1. Jurisdiction of the District Court upon the ground of federal
question is determined by the allegations of the bill, and not by
the way the facts turn out or by a decision of the merits. P.
287 U. S.
30.
2. Where a bill complaining of the attempted appropriation of
plaintiff's land by a city as part of a street alleges that the
city's action is without authority from the state law, but goes on
to say that, under color of state authority, the city is attempting
to take and appropriate the use of plaintiff's property and deprive
him thereof without compensation or condemnation proceedings, and
without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a substantial federal question is presented. P.
287 U. S. 32.
54 F.2d 777, 778, reversed.
Certiorari, 2815 U.S. 535, to review affirmances of two decrees
of the District Court dismissing bills by which the
Page 287 U. S. 30
plaintiff sought to enjoin the city from appropriating land as
part of a street.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
Decrees dismissing the bills of complaint for the want of
jurisdiction were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (54 F.2d
777, 778), and writs of certiorari were granted limited to the
question of the jurisdiction of the District Court as a federal
court, 285 U.S. 535.
There is no diversity of citizenship, and jurisdiction depends
upon the presentation by the bills of complaint of a substantial
federal question. Jurisdiction is thus determined by the
allegations of the bills, and not by the way the facts turn out or
by a decision of the merits.
Pacific Electric Ry. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 194 U. S. 112,
194 U. S. 118;
Columbus Railway, Power & Light Co. v. Columbus,
249 U. S. 399,
249 U. S. 406;
South Covington & Cincinnati Street Ry. Co. v.
Newport, 259 U. S. 97,
259 U. S.
99.
The suits were brought by petitioner as owner of parcels of land
in the City of Phoenix, Arizona, to restrain the city from
appropriating her land for purposes of a street improvement. The
Circuit Court of Appeals, having decided in
Collins v.
Phoenix, 54 F.2d 770 (where jurisdiction of the federal court
rested on diversity of citizenship), that the proceedings of the
city were not authorized by the statutes of Arizona,
* held in the
instant cases that the petitioner, having alleged that the
proceedings were void under the state law, had not presented a
Page 287 U. S. 31
substantial federal question. But petitioner did not stop with
allegations as to the city's authority under state law. Petitioner
also alleged in No. 6, after setting forth her title, her claim as
to the width of the street in question, and the action of the city
in including her property as a part of the street, and in
contracting for the street improvement upon that basis, that the
city was thereby
"attempting to take and appropriate the property of plaintiff
without compensation, and to take and appropriate and use same and
deprive the said plaintiff of the permanent use thereof without due
process of law, or any process of law, . . . and in violation of
the rights of plaintiff as guaranteed her under the Constitution of
the United States, and particularly under Amendments five and
fourteen thereof, which plaintiff here and now pleads and relies on
for her protection against the wrongs and threatened wrongs of the
defendant city in the proposed taking of her property as
hereinbefore described."
And this appeal to the Fourteenth Amendment was reiterated as
against the action of the city which was alleged to have been taken
"under the authority" of the "ordinances, resolutions and acts" set
forth in the bill of complaint, it being also alleged that there
had been no dedication or deed to the city, and no proceedings for
condemnation. Similar allegations of federal right, but more
briefly stated, are found in the bill of complaint in No. 7.
In this respect, the instant cases are similar to that of
Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron, 240 U.
S. 462, where the plaintiff, after setting forth
provisions of the statutes and Constitution of Ohio, and concluding
that the city had no constitutional power to take the property and
franchises of the plaintiff, and was exceeding the authority
conferred by state law, further alleged that the city was
attempting to take the plaintiff's property without compensation,
and was going forward with the enterprise in question in violation
of the contract clause and Fourteenth Amendment
Page 287 U. S. 32
of the Constitution of the United States. This Court held that
"whether the plaintiff has any rights that the city is bound to
respect can be decided only by taking jurisdiction of the case,"
and that it was necessary for the District Court to deal with the
merits.
See also Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya,
270 U. S. 426,
270 U. S. 434;
Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.
S. 239,
284 U. S.
246.
We are of the opinion that the allegations of the bills of
complaint, that the city acting under color of state authority was
violating the asserted private right secured by the Federal
Constitution, presented a substantial federal question, and that it
was error of the District Court to refuse jurisdiction.
Decrees reversed.
*
Compare decision of Supreme Court of Arizona in
Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 7 P.2d 622.