A statute of New Hampshire forbids the owner of any motor
vehicle used on the highways of the State in the transportation of
property for hire to require or permit to operate such vehicle a
driver who has been continuously on duty for more than 12 hours.
Registration certificates, without which no common or contract
carrier may lawfully operate over the highways of the State, may be
suspended or revoked for violations. The statute exempts: those
transporting products of their own manufacture or labor; motor
vehicles not principally engaged in the transportation of property
for hire, and carriers operating exclusively in a city or town or
within 10 miles thereof, or beyond the 10-mile limit on not more
than two trips in 30 days.
Held:
1. As applied to a carrier which was not exempt, the statute was
not by reason of its exemptions repugnant to the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P.
306 U. S.
82.
Page 306 U. S. 80
2. Enforcement of the statute against an interstate motor
carrier for violations committed subsequently to the passage of the
federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, but prior to the effective date
(and the date of issue) of an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission pursuant thereto prescribing maximum hours of service of
employees of such carriers was valid. P.
306 U. S.
83.
3. Congress will not be deemed to have intended that state
regulatory measures relating to safety on the highways should be
superseded prior to the effective date of similar federal
regulation. P.
306 U. S.
85.
89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment dismissing an appeal from an order of the
Public Service Commission of New Hampshire suspending the
registration certificates of a motor carrier for violation of the
state law.
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A statute of New Hampshire [
Footnote 1] declares unlawful the operation on its roads
of motor vehicles for specified transportation by drivers who have
been continuously on duty for more than 12 hours. By this appeal,
we are called on to decide whether, as applied in this case, §§ 3,
4, and 8 are repugnant to the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and whether §§ 8 and 11
Page 306 U. S. 81
were superseded by the federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, § 204,
[
Footnote 2] and regulations
prescribed under it by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The New Hampshire Act declares that the number of motor vehicles
operated by carriers for hire has made regulation necessary to the
end that its highways may be safer for use by the general public. §
1. It requires common and contract carriers between points within
the State to register their trucks with the public service
commission. § 2. Contract carriers include those, other than common
carriers, who haul for hire by motor vehicle on any road of the
State. § 3. Exempted from the challenged regulation are those
transporting products of their own manufacture or labor (§ 3), and
motor vehicles not principally engaged in the transportation of
property for hire or operating exclusively in a city or town or
within 10 miles of its limits or beyond the 10-mile limit on not
more than two trips in 30 days. § 4.
Section 8 declares that
"It shall be unlawful for any driver to operate, or for the
owner thereof to require or permit any driver to operate, any motor
vehicle for the transportation of property for hire on the highways
of this state when the driver has been continuously on duty for
more than twelve hours, and, after a driver has been continuously
on duty for twelve hours, it shall be unlawful for him or for the
owner of the vehicle to permit him to operate any such motor
vehicle on the highways of this state until he shall have had at
least eight consecutive hours off duty."
Section 11 provides that, for violations of the Act, the
commission shall have authority, after notice and hearing, to
suspend or revoke any registration certificate.
Appellant is a Massachusetts corporation doing intrastate and
interstate business as a common and contract
Page 306 U. S. 82
carrier of freight for hire by motor vehicles over public
highways in that State and in New Hampshire. Approximately 99
percent of its business is interstate. It has terminals at Boston
in Massachusetts and at Manchester, Concord, and Claremont in New
Hampshire. In 1937, it obtained from the New Hampshire commission
registration certificates for 20 trucks. After notice and hearing,
the commission, in a decision filed as of December 11, 1937, held
appellant had violated the provisions of § 8 and ordered that its
certificates be suspended for five days. Appellant appealed to the
state supreme court. That court upheld the challenged provisions
and dismissed the appeal. 89 N.H. 428, 199 A. 886.
1. Sections 3, 4, and 8 are not repugnant to the equal
protection clause. The state court found that the purpose of § 8
is
"to protect the users of the highways of this state from the
danger likely to result to them from the operation thereon of
trucks under the control of drivers suffering from the effects of
fatigue."
Appellant's contention is that the discrimination between
drivers of motor carriers for hire subject to § 8 and those
exempted by §§ 3 and 4 has no fair or substantial relation to
highway safety. It suggests, and we may assume, that the roads of
New Hampshire are extensively used for transportation by trucks not
regulated by § 8; that drivers of them are just as susceptible to
fatigue from long hours of continuous operation as are those
operating the trucks used by appellant and other common carriers
for hire, and that the dangers attributable to fatigued drivers are
the same in one class of service as in another. Appellant has
failed to show that, in operations to which § 8 applies, continuous
driving for more than 12 hours is not so much more prevalent than
in those exempted (§§ 3, 4) as to constitute a reasonable basis for
the differentiation. We are of opinion that, for reasons given
above, those stated by the state supreme court in this case, and
by
Page 306 U. S. 83
this Court in
Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. Georgia Comm'n,
ante, p.
306 U. S. 72, the
classification in question does not conflict with the rule of equal
protection.
2. As applicable to the violations of the state law found to
have been committed by appellant, §§ 8 and 11 were not superseded
by the federal Motor Carrier Act, 1935, or the regulations made
under it by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
That Act became law August 9, 1935. Under the caption "General
Duties and Powers of the Commission," § 204(a) declares: "It shall
be the duty of the Commission . . . to regulate" common and
contract carriers by
"motor vehicle . . . , and, to that end, the Commission may
establish reasonable requirements with respect to . . .
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety
of operation and equipment."
By order made under authority of that section December 29, 1937,
the Commission prescribed regulations as to maximum hours of
service of drivers of motor vehicles operated in interstate
commerce by common and contract carriers. [
Footnote 3] These regulations were modified July 12,
1938, [
Footnote 4] and their
effective date has been postponed to January 31, 1939. [
Footnote 5] With exceptions that need
not be stated here, they declare that no common carrier shall
permit or require any driver to remain on duty for more than 60
hours a week or more than 10 hours in any period of 24 consecutive
hours. [
Footnote 6]
Appellant does not suggest that, prior to congressional action,
the State was without power, for protection of persons and
property, to regulate use of its roads as provided in § 8 and to
enforce obedience in accordance with § 11.
Cooley v.
Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299,
53 U. S.
320.
Page 306 U. S. 84
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465;
Cleveland C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Illinois,
177 U. S. 514. The
violations for which the state commission suspended appellant's
registration certificates occurred after the effective date of the
federal Act and before the Interstate Commerce Commission made its
order. Without so deciding, we assume, so far as concerns the
periods of continuous service condemned by the state commission,
that, when the federal regulations take effect, they will operate
to supersede the challenged provisions of the state statute. Then,
the sole question is whether Congress intended that, from the time
of the federal enactment until effective action by the Commission,
there should be no regulation of periods of continuous operation by
drivers of motor vehicles hauling in interstate commerce. Our
decisions provide no formula for discovering implied effect of
federal statutes upon state measures such as that under
consideration. Here, the way is made clear by the language and
context considered in connection with existing conditions. Section
204(a) definitely imposes upon the Commission the duty to
"regulate," but merely authorizes it to establish reasonable
requirements with respect to,
inter alia, qualifications
and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operation
and equipment. The distinction intended between duty imposed and
action permitted is more striking in view of the matters that,
along with qualifications and hours of service of drivers, are
committed to the discretion of the Commission. They include
transportation of baggage and express, uniform systems of accounts,
records, and reports, and preservation of records.
The roads belong to the State. There is need of local
supervision of operation of motor vehicles to prevent collisions,
to safeguard pedestrians, and the like. Unquestionably, reasonable
regulation of periods of continuous driving is an appropriate
measure. In view of the
Page 306 U. S. 85
efforts of governmental authorities everywhere to mitigate the
destruction of life, limb, and property resulting from the use of
motor vehicles, it cannot be inferred that Congress intended to
supersede any state safety measure prior to the taking effect of a
federal measure found suitable to put in its place. Its purpose to
displace the local law must be definitely expressed.
Mintz v.
Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346,
289 U. S. 350.
The rule applicable is clearly stated in
Illinois Cent. R. Co.
v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493,
245 U. S. 510.
"In construing federal statutes enacted under the power
conferred by the commerce clause of the Constitution . . . , it
should never be held that Congress intends to supersede or suspend
the exercise of the reserved powers of a state, even where that may
be done, unless and except so far as its purpose to do so is
clearly manifested."
We have frequently applied that principle.
See e.g., Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U. S. 137,
187 U. S. 148.
Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Larabee Mills Co., 211 U.
S. 612,
211 U. S. 621
et seq.; Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v.
Harris, 234 U. S. 412,
234 U. S.
418-419;
Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,
282 U. S. 133,
139;
N.W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n,
297 U. S. 471,
297 U. S. 478;
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U. S. 1,
302 U. S. 10
et seq. Appellant cites
Northern Pac. Ry. v.
Washington, 222 U. S. 370,
222 U. S. 378;
Erie Railroad Co. v. New York, 233 U.
S. 671;
Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington,
270 U. S. 87;
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line, 272 U.
S. 605,
272 U. S. 613, and
Missouri Pacific v. Porter, 273 U.
S. 341,
273 U. S. 345.
In each, the facts differ so widely from those of the case before
us that no discussion is required to show that it is not in
point.
Plainly, Congress, by mere grant of power to the Interstate
Commerce Commission, did not intend to supersede state police
regulations established for the protection of the public using
state highways.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Laws 1933, c. 106, as amended by c. 169.
[
Footnote 2]
49 Stat. 546, 49 U.S.C. § 304.
[
Footnote 3]
3 M.C.C. 665.
[
Footnote 4]
Ex Parte No. MC-2, July 12, 1938.
[
Footnote 5]
Ex Parte No. MC-2, December 22, 1938.
[
Footnote 6]
Ex parte No. MC-2, July 12, 1938 (Rule 3(a) and (b)).