1. A Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the operation on the
highways of the any vehicle carrying any other vehicle "above the
cab of the carrier vehicle or over the head of the operator of such
carrier vehicle," and applied to interstate carriers,
held
consistent with due process of law, and consistent with the
commerce clause in the absence of Congressional action. P.
309 U. S.
603.
2. The Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935 did not undertake to
deprive the power to impose this regulation upon vehicles moving in
interstate commerce. Pp.
309 U. S. 604
et seq.
3. Section 204 of the Federal Motor Carrier Act empowers the
Interstate Commerce Commission to establish reasonable requirements
with respect to "safety of operation and equipment" of motor
vehicles of common and contract carriers in interstate commerce,
but its authority with respect to sizes and weights of vehicles is
expressly limited in § 225 to investigation and report on the need
of regulation. P.
309 U. S.
607.
4. "Sizes and weight" in the meaning of § 225 includes the size
and weight of the motor vehicle and its load. P.
309 U. S.
610.
5. The authority to regulate the "sizes and weight" of motor
vehicles, left with the States by § 225 of the Federal Motor
Carrier Act, is not restricted to over-all measurements and gross
weight, but includes particular dimensions of motor vehicles and
their loads and the weight distribution of load, which affect
safety as well as the wear and tear of the highways. P.
309 U. S.
610.
6. The Pennsylvania regulation is an exercise of the state's
power to protect the safe and convenient use of its highways, which
it was the purpose of § 225 to reserve to the State from the grant
of regulatory power to the Commission. P.
309 U. S.
611.
7. In ordinary speech, the load of a vehicle is not spoken of as
a part of its equipment. P.
309 U. S.
612.
8. Even if the phrase "operation and equipment" in § 204 could
be taken, when standing alone, as including the weight and size
of
Page 309 U. S. 599
load, it cannot be so taken when read in conjunction with the
reservation of § 225 of "sizes and weight" from the regulatory
power of the Commission. P.
309 U. S.
612.
9. Congressional intention to displace local laws in the
exercise of the commerce power is not to be inferred unless clearly
indicated. P.
309 U. S.
614.
336 Pa. 17; 7 A.2d 466, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment affirming the dismissal of a complaint in
an action to enjoin the enforcement of a state regulation of motor
vehicles.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question for decision is whether a statute of Pennsylvania
prohibiting the operation over its highways of any motor vehicle
carrying any other vehicle over the head of the operator of such
carrier vehicle is superseded by the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Interstate Commerce Commission under the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327, applicable
to common and contract carriers in interstate commerce.
Appellants, co-partners engaged as common carriers in the
business of transporting in interstate commerce new
Page 309 U. S. 600
automobiles upon motor trucks specially constructed for that
purpose, brought this suit in the Pennsylvania state courts to
enjoin appellees, state officers, from enforcing against appellants
§ 1033(c) of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, P.L. 2401, effective
June 29, 1937, 75 P.S. § 642(c), which prohibits the operation on
the highways of the state of any vehicle carrying any other vehicle
"above the cab of the carrier vehicle or over the head of the
operator of such carrier vehicle." [
Footnote 1] Two other like suits brought by motor carriers
engaged in like transportation interstate were consolidated with
the present suit.
After a hearing in which there was extensive evidence tending to
show that the transportation by appellants over the state highways
of cars placed above the cab of the transporting vehicle is unsafe
to the driver and to the public, the trial court found that the
location of motor vehicles over the cab of the carrier rendered its
operation dangerous on the curves and grades of the
Pennsylvania
Page 309 U. S. 601
highways. It found that such location of the carried car above
the driver raises the center of gravity of the loaded car above
that which is normal in trucking operations, places excessive
weight on the front axles and tires, obscures the vision of the
driver of the carrier car, with the results that it increases the
difficulty of steering the loaded car, adversely affects braking,
particularly on curves, and affects the balance of the loaded car
so as to make its use on the highways dangerous.
It also found that, in case of collision or loss of control, the
overhead car has a tendency to fly off the cab, in consequence of
which, in numerous cases, serious injury had resulted to the
operator of the truck or to the colliding car and its occupants, or
both, and that the height of the overhead car and its interference
with the driver's vision causes him to drive on the wrong side of
the road in order to avoid overhead obstructions. The court
concluded that the state statute was a safety regulation of
motorcars using the highways of the state, and that, as applied to
appellants, it infringed neither the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, nor the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and gave judgment dismissing the complaint.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania confirmed the findings
of the trial court and affirmed the decree.
Maurer v.
Boardman, 336 Pa. 17, 7 A.2d 466. The case comes here on
appeal under Section 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 344.
Before the present suit was brought, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, purporting to act under the Motor Carrier Act, had
promulgated regulations effective July 1, 1936, with respect to
"safety of operation and equipment" of common and contract motor
carriers in interstate commerce, subject to the Act. These
regulations contained no provisions specifically applicable to cars
carried over the cab of the carrier vehicle. On March 11, 1939,
while the present cause was pending before
Page 309 U. S. 602
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, in "Car Over Cab Operations," 12 M.C.C. 127, issued its
report of an investigation of the practice of the car over cab
method of transportation of motor vehicles, in which it announced
its conclusion that
"The record discloses no testimony whatsoever to show that the
operation of motor vehicles, used in transporting new automobiles,
and which are so constructed that one of the automobiles being
transported extends in whole or in part over the cab, is unsafe. On
the contrary, the evidence is clear that the average number of
accidents in which vehicles of this type are involved is less than
the country's average for all trucks. We find no reasons of record
why the operations of such vehicles should be forbidden. The safety
regulations heretofore prescribed by us, of course, apply to these
as well as other vehicles operated by common and contract carriers
in interstate or foreign commerce. The operations of vehicles so
equipped are therefore permitted by the existing regulations, and
there is no need for change."
(P. 132.) [
Footnote 2]
Page 309 U. S. 603
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took judicial notice of this
action of the Commission, but concluded that the authority of the
state to enact § 1033(c) of the Vehicle Code was unimpaired by
federal action under the commerce clause for the reason that the
applicable provisions of the Motor Carrier Act, enacted by
Congress, did not purport to withdraw from the state its
constitutional power to make the regulation embodied in that
section, and for a second reason, which we find it unnecessary to
consider, that, in any case, the action of the Commission in
declining to adopt any rule or regulation with respect to the car
over cab practice of interstate common and contract motor carriers
could not be taken as a mandate to such carriers to continue the
practice despite state regulation prohibiting it.
Appellants assail the state statute on the grounds that, even
though it is unaffected by the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act,
it nevertheless infringes the commerce clause and the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that, in any case, the
statute is superseded by the action taken by the Commission in
conformity to the Motor Carrier Act.
Only a word need be said of the constitutional objections. The
present record lays a firm foundation for the exercise of state
regulatory power, unless the state has been deprived of that power
by Congressional action authorizing the commission to substitute
its judgment for that of the state legislature as to the need and
propriety of the state regulation. The nature and extent of the
state power, in the absence of Congressional action, to regulate
the use of its highways by vehicles engaged in interstate commerce
has so recently been considered by this Court that it is
unnecessary to review the authorities now, or to restate the
standards which define the state power to prescribe regulations
adapted to promote safety upon its highways and to insure their
conservation
Page 309 U. S. 604
and convenient use by the public.
See South Carolina Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177.
Judged by these standards, we can find no basis for saying that the
Pennsylvania statute is not such a regulation, or that it is a
denial of due process, or that it infringes the commerce clause if
Congress has not authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to
promulgate a conflicting rule.
This brings us to the more serious question whether Congress, by
the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, as a regulation of
interstate commerce, has undertaken to deprive the state of the
power to impose the present regulation upon vehicles moving in
interstate commerce. With the adoption of the Motor Carrier Act,
the national government embarked on the regulation of a type of
interstate traffic many of whose regulatory problems bear little
resemblance to those of other systems of transportation which had
previously been subjected to Congressional control. They presented
difficulties and complexities differing from and far exceeding
those of any earlier regulations of interstate commerce. Our most
extensive experience had been in the national regulation of rail
carriers, operating over roads and with rolling stock privately
owned and controlled, with standards of roadbed, operation and
equipment, substantially uniform throughout the country, and with
the movement of traffic on each road subject to a single unified
control.
Regulation of vehicular traffic over the highways of the United
States involves a far more varied and complex undertaking. The
highways of the country have been built by the states with
substantial financial aid from the federal government in the
construction of some of them. [
Footnote 3] They are state owned, and, in general, are
open
Page 309 U. S. 605
in each state to use by privately owned and controlled motor
vehicles of widely different character as respects weight, size,
and equipment. [
Footnote 4] The
width, grades, curves, weight-bearing capacity, surfacing, and
overhead obstructions of the highways differ widely in the
forty-eight different states, and in different sections of each
state. There are like variations with respect to congestion of
traffic. State regulation, developed over a period of years, has
been directed to the safe and convenient use of the highways and
their conservation with reference to varying local needs and
conditions.
Assumption of national control involved problems of peculiar
difficulty and delicacy. Apart from regulations of interstate motor
traffic having commercial aims and involving routes, schedules,
rates, and the like, any regulation on a national scale, whatever
its extent, has an intimate and vital relation to the conservation
of highways which belong to the states, and to their safe and
convenient use by the general public in both interstate and
intrastate traffic. Our entire experience with the growth of
automobile traffic and its regulation by the states teaches that,
in any form of noncommercial regulation, safety is a dominant
consideration. Motor vehicles are dangerous machines whose
operation is attended by serious hazard to persons and property.
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352,
274 U. S. 356.
In 1934, the year before the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act,
there were 36,000 reported deaths from motor car accidents in the
United States. [
Footnote 5]
Excessive speed, defective appliances,
Page 309 U. S. 606
negligent driving, size, weight, and loading of cars in
conjunction with local conditions of traffic and of the highways,
contributed in varying degrees to this record of disaster.
It is in the light of this history and background that we must
appraise and apply the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935.
The declared policy of the Act, § 202(a), is to preserve and foster
the economic and commercial advantages of an efficient
transportation system. The power to regulate, which it confers on
the Interstate Commerce Commission, extends in some measure to
safety regulations. Section 204(a) provides:
"It shall be the duty of the Commission -- (1) to regulate
common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in this part, and, to
that end, the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with
respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of
baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts, records, and
reports, preservation of records, qualifications and maximum hours
of service of employees, and safety of operation and
equipment."
Subdivision (2) imposes a like duty upon the Commission to
regulate "contract carriers." Subdivision (3) imposes the duty
"To establish for private carriers of property by motor vehicle,
if need therefor is found, reasonable requirements to promote
safety of operation, and, to that end, prescribe qualifications and
maximum hours of service of employees, and standards of
equipment."
Section 225 provides:
"The Commission is hereby authorized to investigate and report
on the need for Federal regulation of the sizes and weight of motor
vehicles and combinations of motor vehicles and of the
qualifications and maximum hours of
Page 309 U. S. 607
service of employees of all motor carriers and private carriers
of property by motor vehicle. . . ."
The words of this section indicate, as its history demonstrates,
that it was intended to reserve from the regulatory power of the
Commission the regulation of "sizes and weight of motor vehicles."
Unlike § 204(a)(3), which makes it the duty of the Commission "if
need therefor is found" to establish reasonable requirements to
promote safety of operation and to prescribe standards of equipment
for "private carriers of property," § 225 imposes no duty and
confers no authority on the Commission to regulate the sizes and
weights of motor vehicles. [
Footnote 6] Its authority is limited to investigation and
report of the need of such regulation. [
Footnote 7]
The bill containing the provisions of §§ 204 and 225 which we
have quoted was prepared by the Federal Coordinator of
Transportation, and its adoption was recommended in his 1934 report
to the Interstate Commerce
Page 309 U. S. 608
Commission, which transmitted the report and proposed bill to
the Senate with its favorable recommendation. Sen.Doc. No. 152,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess. The report made no mention of the scope,
purpose, or meaning of § 225 other than the statement, p. 49, that
it provides for "investigation and report to Congress of the need,
if any, for federal regulation of the sizes and weights of motor
vehicles." The report referred, p. 32, to the facts that the states
regulate extensively the length, width, height, and speed of motor
vehicles, and their maximum gross weights, and require that they
"be equipped with a variety of safety appliances;" that these
regulations "are designed in part to protect the safety and
convenience of the public in its use of the highways and in part to
protect the highways from excessive wear and tear," and that the
"requirements as to gross weights, lengths, and widths of vehicles
are often grounded in State policies with respect to the design of
highways," with respect to their weight-sustaining capacity and
their curves. In testifying at the hearings upon the bill before
the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, the Coordinator
explained the provisions of § 225 by stating:
"with respect to size and weight of vehicles . . . , we do not
undertake in this bill to cover that situation except to provide
for a thorough investigation of it by the Commission with
recommendations to Congress, because there is involved not only a
question of fact as to what the regulation should be, but also as
to how far the federal government has power to interfere with the
exercise of the police power of the states with respect to the use
of their highways. They have the right to protect their highways
against unsafe or unreasonable use, but whether or not the federal
government can come in and interfere with it, I cannot say at this
time."
Hearings before
Page 309 U. S. 609
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 1629, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., (1935) p. 92. [
Footnote
8]
Again, page 61, he referred to "sizes and weights" as "an
extremely important matter from the standpoint of public safety and
convenience." This Court has also had occasion to point out that
the sizes and weights of automobiles have an important relation to
the safe and convenient use of the highways, which are matters of
state control.
Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.
S. 374;
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., supra. It is evident that the purport of § 225 is to
reserve "sizes and weight" from the regulatory powers of the
Commission, quite as much when related to safety as when related to
highway construction, pending investigation and report by the
Commission of the need for such regulation, and further
consideration of the matter by Congress. Such has been the uniform
construction of § 225 by courts having occasion to consider the
subject. [
Footnote 9]
Page 309 U. S. 610
On the argument before us, it was conceded that the "size and
weight of motor vehicles," of which § 225 speaks, must be taken to
include the sizes and weights of motor vehicles and their loads.
This is evident both because an investigation of sizes and weights
of motor vehicles, apart from their load, would be useless so far
as the major problems of safety and use of the highways are
concerned and because, as presently will appear, the state
regulation of sizes and weights to be investigated has, from the
beginning, included sizes and weights of the loaded vehicle. The
power of the states to regulate the sizes and weights of loaded
motor vehicles was thus left undisturbed. Such other courts as have
had occasion to consider the matter in the cases already noted have
arrived at the same conclusion. [
Footnote 10]
But the question remains whether the Pennsylvania statute is a
regulation of "sizes and weight" within the meaning of § 225, or
whether it is a regulation of "safety of operation and equipment,"
which the Commission was authorized to make by § 204(a)(1)(2).
Perusal of the present record can leave no doubt that, in both a
technical and a practical sense, § 1033(c) is a regulation of
weight and size of the loaded motor vehicle, and that the
Pennsylvania Legislature intended it to be such. [
Footnote 11] By providing
Page 309 U. S. 611
that the carried car shall not be loaded above the cab, the
statute sets practical limits to the height of the loaded car and
precludes its projection beyond the cab of the carrier car and into
the line of vision of its driver. It is also a restriction on
weight distribution of the loaded car and, in its amended form,
specifically prohibits placing the "weight" of the carried car
above the driver. [
Footnote
12] The highest court of the state has declared that such are
the purposes of subsection (c), in order to avoid the safety
hazards resulting from improper weight distribution and the height
of the carried car at a point where it cannot be observed by the
driver. As interpreted and applied by the state court, we cannot
regard the regulation as other than an exercise of the state's
power to protect the safe and convenient use of its highways
through the control of size and weight of motor vehicles passing
over them, which it was the purpose of § 225 to reserve to the
state from the grant of regulatory power to the Commission. Being
thus reserved, we think it is unaffected by the authority conferred
on the Commission by § 204 to regulate "safety of operation and
equipment."
The Commission, in its report in "Car Over Cab Operations,"
supra, gave no consideration to the extent of its
authority under § 204 to make safety regulations affecting the car
over cab practice or to the question whether the Pennsylvania
restriction is, in fact and in practical operation, a weight and
size regulation, or whether the
Page 309 U. S. 612
authority to make such regulations is reserved to the states by
§ 225. The power of the Commission to regulate with respect to
safety in the case of common and contract carriers is defined by §
204(a)(1) and (2), which makes it the duty of the Commission to
regulate "safety of operation and equipment." In the exercise of
this authority, the Commission has made no regulation concerning
sizes and weight of motor vehicles or their loads. But, in a brief
filed in this cause, it contends that the Pennsylvania statute is
an infringement of the Commission's authority to regulate safety of
equipment. In ordinary speech, the load of a vehicle is not spoken
of as a part of its equipment. In the Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, promulgated by the Commission, safety of equipment is
treated as synonymous with or the equivalent of parts and
accessories of motor cars affecting safety. The Uniform Act
regulating motor car traffic on highways, which was recommended by
the National Conference of State and Highway Safety in 1930 and
1934, which was referred to in the report of the Coordinator,
placed all size and weight regulations in a single "Article XVI,
Size, Weight and Load," separate from the articles containing
provisions relating to the speed, driving and movement of motor
cars, and from "Article XV, Equipment," which was confined to
automobile parts and accessories and their inspection. [
Footnote 13]
But even though the phrase "operation and equipment" of motor
cars could be taken, when standing alone, as including the weight
and size of their loads, we think it plain that it cannot be so
taken when read in conjunction with the reservation in § 225 of
"sizes and weights" from the regulatory power of the Commission. As
the report
Page 309 U. S. 613
of the Coordinator and the legislation in the several states
shows, and as this Court has recognized,
see Sproles v.
Binford, supra; South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., supra, the sizes and weights of motor vehicles and
their loads present safety problems which are special and distinct
from those involved in the driving and movement of cars ordinarily
known as their operation, and from their parts and accessories
ordinarily referred to as motor car equipment. As we have seen, one
of the purposes of the reservation made in § 225 was to give
opportunity for further study and consideration by the Commission
of the relation of sizes and weights of motor cars to the public
safety and convenience, as well as to road construction and use, so
that the Commission and Congress might be advised what the
regulation of these safety factors should be, and how far Congress
should interfere with their regulation by the states.
The Couzens bill, S. 2793, § 2(a)(1)(2), 72d Cong., 1st Sess.,
discussed in the 1934 report of the Coordinator, authorized the
Commission to prescribe reasonable requirements with respect to
"safety of operation and equipment (including the weight, length,
width and height of motor vehicles used by such carriers)." This
proposal was not adopted, and, in the bill recommended by the
Coordinator and the Commission in 1934 and enacted as the Motor
Carrier Act of 1935, the parenthetical clause in the provision
authorizing regulation of safety of operation and equipment as it
appeared in the Couzens bill was transferred to § 225, where it
appeared as "sizes and weight of motor vehicles," federal
regulation of which was reserved to await the future action of
Congress. The clause which was thus resorted to in the earlier bill
to include regulations of sizes and weight in the authority to
regulate "safety of operation and equipment" was, by its transfer
to § 225 of the Act of 1935, similarly made the means of
withholding from the regulatory power of the Commission regulations
of sizes and weight affecting safety.
Page 309 U. S. 614
As a matter of statutory construction, Congressional intention
to displace local laws in the exercise of its commerce power is
not, in general, to be inferred unless clearly indicated by those
considerations which are persuasive of the statutory purpose. This
is especially the case when public safety and health are concerned.
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1,
302 U. S. 10-14;
H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S.
79,
306 U. S. 85,
and cases cited. There are other cogent reasons why the reservation
made by § 225 cannot be given a narrow construction. The hesitancy
manifested by Congress, until the adoption of the 1935 Act, to
interfere with the state highway regulations and its failure then
to follow earlier and more far-reaching proposals are persuasive
against such a construction. [
Footnote 14] A thorough investigation by the Commission
which the statute authorized was necessary not only to determine
the importance of sizes and weight "from the standpoint of public
safety and convenience," but also to resolve the uncertainty of the
draftsmen of the bill, and presumably of Congress, "as to the facts
with reference to the matter" and "as to what the regulation should
be." S.Doc.No.152, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 61. The extent to which
Congress should, if at
Page 309 U. S. 615
all, curtail state regulation, could be determined only when
those doubts were resolved.
A considerable period of time was required for preparation for
the investigation and for bringing it to a conclusion. The
investigation which was authorized in November, 1937, Ex parte No.
M.C. 15, has not yet proceeded beyond the preliminary stage of
gathering information. It could not be assumed that, in the
meantime, a rapidly changing industry would not produce new types
of vehicles involving new problems of the relation of sizes and
weight to safety such as are involved in the present case. A
construction of the reservation made in § 225 is not to be favored
which would deprive the states of authority to make safety
regulations of sizes and weight before Congress was informed by a
full investigation and report of the Commission of the nature of
the regulations, both those in force and those which are needed,
and whether, in the light of the competing demands for national
uniformity and for accommodation to local conditions, regulation of
sizes and weight can be best prescribed by the Commission, by the
state legislatures, or by a divided authority. For these reasons,
we think that the reservation of state power by § 225 is not
restricted to the particular problems of weight and size which the
traffic had developed at the moment when the act was passed, or
which were then known to the Commission, in advance of the
investigation which was to ascertain the facts, what the regulation
should be, and how far regulations of sizes and weights should be
withdrawn from the states.
Sizes and weights which affect safety, not excluding
consideration of local conditions, as well as those which affect
wear and tear of the highways, were to be the subject of
investigation, and it is the subject of investigation which defines
the reservation from the Commission's authority to regulate. Hence,
the phrase "sizes and weight" in § 225, when safety is concerned,
is not to be
Page 309 U. S. 616
narrowly limited to the overall length, width and height of the
loaded cars and to their gross weight. For, as we have seen,
distribution of weight and dimensions of load or particular parts
of it in connection with local conditions of curves, grades, and
overhead obstruction of the highways have an important relation to
safety. In the light of the investigation, Congress might conclude
that the regulation of gross weights and dimensions, concededly
left to the states, could not be conveniently or wisely separated
from regulation of weight distribution and particular
dimensions.
It is true that the report of the Coordinator presenting the
bill for Congressional action particularized gross weight and
overall dimensions as a common subject of regulation by the states
and as a reason for making the investigation. But we find nothing
in the report, or in his testimony before the Senate Committee, or
elsewhere in the legislative history, to show that it was intended
by § 225 to confine state power to regulation of sizes and weights
of automobiles and their loads to gross weights and overall
dimensions. The bill, as proposed and as enacted, did not specify
any such limitation of "sizes and weight," and it was well known
that state size and weight regulations then in force or proposed
were not so restricted.
Schedule B of the 1934 report of the Coordinator disclosed, page
213, that state regulation was then concerned with distribution of
load weight by axle and wheel weight requirements. The weight
provisions of the Uniform Act proposed by the National Conference
on State and Highway Safety in 1930 and 1934, contained gross
weight limitations and axle weight limitations which involved
distribution of weight of the loaded car. The preliminary report
(No. 1) of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Motor
Carriers of April, 1940, p. 71, notes various state regulations
fixing axle weight or wheel weight limitations, sometimes with and
sometimes without
Page 309 U. S. 617
a gross weight limitation, and states that the combination of
these factors "is basically intended to control not only total
gross weight of the vehicle and its load, but also distribution of
the load on the vehicle."
The proposed Uniform Act also contained provisions, in "Article
XVI, Size, Weight and Load" (§ 78(e) of the 1930 Draft; § 142(d) of
the 1934 Draft), for the distribution or location of load and its
particular dimensions, independently of gross weight and overall
measurements. They directed that
"the load upon any vehicle . . . shall not extend more than
three feet beyond the front wheels of such vehicle or the front
bumper of such vehicle if it is equipped with such a bumper."
Report No. 1 of the Commission indicates that this provision has
been adopted in twenty-three states, and that three states prohibit
any such projection of load. As already noted, the present
Pennsylvania statute regulating car over cab operation has been
enacted in substance in West Virginia. [
Footnote 15]
Reading the words of § 225 in the light of its legislative
history, and mindful of the peculiar conditions of the traffic and
the problems of state regulation to which the section must be
applied, and of its obvious purpose to postpone until the report of
the Commission's determination of the extent to which Congress
should withdraw from the states their power to regulate sizes and
weight of motor vehicles, we cannot say that the phrase, as used in
the statute, is restricted to overall measurements or gross weight,
or that it does not include particular dimensions of motor vehicles
and their loads and the distribution of load, which affect safety
as well as the wear and tear of the highways. We conclude that the
Pennsylvania statute now before us is a weight and size regulation
within the meaning of § 225, and is within the regulatory authority
of the state reserved by that section from the authority granted to
the Commission by § 204.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
"(c) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this
Commonwealth carrying any other vehicle, any part of which is above
the cab of the carrier vehicle or over the head of the operator of
such carrier vehicle."
After the argument of the appeal in this case, but before the
decree in the State Supreme Court, this section was amended to
read:
"(c) No person shall operate a vehicle on the highways of this
Commonwealth carrying any other vehicle the weight of which is
directly above the cab of the carrier vehicle or directly over the
head of the operator of such carrier vehicle."
Act No. 400 of June 27, 1939.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in its opinion, considered
this amendment and concluded that the statute, both before and
after the amendment, applied to the vehicles used by appellants,
and was directed at the same evils, and that no essential change
was made by the amendment, a construction which we adopt. The
Supreme Court also concluded that, as the amendment named no date
when it was to take effect, it would become effective some two
months later, on September 1, 1939, as provided by § 4 of the
Statutory Construction Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, 1020.
[
Footnote 2]
The report of the Interstate Commerce Commission states, page
133, that, in this proceeding "the only evidence was introduced by
or on behalf of carriers engaged in the type of operation under
investigation," that the State of Pennsylvania declined to
participate in the proceeding, and that a representative of the
state invited the attention of the Commission to the evidence which
had been taken in the present suit, but that such evidence was not
made a part of the record in the proceeding before the Commission,
and was not considered by it. The Commission, so far as the report
discloses, gave no consideration to the consequences of placing the
carried car above the cab of the motor carrier when accidents do in
fact occur, to the effect of the weight distribution of the
combination when used on highways of grades and curves over which
petitioners operate in Pennsylvania, and its tendency to cause the
driver of the combination to hold to the middle of the road to
avoid injury to the carrier car on the tree-lined highways of the
state, all of which were deemed by the state courts in the present
case to have an important bearing on safety.
[
Footnote 3]
For the significance of federal aid,
see hearings
before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2793, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), p. 217.
See also Nashville, C. &
St.L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U. S. 405,
294 U. S.
417.
[
Footnote 4]
It is estimated that 85 percent. of all trucks are privately
owned and operated, and that over 200,000 separate trucks would be
subject to the federal regulation.
See Hearings before
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2793, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess., p. 223; S.Doc. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 28 (1934);
Hearings before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce
on H.R. 5262, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), p. 156
et
seq.
[
Footnote 5]
Accident Facts (1936) published by National Safety Council,
Inc.
[
Footnote 6]
Cf. Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C.
263, 387, Recommendation 11.
[
Footnote 7]
On November 8, 1937, the Commissioner ordered an
Investigation
"IN THE MATTER OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE SIZES AND WEIGHT OF
MOTOR VEHICLES AND COMBINATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES USED BY COMMON AND
CONTRACT CARRIERS . . . AND PRIVATE CARRIERS. . . ."
"1. To enable the Commission to make a report under the
provisions of section 225 on the need for Federal regulation of the
sizes and weight of motor vehicles and combinations thereof."
"2. To enable the Commission to prescribe reasonable
requirements under the provisions of section 204 of the act as to
the sizes and weight of motor vehicles and combinations therefor
insofar as they affect the safety of operation."
The Commission is now engaged in making its investigation, and
has made no report of its findings or conclusions. Report No. 1, a
preliminary study as yet unpublished (April, 1940), made by the
Bureau of Motor Carriers, Interstate Commerce Commission, is
devoted to an analysis of state limitations of sizes and weights of
motor vehicles.
[
Footnote 8]
On Page 61 of the Report, the Coordinator stated:
"But, on this question of sizes and weight of motor vehicles,
which is an extremely important matter from the standpoint of
public safety and convenience, there is not only the question here
as to what those sizes and weights ought to be from the standpoint
of road construction and road use, but there is also the legal
question as to whether the federal government can exercise power
over the matter, or whether it is a matter exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the states. It was because of doubts not only as to
the facts with reference to that matter, but also to the law that
provisions were made for this investigation."
The Committee Reports make no comment on Section 225.
See S.Rept. No. 482, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.Rept. No.
1645, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
[
Footnote 9]
L. & L. Freight Lines v. Railroad
Commission, 17 F. Supp.
13;
Barnwell Bros. v. South Carolina State Highway
Dept., 17 F. Supp.
803;
Werner Transportation Co. v. Hughes, 19 F. Supp.
425;
Houston & North Texas Freight Lines v. Phares, 19
F. Supp. 420;
Morrison v. State, 133 Tex.Cr. App. 141, 109
S.W.2d 205;
Yellow Cab Transit Co., Inc. v. Tuck, 115
S.W.2d 455;
see H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U. S. 79.
Upon the appeal in
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., supra, to the Supreme Court, respondents abandoned
their contention in the trial court that power to regulate the
loaded weight and size of motor vehicles had not been withheld from
the Commission by § 225.
303 U. S. 303 U.S.
177.
[
Footnote 10]
See note 9
supra.
[
Footnote 11]
In addition to subsection (c) of § 1033, which, in its amended
form, is specifically directed to the location of the "weight" of
the carried car, the section contains three other subdivisions
which affect size and weight distribution of the loaded vehicle.
Subsection (a) prohibits the operation of vehicles "having two
levels for the carriage of other vehicles." Subdivision (b)
prohibits operation of vehicles carrying other vehicles any part of
which is more than 115 inches from the ground, and subdivision (d)
prohibits the operation of vehicles carrying any other vehicle "any
axle of which is more than 3 feet higher than any other axle on
such carrying vehicle." Subsections (a), (b) and (d) do not become
effective until January 1, 1942. West Virginia has a statute
containing similar provisions.Ch. 88, Acts of W.Va.1939.
[
Footnote 12]
See note 1
supra.
[
Footnote 13]
See Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, IV,
National Conference on Street and Highway Safety (1930), 38, 49;
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, V, Bureau of Public
Roads, United States Department of Agriculture (1934), 23, 35.
[
Footnote 14]
Prior to the 70th Congress, the bills for federal regulation
contained no provisions of any kind relating to size and weight.
Beginning with the 70th Congress, the bills almost uniformly
provided that interstate carriers should remain subject to state
regulations relating "to the maintenance, protection, safety, or
use of the highways therein, which do not discriminate against
motor vehicles used in interstate commerce." The Rayburn bill which
the Interstate Commerce Commission approved, contained such a
clause (S.Dec. 152, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., 25). Only the Couzens
bill (S. 2793, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.) affirmatively prescribed
federal regulation. The Dill bill (S. 3171, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.)
and S. 1629, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., which was finally enacted as
the Motor Carrier Act, envisaged the possibility of such regulation
of size and weights, but only after a report to Congress. For a
discussion of these bills,
see Kauper, Federal Regulation
of Motor Carriers, 33 Mich.L.Rev. 239, 240-243, notes 128, 129,
132.
[
Footnote 15]
See note 11
supra.