1. Section 154 of the Judicial Code, which forbids prosecution
in the Court of Claims of any claim for which suit is
"pending in any other court . . . against any person who at the
time when the cause of action . . . arose, was, in respect thereto,
acting . . . under the authority of the United States,"
is inapplicable where the other suit is against the United
States, and not against its agent. P.
284 U. S.
355.
2. Where the words of a statute are plain, they may not be added
to or altered, in construction, to effect a purpose not apparent on
its face or from its legislative history. P.
284 U. S.
356.
3. Under the Suits in Admiralty Act, §§ 1 and 2, jurisdiction of
maritime causes of action against the United States, arising out of
the operation of merchant vessels for it, is vested exclusively in
the district courts.
Id.
4. After vessels had been requisitioned by the Shipping Board
under the Act of June 15, 1917, the Board and the owner entered
into a charter contract providing that the vessels should remain in
the service of the United States, to be employed as it might
determine, but that the owner should operate them, furnish crew and
equipment, and pay for provisions, wages, etc. The United States
agreed to pay the owner for certain expenses of maintenance and
operation, and ship hire at a rate established by the Board for
vessels of like description, with liberty in the owner to terminate
the charter if the rate should be less than a specified minimum. It
agreed also to reimburse the owner for any proper increases in
wages over a specified standard.
Held:
(1) That the making of the contract worked an abandonment of the
requisition and a release of the owner's right to just compensation
under the Act of 1917, and that a cause of action of the owner
based on the contract provision for recovery of increased wage
payments could not be entertained by the Court of Claims, under
Jud.Code § 145, as a claim for just compensation. P
284 U.S. 357.
(2) That the contract was maritime, and the cause of action
within the admiralty jurisdiction. P.
284 U. S.
358.
5. A claimant in the Court of Claims has the burden of alleging
and proving a cause of action within its jurisdiction. P.
284 U. S.
359.
Page 284 U. S. 353
6. As the present suit is against the United States upon a
maritime cause of action growing out of the operation of ships for
the government, the Court of Claims is without jurisdiction if the
vessels in question were operated as merchant vessels, and as the
petition does not allege that they were otherwise operated, it
fails to state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of that
court. P.
284 U. S.
359.
7. Want of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be considered,
and appropriate judgment given at any stage of the proceedings,
either here or below.
Id.
8. Section 2 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, which
repealed the Emergency Shipping Fund Provision of the Act of June
15, 1917, and imposed upon the Shipping Board the duty of carrying
out contracts and making settlement, but preserved to every
suitor
"the same right to sue the United State as he would have had if
the decision and been made by the President of the United States
under the acts hereby repealed,"
did not purport to enlarge existing remedies or establish a new
procedure for the enforcement of maritime obligations which, like
the present, are embraced within the Suits in Admiralty Act. P.
284 U. S.
359.
72 Ct.Cls. 210 affirmed.
Certiorari,
post, p. 600, to review a judgment
dismissing a claim for want of jurisdiction.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on certiorari to review a judgment of the
Court of Claims dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction.
72 Ct.Cls. 210.
The suit was brought upon a petition which alleged facts as
follows: on October 15, 1917, the United States Shipping Board,
under the Urgent Deficiencies Appropriation
Page 284 U. S. 354
Act of June 15, 1917, c. 29, 40 Stat. 182, 183, and an Executive
Order promulgated by the President on July 11, 1917, requisitioned
for use by the United States seven merchant vessels then owned and
operated by petitioner. On December 29, 1917, the government,
acting through the Shipping Board, entered into a contract for the
operation of each ship by petitioner under a "requisition charter,"
the form of which was attached. It was agreed that petitioner,
"in consideration of the compensation provided [by the
requisition charter] and the other obligations assumed by the
United States . . . , accepts this Requisition Charter in full
satisfaction of any and all claims he has or may have against the
United States arising out of the Requisition, and accepts the
compensation herein provided for as the just compensation required
by law. . . ."
The attached form contained numerous clauses dealing with
matters commonly covered by time charters. It provided that the
vessel should remain in the service of the United States, to be
employed as it might determine, but that petitioner should operate
the vessel, furnish crew and equipment, and pay for provisions,
wages, shipping fees, and supplies. The United States agreed to pay
to petitioner, in addition to certain enumerated expenses of
maintenance and operation of the vessel, ship hire at the monthly
rate established by the Shipping Board for vessels of like
description, but with provision for terminating the charter by
petitioner, if the rate should be less than a specified minimum. By
the tenth clause of the charter, with which we are chiefly
concerned, the government agreed to reimburse petitioner "for any
proper increases in wages and bonuses over the standard prevailing
1 August, 1917, for master, officers, and crew. . . ."
Acting under the charters, petitioner from time to time credited
the government on its books with sums received on its account, and
charged it with items due petitioner,
Page 284 U. S. 355
including payments of increased wages and bonuses. On October 1,
1926, petitioner entered into a second agreement with the
Government, accepting a specified amount in full satisfaction of
all its demands except one for the sum of $49,373.11, claimed under
clause tenth, for the recovery of which the present suit was
brought.
The Court of Claims made a special finding that the petitioner,
after the petition was filed, had brought separate suits against
the United States in the District Court of the United States for
Northern California to recover the amounts alleged to have been
paid by it as increased wages and bonuses, and granted the
government's motion to dismiss on the sole ground that the pendency
of the suits in the district court deprived it of jurisdiction to
proceed with the cause by virtue of § 154 of the Judicial Code, c.
231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1138. This section forbids prosecution in the
Court of Claims of any claim for which suit is
"pending in any other court . . . against any person who at the
time when the cause of action . . . arose, was, in respect thereto,
acting . . . under the authority of the United States."
Petitioner insists that the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
is unaffected by the suits pending in the district court, since §
154 denies jurisdiction to the Court of Claims only when an agent
of the United States is sued simultaneously in another court; here,
the United States is the defendant. The government does not press
the contention, upheld by the Court of Claims, that its
jurisdiction was ousted by the pendency of the petitioner's suits
in the district court. Although they were not within the language
of the section, they were nevertheless regarded as within its
assumed purpose to prevent the prosecution at the same time of two
suits against the government for the same cause of action. But the
declared purpose of the section (originally enacted as § 8 of the
Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 77, c. 71) was only
Page 284 U. S. 356
to require an election between a suit in the Court of Claims and
one brought in another court against an agent of the government, in
which the judgment would not be
res adjudicata in the suit
pending in the Court of Claims (Statement of Senator Edmunds,
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, in reporting the bill to the
Senate, Cong.Globe, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1868 P. 2769).
See
Sage v. United States, 250 U. S. 33,
250 U. S. 37,
and compare Southern Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
168 U. S. 1,
168 U. S. 48-49,
holding otherwise as to a judgment obtained in a suit brought
against the United States in a district court. As the words of the
section are plain, we are not at liberty to add to or alter them to
effect a purpose which does not appear on its face or from its
legislative history.
Corona Coal Co. v. United States,
263 U. S. 537,
263 U. S. 540.
In supporting the judgment of dismissal below, the government
relies on the Suits in Admiralty Act of March 9, 1920, c. 95, 41
Stat. 525-528 by which, it is contended, jurisdiction over the
asserted cause of action is vested exclusively in courts of
admiralty. Section 1 of the Suits in Admiralty Act forbids the
arrest or seizure of vessels owned or operated by or for the United
States. Section 2 provides that, where a proceeding in admiralty
could be maintained, if at the time of the commencement of the
action such vessel were privately owned or operated, "a libel
in personam may be brought against the United States . . .
provided that such vessel is employed as a merchant vessel . . . ,"
and that "such suits shall be brought in the district court of the
United States. . . ."
Under these sections, jurisdiction of maritime causes of action
against the United States, arising out of the operation of merchant
vessels for it, is vested exclusively in the district courts.
Johnson v. U.S. Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 280 U.
S. 320;
U.S. Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corp. v. Rosenberg
Page 284 U. S. 357
Bros. & Co., 276 U. S. 202. The
language of § 2 is general, embracing suits on maritime causes of
action by owners, as well as by third persons injured by the
operation for the government of merchant vessels.
See Eastern
Transportation Co. v. United States, 272 U.
S. 675,
272 U. S. 689
et seq.
Petitioner argues that the Suits in Admiralty Act is not
applicable, because the cause of action here alleged is nonmaritime
in character; it contends that the so-called requisition charter is
not a time charter, but a mere agreement for just compensation for
the requisitioned ships, which may be recovered in the Court of
Claims. But we think the cause of action is maritime, arising out
of the express contract for the operation of vessels for the United
States, and is not shown to be within the jurisdiction of the court
below.
It is true that, under § 145 of the Judicial Code, c. 231, 36
Stat. 1087, 1136, the Court of Claims has jurisdiction of claims
for just compensation for property requisitioned by the United
States, but such is not the cause of action alleged. Subdivision
(e) of the Emergency Shipping Fund provisions of the Urgent
Deficiencies Appropriation Act of June 15, 1917, authorized the
requisition of the title or possession of ships "for use or
operation by the United States." It required just compensation for
requisitioned ships to be fixed by the President, and provided, in
case the amount was unsatisfactory to the person entitled to
compensation, that 75 percent of it should be paid, and that suit
might be brought against the United States to recover such further
amount as, with that already paid, would make up just
compensation.
But, upon seizure of the petitioner's vessels, this procedure
was abandoned. By the agreement with the Shipping Board, the
requisition charter was substituted for petitioner's right to
receive just compensation under the Constitution and the statute.
The substituted contract
Page 284 U. S. 358
conferred new and different rights upon petitioner, and
subjected it to new obligations, not flowing from the requisition.
The requisition of the ships imposed no duty on petitioner to
operate them or to pay expenses of operation and maintenance after
their seizure. That duty and petitioner's right to compensation for
the performance of it and its right to be reimbursed for increased
costs of operation, one of which is the subject of the present
suit, arose from the contract alone. Such compensation and
reimbursement are not included in just compensation for the
requisition, even though waiver of the constitutional right was
part consideration for the obligation to pay for the operation of
the ships. The stipulated monthly payments to petitioner for ship
hire were not measured by the just compensation which petitioner
would otherwise have been entitled to receive and might, in fact be
either more or less. The effect of the agreement was to release
petitioner's rights, growing out of the requisition, and to define
the rights of the parties with respect to the use of petitioner's
ships and the compensation for them, as effectively and completely
and with the same consequences as though no requisition had ever
been made.
We need not examine the requisition charter with meticulous care
to see whether it is in all respects identical with the usual
charter party, which, as petitioner concedes, is maritime.
Morewood v.
Enequist, 23 How. 491. It is enough that the right
asserted is upon express contract with the shipowner for its
operation of the ship for the government, and stipulates
compensation both for use of the ship and for service rendered and
expense incurred in its operation and maintenance, all of which
undertakings are characteristically within the admiralty
jurisdiction.
Compare 47 U. S. v.
Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344,
47 U. S. 392;
The Thomas
Jefferson, 10 Wheat. 428,
23 U. S. 429;
The Eddy, 5
Wall. 481,
72 U. S. 494;
The General
Smith, 4 Wheat. 438;
James
Shewan & Sons, Inc. v.
Page 284 U. S. 359
United States, 266 U. S. 108;
The Arlyn Nelson, 243 F. 415; 3 Benedict, Admiralty (5th
ed.) 82-96.
Petitioner also asserts that the present cause of action is not
maintainable under the Suits in Admiralty Act because it does not
appear that it arose out of the operation of the ships as merchant
vessels. The government argues that it is inferable from certain
allegations in the petition, read in the light of the requisition
charter, that the vessels were so used, but we do not stop to
consider the argument. The burden rested upon petitioner to allege
and prove a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims.
Johnson v. United States, 160 U.
S. 546,
160 U. S.
552-553;
Merritt v. United States, 267 U.
S. 338;
Contzen v. United States, 179 U.
S. 191,
179 U. S. 192.
As the suit is against the United States upon a maritime cause of
action growing out of the operation of ships for the government,
the Court of Claims is without jurisdiction if the vessels in
question were operated as merchant vessels, and, as the petition
does not allege that they were otherwise operated, it fails to
state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims. As the want of jurisdiction is of the subject matter, it
may be considered and appropriate judgment given at any stage of
the proceedings, either here or below.
Hilton v.
Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165,
108 U. S. 168;
Gainesville v. Brown-Crummer Co., 277 U. S.
54,
277 U. S. 59;
see Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109 U.
S. 278,
109 U. S.
283-284;
Bors. v. Preston, 111 U.
S. 252,
111 U. S.
255.
Section 2 of the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, c. 250, 41
Stat. 988, 989, did not, as petitioner contends, restore to the
Court of Claims the jurisdiction previously withdrawn from it by
the Suits in Admiralty Act. It repealed the Emergency Shipping Fund
provisions of the Act of June 15, 1917, imposed upon the Shipping
Board the duty of carrying out all contracts lawfully entered into
under the repealed act, and of settling
"all matters arising
Page 284 U. S. 360
out of or incident to the exercise by or through the President
of any of the powers or duties conferred or imposed upon the
President."
It preserved to every suitor
"the same right to sue the United States as he would have had if
the decision had been made by the President of the United States
under the Acts hereby repealed."
Assuming, without deciding, that the present claim is one which
the Board was authorized to settle, we think it clear that the Act
did not purport to enlarge existing remedies or establish a new
procedure for the enforcement of maritime obligations which, like
the present, are embraced within the Suits in Admiralty Act.
We have considered, but find it unnecessary to discuss, other
less substantial grounds advanced for denying the applicability of
the Suits in Admiralty Act. The judgment will be affirmed, but
without prejudice to an application by the petitioner to the court
below, if so advised, for leave to amend the petition.
Affirmed.