1. The Act of May 14, 1934, restricting the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to enjoin enforcement of orders of state commissions
affecting public utility rates, is inapplicable to an order of a
commission commanding a corporation to produce evidence on a
certain date, made without notice or hearing. P.
304 U. S.
214.
2. In a suit to enjoin as unconstitutional a projected inquiry
by a state agency into the reasonableness of the rates of a gas
company, the expense to the company of complying with the order by
showing the original and historical costs of its properties, cost
of reproduction as a going concern, and other elements of value
recognized
Page 304 U. S. 210
by law in fixing rates is part of the amount or value in
controversy. P.
304 U. S.
215.
3. The objection that a suit is not within equity jurisdiction
because of the existence of a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
at law (Jud.Code § 267) may be taken by trial or appellate court
sua sponte. P.
304 U. S.
216.
4. The adequate legal remedy which will defeat equity
jurisdiction must be a remedy available in the federal court. P.
304 U. S.
217.
5. A gas corporation owning very valuable property and doing a
large business sought in a federal court to enjoin a state
commission from carrying on proceedings to fix the company's rates
in alleged excess of the commission's jurisdiction and in violation
of the company's constitutional rights.
Held, that a loss
of $25,000 in preparing and presenting the company's case before
the commission would not constitute irreparable injury justifying
equitable intervention.
Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U. S. 41. P.
304 U. S.
218.
When the only ground for interfering with the state procedure is
the reasonable cost of preparing for a hearing, there is no
occasion for equitable intervention. P.
304 U. S.
221.
12 F. Supp. 254 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court of three judges which
dismissed a bill for an injunction.
MR. JUSTICE REED delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a final decree dismissing appellant's
bill of complaint for want of jurisdiction in equity. It was
entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky sitting with three judges under Judicial Code,
§ 266, as amended. 21 F. Supp. 254. The appellant sought to enjoin
the Public Service Commission of
Page 304 U. S. 211
Kentucky from prosecuting an investigation of wholesale rates
for gas marketed by contract in Kentucky by appellant, on the
ground that any regulation of the rates charged by appellant to its
customers would be beyond the statutory power of the Commission,
since the appellant was not a public utility, and would result in a
deprivation of property without due process, a denial of equal
protection of the laws, and a violation of the contracts clause of
the Federal and State Constitutions, affecting contracts entered
into prior to the passage of the regulatory act [
Footnote 1] of the General Assembly of
Kentucky. As grounds for equitable relief, it was alleged that
there was no adequate remedy and that irreparable injury would be
inflicted upon appellant by the large expense entailed in
preparation for the investigation.
Appellant is a corporation solely of the State of Maine, engaged
in the production and purchase of natural gas at various fields in
Kentucky and the transmission of that gas through wholly intrastate
pipelines to distributing agencies at the "city gates" of various
municipalities of that Commonwealth. Appellant sells to three
distributing agencies: a partnership, a corporation entirely free
of connection with appellant, and a corporation in which appellant
owns a dominant interest. It offers to sell and sells its commodity
by separate contracts only to the distributing agencies named in
the bill. All of these agencies, with one immaterial exception, are
the owners of unexpired franchises purchased from the respective
municipalities which they serve. Either by these franchises or by
supplementary contract, the rates are fixed for retail sales of
gas. Acting pursuant to statutory provisions authorizing
investigations of the rates of defined utilities, the Public
Service Commission of Kentucky issued, on May 29, 1937, an order
pertinent provisions of which
Page 304 U. S. 212
are set forth in the margin, [
Footnote 2] reciting that appellant is an operating
utility subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, setting a date
for a public hearing, and ordering appellant
Page 304 U. S. 213
to appear at such hearing and present evidence of the
reasonableness of its rates and charges, and also to make its
records available for examination.
Appellant filed a plea to the Commission's jurisdiction, in
substance setting up the objections subsequently urged in the bill
under consideration. The Commission overruled this plea and reset
the investigation for hearing on the merits. The appellant filed an
application for a rehearing of this order . Though the Commission
has not formally passed upon this application, it admits that it
intended and threatened to proceed with the investigation,
determine and fix a fair rate for appellant's gas, and that it
would have so proceeded but for the temporary restraining order
obtained by appellant upon the filing of the bill in question.
Appellant's bill alleged that it was the obvious purpose of the
Commission to lower appellant's rates; that these rates were not
subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission; that any
reduction would violate the Fourteenth Amendment and impair the
obligations of its contracts, in contravention of the contracts
clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. It was further
alleged that the investigation, and the orders entered therein, are
unlawful and unreasonable, and, if further prosecuted,
Page 304 U. S. 214
would put appellant to considerable unlawful and needless
expense. The Commission filed an answer asserting that appellant
was subject to its regulatory jurisdiction. It denied any purpose
on its part to attempt to lower the contract price which appellant
charged the distributing agencies, but averred that it would
institute and conduct a special investigation and proceeding to
determine a fair and reasonable price or rate to be charged by
appellant and to fix said price or rate.
The majority opinion of the District Court held that, as the
order challenged could be enforced only by judicial proceedings,
there existed no immediately threatened irreparable injury or
damage to the appellant within the equity jurisdiction of the
District Court. Without any consideration of the merits, the bill
was dismissed. The assignments of error attack this conclusion. We
affirm the decree of the District Court.
First. The point is made by appellees that injunction
is prohibited by the Johnson Act of May 14, 1934, c. 283, § 1, 48
Stat. 775, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1). This act withdraws from the district
courts jurisdiction of any suit to enjoin the enforcement of any
order of a state administrative commission where such order
"(1) affects rates chargeable by a public utility, (2) does not
interfere with interstate commerce, and (3) has been made after
reasonable notice and hearing, and where a plain, speedy, and
efficient remedy may be had at law or in equity in the courts of
such State."
The Johnson Act does not apply here, because the order
complained of --
i.e., that of May 29, 1937 -- was entered
without notice or hearing. Though it is entitled a "Notice of
Investigation and Order to Show Cause," which would be an
appropriate method of initiating an investigation, in fact the
order commands appellant to produce certain evidence on a
designated date, and not merely to show cause on that date why
evidence
Page 304 U. S. 215
should not be produced. The order of June 29, 1937, overruling
the plea to the jurisdiction, is not final, but is pending on an
application for rehearing.
Second. This proceeding was begun under the provisions
of § 24(1) of the Judicial Code, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 41(1).
Jurisdiction was challenged by the Commission on the ground that
the value of the matter in controversy was not in excess of $3,000.
To show the requisite amount, appellant alleged that it would be
necessary to expend $25,000 to present the evidence required by the
order. It was found by the District Court from the testimony at the
trial that
"the expense to plaintiff of complying with said orders would be
more than $3,000.00 in employing appraisers, geologists, engineers,
accountants, etc., to show the original and historical cost of its
properties, cost of reproduction as a going concern, and other
elements of value recognized by the law of the land for ratemaking
purposes."
The purpose of this proceeding is to stop the investigation of
the rates under the order issued. Since the necessary expense of
producing the information demanded by the order exceeds the
jurisdictional amount, the value of the matter in controversy is at
least this sum. This purpose or object is analogous to those sought
in injunctions to restrain a continuing trespass, where the value
of the matter in controversy includes the cost of remedying the
condition as part of the value of the matter in controversy --
namely, the prevention of interference with plaintiff's rights.
[
Footnote 3] Other examples are
found in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a tax statute, where
the
Page 304 U. S. 216
amount of the tax is the value of the matter in controversy,
[
Footnote 4] and in a suit to
enjoin enforcement of an order to install and maintain a track,
where the value of the matter in controversy is the cost of
compliance. [
Footnote 5] Where
"expenses incident to compliance" with a regulatory statute exceed
$3,000, the jurisdiction is clear. [
Footnote 6] There is no contention here either that the
Commission's order left appellant with any less expensive
alternative or that the worth of appellant's entire business is
less than $3,000. In undertaking to enjoin this investigation, the
cost incident to making a showing required by the Commission is not
collateral or incidental to the purpose of the injunction, but a
threatened expense from which relief is sought. Whether such
irrecoverable cost is an irreparable injury against which equity
will protect is considered later in this opinion. The District
Court had jurisdiction of the cause as a federal court.
Third. We next consider whether the suit must be
dismissed pursuant to § 267 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 384,
which declares that no suit in equity shall be sustained "where a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law." Though
this contention was not raised below by the Commission, "either the
trial court or the appellate may, of its own motion, take the
objection." [
Footnote 7] For
determination of the adequacy of this remedy
Page 304 U. S. 217
we must here assume the allegations of appellant that, unless an
injunction is granted, irreparable injury will flow from its
compliance with the order of May 29.
It is settled that no adequate remedy at law exists, so as to
deprive federal courts of equity jurisdiction, unless it is
available in the federal courts. [
Footnote 8] If appellant ignores the Commission's order,
action for recovery of penalties for the violation of the order may
be instituted by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Ky.Stat.Ann.,
Carroll's 8th Ed., Baldwin's 1936 Revision, §§ 3952-13 and 3952-61.
But this proceeding could neither be begun nor removed to the
federal court. Apart from the difficulty of maintaining such an
action in the federal courts, in view of its penal nature, the
State would be proceeding as plaintiff to enforce its laws; its
complaint would not be grounded on the Constitution or laws of the
United States, and there would not be diversity of citizenship, the
States not being "citizens" within the Judicial Code. [
Footnote 9] There is equitable
jurisdiction to enjoin the proposed investigation of appellant's
rates if the order of May 29, quoted above, carries a threat of
imminent, irreparable injury.
Fourth. The bill asks injunctive relief to restrain the
Commission from further prosecuting the "investigation" into the
price of gas sold under appellants contracts to the distributing
agencies. Two decisions dealing with
Page 304 U. S. 218
orders for furnishing information have recently been handed down
by this Court. [
Footnote 10]
In both cases, this Court dealt with the merits of the respective
orders, determining that there was no constitutional basis for
saying that "any person is immune from giving information
appropriate to a legislative or judicial inquiry." Here, there is
no need to consider the validity of the challenged order. To
justify the use of the extraordinary power of a court of equity,
something more must be involved than an application of a statute in
an unconstitutional manner against complainant. There must be an
allegation and proof of threatened injury under some of the
recognized sources of equitable jurisdiction. [
Footnote 11] The one most frequently relied upon
in constitutional cases, and pleaded here, is irreparable injury.
[
Footnote 12] To furnish the
information required by the order will cost $25,000, arising from
the necessity of preparing for the hearing on rates. Is this
irrecoverable expense a threatened irreparable injury which a court
of equity will guard against by injunction? Whether or not
equitable relief will be granted rests in the sound discretion of
the court. [
Footnote 13]
It is true that the injury which flows from the threat of
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional regulatory state
statute with penalties so heavy as to forbid the risk of challenge
in proceedings to enforce it has been generally recognized as
irreparable and sufficient to justify an
Page 304 U. S. 219
injunction. [
Footnote 14]
The Commission urges that, since there is ample opportunity for the
appellant to contest in a state court any effort to regulate or
punish for disobedience of orders, with ultimate review by this
Court, there is no irreparable injury, and that the dangers of
lowered rates and threatened punishments can be overcome by
opposition when an effort is made to enforce them. The case of
Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co.,
274 U. S. 160,
where an effort was made to secure an injunction against
enforcement of a Federal Trade Commission order to produce
information, has been cited as a precedent. There were heavy
penalties for violation of that order, [
Footnote 15] but the opinion discussed the issues from
the standpoint of failure to exhaust administrative remedy.
[
Footnote 16] Appellant here
insists that it is compelled to choose between compliance, at a
heavy cost, or noncompliance, with obvious risks of severe, though
nonrecurring and noncumulative, penalties; [
Footnote 17] and that to stand by subjects
Page 304 U. S. 220
appellant to the further risk that the Commission will fix its
rates on the Commission's evidence alone. [
Footnote 18] We may assume, without deciding,
that the risk of these penalties would be sufficiently great to
require the interposition of a court of equity to protect appellant
against a regulatory order.
Compliance with this order, however, subjects appellant only to
an expense in preparing for and carrying out an investigation. It
is not suggested that the expense is disproportionate to the
business of appellant, valued by the District Court as in excess of
$1,500,000 and involving sales of about one billion cubic feet per
annum at a price of $350,000. No order has been entered fixing
rates or regulating conduct. The necessity to expend for the
investigation or to take the risk for noncompliance does
Page 304 U. S. 221
not justify the injunction. It is not the sort of irreparable
injury against which equity protects. [
Footnote 19]
The weight to be given complaints of irrecoverable and
irreparable cost and damage in proceedings to enjoin hearings,
initiated by a federal governmental agency in a matter alleged by
complainants to be beyond the agency's powers, was considered in
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S.
41. In an effort to enjoin hearings by the National
Labor Relations Board, the Corporation alleged (
see 303
U.S. at
303 U. S.
47):
"that hearings would at best, be futile, and that the holding of
them would result in irreparable damage to the corporation, not
only by reason of their direct cost and the loss of time of its
officials and employees, but also because the hearings would cause
serious impairment of the goodwill and harmonious relations
existing between the corporation and its employees, and thus
seriously impair the efficiency of its operations."
"Lawsuits also often prove to have been groundless; but no way
has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of
a trial to establish the fact."
It may be suggested that, in the
Bethlehem Shipbuilding
case, the employer had not presented to the Board its contention of
constitutional immunity, and that proof of that immunity would have
constituted no greater injury if presented to the Board than the
courts, whereas here, the appellant has already been overruled by
the Commission on the question of appellant's constitutional
immunity, and so would be subject to greater expense by presenting
further evidence on another matter before the
Page 304 U. S. 222
Commission than by proceeding in an equity court and there
contesting the Commission's jurisdiction. This was the argument
presented to the Court, but not discussed, in
United States v.
Illinois Central R. Co., 244 U. S. 82,
244 U. S. 85-86.
The situation is still controlled by the abiding and fundamental
principle of this aspect of the
Bethlehem Shipbuilding
case, that the expense and annoyance of litigation is "part of the
social burden of living under government." [
Footnote 20] The authority in other courts is in
accord. [
Footnote 21]
Fifth. Our conclusion that this is not a threatened
injury justifying intervention is strengthened by a balancing of
conveniences. By the process of injunction, the federal courts are
asked to stop at the threshold the effort of the Public Service
Commission of Kentucky to investigate matters entrusted to its care
by a statute of that Commonwealth obviously within the bounds of
state authority in many of its provisions. The preservation of the
autonomy of the states is fundamental in our constitutional system.
The extraordinary powers of injunction should be employed to
interfere with the action of the
Page 304 U. S. 223
state or the depositaries of its delegated powers, only when it
clearly appears that the weight of convenience is upon the side of
the protestant. [
Footnote
22]
"Only a case of manifest oppression will justify a federal court
in laying such a check upon administrative officers acting
colore officii in a conscientious endeavor to fulfill
their duty to the state. [
Footnote 23]"
The Kentucky statute in question contains detailed provisions
for hearings and judicial review. [
Footnote 24] These include notice, procedural rules
before the Commission, right to counsel, production of evidence,
service of orders, rehearing, process for parties and witnesses,
depositions, record of proceedings, review of orders by court, and
appeal to the state court of last resort. The compulsory and
punitive powers of the Commission are exercised through judicial
process. When the only ground for interfering with the state
procedure is the cost of preparing for a hearing, there is no
occasion for equitable intervention.
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS concurs in the result.
MR. JUSTICE STONE concurs, except that he expresses no opinion
on the applicability of the Johnson Act.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Acts Ky.1934, c. 145, as amended by Acts 1936, c. 92.
[
Footnote 2]
"
Notice of Investigation and Order to Show Cause"
"Whereas, An examination of the reports of several wholesale and
retail gas utilities serving in this state shows that they purchase
gas at wholesale rates from the Petroleum Exploration, Inc.,
Lexington, Kentucky; and"
"Whereas, The Commission has found under Sections 3952-1-12-13,
and 14 that the Petroleum Exploration, Inc., is an operating
utility in the State of Kentucky, and subject to the jurisdiction
of this Commission; and"
"Whereas, It is apparent from a comparison of these rates with
those of other companies rendering a similar class of service in
Kentucky that these rates may be excessive; and"
"Whereas, These wholesale rates bear a definite relationship to
the cost of gas to consumers in the following towns and
communities, namely, Corbin, Somerset, Barbourville, Manchester,
Burning Springs, Richmond, Irvine-Ravenna, London, Winchester, Mt.
Sterling, Cynthiana, Georgetown, Lexington, Paris, Frankfort,
Versailles, Midway, and North Middletown; and"
"Whereas, Authority to initiate this investigation is vested in
the Commission by Sections 3952-12-13, and 14 of the Kentucky
Statutes,"
"Now, Therefore, Notice is Hereby Given, That the Commission has
entered upon an investigation of the above matters and that a
public hearing will be held relative to said matters at the office
of the Commission on June 29, 1937, at which time and place any
person interested may appear and present such evidence as may be
proper in the premises; and"
"Whereas, Under such circumstances, the Commission finds the
burden of proof upon the utility to show that rates and charges are
fair and reasonable, and not arbitrary."
"Now, Therefore, it is Ordered:"
"1. That official representatives of the Petroleum Exploration,
Inc., appear at such hearing and present evidence, if any it can,
as will show conclusively the fairness and reasonableness of its
present rates and charges for gas which it is selling to companies
that are in turn selling the same gas at wholesale or retail in
this state, or submit for the approval of the Commission such
changes and revisions as will make such rates or charges fair and
reasonable."
"[Sections 2 and 3, omitted here, relate to a requirement for
the submission of information on contracts between appellant and
other parties. Existence of such contracts was denied by appellant,
and no evidence to establish them was offered.]"
"4. That all books, accounts, records, correspondence, and
memoranda of the Petroleum Exploration, Inc., be made available for
examination by the Commission's representatives."
"Notice is Hereby Given to the Petroleum Exploration, Inc., of
the above order of the Commission."
"Dated at Frankfort, Kentucky, this 29th day of May, 1937."
[
Footnote 3]
Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light Co.,
239 U. S. 121,
239 U. S. 125.
The pleadings and proof in the present case do not in terms raise
the question of the value of the right to conduct business free of
interference by the commission.
Scott v. Donald,
165 U. S. 107.
Cf. Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light Co.,
supra, 239 U. S.
124.
[
Footnote 4]
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263.
[
Footnote 5]
Western & Atlantic R. Co. v. Railroad Commission,
261 U. S. 264.
[
Footnote 6]
Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140,
264 U. S.
142-143.
[
Footnote 7]
See Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U.
S. 684,
274 U. S. 690.
Although the objection does not go to the jurisdiction of the court
as a federal court, and may be waived and not considered if not
timely raised (
Reynes v. Dumont, 130 U.
S. 354,
130 U. S.
395), if it be obvious that there is an adequate remedy
at law, the court acts
sua sponte to preserve the courts
of equity as a forum for extraordinary relief, in accordance with
the legislative direction of § 267 of the Judicial Code.
Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake
Cotton & Woolen Co., 2 Black 545,
67 U. S. 550;
Wright v.
Ellison, 1 Wall. 16,
68 U. S. 22;
Oelrichs v.
Spain, 15 Wall. 211,
82 U. S. 228;
Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.
S. 481,
229 U. S. 486;
Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.
S. 121,
281 U. S. 123,
281 U. S. 128.
Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Claire Furnace Co.,
274 U. S. 160. It
is a question of "whether the case is one for the peculiar type of
relief" granted by courts of equity.
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire
Ins. Assn., 296 U. S. 64,
296 U. S.
69.
[
Footnote 8]
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Assn., 296 U. S.
64,
296 U. S. 69,
and cases cited;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Osborne,
265 U. S. 14,
265 U. S.
16.
[
Footnote 9]
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.
S. 482,
155 U. S. 487;
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S.
48,
194 U. S. 63;
Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U.
S. 185,
183 U. S. 188;
City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S.
24,
291 U. S.
29.
[
Footnote 10]
Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.
S. 300,
302 U. S. 306;
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of Public
Utilities, 304 U. S. 61.
[
Footnote 11]
Dows v.
Chicago, 11 Wall. 108;
Cruickshank v.
Bidwell, 176 U. S. 73,
176 U. S. 81;
McChord v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 183 U.
S. 483,
183 U. S. 495;
Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591,
139 U. S. 596;
Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co. v. Boise City,
213 U. S. 276,
213 U. S.
281.
[
Footnote 12]
See Irreparable Injury in Constitutional Cases, 46 Yale
Law Journal 255 (1936).
[
Footnote 13]
Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Assn., 296 U. S.
64,
296 U. S.
70.
[
Footnote 14]
Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123,
209 U. S. 165;
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197,
263 U. S.
215-216;
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.
S. 140,
264 U. S.
143.
[
Footnote 15]
§§ 9 and 10 of the Act of September 26, 1914, c. 311, 38 Stat.
722, 723, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50.
[
Footnote 16]
Cf. Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. State Corporation
Comm'n, 236 U. S. 699.
[
Footnote 17]
Ky.Stat.Ann. § 3952-61, provides:
"
Penalties. -- Every officer, agent or employee of any
utility as enumerated in § 1 hereof, or other person who shall
willfully violate any provisions of this act, or who procures,
aids, or abets any violation of this act by any such utility shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be
fined not more than one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, or be
confined in jail not more than six (6) months, or both; and if any
such utility shall be a private corporation and shall violate any
of the provisions of this act, or shall do any act herein
prohibited, or shall fail and refuse to perform any duty imposed
upon it under this act for which no penalty has been provided by
law, or who shall fail, neglect or refuse to obey any lawful
requirement or order made by the commission, for every such
violation, failure or refusal such utility shall forfeit and pay
into the treasury a sum not less than twenty-five ($25.00) dollars,
nor more than one thousand ($1,000.00) dollars, for each such
offense, said sum or sums to be paid to the Treasurer and credited
to the general fund. In construing and enforcing the provisions of
this section, the act, omission or failure of any officer, agent or
other person acting for or employed by any utility acting within
the scope of his employment shall in every case be deemed to be the
act, omission or failure of such utility."
There is also provision for proceedings by mandamus or
injunction to compel obedience to the orders of the Commission.
Ky.Stat.Ann. § 3952-13.
The minority opinion below construed this as follows:
"When the violator is an individual, the penalties for failure
to comply with the orders of the Public Service Commission are not
more than $1,000, or confinement in jail for not more than six
months, or both, and, if a corporation, not less than $25 or more
than $1,000 for each violation, the enforcement thereof to be by
the Franklin circuit court of the Commonwealth of Kentucky."
21 F. Supp. 254 at 259.
The appellant argues in this Court that failure to produce the
evidence may subject it to a fine and its officers and agents to
criminal penalties. Neither the majority below nor the Commission
in this Court expresses a contrary view.
[
Footnote 18]
Ky.Stat.Ann. § 3952-14.
[
Footnote 19]
Cf. Lawrence v. St.L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 274 U.
S. 588,
274 U. S.
592.
[
Footnote 20]
Bradley Lumber Co. v. Labor Board, 84 F.2d 97, 100.
Whether expense, in this instance, may be avoided by a challenge
of the interlocutory orders of the Commission on the plea of
appellant to the jurisdiction (
see Ky.Stat.Ann. § 3952-44)
is not within our province to decide.
[
Footnote 21]
The suggestion that an administrative agency be enjoined from
further and expensive proceedings after its allegedly erroneous
determination of jurisdiction was considered and rejected in
Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Commission, 280 F.
45, 48, 49;
Pittsburgh & W.Va. Ry. Co. v. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 52 App.D.C. 40, 280 F. 1014, 1015, 1016;
Paramino Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 18 F. Supp. 645, 647.
Compare State ex rel. Carrau v. Superior Court, 30 Wash.
700, 71 P. 648;
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Knox,
144 Miss. 560, 572, 573, 108 So. 907.
[
Footnote 22]
Gilchrist v. Interborough Co., 279 U.
S. 159,
279 U. S. 207;
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.
S. 176,
294 U. S. 185;
Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521,
284 U. S. 525;
cf. Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.
S. 334,
289 U. S.
338.
[
Footnote 23]
Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U. S. 52,
288 U. S.
61.
[
Footnote 24]
Ky.Stat.Ann. §§ 3952-33 to 3952-51 inclusive.