1. A suit by a shipper for damages resulting from discrimination
practiced by a carrier in violation of its rule for coal car
distribution
Page 288 U. S. 449
in time of shortage, which does not challenge the reasonableness
or validity of the rule itself, may be maintained under § 9 of the
Interstate Commerce Act without action or finding by the
Commission. P.
288 U. S.
455.
2. But if the shipper elects under § 9 to proceed first before
the Commission, and secures an order for reparation which he sues
to enforce under § 16(2), he is bound by the Commission's award,
and cannot claim more upon the ground that the Commission erred as
a matter of law in reducing damages. P.
288 U. S.
456.
3. The fact that the Act merely makes the findings and report of
the Commission
prima facie evidence, and so preserves the
defendant's right to contest the award, gives no support to the
contention that the award does not bind the plaintiff. P.
288 U. S.
458.
4. Facts alleged
held sufficient to show unlawful
discrimination in distribution of coal cars and sufficient to
sustain judgment for the amount of the award, together with
interest, costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and
collected as a part of the costs of the suit. P.
288 U. S. 459.
61 F.2d 242 reversed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 596, to review the affirmance of a judgment
in a suit to enforce an award by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.
Page 288 U. S. 453
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought by respondent in the federal District
Court for Northern West Virginia against petitioners in consequence
of their failure to comply with a reparation order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission. It directed them to pay to
plaintiff $12,838.31 damages found to have been sustained by reason
of undue prejudice to which they had subjected him in respect of
furnishing cars for the transportation of coal from his mine. He
sought judgment for $57,735.11, together with interest, costs, and
an attorney's fee. Defendants demurred to the complaint generally,
and also specifically upon the ground that plaintiff was not
entitled to recover more than the award. The demurrers were
overruled, and, issue having been joined, there was a trial by jury
which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for
$63,048.60, not including attorney's fee, as to which all questions
were reserved. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 61 F.2d
242.
Page 288 U. S. 454
There is no bill of exceptions, [
Footnote 1] and we are called on to decide whether the
facts alleged in the complaint, of which the reports and order of
the Commission are a part, are sufficient to sustain the judgment.
The substance of plaintiff's claim as thus shown is as follows:
Between October 14, 1922, and April 1, 1923, he operated a coal
mine on a branch of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad over which
the Western Maryland had trackage rights. His mine was located
between two mines operated by a competitor and served by both
defendants. During that period, there was a shortage of coal
cars.
For the rating of, and the distribution of coal cars among,
mines on their respective lines, each of the defendants established
and maintained in force certain rules and regulations. These
required that, during periods of coal car shortage, the cars
available for loading should be distributed
pro rata among
the mines in accordance with their ratings. They also permitted the
operator of
"any mine reached by two railroads to order 100 percent or less
of its rating from either of the said railroads, or to divide the
orders between the two railroads in any way which the judgment of
the operator dictated, provided the combined orders did not exceed
100 percent of the rating of the mine, and the mine was entitled to
receive its
pro rata share of the available cars on the
basis of such orders and to ship the coal loaded therein via the
railroad which furnished the cars."
The Baltimore & Ohio furnished a smaller percentage of cars
ordered than did the Western Maryland. Plaintiff's mine was being
served exclusively by the former. Desiring to be served by the
latter, he regularly ordered
Page 288 U. S. 455
from it 100 percent of his rating, but, with a single exception,
was furnished no cars. He complained to the defendants, and was
informed that his competitor was ordering 20 percent from the
Baltimore & Ohio and 80 percent from the Western Maryland, and
that such a division of his orders would be acceptable to them. He
rejected the offer, claiming the right to order from either or both
as from time to time he might see fit. But he was denied the right
so given his competitor.
He complained to the Commission that defendants thus subjected
him to undue prejudice. The Commission so found. [
Footnote 2] And it held the case open to
permit him to file a petition for further hearing as to the amount
of damages, if any, sustained by him. 112 I.C.C. 244.
And
see 102 I.C.C.19. Plaintiff, upon such hearing, claimed that
the cost of mining the coal that he shipped had been increased
$9,283.14, and that his loss of profits was $48,451.97, making a
total of $57,735.11. Defendants, while denying liability, did not
controvert these figures. The commission found that, if plaintiff
had accepted defendant's offer, his increased mining costs would
have been only $2,225.49 and his loss of profits but $10,612.82,
making in all $12,838.31, and that he was entitled to reparation in
that amount, together with interest. It directed that, within 60
days, defendants pay that sum. 152 I.C.C. 327. They refused to do
so.
The complaint attacks the award on the ground that, as a matter
of law, the Commission erred in ruling that, in order to lessen his
loss, plaintiff was bound to accept defendants'
Page 288 U. S. 456
offer. It asserts that the reduction of his claim upon that
ground was beyond the power of the Commission, and therefore null
and void. [
Footnote 3]
The Interstate Commerce Act declares it unlawful for a carrier
to subject any person or traffic to any undue or unreasonable
prejudice or disadvantage (§ 3), and imposes upon carriers
liability for the full amount of damages sustained by any person in
consequence of any such violation of the Act. § 8. A person so
injured may either make complaint to the Commission or bring suit
for damages in a district court, but he shall not have the right to
pursue both remedies, and must elect which method he will adopt. §
9. If the Commission shall determine that complainant is entitled
to an award of damages, it shall make an order directing the
carrier to pay to him the sum to which he is entitled on or before
a day named. § 16(1). If the carrier does not comply with such
order, the complainant may file in the United States District Court
or in any state court a petition
"setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages,
and the order of the commission in the premises. Such suit in the
district court of the United States shall proceed in all respects
like other civil suits for damages, except that, on the trial of
such suit, the findings and order of the commission shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
§ 16(2).
Questions as to the reasonableness of rules and regulations
governing the distribution of coal cars in periods of shortage are
for the Commission. And, until found unreasonable by it, a shipper
may not maintain an action in any court against a carrier upon the
claim that any such rule or regulation was unreasonable and that,
through
Page 288 U. S. 457
its enforcement, he sustained loss or damage.
Morrisdale
Coal Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 230 U. S. 304,
230 U. S. 313.
But, if the rule, regulation, or practice of the carrier is not
attacked, and the shipper's claim is grounded upon its violation or
discriminatory enforcement, there is no administrative question
involved. In such cases, the court is required merely to decide
whether the carrier has departed from its established standard. The
decision does not concern the reasonableness or validity of the
rule itself, and it has no tendency against uniformity or other
purpose of the Act. Suits for damages upon such grounds may be
prosecuted without action or finding by the Commission.
Pennsylvania R. v. Puritan Coal Co., 237 U.
S. 121,
237 U. S.
131-134;
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Mulberry Hill Coal
Co., 238 U. S. 275,
238 U. S.
282-283;
Pennsylvania R. v. Sonman Coal Co.,
242 U. S. 120,
242 U. S.
124.
The facts stated in the complaint clearly show that there was no
question in this case requiring the exercise of the Commission's
administrative powers. Plaintiff's mine was in the same class as
the mines of its competitor. It was entitled to have a supply of
cars from either or both defendants, as it saw fit.
Cf. United
States v. New River Co., 265 U. S. 533,
265 U. S. 542.
His claim for damages does not rest upon defendants' adherence to
or enforcement of their rule, but upon their refusal to furnish him
cars in accordance with the rule. Therefore, without any prior
action on the part of the Commission, plaintiff was entitled under
§§ 8 and 9 to maintain an action at law for the full amount of
damages sustained by him on account of the undue prejudice to which
he claims to have been subjected by defendants.
But, having elected to seek relief through the Commission,
plaintiff is not entitled to recover more than the amount of the
award.
This is not a suit authorized by § 9, but one brought under §
16(2) because of defendants' refusal to comply with the
Commission's order. Subject to the right of
Page 288 U. S. 458
contestation preserved by the Act (
Meeker & Co. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412,
236 U. S.
430), it is a suit for the enforcement of the award. §
16(3)(f).
Lewis-Simas-Jones Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.,
283 U. S. 654,
283 U. S. 661.
Section 16(2) does not permit suit in the absence of an award, and,
if the Commission denies him relief, a claimant is remediless.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.
S. 235;
Brady v. United States, 283 U.
S. 804;
Bartlesville Zinc Co. v. Mellon, 56
F.2d 154. No suit is permitted if the carrier pays the award.
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co.,
242 U. S. 288.
Cf. Penna. R. v. Clark Coal Co., 238 U.
S. 456. Plaintiff may not adopt the award as the basis
of his suit and then attack it.
Cf. Mitchell Coal Co. v. Penna.
R. Co., 230 U. S. 247,
230 U. S.
258.
The fact that the Act merely makes the findings and report of
the Commission
prima facie evidence, and so preserves the
defendant's right to contest the award, gives no support to
plaintiff's contention that it does not bind him. It is to be
remembered that, by electing to call on the Commission for the
determination of his damages, plaintiff waived his right to
maintain an action at law upon his claim. But the carriers made no
such election. Undoubtedly it was to the end that they be not
denied the right of trial by jury that Congress saved their right
to be heard in court upon the merits of claims asserted against
them. The right of election given to a claimant reasonably may have
been deemed an adequate ground for making the Commission's award
final as to him. Confessedly, it is final save when carriers refuse
to pay within the time allowed. If, by such a suit, plaintiff may
obtain a trial
de novo or a revision of the award, the
provisions of § 9 requiring election, and prohibiting pursuit of
both remedies would be set at naught in cases in which carriers
refuse to pay and would be given effect in all other cases. There
is no support for such a distinction. The
Page 288 U. S. 459
construction for which plaintiff contends cannot be sustained.
He is bound by the award.
Defendants insist that plaintiff not only was limited in
recovery by the amount of the award, but that he suffered no
discrimination. The latter contention is without merit. The
allegations of the complaint comply with the requirements of §
16(2), and are clearly sufficient to sustain a judgment against the
defendants for the amount of the award, together with interest,
costs, and a reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as
a part of the costs of the suit.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. The
case is remanded to the District Court for proceedings in
accordance with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The District Court found the proposed bill was presented out of
time, and refused to sign it. 56 F.2d 231. The Circuit Court of
Appeals denied mandamus.
Baltimore & O. R. Co. v.
Baker, 58 F.2d 627. This Court denied certiorari,
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baker, 287 U.S. 610.
[
Footnote 2]
"The acts and practices of defendants whereby they accorded
Maryland service to the mines of the West Virginia Coal & Coke
Company located on the Coalton branch of the B. & O. Railroad
Company during the period from October 14, 1922, to April 1, 1923,
while failing to accord similar service to complainant's mine
located intermediate thereto, resulted in undue prejudice to
complainant in the matter of car supply."
112 I.C.C. 251.
[
Footnote 3]
Plaintiff brought suit against the United States and the
Commission to secure a decree directing the Commission to correct
its findings in respect of damages. The district court dismissed
the bill,
43 F.2d
847, and this Court affirmed.
283 U. S. 804.