An ex-soldier, upon entering the National Home for Disabled
Soldiers, situate in Massachusetts, contracted with its Board of
Managers, pursuant to the Act of June 25, 1910, that, upon his
death while a member of the Home, all of his personal property
should become vested in the Board of Managers for the sole use and
benefit of the post fund of the Home, subject to be reclaimed by
any legatee or person entitled to take the same by inheritance at
any time within five years after his death. He left no will.
Held:
1. The contract was valid and consistent with the law of
Massachusetts. Notice to the heirs unnecessary. P.
302 U. S.
626.
2. That his bank deposits, not having been claimed by his next
of kin within five years of his death, became the property of the
Home. P.
302 U. S. 628.
89 F.2d 151 reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 666, to review the reversal of a
judgment, 15 F. Supp. 139, recovered by the United States in a suit
against a trust company owing money on deposit to the credit of a
deceased veteran, and against the administrator of his estate, and
persons claiming to be his heirs at law and next of kin. The decree
of the District Court required that the trust company pay the
United States the amount of the fund and enjoined the individuals
from asserting any claim to it.
Page 302 U. S. 624
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Can the United States enforce a contract executed by an
ex-soldier in order to obtain admission into the National Home for
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, which contract provides that, upon the
death of the veteran while a member of the Home, all his personal
property shall pass to the Home subject to be reclaimed within five
years by any legatee or person entitled to receive the property by
inheritance?
The District Court held the contract valid and enforceable.
[
Footnote 1] The Court of
Appeals reversed. [
Footnote
2]
The facts disclose that:
Thomas McGovern, a native of Ireland, served in the United
States Army from 1877 to 1882; in 1904, his wife and three
daughters left him, but a son, Robert, continued to live with
McGovern until 1918, when the son (represented in this cause by a
guardian) was committed to a state home for the insane; the
complete severance of all family ties and associations continued
until McGovern's death, and the wife and daughters, living most of
the time in Boston, Massachusetts, were wholly unaware of his
whereabouts for the last twenty years of his life, most of which
were spent in nearby Chelsea; under these circumstances, McGovern,
age 72, in his application for admission to the Home, stated that
the names and addresses of his wife and nearest relatives were
unknown, and that he desired admission because he was "unable, on
account of his disability, to earn his living;" a doctor's
certificate showed that his mental condition was good at the date
of admission, but that he needed medical treatment and attention
due to serious physical weakness and ailments. His written
agreement with the Home stated:
Page 302 U. S. 625
"The said Thomas McGovern hereby agrees that, in event of his
death while a
member of the National Military Home for
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers, leaving no heirs at law or next of
kin, all personal property owned by him at the time of his death,
including money or choses in action held by him and not disposed of
by will, whether such property be the proceeds of pensions or
otherwise derived, shall vest in and become the property of said
Board of Managers
for the sole use and benefit of the post fund
of said home, and that all personal property of the said Thomas
McGovern shall upon his death, while a member at once pass to and
vest in said Board of Managers, subject to be reclaimed by any
legatee or person entitled to take the same by inheritance at any
time within five years after the death of such member. . .
."
(Italics added.)
At the time of his admission into the Home, McGovern had savings
deposits which were his personal property. September 17, 1928,
while an inmate of the Home, he died intestate. His wife died in
1933, without knowledge of his death, and none of the daughters
learned of his death until October 19, 1935. No claim to McGovern's
property was filed with the Home within five years after his
death.
In this action brought by the United States to require payment
to the Home of funds of McGovern on deposit in a Massachusetts bank
at his death, it is contended:
(1) That, because McGovern left surviving heirs, the title to
his personal property did not pass to the Home;
(2) That the Act of June 25, 1910, [
Footnote 3] authorizing the Home to make the contract with
McGovern, is invalid.
Page 302 U. S. 626
1. There is no ambiguity in the contract or in the act which
authorized it. No words in the contract indicate that the personal
property should pass to the Home only in the absence of persons
entitled to take by law. On the contrary, both the contract and the
act evince a clear intent that the personal property of the
veteran, when not claimed by heirs or legatees
within five
years after the veteran's death, should pass to the Home to be
used to provide comforts and entertainment for its inmates.
"The measure [the Act of 1910] leaves the member free to dispose
by will and safeguards to the legatees and heirs the right
within five years to reclaim all the property that
belonged to him at the time of his death. As to that, there is no
ambiguity, and therefore nothing to construe."
(Italics added.)
National Home v. Wood, 299 U.
S. 211,
299 U. S.
216.
2. The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the act of
Congress authorizing the contract was void as an interference with
the reserved rights of the state of the veteran's legal domicile
when he died (Massachusetts)
Page 302 U. S. 627
in that
"it was, at most, but an attempt to make a future testamentary
disposition of McGovern's property, when such a disposition could
only be effected by will."
This contract, however, is valid under the applicable state law.
[
Footnote 4] The Supreme Court
of Massachusetts, in 1931 in the case of
Hale v. Wilmarth,
274 Mass. 186, 189, 174 N.E. 232, 234, said, "The statute of wills
. . . does not prevent an owner of property from stipulating by
contract for the disposition of his property at the time of his
death." [
Footnote 5]
During the life of the veteran, his property was his own to
dispose of as he desired; his was an "intent to make a more binding
and irrevocable provision than a legacy could be," [
Footnote 6] and a stipulation for notice to
his heirs of the fact of his death was not required to make the
provision valid. "Not until the ancestor dies is there any vested
right in the heir."
Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.
S. 288,
247 U. S.
294.
In passing the Act of June, 1910, Congress merely directed the
terms and conditions under which veterans, consistently with state
law, can obtain admittance to Homes built, maintained, and operated
by the government for the benefit of veterans. Homes for the aged,
needy, or infirm, in return for the benefits bestowed by them,
generally receive some benefit from any property or estates of
their members. [
Footnote 7]
Page 302 U. S. 628
When McGovern entered this home, he was aged, without family
ties, lonely, and physically incapacitated. There he received care,
food, shelter, and companionship. He would have been privileged to
remain in the Home even though, after admittance, he had chosen to
make the members of his family the recipients of the money, by
gift, by will, or by notifying them to claim his property after his
death.
The claim of the government is based on a contract between the
veteran and the Home. Nothing in the record indicates that the
agreement was not fairly and voluntarily entered into between the
parties, or that it was inequitable, unjust, or not upon valuable
consideration. Both parties were competent to make the contract.
This contract is valid and enforceable, and, since no claim was
made by heirs or legatees within five years after his death, the
veteran's personal property passed to the Home for the benefit of
its inmates. The decree of the Court of Appeals is not in harmony
with these views, and is reversed.
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
15 F. Supp. 139.
[
Footnote 2]
89 F.2d 151.
[
Footnote 3]
Act of June 25, 1910, c. 384, 36 Stat. 703, 736, U.S.C. Title
24, ยง 136:
"Hereafter, the application of any person for membership in the
National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers and the admission of
the applicant thereunder shall be and constitute a valid and
binding contract between such applicant and the Board of Managers
of said home that, on the death of said applicant while a member of
such home, leaving no heirs at law nor next of kin, all personal
property owned by said applicant at the time of his death,
including money or choses in action held by him and not disposed of
by will, whether such property be the proceeds of pensions or
otherwise derived, shall vest in and become the property of said
Board of Managers for the sole use and benefit of the post fund of
said home, the proceeds to be disposed of and distributed among the
several branches as may be ordered by said Board of Managers, and
that all personal property of said applicant shall, upon his death
while a member at once pass to and vest in said Board of Managers,
subject to be reclaimed by any legatee or person entitled to take
the same by inheritance at any time within five years after the
death of such member. The Board of Managers is directed to so
change the form of application for membership as to give reasonable
notice of this provision to each
applicant, and as to contain
the consent of the applicant to accept membership upon the
conditions herein provided."
[
Footnote 4]
"Contracts respecting the disposition of one's property after
death are not uncommon."
Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233,
236, 104 N.E. 466, 467.
[
Footnote 5]
See also Holyoke National Bank v. Bailey, 273 Mass.
551, 174 N.E. 230;
Ex parte Simons, 247 U.
S. 231,
247 U. S.
239.
[
Footnote 6]
Krell v. Codman, 154 Mass. 454, 458, 28 N.E. 578.
[
Footnote 7]
See United States v. Bowen, 100 U.
S. 508.
Cf. Order of St. Benedict v.
Steinhauser, 234 U. S. 640.
See Digest of Poor Relief Laws of the Several States and
Territories as of May 1, 1936, prepared by Robert C. Lowe and
Staff, Legal Research Section, under the supervision of A. Ross
Eckler, Coordinator of Special Inquiries, Division of Social
Research, Works Progress Administration.