A stevedore at work on a vessel in navigable waters in Oregon
received injuries through the vessel's negligence from which he
afterwards died ashore. The Oregon law gave the administrator an
action at law for the damages resulting from the death, and a lien
on the vessel.
Held that the cause of action was enforceable in
admiralty
in rem against the vessel. P.
288 U. S.
447.
60 F.2d 793 affirmed.
Certiorari, 287 U.S. 593, to review the reversal of a decree
dismissing a libel in admiralty.
Page 288 U. S. 446
MR. JUSTICE BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is the owner of the steamship
City of
Vancouver. December 1, 1929, she was at Westport, Oregon, in
navigable waters of the Columbia taking on a cargo of lumber.
Respondent's intestate was employed by contracting stevedores who
were loading her. While upon the deck of the ship helping in that
work he was struck by a falling sling load of lumber and mortally
injured. He was taken ashore, where he died an hour later.
Respondent was appointed his administratrix and, electing under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, § 33 (33
U.S.C. § 933) to assert her claim against a third party, filed a
libel in admiralty in the District Court of Oregon against the
ship, claiming on behalf of his estate damages in the sum of
$10,000. The libel alleged in substance that intestate's death was
caused by reason of petitioner's negligence in respect of the
ship's winch which was being used to hoist the lumber.
Page 288 U. S. 447
Petitioner excepted to the libel, asserting that the cause of
action arose on land, and not upon the water, and that therefore
the case is not within the admiralty jurisdiction. The district
court so held, and dismissed the libel. The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed. 60 F.2d 793.
The Oregon statute creating a cause of action for death by
wrongful act provides:
"When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or
omission of another, the personal representatives of the former may
maintain an action at law therefor against the latter if the former
might have maintained an action, had he lived, against the latter
for an injury done by the same act or omission."
Oregon Code 1930, § 5-703. And the Oregon Boat Lien Law declares
that every boat or vessel shall be subject to a lien "for damages
or injuries [done] by such boat or vessel resulting in the death of
any person." Section 51-601. Admiralty courts have jurisdiction to
enforce such liens.
The Corsair, 145 U.
S. 335,
145 U. S. 347;
The Anglo-Patagonian, 235 F. 92, 94.
The libel alleges no cause of action that accrued to the
deceased. The only cause of action here involved is that created by
the Oregon statute, and it did not arise until the intestate died.
The sole question is whether the happening of the fatal event upon
navigable waters gave the admiralty court jurisdiction
notwithstanding death occurred on land. The right to recover for
death depends upon the law of the place of the act or omission that
caused it, and not upon that of the place where death occurred.
Van Doren v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 93 F. 260, 264;
De
Harn v. Mexican National Ry. Co., 86 Tex. 68, 23 S.W. 381;
Rudiger v. Chicago, St.P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 94 Wis.
191, 194, 68 N.W. 661;
Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38
Vt. 294, 311;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.
Williams, 113 Ala. 402, 405, 21 So. 938. Where a longshoreman
working upon the land assisting in the unloading of a ship was
struck by a sling
Page 288 U. S. 448
of cargo and knocked into the water, where he died, this Court
held that the state compensation act, and not the maritime law,
governed.
Smith & Son v. Taylor, 276 U.
S. 179. Defendant conceded that the state law would
apply if the deceased had been killed on the land. But it argued
that, as no claim was made for injuries there sustained, and that,
as the suit was solely for death, the case was exclusively within
the admiralty jurisdiction. We said (p.
276 U. S.
182):
"But this is a partial view that cannot be sustained. The blow
by the sling was what gave rise to the cause of action. It was
given and took effect while deceased was upon the land. It was the
sole, immediate, and proximate cause of his death."
Mutatis mutandis, what was there said is applicable
here.
The substance and consummation of the occurrence which resulted
in intestate's death, and so gave rise to respondent's cause of
action, took place on the deck of the ship lying in navigable
waters. The damages allowed by the Oregon statute are those
resulting solely from the death. The foundation of the right to
recover is a wrongful act or omission taking effect aboard the ship
and resulting in death upon the land. This is a maritime tort, and
upon it the respondent's claim rests. The admiralty court has
jurisdiction.
The Chiswick, 231 F. 452.
The
Anglo-Patagonian, supra, p. 94.
The Samnanger, 298 F.
620, 624.
Shipping Board v. Greenwald, 16 F.2d 948,
951.
Decree affirmed.