it responds in damages, it is entitled to
recover over from the responsible carrier. Further, the initial
carrier is made liable to the shipper for full damages sustained,
notwithstanding any limitation of liability in the receipt or bill
of lading, with the exception, important here, that, where a
carrier, by authority or direction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission, maintains rates dependent upon the value of the
property declared in writing by the shipper, such declaration also
limits liability of the carrier for loss or damage to an amount not
in excess of the declared value.
Following the Carmack Amendment, this Court, in several cases,
upheld the power of the receiving carrier to limit its liability to
an agreed valuation, made to obtain the lower of two or more rates.
See Adams Express Co.
v.
Page 316 U. S. 352
Croninger, 226 U. S. 491;
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U.
S. 657;
Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
236 U. S. 278. The
so-called First Cummins Amendment of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1196,
prohibited in general any such limitation of liability. By the
Second Cummins Amendment of August 9, 1916, 39 Stat. 441, Congress
adopted the present provisions authorizing limitation of liability
in the manner already noted, and substantially restored the rule of
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra.
Respondent, confessing error, asserts that, under § 20(11) as it
now stands, a suit brought against a single interstate carrier for
its negligent nondelivery is one not merely to enforce a common law
liability limited by an Act of Congress, but that petitioner's
cause of action has its origin, in and is controlled by, such act,
and so "arises under" it. Any doubts as to the correctness of this
position,
* are resolved by
the Act of January 20, 1914, c. 11, 38 Stat. 278, 28 U.S.C. § 71,
regulating removal to the federal courts of suits brought under the
Carmack Amendment in the state courts.
After the Carmack Amendment, a conflict of decisions had
developed in the lower federal courts on the question whether suits
for damages brought against interstate carriers under the amendment
were suits "arising under" an act regulating commerce, so that
their removal from state to federal district courts would be
permitted.
McGoon v. Northern Pac. Ry., 204 F. 998;
Storm Lake Tub & Tank Factory v. Minneapolis & St.L.
Ry., 209 F. 895;
Adams v. Chicago, G.W. Ry., 210 F.
362. The decision
Page 316 U. S. 353
in the
McGoon case, sustaining removal jurisdiction
irrespective of the amount in controversy, was followed by the
removal of many small suits against carriers to the federal
district courts. Congress ended this practice by the Act of January
20, 1914, which forbade removal of suits under the Carmack
Amendment involving less than $3,000.
The report of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 9994, 63d
Cong.2d Sess. (which was the same in substance as S. 3484, which
became the 1914 law) expressly recognized the effect and authority
of the decision in the
McGoon case. In prohibiting
removals where less than $3,000 is in controversy, instead of
imposing the $3,000 limitation directly on all suits brought in the
federal courts under the Carmack Amendment, Congress recognized
that such suits arise under a law regulating commerce within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 41(8), and sanctioned the exercise of
original jurisdiction by the district courts in such cases.
See H.Rep. No. 120, 63d Cong., 2d Sess.;
also 51
Cong.Rec. 1327, 1544-1548.
Whether a suit arises under a law of the United States must
appear from the plaintiff's pleading, not the defenses which may be
interposed to, or be anticipated by it. Petitioner's pleading,
which we have summarized, satisfies this requirement, since it
adequately discloses a present controversy dependent for its
outcome upon the construction of a federal statute.
See
Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.
S. 454;
Louisville & Nashville Ry. v.
Mottley, 211 U. S. 149;
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S.
22,
228 U. S. 25;
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74;
Gully v. First Natl. Bank, 229
U. S. 109,
229 U. S.
113.
Reversed.
*
Compare Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Rankin,
241 U. S. 319,
241 U. S. 326;
Chicago & E.I. R. Co. v. Collins Co., 249 U.
S. 186,
249 U. S. 191,
with Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226
U. S. 505;
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v.
Harriman, 227 U. S. 657,
227 U. S. 672;
Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.
S. 632,
240 U.S.
639-640.