1. In deciding this case concerning the liability of an insurer
for loss of a cargo of fruit, both courts below assumed that the
fruit was in sound condition when shipped, and would have been
merchantable at the end of the voyage had it not been for the
stranding of the ship and consequent delay.
Held that this
Court, in reviewing the question decided, will make the same
assumptions. P.
302 U. S.
559.
2. Application of a general coverage clause of a marine
insurance policy
held unaffected by a rider attached for
an additional premium, after the policy had been long in effect but
cancelled before the occurrence of the loss. P.
302 U. S.
560.
The rider covered losses not embraced in the marine perils
against which the policy insured, and it also covered losses which
were already covered by the policy, and there was room for
difference of opinion as to exactly how far the rider
overlapped.
3. Stranding of the ship is a peril of the sea. P.
302 U. S.
561.
4. The doctrine of proximate cause is applied strictly in marine
insurance cases. P.
302 U. S.
562.
5. A vessel carrying a cargo of bananas stranded
en
voyage. The stranding caused delay, with the result that the
fruit, which was sound when shipped, and, but for the delay, would
have been
Page 302 U. S. 557
marketable upon arrival at destination, was spoiled by decay --
a total loss.
Held that the stranding was the proximate
cause of the loss, and that the loss was covered by insurance
against perils of the sea. P.
302 U. S.
562.
6. In marine insurance cases, the proximate cause of loss is the
efficient cause, not necessarily that cause, in a chain or series,
which was nearest in time to the event. P.
302 U. S.
562.
89 F.2d 545 reversed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 664, to review the affirmance of a
judgment in favor of the respondent Insurance Company in an action
on a policy of marine insurance. The case had been removed to the
District Court from the Court of Common Pleas of Baltimore
City.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought upon a policy of marine insurance.
Judgment for respondent was affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 89 F.2d 545, and certiorari was granted.
Petitioner was the owner of a cargo of bananas aboard the
Norwegian steamship
Smaragd. While proceeding up
Chesapeake Bay to Baltimore on July 21, 1935, the vessel stranded,
and, before she could be floated, the entire cargo of bananas
became overripe and rotted, causing a total loss. Petitioner held a
floating policy of insurance which had been issued by respondent on
June 23, 1933. The general coverage clause of the policy embraced
perils of the sea.
Page 302 U. S. 558
To the declaration setting forth these facts and claiming that
the loss was within the coverage of the policy, respondent filed
four pleas, the first two pleading the general issue and the two
others being special pleas. Petitioner joined issue on the first
and second pleas and demurred to the third and fourth. The District
Court overruled the demurrer to the third plea and, as that
decision was considered by the parties and the court to be
conclusive of the issue, final judgment was entered for
respondent.
The third plea, thus sustained, set forth a rider which, for an
additional premium, had been added to the policy on April 4, 1934,
and had been cancelled on January 25, 1935, before the loss
occurred. The rider amended the policy so as to provide that the
coverage should be
"free of particular average unless the vessel be stranded, sunk,
burned, on fire, or in collision, in any, all, or several of which
events, the insurers are liable for such loss by decay, injury, or
damage to the fruit as is occasioned thereby or occurs during or in
consequence of delay resulting therefrom."
The insurers also assumed liability for such loss in consequence
of delay resulting from breakage of shaft, loss of blades from
propeller, and derangement or breakage of machinery or rudder
and/or stern post, "whether or not the vessel be stranded, sunk,
burned or in collision," provided that the loss amounted to 10
percent after deducting 5 percent for ordinary loss.
On the cancellation of the rider, it was agreed that the policy
should have the same coverage as prior thereto, and the premium
rate was reduced from 60 cents to the original rate of 25 cents on
the $100 of risk. 89 F.2d 545, at 546.
In affirming the judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeals observed
that the judgment had been entered upon the pleadings, and that
petitioner had conceded that its right to recover depended upon the
construction of the policy.
Page 302 U. S. 559
89 F.2d at 545, 546. The appellate court then examined the
policy, and, after a review of authorities in this country and in
England, held that the loss was not within the general coverage
clause relating to perils of the sea. The court, in concluding its
opinion, referred to the rider as showing that the parties had
interpreted that clause in the same way.
Id., p. 549. We
granted certiorari because of the importance of the principal
question thus determined by the Court of Appeals, a question which
had not been decided by this Court, and as to which the decisions
of other courts were said to be in conflict.
We are met by two preliminary questions. The first of these is
with respect to the sufficiency of the declaration. It is suggested
that the declaration does not allege that the bananas were shipped
in sound condition, and that they would have been merchantable at
the end of a normal voyage, and that there is no allegation as to
the duration of the delay. It does not appear that these questions
were raised in the District Court, and they were not dealt with by
the Court of Appeals, which evidently assumed the sufficiency of
the declaration to present the main question as to the
interpretation of the general coverage clause. Both courts below
have decided the case upon the assumption that the fruit was in
sound condition when shipped, and would have been merchantable at
the end of the voyage had it not been for the stranding and the
consequent delay. In view of this course of proceedings, we make
the same assumption. If any question as to the condition of the
cargo or length of the delay and its effect had been presented in
the trial court, it might have been met by amendment of the
declaration, and the issue could have been tried, and, if the main
question, upon the assumption stated, has been wrongly decided and
the case is remanded to the District Court, there will still be
opportunity to try any other issues of fact or law which may
properly be presented.
Page 302 U. S. 560
The other preliminary question is with respect to the effect of
the rider above mentioned. We do not regard that indorsement as
either controlling or persuasive. Manifestly, it did not affect the
application of the general coverage clause. That clause had been in
effect for a long period before the rider, and, by express
agreement, that clause remained in effect after the rider was
cancelled. The rider covered losses not embraced in the marine
perils against which the policy insured, and it also covered losses
which were already covered by the policy, and there was room for
difference of opinion as to exactly how far the rider overlapped.
The actual views of the parties when the rider was obtained, and
the reasons for its cancellation, are not shown with any
definiteness. For all that appears, the insured may have been
advised, and may have assumed, that the coverage clause of the
policy gave protection in such a case as is here involved, and may
not have desired to continue to pay the additional premium for the
other losses described. We are not called upon to speculate as to
the state of mind of the insured's officers, and one asserted
ambiguity is not to be cured by another. ,If the general coverage
clause permits recovery, we see nothing to defeat it in what was
done in connection with the rider.
Petitioner thus states the main question broadly: does the
general clause of the marine cargo insurance policy, insuring for
loss caused by perils of the sea, cover a loss where a marine peril
--
viz., stranding -- has so delayed the voyage that the
cargo has become a total loss?
Respondent contends (1) that deterioration of perishable cargo
caused through inherent vice while the vessel is delayed by a sea
peril is not, without more, covered under a marine policy which
does not expressly insure against such deterioration, and (2) that,
in order to recover for such deterioration, it must be shown that
the adventure was not merely delayed, but frustrated, by reason
Page 302 U. S. 561
of the vessel's forced departure from the course of her voyage
-- as, for example, where the vessel has put into a port of
distress and remained there for a period which constituted a
virtual abandonment or frustration of the voyage.
In considering these contentions, we start with the fact that
the vessel, while proceeding up Chesapeake Bay, stranded. That is
alleged and conceded. Stranding is a peril of the sea.
Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance
Co., 129 U. S. 397,
129 U. S. 438;
Richelieu & Ontario Navigation Co. v. Boston Marine
Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 408,
136 U. S. 421;
Arnould on Marine Insurance, 11th ed., § 816; Winter on Marine
Insurance, 2d Ed., p. 156. Loss through stranding was within the
coverage of the policy. This, as the court below observed, was
expressly recognized in the warranties against particular average
in which loss by stranding was excepted. 89 F.2d 545 at 546, 547.
And it was the stranding which caused the delay. The case is not
one of the mere lengthening of a voyage due to the ordinary
vicissitudes of wind and wave against which the underwriter does
not insure,
Jordan v. Warren Insurance Co., 1 Story 342,
352, and we are not called upon to determine in what circumstances
other than those now presented delay may be considered to be due to
a peril of the sea within the meaning of the policy.
The cargo was perishable fruit. Respondent insists that its
decay was caused by inherent vice which began to operate as soon as
the fruit was picked. But, although perishable, the cargo was
insured for the voyage against sea perils, and the sole question is
whether a sea peril caused the loss. As we have said, we must
assume for the present purpose, in view of the way in which the
case was presented and determined below, that the fruit was sound
when shipped and would have been merchantable on arrival after a
normal voyage, and that, had it not been
Page 302 U. S. 562
for the delay due to the stranding of the vessel, the loss would
not have occurred despite the perishable nature of the cargo.
We are not impressed by the argument that, to permit recovery,
it must appear that the adventure was not merely delayed, but that
it was frustrated through a forced departure of the vessel from the
course of her voyage and the putting into a port of distress. So
far as the cargo in question was concerned, the adventure was
frustrated by the stranding, and the cargo became a total loss
before the vessel could be floated. That loss was just as complete
as if the vessel had been compelled to put into a port and the
voyage had then been abandoned.
The sole question is whether, in these circumstances, the
stranding should be regarded as the proximate cause of the loss.
Respondent contends that decay or inherent vice was the proximate
cause. It is true that the doctrine of proximate cause is applied
strictly in cases of marine insurance. But, in that class of cases
as well as in others, the proximate cause is the efficient cause,
and not a merely incidental cause which may be nearer in time to
the result.
Aetna Insurance Company v. Boon, 95 U. S.
117,
95 U. S. 130;
Arnould on Insurance, 11th ed., § 783.
The subject was discussed in an illuminating way by Lord Shaw in
his judgment in
Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire
Insurance Society, [1918] A.C. 350, 368-371. He said:
"To treat
proxima causa as the cause which is nearest
in time is out of the question. Causes are spoken of as if they
were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in a
chain, but, if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to, it is
not wholly so. The chain of causation is a handy expression, but
the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain, but a net. At
each point, influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous,
meet, and the radiation from each point extends
Page 302 U. S. 563
infinitely. At the point where these various influences meet, it
is for the judgment, as upon a matter of fact, to declare which of
the causes thus joined at the point of effect was the proximate,
and which was the remote, cause."
"What does 'proximate' here mean? To treat proximate cause as if
it was the cause which is proximate in time is, as I have said, out
of the question. The cause which is truly proximate is that which
is proximate in efficiency. That efficiency may have been preserved
although other causes may meantime have sprung up which have yet
not destroyed it, or truly impaired it, and it may culminate in a
result of which it still remains the real efficient cause to which
the event can be ascribed."
There, in a policy insuring a ship, there was a warranty of
exception in case of hostilities or warlike operations, and the
question was whether the loss of the vessel fell within the
exception. The vessel was torpedoed, and sustained severe injuries,
but succeeded in making the outer harbor of the port of Havre.
Notwithstanding all efforts by pumping and otherwise, she bumped,
broke her back, and sank. It was contended that she perished by a
peril of the sea because sea water entered the gash in her side
which the torpedo made. The entry of the sea water was indeed a
peril of the sea, and was proximate in time to the sinking. But, as
"proximate cause is an expression referring to the efficiency as an
operating factor upon the result," it was held that "the real
efficient cause" of the sinking of the vessel was that she was
torpedoed, and hence that the loss was within the exception.
In the
Leyland case, the House of Lords approved the
decision of the Court of Appeal in
Reischer v. Borwick
[1894] 2 Q.B. 548, where the policy covered collision with any
object, but excluded perils of the sea. The ship struck a snag
which made a hole in her. She was anchored, and the leak was
temporarily plugged. Then, while she was being towed towards the
nearest dock for
Page 302 U. S. 564
repair, the water burst through the hole and she had to be run
aground and abandoned. The contention was that the proximate cause
of the damage was the excepted marine peril of the inrush of the
sea water. But the Court of Appeal held that the proximate cause
was the collision with the snag.
The same principle applies although, within the network of
causation, there may be found the operation of natural forces to
which a disaster within the coverage of the policy has given play.
The decision of Justice Story in
Magoun v. New England Marine
Insurance Co., Fed.Cas. No.8,961, 1 Story 157, is an
illustration. In that case, the question was whether the loss was
due to a restraint and detainment of government within the words of
a policy insuring the vessel and freight. It appeared that there
had been an arrest and detainment by the authorities of New
Granada; that the vessel had been restored, but that, when
restored, it was found, from her long exposure to the weather in a
hot climate, in an open roadstead, that she had been so damaged
that she could not perform the voyage without great repairs which
would cost more than the vessel was worth; that hides belonging to
the cargo had become rotten and were thrown overboard, and that no
other vessel could be found to carry the residue of the cargo to
destination. The vessel was accordingly abandoned to the
underwriters, and Justice Story held that the abandonment was good,
and the underwriters were liable for a total loss. He said:
"The argument is that the injury to the vessel, by the long
delay and exposure to the climate, was the immediate cause of the
loss, and the seizure and detainment the remote cause only, and
that therefore the rule applies, '
Causa proxima, non remota,
spectatur,' and the underwriters are not liable for injury by
mere wear and tear, or by delays in the voyage, or by worms, or by
exposure to the climate. But it appears to me that this is not
a
Page 302 U. S. 565
correct exposition of the rule. All the consequences naturally
flowing from the peril insured against, or incident thereto, are
properly attributable to the peril itself."
In support, Justice Story referred to the decision of the Court
in
Peters v. Warren Insurance
Co., 14 Pet. 99, in which he delivered the opinion.
In that case, he put the following illustration (p.
39 U. S.
110):
"Suppose a perishable cargo is greatly damaged by the perils of
the sea, and it should, in consequence thereof, long afterwards,
and before arrival at the port of destination, become gradually so
putrescent as to be required to be thrown overboard for the safety
of the crew. The immediate cause of the loss would be the act of
the master and crew; but there is no doubt, that the underwriters
would be liable for a total loss upon the ground that the operative
cause was the perils of the sea."
And, in the same case, Justice Story took occasion to observe
that, if there be any commercial contract which, more than any
other, "requires the application of sound common sense and
practical reasoning in the exposition of it," it is "certainly a
policy of insurance."
Id., 39 U. S.
109.
If we apply this principle of the "real efficient cause" to the
instant case, it can hardly be doubted that, upon the facts
assumed, the loss would be within the coverage of the policy.
Indeed, this is not strongly contested, but it is insisted that the
case is controlled by certain precedents to which we should give
heed in dealing with an ancient form of words. These precedents are
found in certain English cases to which the Circuit Court of
Appeals referred. The court recognized that a number of American
cases had taken a different view, but thought that, in the absence
of a contrary decision by this Court or any federal court, the
cited English cases should be followed in the view that, in the
field of marine insurance, "it is highly desirable that our
decisions be kept in harmony with those of England." 89 F.2d p.
549.
Page 302 U. S. 566
Reference is made to the case of
Taylor v. Dunbar, L.R.
4 C.P. 206. There, meat shipped at Hamburgh for London was delayed
on the voyage by tempestuous weather, and, solely by reason of such
delay, became putrid and was necessarily thrown overboard. The
court held that it was not a loss by perils of the sea. Judge
Keating said that the facts showed "beyond a doubt that the
proximate cause of the loss of the meat was the delay in the
prosecution of the voyage," and "that delay was occasioned by
tempestuous weather." But he held "that a loss by the unexpected
duration of the voyage, though that be caused by perils of the
sea," did not entitle the assured to recover. Judge Montague Smith,
concurring, said that, if it were held "that a loss by delay,
caused by bad weather or the prudence of the captain in anchoring
to avoid it was a loss by perils of the sea," the court would
"be opening a door to claims for losses which never were
intended to be covered by insurance, not only in the case of
perishable goods, but in the case of goods of all other
descriptions."
The case of
Pink v. Fleming, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 396, upon
which chief reliance is placed, was a case of collision. It was
necessary for the damaged ship to put into a port for repairs, and
for that purpose to discharge a portion of the goods insured,
consisting of fruit. The goods were reshipped, but, on arrival, it
was found that, being of a perishable nature, they had been damaged
by the handling necessary for their discharge and reshipment and by
the delay. The Court of Appeal held that the collision was not the
proximate cause of the loss, and that there could be no recovery on
the policy. Lord Esher said:
"The collision may be said to have been a cause, and an
effective cause, of the ship's putting into a port and of repairs'
being necessary. For the purpose of such repairs, it was necessary
to remove the fruit, and such removal necessarily caused damage to
it. The agent, however,
Page 302 U. S. 567
which proximately caused the damage to the fruit was the
handling, though no doubt the cause of the handling was the
repairs, and the cause of the repairs was the collision. According
to the English law of marine insurance, only the last cause can be
regarded. There is nothing in the policy to say that the
underwriters will be liable for loss occasioned by that. To connect
the loss with any peril mentioned in the policy, the plaintiffs
must go back two steps, and that, according to English law, they
are not entitled to do."
The court thought that the case was governed by
Taylor v.
Dunbar, supra. Lord Esher added:
"With regard to the American authorities, the American law on
the subject seems to differ materially from our law, and therefore
it is not necessary to consider them.
*"
It seems that neither of these cases went to the House of Lords,
and we find it impossible to reconcile Lord Esher's ruling, "that,
according to the English law of marine insurance, only the last
cause can be regarded," with the elaborate exposition of the
doctrine of proximate cause which has been given by the House of
Lords in
Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance
Society, supra, from which we have quoted. And it is
recognized in England that "Passages in Lord Esher's Judgment in
Pink v. Fleming . . . to the effect that only the cause
last in time can be looked to, cannot now be supported." Arnould on
Marine Insurance, 11th ed., § 783, note (r). So far as the English
rule, however, relates to losses on ship or goods "proximately
caused by delay," "although the delay be caused by a peril insured
against," it has been embodied in statute which apparently applies
to all goods, perishable or otherwise, unless the policy otherwise
provides. That statute, of course, is controlling in relation
to
Page 302 U. S. 568
English practice in that class of cases. Marine Insurance Act,
1906, § 55(2)(b). L.R. Statutes, 6 Edward VII, p. 227. There is no
statute applicable here which so restricts the doctrine of
proximate cause, as we understand it and as it is set forth in the
Leyland case, and the weight of American authority is
contrary to the doctrine of
Pink v. Fleming.
In
Williams v. Smith, 2 Caines 1, the action was on a
policy of insurance covering a cargo consisting chiefly of naval
stores, including tar in barrels, on a voyage from New York to
Algiers. The vessel experienced severe weather which resulted in
such serious damage that it was compelled to put into Cadiz as a
port of distress. There, more than half of her landing was taken
out, and the vessel moved to the usual place for repairing. While
there, an epidemic fever broke out which prevented all business and
made it impossible to obtain permits for taking the cargo from the
place where it had been landed. Meanwhile, the vessel was driven to
sea by a storm and sustained further injuries, and, on returning to
Cadiz, it was found that the cargo, both on shore and on board,
from the heat of the climate and violence of the gale, was
deteriorated more than one half of its original value. As the whole
would not have produced enough to fit the ship for the completion
of her voyage, the vessel and the cargo were abandoned to the
underwriters. The court charged the jury, among other things, that
"any damages which arose in consequence of the fever at Cadiz were
within the perils of the policy." The jury brought in a verdict for
a total loss. The court denied a new trial, Judge Kent stating in
his opinion "that the damage resulting from the pestilence at
Cadiz" was covered by the policy. The court found it unnecessary to
decide "whether a pestilence is a peril direct within the policy,"
but held that it formed "a sound excuse for delay at Cadiz," and
"if the consequence of that delay was a deterioration of the
subject insured, the insurer must be answerable for the loss."
Page 302 U. S. 569
In
Tudor v. New England Marine Insurance Co., 12 Cush.
554, the suit was upon a policy of insurance on a cargo of ice
shipped from Boston to Calcutta. It was agreed that the ice was
properly packed and surrounded with nonconductors of heat. Under
the stipulations of the policy, the insurer could be liable, if at
all, only for a total loss. There was also a clause that there
should be no liability "for ice melting in consequence of putting
into port." By perils of the sea, the vessel sprung a leak which
increased, and it became necessary to put away for a port. On
taking out her cargo, in order to ascertain her condition and the
practicability of repairs, it was found that the ice had settled, a
portion of it having been melted by the sea water which had come in
contact with it by reason of the leak. The ice was taken out and
sold for a very small sum in comparison with its estimated value at
the port of delivery. The voyage was abandoned. It was denied that
the loss was occasioned by a peril of the sea. The insured had
judgment for a total loss. The court considered it to be well
settled that, if an article insured as free from average be
"placed in such a condition that, in consequence of inevitable
deterioration or decay, it cannot be carried to the port of
destination, but will necessarily, before the completion of the
voyage, be wholly destroyed, and it is accordingly sold at an
intermediate port,"
this would constitute a total loss within the meaning of the
policy. The court also held that the exception of the risk of ice
"melting in consequence of putting into port" did not include "a
loss occasioned by the melting of the ice from other causes, or a
combination of other causes." The real cause was the injury to the
vessel which made it necessary to take out the ice in a port in the
tropics.
See also Musgrave v. Mannheim Insurance Co., 32
Nova Scotia Rep. 405.
Cory v. Boylston Insurance Co., 107 Mass. 140, is cited
by respondent as an answer to the
Tudor case, but the
latter was not overruled or even mentioned. In the
Cory
Page 302 U. S. 570
case, a vessel with wine on board met with severe gales which
prolonged her voyage and caused her to ship much sea water, and,
upon her arrival at the port of destination, the cases of wine were
found to be more or less wet either by the sea water or by the
steam and dampness generated in the hold by the presence of the sea
water and the changes of climate through which the vessel had
passed. The case was controlled by special provisions of the
policy. The policy provided that the insurers should not be liable
for loss by leakage unless occasioned by stranding or collision,
or
"for damage or injury to goods by dampness, rust, change of
flavor, or by being spotted, discolored, musty or mouldy, unless
the same be caused by actual contact of sea water with the articles
damaged, occasioned by sea perils."
The court thought that the latter clause was inserted with a
knowledge of the decisions in
Baker v. Manufacturers' Insurance
Co., 12 Gray 603, and
Montoya v. London Assurance
Co., 6 Exch. 451. To bring a case within that clause, the
court held that it was not enough
"that perils of the sea should be the efficient, and within the
rule laid down in the previous decisions, the proximate cause, by
which the sea water was shipped,"
but that the sea water "must come into actual contact with the
articles, for the damage to which the underwriters are sought to be
charged."
Respondent also cites
Perry v. Cobb, 88 Me. 435, 34 A.
278, 280, where the insurance was on a cargo of lime shipped by a
brig from Rockland to New York. The voyage was prolonged on account
of rough weather, but the vessel arrived tight and only slightly
damaged. No sea water had reached the cargo unless in a few
instances where a hatch had been taken off or once when the cabin
was flooded. That damage was far below the partial loss which had
been excepted from the coverage. The remaining damage was "from the
shrinking of the staves of the barrels, and slacking up of the
cooperage," causing a loss of contents and
Page 302 U. S. 571
making the barrels insecure for hoisting, a condition which was
claimed to have resulted from the rolling and pitching of the
vessel caused by the storms of an unusually protracted voyage. The
court said that
"[a]ll authorities agree that a protracted voyage is not a sea
peril within a marine policy, because it is not an unusual event,
but one of the natural incidents to sea transit;"
that the evidence was conflicting "as to the proximate cause for
the condition of the cargo upon its arrival;" that the associates,
who in this case had insured each other and to whom it was agreed
that the question of liability should be submitted, were men of
large experience in burning and shipping lime, and that their
decision against the plaintiff
"must have great weight upon the fact as to whether the
condition of the cargo, upon its arrival in New York, was other
than what might have been expected from ordinary sea weather at
that time of year,"
without any "unusual sea peril." The conclusion was that the
principal damage to the cargo came "from its own inherent
qualities, excited by the long-continued transit."
Id.,
pp. 449-450.
In the case of
Bond v. The Superb, 3 Fed.Cas. p. 845,
No. 1,624, 1 Wall.Jr. 355, also cited by respondent and the court
below, the decision of Mr. Justice Grier at circuit turned upon the
question of liability for general average and in this view had
distinguishing features.
Fourteen years ago, a case closely resembling the one at bar
came before the New York courts.
Brandyce v. United States
Lloyds (The Corsicana), 207 App.Div. 665, 203 N.Y.S. 10, 11;
239 N.Y. 573, 147 N.E. 201. The action was upon policies covering a
cargo of potatoes insured against perils of the sea. The vessel, in
consequence of a collision at sea with some unknown object, was
compelled to put into Charleston for repairs, where it was found
necessary to discharge the cargo. After repairs, the vessel resumed
her voyage but, on account of the delay,
Page 302 U. S. 572
the potatoes, because of sprouting and rot, had to be sold. They
were not injured directly in the collision or touched by sea water.
The precise question presented was
"whether loss by natural deterioration, during a delay in the
voyage caused by a sea peril, is a loss by sea perils, within the
meaning and intent of the policy of insurance."
The Appellate Division reviewed the authorities in England and
in this country. The court held that mere delay on the voyage, as a
result of which cargo is spoiled or damaged, was not a ground for
recovery. But the court found that the collision, the sea peril
insured against, was the real cause of the loss. The court
said:
"The evidence indicates that, if the
Corsicana had not
been damaged by reason of sea perils, the potatoes would have
arrived sound. The proximate cause of the loss therefore was the
sea peril, because it was the
efficient dominant cause,
which, although incidentally involving
delay, placed the
cargo in such a condition that, because of inevitable deterioration
or decay, it could not be reshipped and carried to its
destination."
The Court of Appeals of New York stated the question in the same
way, and affirmed the judgment.
We lay on one side cases of protracted voyages caused by storms,
and the special questions to which their varied circumstances give
rise. Such a case is not before us. The instant case is one of
stranding, a sea peril insured against, and we think that the well
settled doctrine of proximate cause, meaning the real efficient
cause of the loss, requires the conclusion that, upon the
assumptions of fact we stated at the outset, the loss of the cargo
was within the general coverage clause of the policy.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further
proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS and MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND are of opinion
that the case was correctly decided by the court below on grounds
adequately stated.
* As to other English decisions cited below,
Tatham v.
Hodgson, 6 T.R. 656, and
Inman Steamship Co. v.
Bischoff, L.R. 7 App.Cas. 670,
see Arnould on Marine
Insurance, 11th Ed., §§ 781, 785.