A surety company went on the bond furnished by a bank to secure
repayment on demand of the deposits of a county treasurer up to a
specified amount, and, as part consideration for executing the
bond, took the bank's agreement to indemnify it for any liability
it might thereby sustain or incur. The bank became insolvent while
holding deposits of the treasurer exceeding the amount of the bond,
and the surety, having paid that amount, sought to participate
pro rata with him and his surety in the distribution of
surplus assets of the bank, basing its claim on the indemnity
agreement.
Held:
1. That a former judgment denying the surety the right to be
subrogated to the creditor's claim and remedies against the debtor
until the creditor had been paid in full did not bar the surety's
claim under the indemnity agreement. P.
277 U. S.
265.
Page 277 U. S. 259
2. That the indemnity claim should not be allowed. A surety for
part of an indebtedness does not, through the expedient of taking a
separate indemnity agreement from the debtor, equip himself to
compete with the secured creditor in the distribution of the
debtor's assets when the debtor becomes insolvent and the surety's
obligation has been paid. P.
277 U. S.
265.
18 F.2d 707 reversed.
Certiorari, 275 U.S. 515, to a decree of the circuit court of
appeals, which allowed the respondent surety company's claim to
share, by way of indemnity, in assets of an insolvent national
bank. The claim had been denied in the district court.
Page 277 U. S. 263
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner Jenkins was appointed receiver of the National
City Bank of Salt Lake City, an insolvent national bank, by the
Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of § 5234, R.S.
The respondent National Surety Company brought this action against
the receiver to compel the allowance of and payment of dividends on
its claim upon an indemnity agreement executed by the bank. The
agreement was contained in the bank's application for a bond by
which the bank as principal and the respondent company as surety
undertook that the official deposits of the Treasurer of Salt Lake
County, Utah, up to a named sum, would be repaid on demand. The
deposits at the time of the insolvency exceeded the amount of the
bond. The district court directed that dividends on the claim for
indemnity be postponed until the county treasurer should have been
repaid the full balance of his deposit. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the decree, with
instructions that the respondent
Page 277 U. S. 264
be paid dividends on an equal basis with other creditors,
including the treasurer.
National Surety Co. v. Jenkins,
18 F.2d 707. This Court granted certiorari to remove a conflict
alleged to exist between the decision below and rulings by the
circuit courts of appeals in other circuits.
Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Fouts, 11 F.2d 71;
Springfield National Bank v.
American Surety Co., 7 F.2d 44.
In his answer, the receiver prayed that Groesbeck, the county
treasurer, and the American Surety Company be required to
interplead. An order issued, and they filed a joint answer, from
which it appeared that Groesbeck, as principal, and the American
Surety Company, as surety, had given to Salt Lake County an
official fidelity bond in the sum of $200,000. The treasurer
deposited the county funds in his custody in the bank and took as
security the respondent's bond in the sum of $125,000, bonds of
other surety companies, executed to him as obligee, in the total
sum of $100,000, and from the bank a certain amount of apparently
doubtful collateral.
When the bank failed, his official deposit amounted to
$643,094.29. Salt Lake County was paid in full -- $200,000 by the
American Surety Company as surety of the treasurer's fidelity bond,
$125,000 by the respondent National Surety Company, the balance by
the other surety companies and by dividends paid by the receiver.
When the second dividend was paid, it was sufficient to pay the
final balance due from the treasurer to the county and leave a
surplus of over $9,000, but there remained an unpaid balance of the
deposit due from the bank to the treasurer.
The claim of the respondent company is for its
pro rata
share of this surplus and of all dividends paid or to be paid by
the receiver as well as of the collateral given to the treasurer by
the bank. The claim is resisted by the interpleaded petitioners,
the treasurer and the American Surety Company, on two grounds:
first, that the right of the
Page 277 U. S. 265
treasurer and his surety to full repayment of his deposits
before any dividends and paid the respondent is in this case
res judicata; second, that the respondent is not entitled
to share in the estate of the insolvent debtor until the balance of
the creditors' claims have been fully satisfied. On both grounds,
the circuit court of appeals ruled against the petitioners.
The plea of
res judicata was based on the decree in an
earlier suit brought in the district court by the county treasurer
and the American Surety Company against the receiver to determine
their right to the excess of the second dividend over the county's
claim, to all future dividends, and to the collateral. The National
Surety Company, the respondent here, was interpleaded, and
answered. A decree in favor of the American Surety Company was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
National Surety Co. v. Salt Lake County, 5 F.2d 34. We
think the court below was right in holding that the earlier
litigation had determined only that the National Surety Company was
not entitled to be subrogated to the treasurer's claim and remedies
against the insolvent bank until he had been paid in full, and in
no way involved the National Surety Company's present separate
claim on its contract of indemnity, and that the plea of
res
judicata was consequently ineffective. But, as the certiorari
was granted to review the other branch of the case, and as the view
we take of it makes unnecessary an extensive consideration of the
first question, we pass at once to the second.
The right now asserted by the respondent arises not from
subrogation to the rights of the treasurer, but upon its
independent agreement with the bank for indemnity. The bank's
undertaking was to indemnify respondent for liability which it
might "sustain or incur" by reason of its having given its surety
bond, which was conditioned on the bank's keeping its deposits
"subject at all times to the check and order of the treasurer." So
long as the bank
Page 277 U. S. 266
remained solvent, respondent would have been entitled to
immediate indemnity from the bank, even though that payment neither
satisfied the treasurer's claim nor exhausted the surety's own
liability.
Davies v. Humphreys, 6 M. & W. 153;
Ex
parte Snowden, 17 Ch.D. 44. As between itself and its
principal, the surety should not have been required to make any
payment at all, and to allow it prompt reimbursement would in no
way impede the creditor so long as the principal remained solvent.
But if, as here, the principal is insolvent, any dividends paid the
surety on its claim for indemnity before the creditor's whole claim
has been satisfied would decrease the creditor's dividends by his
proportionate share of the payments to the surety. They would also
result in a species of double proof detrimental to the principal's
other creditors, for the secured creditor would, under the
applicable "chancery rule," still be entitled to dividends on his
entire original claim.
Compare Merrill v. National Bank of
Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131.
Respondent, in insisting on the letter of its agreement, takes a
position in effect inconsistent with its obligation it undertook to
secure to the treasurer the repayment of his deposits to the extent
of $125,000. If, after paying that amount to the treasurer, it may
then compete with him in the distribution of the insolvent's
assets, the treasurer recovering on the balance of his claim is
reduced accordingly, and the benefit of the surety bond to the
treasurer is diminished
pro tanto. By the expedient of
taking a separate indemnity agreement from the debtor, the surety
would be enabled to deprive the creditor of the full benefit of the
security he had demanded.
The established rule that the surety may not claim subrogation
against an insolvent debtor until the creditor is paid in full is a
recognition of the inconsistency of that position.
United
States v. National Surety Co., 254 U. S.
73,
254 U. S. 76;
Peoples v. Peoples Bros., 254 F. 489;
United
Page 277 U. S. 267
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Union Bank & Trust
Co., 228 F. 448, 455. The rule would go for naught if, by
claiming indemnity instead of subrogation, the surety could achieve
the same result. The same policy against permitting a surety to
compete with the creditor for the insolvent debtor's assets
requires that the surety be denied subrogation to security given to
a creditor for several debts for only one of which the surety is
obligated.
National Bank of Commerce v. Rockefeller, 174
F. 22. Similar reasoning underlies the requirement of equity that
the surety who holds the security of an insolvent debtor must give
the benefit of it to the creditor for whom he is surety, until the
debt is fully paid.
See Keller v. Ashford, 133 U.
S. 610;
Hampton v. Phipps, 108 U.
S. 260;
Chamberlain v. St. Paul & S.C. R.
Co., 92 U. S. 299,
92 U. S. 306; 2
Pomeroy, Equitable Remedies (2d ed.) § 925.
Wherever equitable principles are called in play, as they
preeminently are in determining the rights and liabilities or
sureties and in the distribution of insolvents' estates, they
likewise forbid the surety to secure by independent contract with
the debtor indemnity at the expense of the creditor whose claim he
has undertaken to secure.
Reversed.