1. A shipper claiming that an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission infringes his right to reasonable and nondiscriminatory
rate, and who was a party to the proceeding before the Commission,
is entitled to sue to set the order aside under U.S.C., Title 28,
§§ 46 and 47. P.
295 U. S.
479.
2. In determining the reasonableness of a rate, the Commission
may consider its effect upon an existing rate structure which it
has found to be just and reasonable. P.
295 U. S.
479.
3. Comparisons with other rates in the same or adjacent
territory, though not conclusive of the reasonableness of the rate
under investigation, have probative value. P.
295 U. S. 480.
4. An order of the Commission fixing minimum rates on ex-river
coal from points on the Ohio River to destinations in Northern
Ohio, upon a finding that the minima fixed are reasonable and that
lower rates would create discrimination against shippers in origin
districts who cannot use the water-rail route, and would tend to
disrupt the rate structure and destroy proper differentials between
various producing districts,
held essentially an order
under § 15, rather than § 3, of the Interstate Commerce Act. P.
295 U. S. 480.
7 F. Supp. 33 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the District Court, of three judges,
dismissing a suit to annul an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Page 295 U. S. 477
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit for the annulment of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission fixing minimum rates on ex-river coal from Ohio
river points to destinations in Northern Ohio. The District Court
entered a decree of dismissal. [
Footnote 1] The appellants attack the rate order as based
upon matters the Commission had no authority to consider and as
unsupported by evidence. The appellees opposed these charges and
add that the appellants have no standing to maintain the suit.
Improvement of navigation on the Ohio river and its tributaries
has recently made possible shipment of coal in barges from mines at
or near the streams to river destinations for use there or for
transshipment by rail to inland points. Previously these mines,
with others in the same producing territory, were dependent upon
the railroads, and a system of rate relationships had been built up
as between the producing localities.
In anticipation of shipment of coal from river points, the rail
carriers filed schedules proposing a proportional rate of $1.02 on
carloads from Conway and Colona, points on the Ohio River in
Pennsylvania, to Youngstown, Ohio,
Page 295 U. S. 478
effective May 15, 1929. The Commission suspended them and
instituted an investigation. It found the proposed rate
unreasonable and declared a reasonable maximum would be 77 cents,
but contented itself with ordering the scheduled rate of $1.02
cancelled, and did not require that a maximum rate of 77 cents be
adopted. [
Footnote 2]
Subsequently the Commission held an investigation respecting
proposed schedules of rates on ex-river coal from points farther
down the Ohio River to Canton, Massillon, Cleveland, Lorain, and
South Lorain, Ohio. It cancelled these and found lower rates would
be reasonable, but did not prescribe them. [
Footnote 3] Upon the carriers' compliance with the
views of the Commission, by the establishment of the suggested
rates, tonnage began to move in quantity. Meantime, the Ohio Public
Utilities Commission permitted and authorized reductions in
intrastate coal rates, with the result that the Interstate Commerce
Commission instituted a 13th section proceeding, found the
interstate rail rates from the Pittsburg and Connellsville
districts to Northeastern Ohio destinations reasonable, and
required the restoration of the old intrastate rates to avoid
discrimination against interstate commerce. [
Footnote 4] While that proceeding was pending,
certain carriers prayed a rehearing of the two ex-river cases above
mentioned. This was granted, the cases consolidated, further
evidence received, and an order made in which the rate from Colona
and Conway to Youngstown was fixed at not less than 90 cents, that
from the lower river points to Canton and Massillon at not less
than $1.20, and to Cleveland and Lorain at not less than $1.45.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 295 U. S. 479
The Commission finds: these prescribed minima are reasonable;
lower rates would create undue discrimination against shippers in
origin districts who cannot use the water-rail route, and would
tend to disrupt the rate structure, and to destroy the proper
differentials between various producing districts on shipments to
Ohio destinations. These findings have ample support in the
evidence.
1. The appellants were entitled to bring and maintain this suit
to set aside the order. [
Footnote
6] They were parties to the proceeding before the Commission,
had a pecuniary interest in the rates, and were affected by the
order. The authorities cited by the appellees are to be
distinguished on the ground that the plaintiffs either had no legal
interest or capacity to sue or failed to allege that the rates
under attack were unreasonable or discriminated against them.
[
Footnote 7]
2. The appellants' principal complaint is that the Commission
raised the permissible minimum rate to prevent disruption of the
existing rate structure and relationship of rates for carriage from
various producing regions to Ohio destinations, and that an order
grounded upon any such consideration is unauthorized, and violates
the principle announced in
United States v. Chicago, M., St. P.
& P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 499. The
position is not well taken. This record exhibits a situation quite
distinct from that
Page 295 U. S. 480
disclosed in the cited case. In the first place, the Commission
here found the required minimum reasonable; in the second place, it
had, after full investigation in this and the Ohio case, [
Footnote 8] held the existing rate
structure -- built upon certain reasonable key or controlling rates
by application of proper differentials -- just and reasonable, and
the ex-river rates here in issue, in contrast, too low. Comparisons
of other rates in the same or adjacent territory, while not a
conclusive test of reasonableness of a rate under investigation,
have probative value. [
Footnote
9] There was much other evidence bearing upon the character of
the service and cost. The order of the Commission was based
primarily upon the reasonableness of the minimum prescribed. The
existing rate structure furnished support for the finding of
reasonableness.
3. There is no merit in the contention that the order was a § 3
order and invalid for failure to afford the carriers an alternative
of raising the contested rate or lowering others to remove
discrimination. It is true the Commission found prejudice to
shippers all rail, but, in essence, the order entered was a § 15
order, and not one made under § 3. [
Footnote 10]
Decree affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
7 F. Supp. 33.
[
Footnote 2]
163 I.C.C. 3.
[
Footnote 3]
185 I.C.C. 211.
[
Footnote 4]
192 I.C.C. 413. This order was sustained,
6 F. Supp.
386;
292 U. S. 292 U.S.
498.
[
Footnote 5]
197 I.C.C. 617.
[
Footnote 6]
U.S.C. Tit. 28, §§ 46, 47;
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v.
United States, 249 U. S. 557;
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258,
264 U. S.
266-269;
United States v. New River Co.,
265 U. S. 533,
265 U. S. 541;
Western Paper Makers' Chemical Co. v. United States,
271 U. S. 268;
Assigned Car Cases, 274 U. S. 564;
McLean Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F. 460, 464-468;
Anchor Coal Co. v. United States, 25 F.2d
462, 478.
[
Footnote 7]
See United States v. M. & M. Traffic Assn.,
242 U. S. 178;
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States,
263 U. S. 143;
Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.
S. 249;
Moffat Tunnel League v. United States,
289 U. S. 113.
[
Footnote 8]
Supra, Note 4
[
Footnote 9]
United States v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 288 U.
S. 490,
288 U. S.
500.
[
Footnote 10]
Compare St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. United
States, 245 U. S. 136,
245 U. S.
145.