1.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. Myers, ante p.
303 U. S. 41,
followed. P.
303 U. S.
57.
2. In a suit in equity to enjoin the holding of a hearing upon a
complaint issued by the National Labor Relations Board, allegations
of the bill that interstate or foreign commerce is not involved are
conclusions of law, and are not admitted by a motion to dismiss. P.
303 U. S.
57.
3. The National Labor Relations Act does not vest in the Labor
Board exclusive power to determine its own jurisdiction. It confers
upon the Board exclusive initial power to make the investigation,
but provides for judicial review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
P.
303 U. S.
57.
4. There is no basis in the Act for the contention that the
District Court may entertain a suit to prevent the Board from
conducting a public investigation under § 10 if the employer claims
that it is not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. P.
303 U. S.
58.
5. A cause in which equitable relief was sought to prevent
injury which allegedly would result from the holding of a hearing
by the Labor Board cannot be disposed of as moot where, though the
hearing has in the meantime been held, the trial examiner has not
yet made his report to the Board, the Board has made no decision,
and there is thus a possibility of further proceedings. P.
303 U. S.
58.
91 F.2d 730 affirmed.
Certiorari, 302 U.S. 673, to review a decree affirming the
dismissal of a bill which sought to restrain officials of the
National Labor Relations Board from holding a hearing upon a
complaint issued against the shipbuilding company.
Page 303 U. S. 55
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company is a Virginia
corporation engaged in the construction, overhaul, and repair of
ships at its plant in that State. In June, 1937, the Industrial
Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America filed with the
National Labor Relations Board the charge that the company was
"dominating and interfering with the employees' right of
self-organization by dominating, interfering with and lending
financial support to a so-called labor organization"
at said plant known as "Representation of Employees;" that the
Company had discharged and refused to reinstate several employees
at the plant
"because they joined and assisted a labor organization of their
own choosing and engaged in concerted activities with fellow
employees for collective bargaining and other mutual aid and
protection;"
and that, by so doing, the company was engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of § 8, subsections (1), (2) and (3),
of the National Labor Relations Act. Thereupon the Board, through
its regional director for the Fifth Region, Bennett F. Schauffler,
filed a complaint against the company and gave notice of a hearing
pursuant to § 10(b) of the Act.
The company did not answer the complaint. Before the date
assigned for the hearing, it brought, in the federal court for
Eastern Virginia, this suit, in which it sought to enjoin
Schauffler, Jacob Blum, the regional attorney for the Fifth Region,
both citizens of Maryland, and the trial examiner designated or to
be designated, from holding the hearing and taking further
proceedings under
Page 303 U. S. 56
the act. There were prayers for both an interlocutory and a
final injunction and for a declaratory judgment that the act as
applied to the company's business and its relations to its
employees is unconstitutional. As the basis for this relief, it
alleged facts similar to those set forth in the bill of the
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, Ltd., in No. 181,
ante, p.
303 U. S. 41. It
alleged specifically that neither the company's business nor its
relations with its employees affected interstate or foreign
commerce; that it had not engaged in any unfair labor practice, and
that it would be irreparably damaged by the holding of the hearing
of the Board and the taking of any action in connection therewith.
Among the elements of irreparable injury alleged were that the
company would be held up to scorn as a violator of a law of the
United States, and so would incur for as long as the proceedings
lasted the odium and ill will of the public and of its own
employees; that its officials would be compelled to produce
evidence of a confidential nature, and that the pendency and
holding of the Board's proceedings, regardless of their outcome,
would impede the company in exercising its right to bargain freely
with its employees.
The case was heard by the District Court upon the plaintiff's
application for a temporary injunction and the defendants' motion
that the bill be dismissed on the ground, among others, that the
company had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that
granting the relief prayed would be an usurpation of the authority
exclusively vested by the act in the Circuit Court of Appeals. The
court denied the temporary injunction and dismissed the bill on the
ground that the company had
"a plain, adequate and exclusive remedy under the terms of the
Act itself, that no irreparable damage is threatened, and that this
[the District] Court has no jurisdiction of the controversy
presented by the bill."
That decree was affirmed
Page 303 U. S. 57
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held that
the company "has an adequate remedy under the statute, and may not
apply for relief in equity until it has exhausted the
administrative remedy there provided." 91 F.2d 730, 731.
We granted certiorari because of conflict with
Myers et al.
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 89 F.2d 1000, in which the
facts are substantially similar and the issues the same. That case
is reversed by our opinion delivered this day in No. 181. For the
reasons there stated, we affirm the decree herein, adding only the
following.
First. The company insists that, since the case was
heard on motion to dismiss the bill which alleges that the company
is not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and its relations
to its employees do not affect such commerce, these allegations
must be accepted as true. The motion admits as facts allegations
describing the manner in which the business is carried on, but not
legal conclusions from those facts. The allegations that interstate
or foreign commerce is not involved are conclusions of law.
[
Footnote 1]
Second. The company urges that, since the Board can
have jurisdiction only over businesses engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce, since the company denies that it is so engaged,
and the Federal Constitution does not permit vesting in an
administrative body exclusive power to determine its own
jurisdiction, the District Court must have power to pass upon that
issue. The act does not purport to leave the determination wholly
to the Board. It confers upon the Board exclusive initial power to
make the investigation, but provides for judicial review by the
Page 303 U. S. 58
Circuit Court of Appeals. [
Footnote 2] As the only question here involved is the
power of the Board to make the investigation, we have no occasion
to consider the extent of the review provided.
It is suggested that, while the Board has the right and duty to
make, under § 5 of the Act, a preliminary informal inquiry before
public action for the purpose of informing itself whether a
particular concern is subject to its authority, the District Court
may entertain a suit to prevent the Board from conducting a public
investigation under § 10 if the concern claims that it is not
engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. The limitation suggested
would in large measure defeat the purpose of the legislation. There
is no basis in the act for such a contention.
Third. The Circuit Court of Appeals having refused to
grant an injunction staying the action by the Board pending the
contemplated appeal, application for a stay was made to Mr. Justice
Butler of this Court, after filing of the petition for a writ of
certiorari. It has been called to our attention that, upon his
denial of that application, the hearing was held before the trial
examiner of the Board from August 30 to September 8, 1937, and has
apparently been closed. To the extent that relief was sought to
prevent the injury resulting from a hearing, the cause appears to
be moot. But the cause cannot be disposed of as moot, as the trial
examiner has not yet made his report to the Board; the Board has
made no decision, and thus there is a possibility of further
proceedings.
Decree affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Compare Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.
S. 464,
132 U. S.
469-470;
Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.
S. 498,
248 U. S. 500;
Nortz v. United States, 294 U. S. 317,
294 U. S.
324-325;
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v.
White, 296 U. S. 176,
296 U. S.
184-185.
[
Footnote 2]
§ 10(a), (e), (f).
See Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Co., 301 U. S. 1,
301 U. S. 47;
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. Ltd., supra.