1. Although the function of determining whether a veteran is
entitled to hospital facilities under the World War Veterans Act,
and of ordering his hospitalization or certifying to his right
thereto, is a function of the Director of the Veterans Bureau, the
right of the veteran, where it exists on indisputable facts as a
matter of law, may be enforced by the courts. P.
292 U. S.
446.
2. An honorably discharged veteran of the Spanish-American War,
suffering from a neuropsychiatric ailment, was in 1911 committed to
St. Elizabeths Hospital by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant
to statutory authority, and remained there confined as an insane
person until, in 1930, he was discharged.
Held:
(1) That the Veterans Bureau having had and exercised the right
to make use of this hospital for insane veterans, the facilities of
the hospital were under the control and jurisdiction of that Bureau
within the meaning of § 202(10) of the World War Veterans Act of
1924, as amended July 2, 1926. P.
292 U. S.
445.
(2) Under the proviso of § 202(10) of this amended Act, the
pension money credited to the veteran while in the hospital could
not, upon his discharge, be withheld to pay for his board at the
hospital during that period. P.
292 U. S.
447.
(3) This applies to the charges for board incurred before July
2, 1926, the date of the proviso, as well as to those incurred
afterwards, the entire deduction having been made after the proviso
became effective. P.
292 U. S.
447.
3. A statute is not rendered retroactive merely because the
facts or requisites upon which its subsequent action depends, or
some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent to the enactment.
Cox v. Hart, 260 U. S. 427,
260 U. S. 435.
P.
292 U. S. 449.
78 Ct.Cls. 401 reversed.
Certiorari to review a judgment rejecting a claim for recovery
of pension money which had been applied to pay for the board of a
Spanish War Veteran at a government hospital for the insane.
Page 292 U. S. 444
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought in the Court of Claims by petitioner, an
honorably discharged veteran of the Spanish-American War, to
recover judgment against the United States for money deducted from
his pension on account of board furnished him while he was an
inmate of St. Elizabeths Hospital. He was committed to the hospital
as an insane person on June 19, 1911, and remained there until
April 25, 1930, when he was discharged in the custody of his
brother. Thereafter, petitioner regained his sanity and was of
sound mind when this suit was prosecuted. During the entire period
of his confinement, he suffered from a neuropsychiatric ailment.
Preceding the time of his discharge from the hospital, there had
been placed to his credit on the books of the institution, under
the certificate of the Bureau of Pensions, $4,036, representing
funds paid to the institution by the Bureau of Pensions on his
behalf. Upon his discharge, the hospital deducted from these
pension funds a sum which had been advanced to him for clothing and
cash, and applied the remaining $3,259.17 on account of board
furnished during the period of his confinement. Petitioner at the
time protested against the application thus made and against the
refusal of the hospital to pay over to him the amount so
withheld.
Shortly after his discharge from the hospital, application was
made on his behalf to the Director of the Veterans' Bureau for an
order authorizing and directing his hospitalization at St.
Elizabeths Hospital from the effective
Page 292 U. S. 445
date of the World War Veterans' Act of June 7, 1924, to the date
of his discharge, April 25, 1930. The director held that, since no
application had been made by petitioner or by any one acting in his
behalf until after his discharge, the question was moot, and the
director was without authority of law to issue a retroactive order
authorizing hospitalization in such a case. Following this ruling,
however, the bureau issued a certificate recognizing petitioner as
a veteran entitled to hospitalization under § 202(10) of the World
War Veterans' Act of 1924, as amended.
Petitioner, by three successive enlistments, served in the army
of the United States from November 30, 1897, until January 25, 1907
at which time he was honorably discharged by reason of the
expiration of his term of service.
The Court of Claims denied petitioner's right to recover and
dismissed his petition.
Section 202(10) of the World War Veterans' Act, as amended
(U.S.C. Title 38, § 484), directs that all hospital facilities
under the control and jurisdiction of the Veterans' Bureau shall be
available "for every honorably discharged veteran of the
Spanish-American War . . . suffering from neuropsychiatric . . .
ailments," with the following proviso:
"That the pension of a veteran entitled to hospitalization under
this section shall not be subject to deduction, while such veteran
is hospitalized in any Government hospital, for board, maintenance,
or any other purpose incident to hospitalization."
This proviso appeared for the first time in the Act of July 2,
1926, c. 723, § 9, 44 Stat. 794.
The Veterans' Bureau had and exercised the right to make use of
St. Elizabeths Hospital for insane veterans, and this, we think,
satisfied the requirement contemplated by the statute that the
hospital facilities (not the hospital)
Page 292 U. S. 446
shall be under the control and jurisdiction of that bureau.
The court below, in ruling against petitioner, proceeded upon
the theory that a court is without jurisdiction to entertain a
proceeding for the determination of the question whether a veteran
is entitled to hospital facilities, to order his hospitalization,
or to certify his right thereto -- those being matters, the court
said, within the sole authority of the director of the bureau.
Granting the correctness of this view, we are of opinion that it
does not apply in this case. The undisputed and indisputable facts
bring the veteran within the requirements of the statute.
Undoubtedly, therefore, as matter of law, he was entitled to the
hospital facilities of St. Elizabeths, and if timely application
had been made to the director of the bureau, a refusal upon his
part to order the hospitalization would have been wholly without
evidentiary support, clearly arbitrary and capricious, and would
not, upon well settled principles, have concluded the courts.
Silberschein v. United States, 266 U.
S. 221,
266 U. S. 225,
and authorities cited;
United States v. Williams,
278 U. S. 255,
278 U. S. 257.
So much, indeed, seems to be within the concession made in the
brief and argument for the government:
"It may be conceded at the outset that, if a court may determine
whether a person is entitled to hospitalization under the statute
when the Director of the Veterans' Bureau has not passed upon the
facts of the case, the petitioner has stated and proved a good
cause of action, and the court below erred in rendering judgment in
favor of the United States."
Here, no application was made to the director for the sufficient
reason that petitioner was mentally, and therefore legally,
incapable of making it, and apparently he had no guardian to act
for him. However, his condition being certified to the Secretary of
the Interior, in virtue of a statutory provision, that official,
acting under the
Page 292 U. S. 447
statute, ordered petitioner confined at St. Elizabeths Hospital,
and to that hospital he was accordingly committed and there held
until his discharge in 1930. It would perhaps not be going too far
to say that the hospital authorities were charged with the duty of
making application to the director if under these circumstances any
further steps were required. We therefore do not have the case of
an insane person seeking at the hands of a court an order awarding
him the facilities of the hospital, but that of one who, having
been accorded such facilities, was in and entitled to be in the
possession and use of them as of right.
In this state of affairs, about which there is and can be no
dispute, the only question presented to the court below was
whether, under the proviso already quoted, the pension of
petitioner was subject to deduction for board. The purpose of that
proviso was to exempt pensions of the class named from hospital
charges like the one here involved, and thereby cure what Congress
deemed a defect in the prior law. The language is clear and
explicit -- namely,
"that the pension of a veteran entitled to hospitalization under
this subdivision shall not be subject to deduction, while such
veteran is hospitalized . . for board. . . ."
Given their natural meaning, these words plainly are applicable
to the situation with which the court below was called upon to
deal. The result is that the hospital was without authority to
retain the funds here in question, and the court below should have
given judgment for petitioner.
The final contention of the government is that, in any event,
petitioner is not entitled to recover so much of the funds withheld
by the hospital as equal the charges for board furnished prior to
July 2, 1926, when the proviso first came into effect, since to
allow him to do so, it is said, would be to give the proviso a
retroactive operation contrary to the intention of Congress. The
evidence of
Page 292 U. S. 448
such intention is said to lie in the fact that the bill as it
passed the House contained an additional provision to the effect
that, when any such deductions "have heretofore been made," the
Veterans' Bureau shall reimburse the veterans concerned in amounts
equal thereto, and that this provision was rejected by the Senate
and finally eliminated from the bill, thus evincing the intention
of Congress that the proviso should operate prospectively only.
But the rejected provision spoke only of deductions made before
the enactment of the proviso, and the deduction in the present case
was not so made. The court below found that, at the time of
petitioner's discharge from the hospital, the sum of the pension
payments which had been credited to him on the books of that
institution was $4,036, and that, upon his discharge, the hospital
deducted the amount here in dispute on account of board from May 7,
1922, to February 6, 1930. The deduction therefore was not one
which had "heretofore been made," but was one made long after the
passage of the proviso, and did not come within the terms of the
rejected provision. Certainly Congress has power to relieve a
pension paid by the federal government from liability to answer for
a preexisting unpaid debt owing to a governmental institution, as
well as one thereafter incurred, and it seems entirely clear that
the proviso in question was so intended. The liability for board
arose from continuous charges, beginning before the proviso was
passed and ending at the time of petitioner's discharge, when the
pension funds credited to petitioner and then in the hands of the
hospital were taken over or "deducted" in settlement of the then
existing account for board -- a proceeding plainly forbidden by the
proviso.
But in no aspect of the matter would the allowance of that
portion of the amount sued for which was applicable to board
furnished prior to July 2, 1926, cause the proviso
Page 292 U. S. 449
to operate retroactively. A statute is not rendered retroactive
merely because the facts or requisites upon which its subsequent
action depends, or some of them, are drawn from a time antecedent
to the enactment.
Cox v. Hart, 260 U.
S. 427,
260 U. S. 435,
and cases cited.
Judgment reversed with directions to enter judgment for
petitioner.
MR. JUSTICE STONE and MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO dissent.