1. The presumption that identical words used in different parts
of the same statute are intended to have the same meaning is not
conclusive. Where the subject matter to which the words refer
is
Page 286 U. S. 428
not the same, or the conditions are different, or the scope of
the legislative power exercised in one case is broader than that
exercised in another, the meaning well may vary to meet the
purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a consideration of the
language in which those purposes are expressed, and of the
circumstances under which the language was employed. P.
286 U. S.
433.
2. The power exercised by Congress in the enactment of § 3 of
the Sherman Act, relating to restraint of trade or commerce
exclusively within the District of Columbia, was its plenary power,
under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, of the Constitution, to legislate for
the District, and therefore the meaning of this provision, unlike §
1 of the Act, is not limited by the scope of the power to regulate
commerce (Art. I, § 8, cl. 3). P.
286 U. S.
434.
3. Under Art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution, Congress, in
legislating for the District of Columbia, possesses not only every
appropriate national power but, in addition, all the powers of
legislation which may be exercised by a State in dealing with its
affairs, so long as other provisions of the Constitution are not
infringed. It therefore had power to forbid combinations and
conspiracies to maintain prices and allot customers between persons
engaged in the District in the purely local business of cleaning,
dyeing, and renovating clothes. Pp.
286 U. S.
434-435.
4. The word "trade" is not necessarily limited in its meaning to
the buying, selling, or exchanging of commodities; it may be used
in a broader sense. P.
286 U. S.
435.
5. An agreement to fix prices and allot customers, entered into
by persons engaged in the District of Columbia in the business of
cleaning, dyeing, and renovating clothes, though these have already
passed to the ultimate consumers, is in restraint of "trade" within
the meaning of § 3 of the Sherman Act. P.
286 U. S. 437.
Affirmed.
Appeal from a decree granting an injunction in a suit brought by
the United States under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Page 286 U. S. 431
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit brought by the United States against appellants
to enjoin them from continuing, in the District of Columbia, an
alleged combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and
commerce in cleaning, dyeing, and otherwise renovating clothes,
contrary to § 3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, c. 647, 26 Stat.
209, U.S.C. Title 15, § 3. Appellants answered, setting up
affirmatively that they were engaged solely in the performance of
labor and rendering service in cleaning, dyeing, and renovating
wearing apparel and other articles which had passed into the hands
of the ultimate consumers thereof, and that this did not constitute
trade or commerce within the meaning of the Anti-Trust Act. Upon
motion, the answer was stricken from the files on the ground that
the matter pleaded was not a valid defense. Appellants elected to
stand upon their answers; and a decree was entered as prayed. The
case comes here by appeal under the provisions of the Act of
February 11, 1903, c. 544, 32 Stat. 823, U.S.C. Title 15, § 29;
Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.
S. 311,
276 U. S. 322;
United States v. California Co-op. Canneries, 279 U.
S. 553,
279 U. S.
558.
Upon the facts which stand admitted and those affirmatively
pleaded by the answers, the sole question to be determined is
whether, within the meaning of § 3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
appellants are engaged in trade or commerce in the District of
Columbia.
The facts, established as above, are that they are carrying on
the business of cleaning, dyeing, and renovating wearing apparel at
plants located in the District, in part, and in some cases
principally at wholesale pursuant to contracts or engagements with
numerous so-called retail
Page 286 U. S. 432
dyers and cleaners who maintain shops in the District for
receiving from the public clothing to be cleaned, dyed, or
otherwise renovated. Appellants, in August, 1928, met together in
the District and agreed to raise the then current prices charged
for cleaning, dyeing, and renovating clothes, and formulated and
agreed upon certain minimum and uniform prices, which they, and
each of them, should thereafter charge and receive for the
performance of such service. They further agreed to assign and
allot to one another the retail dyers and cleaners, who, thereupon,
were to be held, respectively, as exclusive customers. The
agreement to maintain prices and assign and allot customers has
been and is being carried into effect.
Section 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act provide as follows:
"Sec 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal. . . ."
"Sec. 3. Every contract, combination in form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any
Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or
in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and
another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State
or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or
between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign
nations, is declared illegal. . . ."
The words describing the activity declared to be illegal are the
same in both sections, namely, "restraint of trade or commerce."
The contention on behalf of appellants is that the words, being
identical, should receive the same construction in § 3 as in the
preceding § 1; that § 1 rests solely on the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution; that the words "trade or commerce" in § 1 cannot be
broader than the single word "commerce" as used in that clause; and
that commerce does not include a business such as that carried on
by appellants.
Page 286 U. S. 433
Assuming, but not deciding, that, if the acts here charged had
involved interstate transactions, appellants would not come within
the provisions of § 1, because the scope of the words "trade or
commerce" must there be limited by the constitutional power to
regulate commerce, it does not follow that the same words contained
in § 3 should be given a like limited construction. Most words have
different shades of meaning, and consequently may be variously
construed not only when they occur in different statutes, but when
used more than once in the same statute or even in the same
section. Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical
words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have
the same meaning.
Courtauld v. Legh, L.R., 4 Exch. 126,
130. But the presumption is not rigid, and readily yields whenever
there is such variation in the connection in which the words are
used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were
employed in different parts of the act with different intent. Where
the subject matter to which the words refer is not the same in the
several places where they are used, or the conditions are
different, or the scope of the legislative power exercised in one
case is broader than that exercised in another, the meaning well
may vary to meet the purposes of the law, to be arrived at by a
consideration of the language in which those purposes are
expressed, and of the circumstances under which the language was
employed.
See State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 654, 45 A.
877;
Henry v. Trustees, 48 Ohio St. 671, 676, 30 N.E.
1122;
Feder v. Goetz, 264 Fed. 619, 624;
James v.
Newberg, 101 Or. 616, 619, 201 P. 212;
County Seat of Linn
Co., 15 Kan. 500, 527.
It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different
meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory
construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the
meaning which the Legislature intended it should have in each
instance.
Louisville & N.
Page 286 U. S. 434
R. Co. v. Gaines, 3 Fed. 266, 277, 278. Thus, for
example, the meaning of the word "Legislature," used several times
in the Federal Constitution, differs according to the connection in
which it is employed, depending upon the character of the function
which that body in each instance is called upon to exercise.
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355.
And, again in the Constitution, the power to regulate commerce is
conferred by the same words of the Commerce Clause with respect
both to foreign commerce and interstate commerce. Yet the power,
when exercised in respect of foreign commerce, may be broader than
when exercised as to interstate commerce. In the regulation of
foreign commerce, an embargo is admissible, but it reasonably
cannot be thought that, in respect of legitimate and
unobjectionable articles, an embargo would be admissible as a
regulation of interstate commerce, since the primary purpose of the
clause in respect of the latter was to secure freedom of commercial
intercourse among the states.
See Groves v.
Slaughter, 15 Pet. 449,
40 U. S. 505;
Southern Steamship Company v.
Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31,
73 U. S. 32-33;
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470,
192 U. S. 492.
Compare Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States,
261 U. S. 514,
261 U. S.
520-521.
Section 1 having been passed under the specific power to
regulate commerce, its meaning necessarily must be limited by the
scope of that power; and it may be that the words "trade" and
"commerce" are there to be regarded as synonymous. On the other
hand, § 3, so far as it relates exclusively to the District of
Columbia, could not have been passed under the power to regulate
interstate or foreign commerce, since that provision of the section
deals not with such commerce, but with restraint of trade purely
local in character. The power exercised, and which gives vitality
to the provision, is the plenary power to legislate for the
District of Columbia, conferred by article 1, § 8, cl. 17, of the
Constitution. Under that clause,
Page 286 U. S. 435
Congress possesses not only every appropriate national power,
but, in addition, all the powers of legislation which may be
exercised by a state in dealing with its affairs, so long as other
provisions of the Constitution are not infringed.
Capital
Traction Company v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1,
174 U. S. 5.
Undoubtedly, under that extensive power, it was within the
competency of Congress to prohibit and penalize the acts with which
appellants are here charged, and the only question is whether, by §
3, it has done so.
A consideration of the history of the period immediately
preceding and accompanying the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and of the mischief to be remedied, as well as the general
trend of debate in both Houses, sanctions the conclusion that
Congress meant to deal comprehensively and effectively with the
evils resulting from contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade, and, to that end, to exercise all the power it
possessed. In passing § 1, Congress could exercise only the power
conferred by the Commerce Clause; but, in passing § 3, it had
unlimited power, except as restricted by other provisions of the
Constitution. We are therefore free to interpret § 3 dissociated
from § 1, as though it were a separate and independent act, and,
thus viewed, there is no rule of statutory construction which
prevents our giving to the word "trade" its full meaning, or the
more extended of two meanings, whichever will best manifest the
legislative purpose.
See United States v.
Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385,
73 U. S. 396;
Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.
S. 326,
273 U. S.
329-330.
We perceive no reason for holding that Congress used the phrase
"restraint of trade" in § 3 in a narrow sense. It is true that the
word "trade" is often employed as importing only traffic in the
buying, selling, or exchanging of commodities; but it is also true
that frequently, if not generally, the word is used in a broader
sense. This is pointed out in
The Schooner Nymph, 1 Sumn.
516, 517, 518, 18 Fed.Cas. 506, No. 10,388. Construing § 32
Page 286 U. S. 436
of the Coasting and Fishery Act of 1793, c. 8, 1 Stat. 305, 316,
which declares that any licensed ship, etc., which shall be
employed in any other "trade" than that for which she is licensed,
shall be forfeited, Mr. Justice Story in that case said:
"The argument for the claimant insists, that 'trade' is here
used in its most restrictive sense, and as equivalent to traffic in
goods, or buying and selling in commerce or exchange. But I am
clearly of opinion that such is not the true sense of the word, as
used in the 32d section. In the first place, the word 'trade' is
often, and indeed generally, used in a broader sense, as equivalent
to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or
mercantile. Wherever any occupation, employment, or business is
carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not
in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is constantly
called a
trade. Thus, we constantly speak of the art,
mystery, or trade of a housewright, a shipwright, a tailor, a
blacksmith, and a shoemaker, though some of these may be, and
sometimes are, carried on without buying or selling goods."
A like view was taken by Pollock, B., in
Bank of India v.
Wilson, L.R., 3 Exch.Div. 108, 119-120.
* See
also
Page 286 U. S. 437
Buckelew v. Martens, 108 N.J.L. 339, 156 Atl. 436;
American Laundry Co. v. E. & W. D. C. Co., 199 Ala.
154, 74 So. 58;
Campbell v. Motion Picture M. Op. Union,
151 Minn. 220, 231, 232, 186 N.W. 781.
We think the word "trade" was used in § 3 of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act in the general sense attributed to it by Justice
Story, and at least is broad enough to include the acts of which
the government complains.
Decree affirmed.
* One of the earliest decisions under the common law is
Diers Case, 2 Henry V, 5, pl. 26, which arose in the time
of Henry V (1414). There, a weaver had bound himself for a moderate
consideration not to follow his craft within the town for a limited
time. Before the expiration of the time, however, his necessities
sent him back to the loom, and an action against him for damages
was brought. The learned judge, in deciding the case, not only held
the obligation to be void, but quite evidently considered it
criminal as well. With some display of feeling he said:
"The obligation is void as being contrary to the common law and
by G_____ if the plaintiff were here he should go to prison until
he paid a fine to the King."
And even a century or two later, when the rule in respect of
contracts in restrain of trade had become less strict, in
Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 Peere Williams 181, 193, Parker,
C. J., referring to
Diers Case, approved the indignation
of the judge, "tho' not his manner of expressing it."