1. Where a consent decree, entered in a suit brought by the
government under the Anti-Trust Act, provided for entertaining at
any time thereafter any application which the parties might make in
respect to it, motions to vacate it made by defendants four years
later in response to petitions of intervention and entitled in the
suit were part of the original cause. P.
276 U. S.
322.
2. An appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of the District
of Columbia overruling defendant's motion to vacate a decree in a
suit by the government under the Anti-Trust Act does not lie to the
Court of Appeals of the District, and where erroneously taken there
from an order entered before the effective date of the
Jurisdictional Act of February 13, 1925, should be transferred by
that court, as a circuit court of appeals, to this Court. P.
276 U.S. 323.
3. Where questions were certified to this Court in a case
appealed to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia which,
under the Expediting Act of 1903, should have been appealed
directly here, this Court, by ordering up the entire record,
acquired jurisdiction as fully as if a formal transfer had been
made. P.
276 U.S. 323.
4. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia has power to
administer relief under the Anti-Trust Act (
Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Klesner, 274 U. S. 145),
and where the suit is one under § 4, which can only be brought in
equity, it is properly brought in that court sitting in Equity, and
need not be addressed to it at special term as the "District Court
of the United States." P.
276 U. S.
324.
5. In a suit by the government to restrain alleged violations of
the Anti-Trust Act, defendants denied material allegations of the
bill, but consented to the entry without any proof or finding of
facts, of a decree granting comprehensive relief under the bill but
declaring that defendants maintained the truth of their answers,
asserted their innocence, and consented to the entry of the decree
upon condition that their consent should not constitute an
admission, nor the decree an adjudication, that they, or any of
them, had violated any law of the United States.
Held:
(1) That a motion by the defendants to vacate the consent decree
could not be sustained upon the ground that there was no case
Page 276 U. S. 312
or controversy to afford jurisdiction, since (a) an injunction
may issue to prevent future wrongs though no right has yet been
violated, and (b) because, if the court, having jurisdiction of the
subject and the parties, erred in deciding that there was a
controversy, the error could have been reached only by bill of
review or appeal. P.
276 U. S.
325.
(2) A motion to vacate would not lie upon the ground that the
facts necessary to constitute a violation conferring jurisdiction
under the Anti-Trust Act were neither admitted nor proved, since an
injunction limited to future acts might be based upon allegations
of the bill not specifically denied. Error in that regard would not
go to the jurisdiction, and, besides being of a kind reviewable
only by appeal, was in this case waived by consent to the decree.
P.
276 U. S.
327.
(3) Prohibitions in an injunction decree which, standing alone,
are too general are to be read with other parts of the decree and
with allegations of the bill for the purpose of removing
uncertainties. P.
276 U. S.
327.
(4) Provisions of the consent decree cannot be assailed by a
motion to vacate upon the ground that they enjoin future conduct in
terms too vague and general. P.
276 U. S.
327.
(5) Nor upon the ground that defendants are debarred in the
future from lawful lines of business not connected by any finding
of facts with the conspiracy charged, since consent to entry of the
decree without such findings left power in the court to construe
the pleadings and therein to find circumstances of danger
justifying such prohibitions. P.
276 U. S.
328.
(6) Even if the consent decree contain prohibitions which are
contrary to the Anti-Trust Act and the common law, and are grossly
erroneous, it is not therefore void. P.
276 U. S.
330.
(7) If the court, in addition to enjoining the acts that were
admittedly interstate, enjoined some that.were wholly intrastate
and in no way related to the conspiracy to obstruct interstate
commerce, it erred, and, had the defendants not waived such error
by their consent, they might have had it corrected on appeal. But
the error, if any, does not go to the jurisdiction of the court. P.
276 U. S.
330.
(8) The consent of the Attorney General to the decree, whether
correctly or erroneously given, was within his official discretion.
P.
276 U. S.
331.
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia affirmed.
Page 276 U. S. 313
Review of orders of the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, overruling motions of Swift & Company and other
defendants seeking to vacate a decree which had been entered by
consent in a suit brought by the government under the Anti-Trust
Law. The matter went first, by appeal, to the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia, and became lodged in this Court by an
order calling up the entire record after that court had certified
certain questions concerning it.
Page 276 U. S. 318
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the consent decree
entered February 27, 1920, with a view to preventing
Page 276 U. S. 319
a long-feared monopoly in meat and other food products, is void.
[
Footnote 1]
On that day, the United States filed in the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia, sitting in equity, a petition under § 4 of
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, to
enjoin violations of that statute and of the Clayton Act, October
15, 1914, c. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 736. It named as defendants the
five leading packers -- namely, Swift & Co., Armour & Co.,
Morris & Co., Wilson & Co., Inc., and the Cudahy Packing
Company. And it joined with them 80 other corporations and 50
individuals, all but four of whom were associated with some one of
the five defendants above named. The petition charged the
defendants with attempting to monopolize a large proportion of the
food supply of the nation and with attempting to extend the
monopoly by methods set forth. It stated that the purpose of the
suit was to put an end to the monopoly described, and to deprive
the defendants of the instrumentalities by which they were
perfecting their attempts to monopolize. It sought a comprehensive
injunction and also the divestiture of the instrumentalities
described.
Page 276 U. S. 320
Simultaneously with the filing of the petition, all the
defendants filed answers which denied material allegations of the
bill. There was filed at the same time a stipulation, signed by all
the parties to the suit, which provided that the court might,
without finding any fact, enter the proposed decree therein set
forth. On the same day, a decree in the form so agreed upon was
entered. To this decree all parties filed assents. In its opening
paragraph, the decree embodied a clause of the stipulation to the
effect that, while the several corporations and individual
defendants
"maintain the truth of their answers and assert their innocence
of any violation of law in fact or intent, they nevertheless,
desiring to avoid every appearance of placing themselves in a
position of antagonism to the government, have consented and do
consent to the making and entry of the decree now about to be
entered without any findings of fact, upon condition that their
consents to the entry of said decree shall not constitute or be
considered an admission, and the rendition or entry of said decree,
or the decree itself, shall not constitute or be considered and
adjudication that the defendants or any of them have in fact
violated any law of the United States."
The decree declared, among other things, that the court had
jurisdiction of the persons and the subject matter, and "that the
allegations of the petitioner state a cause of action against the
defendants under the provisions" of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and
supplementary legislation. It granted comprehensive relief in
accordance with the prayer of the bill. The details will be
discussed later. The decree closed with this provision:
"Eighteenth. That jurisdiction of this cause be, and is hereby,
retained by this Court for the purpose of taking such other action
or adding at the foot of this decree such other relief, if any, as
may become necessary or appropriate
Page 276 U. S. 321
for the carrying out and enforcement of this decree and for the
purpose of entertaining at any time hereafter any application which
the parties may make with respect to this decree."
None of the original parties to the suit made any application to
the court between the date of the entry of the consent decree and
November 5, 1924, but three intervening petitions were filed --
that of the Southern Wholesale Grocers' Association, allowed
September 10, 1921, that of the National Wholesale Grocers'
Association, allowed November 5, 1921, and that of the California
Cooperative Canneries, allowed September 13, 1924.
See
California Co-op. Canneries v. United States, 299 F. 908. On
November 5, 1924, two motions to vacate the decree were filed in
the cause. One was by Swift & Co. and the subsidiary
corporations and individual defendants associated with it, the
other by Armour & Co. and the subsidiary corporations and
individual defendants associated with it. The allegations of the
two motions were identical, and each prayed that the consent decree
be declared void. The grounds of invalidity relied upon will be
stated later. On May 1, 1925, the two motions to vacate the consent
decree were overruled. From the order overruling them, Swift &
Co. and Armour & Co., with their respective associates, took
appeals to the court of appeals of the District of Columbia.
On May 28, 1926, the United States filed in that court a motion
to dismiss the appeals for want of jurisdiction, contending that an
appeal lay only directly to this Court. On January 3, 1927, the
Court of Appeals of the District entered an order dismissing the
appeals. Promptly thereafter, Swift & Co., Armour & Co.,
and their respective associates, moved that court to stay the
mandate and to transfer the appeals to this Court, pursuant to the
Act of September 14, 1922, c. 305, 42 Stat. 837, incorporated in
the Judicial Code as § 238(a). On
Page 276 U. S. 322
January 31, 1927, the court of appeals vacated its opinion and
order and restored the case for reargument upon the question of its
jurisdiction of the appeals and for argument on its jurisdiction to
transfer the appeals to this Court. Thereafter, having heard
argument, the Court of Appeals certified five questions to this
Court under § 251 of the Judicial Code as existing prior to the Act
of February 13, 1925, c. 229, 43 Stat. 936. On October 17, 1927,
this Court, having heard argument on the certificate, ordered that
the entire record in the cause be sent here, as provided in the
same section. On that record, the case is before us. Many questions
are presented.
An objection of the government to the jurisdiction of this Court
must first be considered. The Expediting Act of February 11, 1903,
c. 544, 32 Stat. 823, U.S.C. Tit. 15, § 29, provides that, from a
final decree in a suit in equity brought by the government under
the Anti-Trust Act, an appeal lies only directly to this Court. The
government suggests that, under the Expediting Act, no appeal lay
to the Court of Appeals from the order denying the motion to
vacate; that the court of appeals consequently was powerless to
certify questions relating to the merits; that this Court, by
ordering up the record as provided in § 251 of the Judicial Code,
did not acquire jurisdiction to decide questions which could not
lawfully have been certified under that section; that the case may
not be treated as here on transfer, because the Court of Appeals of
the District is not a circuit court of appeals within the meaning
of the Act of 1922, and that this Court is therefore without power
to pass on the merits of the cause. Swift and Armour answer that
the motions to vacate the consent decree are not subject to the
provisions of the Expediting Act because they are not a part of the
suit filed February 27, 1920, under the Anti-Trust Act, but
constitute a new suit.
Compare 245 U. S. S.
323� & Gas Co. v. Dittman,@
245 U.
S. 210. The argument is that the original suit ended
with the entry of the consent decree, or at all events at the
expiration of the term or at the end of the 60 days from the entry
of the decree allowed by the Expediting Act for an appeal. We need
not inquire whether an independent suit to set aside a decree
entered upon the Anti-Trust Act is subject to the provisions of the
Expediting Act. The consent decree provided by paragraph eighteenth
for "entertaining at any time hereafter any application which the
parties may make with respect to this decree." Swift and Armour
made these motions to vacate in the original suit; they arose out
of the three proceedings for intervention filed after entry of the
consent decree, and they were entitled in the original cause.
The court of Appeals of the District was therefore without
jurisdiction to entertain the appeals. We think, however, that it
was a circuit court of appeals within the meaning of the Transfer
Act, and, as the judgment appealed from was entered before the
effective date of the Act of February 13, 1925, the appeals should
have been transferred to this Court.
Compare Pascagoula
National Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, 269 U.S.
537;
Salinger v. United States, 272 U.
S. 542,
272 U. S. 549;
Rossi v. United States, 273 U.S. 636;
Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 274 U.
S. 181,
274 U. S. 186.
The want of a formal order of transfer would not have been fatal to
our taking jurisdiction of the whole case had it come before us on
writ of error or appeal.
Wagner Electric Manufacturing Co. v.
Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226,
262 U. S. 231;
Waggoner Estate v. Wichita County, 273 U.
S. 113,
273 U. S. 116.
It is no more so now, when we have required the record to be sent
up to us. We treat the case as here.
The decree sought to be vacated was entered with the defendants'
consent. Under the English practice, a consent decree could not be
set aside by appeal or bill of
Page 276 U. S. 324
review except in case of clerical error.
Webb v. Webb,
3 Swanst. 658;
Bradish v. Gee, 1 Amb. 229; Daniell,
Chancery Practice (6th Am. ed.) 973-974. In this Court, a somewhat
more liberal rule has prevailed. Decrees entered by consent have
been reviewed upon appeal or bill of review where there was a claim
of lack of actual consent to the decree as entered (
Pacific R.
Co. v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 289,
101 U. S. 295;
White v. Joyce, 158 U. S. 128,
158 U. S.
147), or of fraud in its procurement (
Thompson v.
Maxwell Land Grant Co., 168 U. S. 451), or
that there was lack of federal jurisdiction because of the
citizenship of the parties (
Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum,
supra).
Compare Fraenkl v. Cerecedo, 216 U.
S. 295. But "a decree, which appears by the record to
have been rendered by consent is always affirmed, without
considering the merits of the cause."
Nashville, Chattanooga
& St. Louis Ry. Co. v. United States, 113 U.
S. 261,
113 U. S. 266.
Compare United States v. Babbitt, 104 U.
S. 767;
McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.
S. 285,
237 U. S. 295.
Where, as here, the attack is not by appeal or by bill of review,
but by a motion to vacate, filed more than four years after the
entry of the decree, the scope of the inquiry may be even narrower.
Compare 49 U. S. Georgia
Bank, 8 How. 586,
49 U. S.
611-612. It is not suggested by Swift and Armour that
the decree is subject to infirmity because of any lack of formal
consent, or fraud, or mistake. But eight reasons are relied on as
showing that, in whole or in part, it was beyond the jurisdiction
of the court.
First. At the time the questions were certified, there
was a contention that the Supreme Court of the District lacked
jurisdiction of the subject matter because it is not a district
court of the United States within the meaning of the Anti-Trust
Act. After entry of the case in this Court, that contention was
disposed of by
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner,
274 U. S. 145. Now
it is conceded that the Supreme Court of the District has power
Page 276 U. S. 325
to administer relief under the Anti-Trust Act, but the claim is
made that, in this proceeding, it was without jurisdiction because
the petition was addressed to the "Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia, sitting in equity," instead of to the special term of
that court "as the district court of the United States." The
argument has compelled inquiry into legislation affecting the
courts of the District, enacted from time to time during a long
period. It would not be profitable to discuss the details of the
legislation. We are of opinion that this suit under § 4 of the
Anti-Trust Act, which could only have been brought in a court of
equity, was properly brought in the Supreme Court of the District,
sitting in equity. This conclusion has support in established
practice in analogous cases. [
Footnote 2]
Second. It is contended that the Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction because there was no case or controversy within the
meaning of § 2 of article 3 of the Constitution.
Compare
49 U. S.
Veazie, 8 How. 251;
Little v. Bowers, 134 U.
S. 547;
South Spring Hill Gold Mining
Co.
Page 276 U. S. 326
v. Amador Medean Gold Mining Co., 145 U.
S. 300;
California v. San Pablo & Tulare R.
Co., 149 U. S. 308. The
defendants concede that there was a case at the time when the
government filed its petition and the defendants their answers, but
they insist that the controversy had ceased before the decree was
entered. The argument is that, as the government made no proof of
facts to overcome the denials of the answers, and stipulated both
that there need be no findings of fact and that the decree should
not constitute or be considered an adjudication of guilt, it
thereby abandoned all charges that the defendants had violated the
law, and hence the decree was a nullity. The argument ignores the
fact that a suit for an injunction deals primarily not with past
violations, but with threatened future ones, and that an injunction
may issue to prevent future wrong although no right has yet been
violated.
Vicksburg Waterworks Co. v. Vicksburg,
185 U. S. 65,
185 U. S. 82;
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.
S. 510,
268 U. S. 536.
Moreover, the objection is one which is not open on a motion to
vacate. The court had jurisdiction both of the general subject
matter -- enforcement of the Anti-Trust Act -- and of the parties.
If it erred in deciding that there was a case or controversy, the
error is one which could have been corrected only by an appeal or
by a bill of review.
Compare Pacific R. Co. v. Ketchum,
101 U. S. 289,
101 U. S. 297.
On a motion to vacate, the determination by the Supreme Court of
the District that a case or controversy existed is not open to
attack.
Compare 16 U. S.
M'Roberts, 3 Wheat. 591;
McCormick v.
Sullivant, 10 Wheat.192,
23 U. S. 199;
Kennedy v. Georgia
Bank, 8 How. 586,
49 U. S.
611-612;
Des Moines Navigation Co. v. Iowa Homestead
Co., 123 U. S. 552,
123 U. S. 557;
Dowell v. Applegate, 152 U. S. 327;
Cutler v. Huston, 158 U. S. 423,
158 U. S. 430;
New Orleans v. Fisher, 180 U. S. 185,
180 U. S. 196;
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U.
S. 207.
Page 276 U. S. 327
Third. It is contended that the consent decree was
without jurisdiction because it was entered without the support of
facts. The argument is that jurisdiction under the Anti-Trust Acts
cannot be conferred by consent; that jurisdiction can exist only if
the transactions complained of are in fact violations of the act;
that merely to allege facts showing violation of the antitrust laws
is not sufficient; that the facts must also be established
according to the regular course of chancery procedure; that this
requires either admission or proof, and that here, there was no
admission, but, on the contrary, a denial of the allegations of the
bill, and a recital in the decree that the defendants maintain the
truth of their answers, assert their innocence, and consent to the
entry of the decree without any finding of fact, only upon
condition that their consent shall not constitute or be considered
an admission. The argument ignores both the nature of injunctions,
already discussed, and the legal implications of a consent decree.
The allegations of the bill not specifically denied may have
afforded ample basis for a decree limited to future acts.
Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 241,
134 U. S.
250-251. If the court erred in finding in these
allegations a basis for fear of future wrong sufficient to warrant
an injunction, its error was of a character ordinarily remediable
on appeal. Such an error is waived by the consent to the decree.
United States v. Babbitt, 104 U.
S. 767;
McGowan v. Parish, 237 U.
S. 285,
237 U. S. 295.
Clearly it does not go to the power of the court to adjudicate
between the parties.
Voorhees v. Bank of the United
States, 10 Pet. 449;
Cooper v.
Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308;
Christianson v. King
County, 239 U. S. 356,
239 U. S.
372.
Fourth. It is contended that, even if the decree is not
void as a whole, parts of it must be set aside as being in excess
of the court's jurisdiction. This is urged in respect to the first
and the ninth paragraphs, which are said to
Page 276 U. S. 328
be too vague and general. The first enjoins the corporation
defendants from
"in any manner maintaining or entering into any contract,
combination, or conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several states, or from . . . monopolizing or attempting
to monopolize . . . any part of such trade or commerce."
The ninth enjoins the corporation defendants from "using any
illegal trade practices of any nature whatsoever in relation to the
conduct of any business in which they or any of them may be
engaged." It is insisted that, as a court's power is limited to
restraining acts which violate or tend to violate laws, the acts to
be enjoined must be set forth definitely, and that these paragraphs
are so general in terms as to make the defendants liable to
proceedings for contempt if they commit any breach of the law. The
paragraphs, if standing alone, might be open on appeal to the
objection that they are too general to be sanctioned.
Compare
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375,
196 U. S. 396,
196 U. S. 401.
But they do not stand alone. They are to be read in connection with
other paragraphs of the decree and with the allegations of the
bill.
Barnes v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,
122 U. S. 1,
122 U. S. 14;
City of Vicksburg v. Henson, 231 U.
S. 259,
231 U. S. 269.
When so read, any uncertainties are removed. Moreover, the
defendants, by their consent, lost the opportunity of raising the
question on appeal. Obviously the generality of a court's decree
does not render it subject to a motion to vacate.
Fifth. It is contended that paragraphs second to eighth
of the decree are void because of their comprehensiveness. These
paragraphs enjoin the defendants from holding directly or
indirectly (without the consent of the court) any interest in any
public stockyard, or any stockyard terminal railroad, or any
stockyard market journal published in the United States, and enjoin
the defendants, except as there provided, from engaging or being
interested in
Page 276 U. S. 329
the business of manufacturing, buying, selling, or handling any
one of 114 enumerated food products or any one of 30 other named
articles of commerce; from selling meat at retail; from selling
milk or cream; from holding any interest in any public cold storage
plant; from using their distributive systems (including branch
houses, refrigerator cars, route cars, and autotrucks) in any
manner for the purpose of handling any of the many articles above
referred to, and from having more than a half interest in or
control of any business engaged in manufacturing, jobbing, selling,
transporting, or delivering any one of most of the articles above
referred to.
The argument is that the power to issue an injunction is limited
by the scope of the transactions prohibited by §§ 1, 2, and 3 of
the Anti-Trust Act; that the defendants are here enjoined not only
from remaining in these lawful businesses named, but also from ever
reentering them; that none of these "unrelated" lines of business
are unlawful in themselves; that none can be restrained unless, by
a finding of the essential facts, the connection with the
conspiracy is established; that no such facts have been found; that
the parties cannot by consent confer jurisdiction to issue an
injunction broader than the facts warrant, and that an injunction
so broad as that entered involves usurpation by the judicial branch
of the government of the function of Congress.
Compare United
States v. New York Coffee & Sugar Exchange, 263 U.
S. 611,
263 U. S. 621.
Here again, the defendants ignore the fact that, by consenting to
the entry of the decree "without any findings of fact," they left
to the court the power to construe the pleadings, and, in so doing,
to find in them the existence of circumstances of danger which
justified compelling the defendants to abandon all participation in
these businesses, to divest themselves of their interest therein,
and to abstain from acquiring any interest hereafter.
Page 276 U. S. 330
Sixth. The defendants make a further contention
concerning paragraphs second to eighth which differs little from
that just answered. It is urged that the decree is void because it
obliges the defendants to abandon completely certain business which
are inherently lawful, and forbids them from entering into other
businesses which may be lawfully conducted, and that to do this is
not merely unauthorized by, but is contrary to, the common law and
the Anti-Trust Act.
Compare Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt
Co. [1897] A.C. 535;
United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271. But the court had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and of the parties. And even gross error in the
decree would not render it void.
Compare 28 U.
S. 3 Pet. 193;
Ex parte Parks,
93 U. S. 18;
In
re Coy, 127 U. S. 731,
127 U. S.
756.
Seventh. It is contended that the decree is void
because the injunction is not limited to acts in interstate
commerce. This objection is, in essence, like the two preceding
ones. The argument is that each of the businesses named in
paragraphs second to eighth is susceptible of being carried on in
intrastate commerce alone; that some of these businesses, for
instance, retail meat markets, are distinctly intrastate in
character; that there was no finding of an interweaving of
intrastate and interstate transactions, as in
United States v.
New York Central R. Co., 272 U. S. 457,
272 U. S. 464,
or that the intrastate transactions had any relation to interstate
operations, as in
Swift & Co. v. United States,
196 U. S. 375,
196 U. S. 397,
and
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495, and
that therefore the prohibition of intrastate transactions was an
overstepping of federal powers which renders the decree a nullity.
Again, the argument fails to distinguish an error in decision from
the want of power to decide. The allegations of a conspiracy to
obstruct interstate commerce brought the case within
Page 276 U. S. 331
the jurisdiction of the court.
The Fair v. Kohler Die
Co., 228 U. S. 22;
Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.
S. 291,
263 U. S. 304;
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.
S. 593,
270 U. S. 608.
Compare Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v.
Schendel, 270 U. S. 611,
270 U. S.
616-617. If the court, in addition to enjoining acts
that were admittedly interstate, enjoined some that were wholly
intrastate and in no way related to the conspiracy to obstruct
interstate commerce, it erred, and, had the defendants not waived
such error by their consent, they might have had it corrected on
appeal. But the error, if any, does not go to the jurisdiction of
the court. The power to enjoin includes the power to enjoin too
much.
Compare Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.
S. 230.
Eighth. Finally, it is urged that the decree is void
because the Attorney General had no power to agree to its entry.
Compare Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139,
127 U. S. 159.
The argument is that the utmost limit of his authority was to agree
to a decree which would prohibit the defendants from doing specific
acts which constitute contracting, combining, conspiring, or
monopolizing in violating of the antitrust law; that he was without
authority to enter into a contract by which citizens of the United
States were prohibited absolutely and forever from engaging in the
lawful business of conducting stockyards, storage warehouses, or
the manufacture and distribution of many named food and other
products, and by which many corporations and individuals would be
forever taken out of the field of competition with others engaged
in the same lines of business. Whether it would follow that the
defendants are entitled to have the decree vacated because of such
lack of authority we need not decide. For we do not find in the
statutes defining the powers and duties of the Attorney General any
such limitation on the exercise of his discretion as this
contention involves. His
Page 276 U. S. 332
authority to make determinations includes the power to make
erroneous decisions, as well as correct ones.
Compare United
States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.
S. 273,
125 U. S.
278-280;
Noble v. Union River Logging R. Co.,
147 U. S. 165;
Kern River Co. v. United States, 257 U.
S. 147,
257 U. S. 155;
Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U. S. 254,
258 U. S.
262.
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND and MR. JUSTICE STONE took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.
S. 375;
United States v. Armour & Co., 142
F. 808;
Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.
S. 495; Report of the Select Committee on the
Transportation and Sale of Meat Products, 51st Cong. 1st Sess.
Sen.Rep. No. 829; Report of the Commissioner of Corporations on the
Beef Industry, 58th Cong.3d Sess. H.R.Doc. No. 382; Message from
the President of the United States transmitting Summary of Report
of the Federal Trade Commission on the Meat Packing Industry, 65th
Cong.2d Sess. H.R.Doc. 1297; Report of the Federal Trade Commission
on the Meat Packing Industry, 1918-1920; Report of the Federal
Trade Commission on Private Car Lines, 1919.
See also
Hearings before the Committee on Agriculture of the House of
Representatives, 66th Cong.2d Sess. pp. 2309-2357; Letter from the
Attorney General, 68th Cong. 1st Sess. Sen.Doc. No. 61; Letter from
the Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 68th Cong.2d Sess.
Sen.Doc. No. 219.
[
Footnote 2]
Suits in equity under Revised Statutes, § 4921, to enjoin patent
infringements, like suits in equity under the Anti- Trust Acts, are
entertained by the Supreme Court of the District solely by virtue
of its general powers as a district court of the United States.
Revised Statutes, § 629(9); Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat.
1087, 1167. These are commonly brought, as was the case at bar, in
the equity term.
See the original papers in
Krupp v.
Crozier, 32 App.D.C. 1;
Boynton v. Taggart, 40
App.D.C. 82;
Tabulating Machine Co. v. Durand, 38 Wash.
L.R. 552;
Comptograph Co. v. Adder Machine Co., 41
App.D.C. 427;
Hutchison Vapor Heating Corp. v. Mount, 48
App.D.C. 388. In
United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 26 App.D.C. 581, it was held that a suit to collect
penalties for violation of the Safety Appliance Act might be
brought in the circuit term of the Supreme Court of the District,
though the act provided for the bringing of suits "in the district
court of the United States having jurisdiction in the locality
where such violation shall have been committed." Act of March 2,
1893, c.196, 27 Stat. 531, 532.