1. Under the Raker Act of December 19, 1913, which granted to
the City and County of San Francisco certain lands and rights of
way in the Hetch-Hetchy Valley for use by the City in constructing
and maintaining a means of supplying water for the domestic
purposes of the City and other public bodies, and in establishing a
system for generation and sale and distribution of electric energy,
held:
That § 6 prohibits the City from transferring to a public
utility the right to sell electric power produced by the City under
the grant, in addition to forbidding sale of the power itself as a
commodity for resale. P.
310 U. S.
20.
Congress clearly intended to require -- as a condition of its
grant -- sale and distribution of power exclusively by San
Francisco and other municipal agencies directly to consumers, in
the belief that consumers would thus be afforded power at cheap
rates in competition with private power companies. P.
310 U. S.
26.
2. The City, instead of selling the power produced under the
grant directly to consumers at prices fixed by itself, delivered it
under a contract, for a fixed compensation, to a public utility
corporation, which, in turn, sold it to consumers in the City and
elsewhere, along with power produced by itself at the rates fixed
from time to time by the State Railroad Commission.
Held,
that the contract is in violation of the Act, and cannot be
defended upon the ground that the City has a right to sell through
the corporation as its agent. P.
310 U. S.
28.
Page 310 U. S. 17
3. The prohibitions of § 6 are not an unconstitutional invasion
of the right of the California to regulate distribution of
electricity, and are not mere covenants subject to alleged
equitable defenses, but are conditions which Congress, in virtue of
its power over the public domain, was authorized to attach to the
grant. P
310 U. S.
28.
4. In disposing of rights to develop hydroelectric power in the
public lands, Congress may impose limitations designed to avoid
monopoly and to bring about a widespread distribution of benefits.
P.
310 U. S.
30.
5. A suit brought by the Attorney General in the name of the
United States, pursuant to the mandate of the granting Act, to
enforce its provisions by an injunction is cognizable in equity. P.
310 U. S.
30.
6. In such a suit, the duty of the court to enjoin plain
violations of the Act is not measured by a balancing of equities,
but by the policy of the statute. P.
310 U. S.
31.
7. A former erroneous administrative construction of 6 of the
Act (since abandoned) as forbidding no more than sale of power for
resale
held ineffectual. P.
310 U. S.
31.
8. The United States is not estopped by acts of its officers in
sanctioning an agreement not permitted by law. P.
310 U. S. 32.
106 F.2d 569 reversed.
Certiorari, 309 U.S. 642, to review the reversal of a decree of
injunction commanding the City and County of San Francisco to cease
disposing of its electric power to a public utility corporation,
or, in the alternative, to cease further use of lands and rights
granted to it by an Act of Congress, for generation and
transmission of electricity.
Page 310 U. S. 18
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Raker Act of December 19, 1913, [
Footnote 1] Congress granted the City and County of San
Francisco, [
Footnote 2] subject
to express conditions, certain lands and rights-of-way in the
public domain in Yosemite National Park and Stanislaus National
Forest. The Act in terms declared that this, known as the
"Hetch-Hetchy" grant, was intended for use by the City both in
constructing and maintaining a means of supplying water for the
domestic purposes of the City and other public bodies and in
establishing a system "for generation and sale and distribution of
electric energy."
Upon application of the Secretary of the Interior, the United
States brought this suit [
Footnote
3] in equity charging the city with disposing of power through
the Pacific Gas & Electric Company, a private utility, in
violation of § 6 of the granting Act. § 6 provides
"That the grantee [the City] is prohibited from ever selling or
letting to any corporation or individual, except a municipality or
a municipal water district or irrigation district, the right to
sell or sublet the water or the electric energy sold or given to it
or him by the said grantee:
Provided, That the rights
hereby granted shall not be sold,
Page 310 U. S. 19
assigned, or transferred to any private person, corporation, or
association, and in case of any attempt to so sell, assign,
transfer, or convey, this grant shall revert to the Government of
the United States."
The District Court concluded that the City was violating § 6 by
the sale and distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power through the Pacific
Gas & Electric Company, a private utility. Accordingly, the
City was required by injunction alternatively to discontinue such
disposal of the power or cease further use of the lands and rights
granted it under the Act for generation and transmission of
electric energy. [
Footnote 4]
The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, [
Footnote 5] finding that the private utility was merely
acting as the City's agent in the sale and distribution of
Hetch-Hetchy power and holding that § 6 does not prohibit such sale
and distribution of that power by private utility.
Here, as in the courts below, the City has defended the sale and
distribution by the Pacific Gas & Electric Company of power
originating at Hetch-Hetchy upon the grounds that such disposition
does not violate the prohibitions of § 6; that imposition of these
prohibitions was not within the constitutional authority of
Congress, and that, if § 6 is valid and has been violated, the
United States is not entitled to injunctive relief in equity.
First. Prohibitions of Section 6. In the City's view, §
6 does not preclude private utilities from all participation in the
ultimate sale and distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power. The City
insists that the Section, so construed, does no more than prohibit
the City from selling
Page 310 U. S. 20
Hetch-Hetchy power to a private utility for resale to consumers,
and therefore permits consignment of the power to the Company, as
agent of the City, for sale and distribution. On the contrary, the
Government's position rests upon the claim that Pacific Gas &
Electric Company is not in reality selling and distributing
Hetch-Hetchy power as consignee and agent, but as purchaser for
resale; that the grant to the City was made upon the mandatory
condition that this power be sold solely and exclusively by the
City directly to consumers and without private profit in order to
bring it into direct competition with adjacent privately owned
utilities, and that § 6 not only withholds the right of selling for
resale, but also prohibits the City "from ever selling or letting"
to any private corporation "the right to sell or sublet the . . .
electric energy sold or given to it . . . " by the City. The
language of the Act, its background, and its history require the
construction given § 6 by the Government.
From its provisions, [
Footnote
6] it is apparent that the Act conditions the grant upon and
contemplates the development, sale, and distribution of electrical
power by the City itself "for municipal and commercial use" on a
scale to be gradually stepped up over a period of years.
"The . . . grantee shall develop and use hydroelectric power for
the use of its people, and shall . . . sell or supply such power
for irrigation, pumping, or other beneficial use."
The "right to sell or sublet the . . . electric energy" so
generated by the City cannot, as a consequence of § 6, be sold or
let. And, in case of any attempt to "sell, assign, transfer, or
convey [the rights granted], this grant shall revert to the
Government of the United States."
From the statement of the Congressman responsible for the
application of the prohibitions of § 6 specifically to
Page 310 U. S. 21
electric energy, [
Footnote
7] it is clear that, as enacted, § 6 was understood to prohibit
the City from transferring to a private utility the right to sell
Hetch-Hetchy power (the Government's contention), and not merely to
forbid sale of power as a commodity for resale, as the City would
have us hold:
"Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. We have got to let the municipality
sell to individuals or consumers."
"Mr. THOMSON of Illinois. Yes; but not the right to sell some
one else the power."
"Mr. TAYLOR of Colorado. Supposing that San Francisco sells a
certain block, you may say, of its power to Alameda. Has not
Alameda got the right to resell that to its inhabitants?"
"Mr. THOMSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, in answering the
question of the gentleman from Colorado, I would like to call his
attention to the fact that the subject of sale as printed in this
section is not the power or the water, but the right to sell the
power or the water."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. RAKER. That [the word 'individual'] really is intended to
cover any person who might attempt to buy this electric power or
right. I think it would cover everybody outside of a corporation,
the intention being to prevent anybody getting in and getting a
right and subletting it. [
Footnote
8]"
In its Report on the Bill, the House Committee on Public Lands
stated that the provision of § 6,
"acquiesced in by the grantee, was designed to prevent any
monopoly or private corporation from hereafter obtaining control of
the water supply of San Francisco. [
Footnote 9] "
Page 310 U. S. 22
From the congressional debates on the passage of the Raker Act
can be read a common understanding, both on the part of sponsors of
the Bill and its opponents, that the grant was to be so conditioned
as to require municipal performance of the function of supplying
Hetch-Hetchy water and electric power directly to the ultimate
consumers, and to prohibit sale or distribution of that power and
water by any private corporation or individual. [
Footnote 10] On the floor of the House, the
following took place between the Bill's author and other
Representatives:
"Mr. SUMNERS. Does San Francisco own its own lighting plant
now?"
"Mr. KAHN. No; it does not."
"Mr. RAKER. I understand it does not."
"Mr. KAHN. It does not own its own water supply. Its present
water supply is furnished by a private company."
"Mr. RAKER. The Spring Valley Water System."
"Mr. SUMNERS. Is it the purpose of this bill to have San
Francisco supply electric power and water to its own people?"
"Mr. RAKER. Yes."
"Mr. SUMNERS. Or to supply these corporations, which will in
turn supply the people?"
"Mr. RAKER. Under this bill, it is to supply its own inhabitants
first. . . . [
Footnote
11]"
These views were in accord with the recommendation of the then
Secretary of the Interior, as set out in the Report of the Public
Lands Committee of the House:
Page 310 U. S. 23
"I think that it is very proper that the Federal Government
should use whatever power it has over the public lands, over the
parks, and over the forests, to compel the fullest use of these
waters, and indirectly to require through its power to make
conditions, the lowest possible rate for consumers. [
Footnote 12]"
The theme -- of an intent to require public utilization of
Hetch-Hetchy power independently of private utilities -- recurred
at a later stage of the debate in the House:
"Mr. GRAY. . . ."
"As I understand the bill, it provides for the furnishing of
water, and also for power for commercial use. . . ."
". . . if these words here are to be constructed to serve the
baseness of commercialism, it is the vilest of all vandalism. My
suggestion here to you is to strike out of this bill all the
commercial profit. . . ."
"Mr. KENT [a Member of the California delegation and a supporter
of the measure]. Mr. Chairman, I should like to suggest to the
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Gray] that this bill is strictly drawn
in the public interest, that there is no possibility of selfish
gain, and that no corporation or individual can obtain any benefit
whatsoever from this bill. It is for the benefit of the people of
California. [
Footnote
13]"
In the Senate, Senator Thomas, a Member of the Committee
reporting the Bill, said:
". . . San Francisco needs electric power, and California needs
development in electric power just as much as she needs ownership
in water, . . . "
Page 310 U. S. 24
". . . She is anxious to extend her spheres of municipal
usefulness, but she is in the grip of a power monopoly as well as
that of the Spring Valley Co."
". . . This scheme appeals to me, Mr. President, so far as the
power is concerned, because the city of San Francisco, as a
municipality, will be the owner of it, the manufacturer, the
distributor of it. [
Footnote
14]"
And the words of Senator Norris, also a Member of the reporting
Committee and a leading sponsor of the bill, on the day of its
final passage through the Senate, illuminate just what the Raker
Act was intended to accomplish:
". . . I said that I was in favor of this bill to a great extent
for the reason that it developed this power. This power will come
into competition with the various water power companies of
California, and there are lots of them there."
". . . this proposition is to harness that power and to put it
to public use, not to give it to a private corporation. . . ."
"Here is an instance where we are going to give it directly to
the people, if we pass this bill. It is going to come into
competition with power companies and corporations that have, or
will have, if this bill is defeated, almost a monopoly not only in
San Francisco, but throughout the greater portion of
California."
"
* * * *"
"These make, in all, as I have counted them, 18 corporations
controlling the power in the vicinity of San Francisco that are
under the control of this one corporation. [Pacific Gas &
Electric Company.]"
". . . When you sum them all up, you will find that they own
practically all of the hydroelectric power of the California, and
this bill, if passed, will bring
Page 310 U. S. 25
into competition with them one of the greatest units for the
development of power that has ever been developed in the history of
the world. It means competition."
". . . Conservation does not mean dealing out these resources to
private capital for gain. It is not necessary to accuse those
corporations of doing any wrong; but here will be an instance where
the cheapest power on earth with be developed, and where it will be
sold at cost. [
Footnote
15]"
Opponents of the bill themselves recognized that its regulatory
conditions were designed to insure distribution of power from
Hetch-Hetchy through a municipal system in San Francisco. Before
final passage in the Senate, opposition had practically narrowed
down to the power provisions of the measure [
Footnote 16] and these provisions contemplated a
publicly owned and operated power system. [
Footnote 17]
Page 310 U. S. 26
Immediately before the vote in the Senate, Senator McCumber,
opposed to the power provisions of § 6, offered a sweeping
amendment which would have omitted that Section and all other
provisions relating to the generation, sale, and distribution of
Hetch-Hetchy power. [
Footnote
18] But his amendment was defeated. [
Footnote 19] And, despite this articulate opposition
to the policy embodied in its power features, the Act was
passed.
To limit the prohibitions of § 6 of the Act narrowly to sales of
power for resale without more, as the City asks, would permit
evasion and frustration of the purpose of the lawmakers. Congress
clearly intended to require -- as a condition of its grant -- sale
and distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power exclusively by San Francisco
and municipal agencies directly to consumers in the belief that
consumers would thus be afforded power at cheap rates in
competition with private power companies, particularly Pacific Gas
& Electric Company. It is not the office of the courts to pass
upon the justification for that belief or the efficacy of the
measures chosen for putting it into effect. Selection of the
emphatically expressed purpose embodied in this Act was the
appropriate business of the legislative body.
Page 310 U. S. 27
The admitted facts shown by this record required the District
Court to find -- as it did -- that the City was violating § 6 in
permitting sale and distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power by the
Pacific Gas & Electric Company. Now, as it has been doing since
contracting with the City in 1925, the Company sells and
distributes that power as follows:
Power generated in the City's plant is transmitted to the
Company at Newark, about thirty-five miles from San Francisco.
There, the power is delivered to the Company's substation, and
thereafter is under the Company's complete control. The Company
distributes and sells this power to its customers in San Francisco
and elsewhere exactly as it handles other power which it generates,
buys, or owns. Consumers of the power are billed by and pay the
Company. The City buys Hetch-Hetchy power from the Company exactly
as do other consumers. The City receives monthly payments from the
Company on a fixed basis set out in the contract. The price
received by the City has remained constant from 1925 to date,
although rates to the consumers have varied in the interim. In the
event of the refusal, failure, or inability of the Company to take
the available output of the City's plant in accordance with the
agreement, the amount of energy which the City could have delivered
is the basis of making the monthly payment, and the Company must
pay for power delivered to it, whether actually disposed of by
resale or not. The rate paid by consumers for the Hetch-Hetchy
power is not fixed by the City, as it could be under the
Constitution of California, [
Footnote 20] but is fixed by the State Railroad
Commission just as the price of
Page 310 U. S. 28
all other power sold by the Pacific Gas & Electric Company
in California is fixed.
Thus, in brief, the City does not itself distribute and sell the
power directly to consumers; it has not provided competition with
the private power company, and it has transferred the right to sell
and distribute the power to a private power company in violation of
the express prohibition of § 6 of the Act.
Terminology of consignment of power, rather than of transfer by
sale, and verbal description of the power Company as the City's
agent or consignee, are not sufficient to take the actions of the
parties under the contract out of § 6. Congress, in effect trustee
of public lands for all the people, has by this Act sought to
protect and control the disposition of a section of the public
domain. The City has, in fact, followed a course of conduct which
Congress, by § 6, has forbidden. Mere words and ingenuity of
contractual expression, whatever their effect between the parties,
cannot, by description, make permissible a course of conduct
forbidden by law. When we look behind the word description of the
arrangement between the City and the power company to what was
actually done, we see that the City has -- contrary to the terms of
§ 6 -- abdicated its control over the sale and ultimate
distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power. There remain only the
determinations whether the prohibitions of § 6 are constitutional
and can be enforced in equity.
Second. The prohibitions of § 6 are challenged by the
City as an unconstitutional invasion of the rights of the
California on the ground that they attempt to regulate the manner
in which electricity shall be disposed of in San Francisco. And the
City therefore insists that these prohibitions must be considered
only as covenants in a contract between the City and the United
States. Upon this premise, the City has argued here, as it did
in
Page 310 U. S. 29
the Court of Appeals, that alleged equitable defenses render the
covenants unenforceable.
When the Raker Bill was before Congress, the City filed with the
Public Lands Committee of the House a brief and argument in support
of the Bill. Citing authorities, including this Court's opinions,
and legislative precedents, the City submitted to Congress that, as
grantee, it would be bound by, and, as grantor, Congress was
empowered to impose, "the conditions set forth in the Hetch-Hetchy
bill." [
Footnote 21] After
passage of the Bill, the City accepted the grant by formal
ordinance, assented to all the conditions contained in the grant,
constructed the required power and water facilities, and, up to
date, has utilized the rights, privileges and benefits granted by
Congress. Now the City seeks to retain the benefits of the Act
while attacking the constitutionality of one of its important
conditions. [
Footnote
22]
Article 4, § 3, Cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that
"The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States."
The power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is
without limitations. [
Footnote
23] "And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall
be administered. That is for Congress
Page 310 U. S. 30
to determine." [
Footnote
24] Thus, Congress may constitutionally limit the disposition
of the public domain to a manner consistent with its views of
public policy. And the policy to govern disposal of rights to
develop hydroelectric power in such public lands may, if Congress
chooses, be one designed to avoid monopoly and to bring about a
widespread distribution of benefits. The statutory requirement that
Hetch-Hetchy power be publicly distributed does not represent an
exercise of a general control over public policy in a State, but,
instead, only an exercise of the complete power which Congress has
over particular public property entrusted to it. [
Footnote 25]
Third. Finally, on the basis of numerous objections to
the District Court's judgment, assigned as errors in the Court
below and pressed here, the City denies the Government's right --
upon a balancing of equities -- to relief by injunction even if the
present disposition of Hetch-Hetchy power be in violation of the
Act.
However, after consideration of all these objections, we are
satisfied that this case does not call for a balancing of equities
or for the invocation of the generalities of judicial maxims in
order to determine whether an injunction should have issued. The
City is availing itself of valuable rights and privileges granted
by the Government, and yet persists in violating the very
conditions upon which those benefits were granted. Congress
provided
"That the grantee [City] shall at all times comply with and
observe on its part all the conditions specified in this Act, and,
in the event that the same are not reasonably complied with and
carried out by the grantee, upon written request of the Secretary
of the Interior, it is made the duty of the Attorney General, in
the name of the United
Page 310 U. S. 31
States to commence all necessary suits or proceedings in the
proper court having jurisdiction thereof for the purpose of
enforcing and carrying out the provisions of this Act."
Pursuant to this legislative mandate, the present suit was
instituted to enforce covenants exacted from a grantee of rights in
the public domain by a Congress sympathetic with the local needs of
San Francisco, but also jealous of its own responsibility to
dispose of such rights in a manner deemed by it most likely to
render their benefits widespread. The equitable doctrines relied on
do not militate against the capacity of a court of equity as a
proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress
effective. Injunction to prohibit continued use -- in violation of
that policy -- of property granted by the United States, and to
enforce the grantee's covenants, is both appropriate and necessary.
[
Footnote 26]
A substantial part of the City's argument rests upon its claim
that the Department of the Interior, in the period from 1913 to
1937, construed § 6 to forbid no more than sale of power for
resale. We are asked to accept these administrative
interpretations. And, in addition, the City suggests that conduct
of the Department, of which these interpretations were a part, is
sufficient to create an estoppel against the Government. Whether
the Department at any time ever did more than merely to tolerate
sale and distribution of Hetch-Hetchy power by the Company as a
temporary expedient is doubtful. Certain it is, however, that, in
1935, the Secretary of the Interior declared the City's disposition
of the power through the Company to be a violation of § 6, demanded
discontinuance of this violation without success, and thereafter
instigated this proceeding. We cannot accept the contention that
administrative rulings -- such as those here
Page 310 U. S. 32
relied on -- can thwart the plain purpose of a valid law. As to
estoppel, it is enough to repeat that
". . . the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts
of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or
agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction
or permit. [
Footnote
27]"
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed. The judgment of
the District Court is affirmed, and we remand the case to it.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS is of the opinion that the judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals should be affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
C. 4, 38 Stat. 242.
[
Footnote 2]
The City and County of San Francisco is a municipal corporation
of California, and will be referred to here as the City.
[
Footnote 3]
Section 9(u) of the Act contains the following:
"
Provided, however, That the grantee shall at all times
comply with and observe on its part all the conditions specified in
this Act, and in the event that the same are not reasonably
complied with and carried out by the grantee, upon written request
of the Secretary of the Interior, it is made the duty of the
Attorney General in the name of the United States to commence all
necessary suits or proceedings in the proper court having
jurisdiction thereof, for the purpose of enforcing and carrying out
the provisions of this Act."
38 Stat. 250.
[
Footnote 4]
23 F. Supp.
40. The District Court stated:
"In order that the City may face its problem and comply with its
obligations under section 6 of the Raker Act, the court will make
its injunction issuable forthwith, but effective six months from
the date of its issue."
P. 53.
[
Footnote 5]
106 F.2d 569.
[
Footnote 6]
See § 9(m).
[
Footnote 7]
50 Cong.Rec. Part 4, p. 4906. Mr. Thomson of Illinois was a
member of the committee that considered and reported the Bill.
[
Footnote 8]
Id., p. 3999.
[
Footnote 9]
H.R. No. 41, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 11.
[
Footnote 10]
Reference to congressional debates may be made to establish a
common agreement upon the general purpose of an Act.
Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1,
221 U. S. 50;
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U.
S. 643,
283 U. S. 650;
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.
S. 602,
295 U. S.
625.
[
Footnote 11]
50 Cong.Rec. Part 4, p. 3905.
[
Footnote 12]
House Reports, Vol. 1, Nos. 17-92, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., 1913,
p. 25.
[
Footnote 13]
50 Cong.Rec. Part 4, p. 3991.
See also 69 Cong.Rec.
Part 9, pp. 9239
et seq.
[
Footnote 14]
51 Cong.Rec. Part I, pp. 126, 136.
[
Footnote 15]
51 Cong.Rec. Part 1, pp. 343, 344, 347. Senator Pittman, one of
the Bill's sponsors and a Member of the reporting Committee, stated
that the Bill provided "absolutely that neither this water nor this
power can ever fall into the hands of a monopoly." 50 Cong.Rec.
Part 6, p. 5473.
[
Footnote 16]
See, e.g., views of Senator Smoot, who opposed the
measure:
". . . I was opposed to the regulations that were put in this
bill, and that is what I was opposed to more than any other thing.
I wanted the question of regulations taken out of the controversy,
and the bill reported to the Senate without those regulations in
it."
"
* * * *"
"Mr. President, I do not think there ought to be any
misunderstanding about this matter. The Senator himself, I think,
will admit that the principal object of this bill is to provide for
the creation of power. . . ."
". . . I will, moreover, say that it is my opinion that the
reason San Francisco wants this particular dam site is for the
power that she thinks can be developed cheaper than from any other
source, and at the same time get a large supply of water. That is
my personal opinion."
51 Cong.Rec. Part 1, pp. 304, 314, 360.
[
Footnote 17]
"The people who ride on street cars, the people who use electric
lights, the people who are now using gas, those who eventually will
use coal for purposes of heat, and those who use water for washing
purposes will all receive all the benefit there is in this
legislation without any rake-off by any corporation or
monopoly."
Senator Norris, 51 Cong.Rec. Part 1, p. 347.
[
Footnote 18]
Senator Clark, of Montana, also opposed to the power provision
of the Bill, said with reference to Senator McCumber's
amendment:
". . . The Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCumber] has prepared
an amendment to the bill which accomplishes all the purposes which
the proponents of the bill claim are desired, leaving out the
objectionable features, which have nothing whatever to do with the
water supply of the city of San Francisco."
51 Cong.Rec. Part 1, p. 184.
[
Footnote 19]
Id., pp. 383, 384, 385.
[
Footnote 20]
Under Art. XII, § 23 of the California Constitution
municipalities are exempt from rate regulation by the State
Commission.
See Pasadena v. Railroad Comm'n, 183 Cal. 526,
192 P. 25;
Water Users' & Taxpayers' Assn. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 188 Cal. 437, 205 P. 682.
[
Footnote 21]
H.R. No. 41, 63rd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 41. Similar views were
entertained in Congress upon the effect of the conditions.
See,
e.g., Senator Walsh of Montana:
"We are making a grant of rights in the public lands to the city
of San Francisco, and we may impose just exactly such conditions as
we see fit, and San Francisco can take the grant with all those
conditions or it can let it alone."
51 Cong.Rec. Part 1, p. 69.
[
Footnote 22]
Cf. Daniels v. Tearney, 102 U.
S. 415,
102 U. S. 421;
Grand Rapids & Indiana Ry. Co. v. Osborn, 193 U. S.
17,
193 U. S. 29;
Wall v. Parrot Silver & Copper Co., 244 U.
S. 407,
244 U. S. 411;
St. Louis Co. v. Prendergast Co., 260 U.
S. 469,
260 U. S. 473;
Booth Fisheries Co. v. Industrial Commission, 271 U.
S. 208,
271 U. S.
211.
[
Footnote 23]
United States v.
Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526,
39 U. S.
527.
[
Footnote 24]
Light v. United States, 220 U.
S. 523,
220 U. S.
537.
[
Footnote 25]
Cf. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.
S. 246,
206 U. S. 256;
see Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U. S. 104.
[
Footnote 26]
Cf. Oregon & California R. Co. v. United States,
238 U. S. 393,
238 U. S. 436,
238 U. S.
438.
[
Footnote 27]
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States,
243 U. S. 389,
243 U. S.
409.