1. An order of the Interstate Commerce Commission reduced the
divisions of joint rates accorded a short line railroad by an
agreement with its connections, and thus increased theirs
correspondingly, upon a finding that the share of the short line
exceeded a fair return on its property over cost of service and was
tantamount to a rebate to a mining company which owned its stock
and contributed most of its traffic. The finding was based on a
study of the short line's property and affairs; the service it
performed; divisions established by the United States Railroad
Administration; other divisions, past and present; volume and
distribution of traffic; comparison between the questioned
divisions and those received by other lines in the same territory,
and testimony that competition controlled the agreed divisions; but
there was no evidence that the connecting carriers were in need, or
received, or would receive, more than or less than a fair return
from the agreed divisions; that the joint rates themselves were
unfair or unjust, or that the agreed divisions were "unjust,
unreasonable, inequitable or unduly preferential or prejudicial as
between the carriers." The order was made retroactive to the date
when the investigation was instituted by the Commission.
Held:
(1) That, as items definitely specified by § 15(6) of the
amended Act to Regulate Commerce were not considered, the order
must be annulled.
New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
S. 184;
United States v. Abilene & Southern
Railway, 265 U. S. 274,
distinguished. P.
276 U. S.
115.
(2) Section 15(6) grants no power to require readjustment
between carriers of past receipts from agreed joint rates. P.
276 U. S.
117.
Page 276 U. S. 105
(3) Section 15(6) authorizes the Commission to readjust
divisions already received only when the joint rate was established
pursuant to a finding or order of the Commission made under § 15(1)
or (3), after full hearing in respect of the specific rate. Mere
permission granted by the Commission to increase or diminish all
rates according to the needs of carriers throughout the country is
not enough. P.
276 U. S.
125.
17 F.2d 165
reversed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court sustaining an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in a suit brought by the
appellant to annul it. The nature of the order is fully explained
in the opinion.
Page 276 U. S. 108
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant seeks annulment of an Interstate Commerce Commission
order, entered December 14, 1925, which designated the divisions it
might thereafter receive from
Page 276 U. S. 109
agreed joint rates and required readjustment of divisions
received subsequent to August 1, 1921, when the investigation
began.
The court below dismissed the bill. Two of the objections to the
order there advanced will be considered.
1. The Commission failed to investigate or determine the
reasonableness or justness of the divisions, or whether they were
unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly preferential or
prejudicial, as between the carriers; also failed to consider
whether the circumstances entitled one to a greater or less
proportion than another of the joint rates, as commanded by §
15(6), Transportation Act 1920. (41 Stat. c. 91, p. 456.)
2. The joint rates were agreed upon by the parties, and not
"established pursuant to any finding or order" of the Commission,
within § 15(6), Transportation Act 1920. Consequently the
Commission had no power to require adjustments for any period prior
to the final order.
Section 1(4), Transportation Act 1920, directs common carriers
to establish through routes, reasonable and equitable rates, fares,
and charges; also to establish divisions of joint rates just,
reasonable, and equitable as between the participants, which shall
not unduly prefer or prejudice any of them.
Section 15(1) empowers the Commission, whenever, after full
hearing, it shall find any rate charged by a carrier is or will be
unjust or unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory or unduly
preferential, or prejudicial, or otherwise in violation of this
Act, to determine and prescribe the just and reasonable rate
thereafter to be observed and to make an order requiring the
carrier to cease and desist from such violation.
Section 15(3) provides that "the Commission may, and it shall
whenever deemed by it to be necessary or desirable in the public
interest, after full hearing," establish joint
Page 276 U. S. 110
rates, "and the divisions of such rates, fares, or charges as
hereinafter provided."
Section 15(6):
"Whenever, after full hearing upon complaint or upon its own
initiative, the Commission is of opinion that the divisions of
joint rates, fares, or charges, applicable to the transportation of
passengers or property are or will be unjust, unreasonable,
inequitable, or unduly preferential or prejudicial as between the
carriers parties thereto (whether agreed upon by such carriers, or
any of them, or otherwise established), the Commission shall by
order prescribe the just, reasonable, and equitable divisions
thereof to be received by the several carriers, and in cases where
the joint rate, fare, or charge was established pursuant to a
finding or order of the Commission and the divisions thereof are
found by it to have been unjust, unreasonable, or inequitable, or
unduly preferential or prejudicial, the Commission may also by
order determine what (for the period subsequent to the filing of
the complaint or petition or the making of the order of
investigation) would have been the just, reasonable, and equitable
divisions thereof to be received by the several carriers, and
require adjustment to be made in accordance therewith. In so
prescribing and determining the divisions of joint rates, fares,
and charges, the Commission shall give due consideration, among
other things, to the efficiency with which the carriers concerned
are operated, the amount of revenue required to pay their
respective operating expenses, taxes, and a fair return on their
railway property held for and used in the service of
transportation, and the importance to the public of the
transportation services of such carriers, and also whether any
particular participating carrier is an originating, intermediate,
or delivering line, and any other fact or circumstance which would
ordinarily, without regard to the mileage haul, entitle
Page 276 U. S. 111
one carrier to a greater or less proportion than another carrier
of the joint rate, fare or charge."
Appellant owns and operates a railroad ten miles long in
southwestern Louisiana, is a common carrier of freight only, and
makes interchanges with lines of the Southern Pacific [
Footnote 1] and Kansas City Southern.
Except five shares, its capital stock -- $200,000 -- is owned by
Union Sulphur Company, which operates mines near its line and
consigns and receives over 90 percentum of the property moving
thereon. Prior to 1920, appellant and connecting carriers
established through rates and divisions by agreements. These were
modified as permitted or suggested in Ex parte 74 (1920), 58 I.C.C.
220, and Matter of Reduced Rates (1922) 68 I.C.C. 676.
In Ex parte 74, the Commission considered applications under §
15a, [
Footnote 2]
Transportation Act 1920, for authority generally to increase rates
so that carriers as a whole might earn a fair return. It found
(July 29, 1920, 58 I.C.C. 220, 246, 245):
Page 276 U. S. 112
". . . The following percentage increases in the charges for
freight service, including switching and special services, together
with the other increases hereinbefore approved, would under present
conditions result in rates not unreasonable in the aggregate under
section 1 of the act and would enable the carriers in the
respective groups, under honest, efficient, and economical
management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance of way,
structures, and equipment, to earn an aggregate annual railway
operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a return of 5 1/2
percent upon the aggregate value, for the purposes of this
proceeding, of the railway property of such carriers held for and
used in the service of transportation and one-half of 1 percent in
addition; Eastern group, 40 percent; Southern group, 25 percent;
Western group, 35 percent; Mountain-Pacific group, 25 percent . .
."
"After carefully considering the situation, we find that with
the exceptions hereinafter noted general percentage increases made
to fit the needs of the groups of lines serving each of the four
groups must be considered for present purposes the most
practicable. This conclusion is without prejudice to any subsequent
finding in individual situations."
And it accordingly authorized general increases as specified "in
the rates, fares, and charges of railroads within the continental
United States." It did not approve or require the adoption or
maintenance of any particular rate.
In the Matter of Reduced Rates (May 16, 1922, 68 I.C.C. 676) --
instituted to determine whether further general reductions might be
required under § 1, also what would constitute fair return under §
15a(3), after referring to the authorized increases of 1920, the
Commission found that 5.75 percentum would be fair thereafter, and
would result if formerly authorized rates were reduced by specified
percentages. The order was that carriers should promptly report
"whether the
Page 276 U. S. 113
findings herein will be carried into effect without formal order
or orders by us." It did not require the adoption or maintenance of
any rate, nor was any particular rate approved.
August 1, 1921, the Commission began
"an investigation into and concerning the justness,
reasonableness, and equitableness of the divisions received by the
Brimstone Railroad & Canal Company out of the joint rates
applicable to the transportation of property."
It ordered:
"That the Brimstone Railroad and Canal Company, the Southern
Pacific Company, and the Kansas City Southern Railway Company be
and they hereby are made respondents to this proceeding."
Testimony was taken relative to ownership and organization of
the Brimstone Company; its relation to Union Sulphur Company; its
operating and financial condition, including dividends, surplus,
and character of service performed; volume of roadbuilding material
carried for parish purposes; establishment by United States
Railroad Administration of divisions with connecting lines, with
factors considered in connection therewith; comparison between the
questioned divisions and those received by other lines in the same
territory; also value of operating property, including cost of
reproduction.
The Commission's first report -- April 4, 1922 -- declared the
Brimstone Company a common carrier subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act entitled to participate in joint rates, or have its
charges absorbed under appropriate tariff provisions, and
further:
"The divisions to the Brimstone should produce no more than an
amount sufficient to cover the cost of its service and a fair
return upon the property held for and used in the service of
transportation. We conclude that the facts of record, including the
dividends paid by the Brimstone in past years and the accumulated
credit balance to profit and loss, indicate divisions to the
Brimstone
Page 276 U. S. 114
which are disproportionate, in view of the service rendered, and
are tantamount to a rebate to the proprietary company."
"We find that the divisions of joint rates now received by the
Brimstone from the two other respondents on interstate traffic are,
and for the future will be unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, and
to the extent that they exceed or may exceed the cost of the
service and a fair return upon the property held for and used in
the service of transportation for the public generally, are
excessive, and, in effect, amount to a rebate to the proprietary
company. It does not necessarily follow that reasonable and
equitable divisions to the Brimstone should be on the maximum
basis."
"The record will be held open for a period of ninety days from
the date of service of this report, during which respondents will
be expected to make the necessary cost studies for the purpose of
arriving at reasonable divisions to the Brimstone."
The subsequent studies related only to the Brimstone Company;
they did not extend at all to connecting carriers. The Commission
(88 I.C.C. 63, March 10, 1924) said they were
"intended to develop the average cost, including return on
investment, of moving loaded cars to any from the Southern Pacific
and Kansas City Southern."
No studies were made or evidence taken concerning efficiency of
Southern Pacific and Kansas City Southern lines, amount of revenue
required to pay their respective operating expenses, taxes, and
fair return upon their property, or the public importance of
services performed by them, or any other fact or circumstance
(except as shown above) which ordinarily, without regard to the
mileage haul, would entitle them to a greater or less proportion of
the joint rate. Section 15(6).
March 10, 1924, a second report and order prescribed what the
Brimstone Company might thereafter receive
Page 276 U. S. 115
from joint rates and ordered readjustment of divisions received
after August 1, 1921. No change was directed in the joint rates or
finding made relevant to their justness, nor was there any
pronouncement concerning apportionments amongst other carriers. The
Commission said:
"Based upon the cost of the service and a fair return upon the
property held for and used in the service of transportation for the
public generally, we find that, during the period from August 1,
1921, to, but not including, July 1, 1922, just, reasonable, and
equitable divisions to the Brimstone would have been: [here follow
certain specific divisions]. . . ."
"We further find that, on and after July 1, 1922, just,
reasonable, and equitable divisions to the Brimstone were, are, and
for the future will be: [here follow certain specific divisions]. .
. ."
"We further find that the divisions received by the Brimstone
should be adjusted on a basis not in excess of the charge above
found just, reasonable, and equitable during the periods
named."
On December 14, 1925, a final report and order reaffirmed the
order of March 10, 1924, with some modifications (presently
unimportant) in amounts allowed the Brimstone Company from the
joint rates.
The Commission evidently undertook to deprive the Brimstone
Company of receipts supposed to exceed a fair return on its
property and award the same to connecting carriers without evidence
tending to show they were in need or had or would receive more or
less than a fair return from agreed divisions, or that the joint
rates themselves were unfair and unjust, or that the agreed
divisions were "unjust, unreasonable, inequitable, or unduly
preferential or prejudicial as between the carriers."
Counsel suggest that, in addition to facts revealed by studies
of the Brimstone Company's affairs, the Commission did consider
existing division sheets of joint rates,
Page 276 U. S. 116
volume and distribution of traffic, past division sheets,
divisions accorded to the Brimstone Company by the federal Director
General; also testimony showing competition controlled the agreed
divisions. But the very definite command of § 15(6) required more
than that.
Both parties rely upon
New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184, and
United States v. Abilene & Southern Ry. Co.
265 U. S. 274.
The first involved an order granting larger divisions to New
England roads. We there recognized the necessity of evidence
"typical in character, and ample in quantity, to justify the
finding made in respect to each division of each rate of every
carrier," and declared that, with such evidence before it, the
Commission properly proceeded to consider the importance to the
public of the weak carriers and directed divisions intended to
effectuate the purpose of Congress to insure adequate
transportation service for the whole country by extending aid to
them. Nothing in the opinion supports the view that the Commission
may take something from one carrier merely because its net revenue
appears unduly large, and donate this to another demanding nothing
and not in need. Cost of service to one carrier is not the only
factor to be considered in determining just divisions.
In the second case, the Commission undertook to modify existing
divisions for the benefit of a weak road. It did not appear that
any matters consideration of which was required by § 15(6),
Transportation Act 1920, had been ignored, but the evidence
concerning some of these things had not been properly presented,
and therefore the order was annulled. It was there said: (274)
"Relative cost of service is not the only factor to be considered
in determining just divisions." (291) "The power conferred by
Congress on the Commission is that of determining, in respect to
each joint rate, what divisions
Page 276 U. S. 117
will be just. Evidence of individual rates or divisions, said to
be typical of all, affords a basis for a finding as to any one. But
averages are apt to be misleading. It cannot be inferred that every
existing division of every joint rate is unjust as between
particular carriers, because the aggregate result of the movement
of the traffic on joint rates appears to be unjust. These aggregate
results should properly be taken into consideration by the
Commission; but it was not proper to accept them as a substitute
for typical evidence as to the individual joint rates and
divisions. In the New England Divisions Case, tariffs and division
sheets were introduced which, in the opinion of the Commission were
typical in character, and ample in quantity, to justify the
findings made in respect to each division of each rate of every
carrier. A like course should have been pursued in the proceeding
under review."
The record discloses that, before making the challenged order,
the Commission failed to consider the items indefinitely specified
by § 15(6). And it must be annulled.
The court below gave special attention to the second of the
above stated objections to the order. This relates only to the
retroactive feature. And it approved what we regard as an erroneous
view touching readjustments of past divisions announced by the
Interstate Commerce Commission in several proceedings. Pittsburg,
etc., Ry. Co. v. Pittsburg Co., 61 I.C.C. 272, decided April 5,
1921; Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 69
I.C.C. 703, 707; New York Dock Ry. Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 89 I.C.C. 695, and Marion & Eastern Ry. Co. v. C. & E.
I. R. Co., 96 I.C.C. 402.
Prior to 1920, the Interstate Commerce Act contained the
following provisions concerning the readjustments of divisions of
rates determined and prescribed by the Commission:
Page 276 U. S. 118
"Sec. 15. That whenever, after full hearing . . . the Commission
shall be of opinion that any individual or joint rates or charges
whatsoever demanded, . . . are unjust or unreasonable or unjustly
discriminatory, or unduly preferential or prejudicial or otherwise
in violation of any of the provisions of this act, the Commission
is hereby authorized and empowered to determine and prescribe what
will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate or rates,
charge or charges, to be thereafter observed in such case as the
maximum to be charged, . . . and to make an order that the carrier
or carriers shall cease and desist from such violation to the
extent to which the Commission finds the same to exist. . . .
Whenever the carrier or carriers, in obedience to such order of
the Commission or otherwise, in respect to joint rates, fares, or
charges, shall fail to agree among themselves upon the
apportionment or division thereof the Commission may, after full
hearing, make a supplemental order prescribing the just and
reasonable proportion of such joint rate to be received by each
carrier party thereto, which order shall take effect as a part of
the original order. . . ."
An explanation of the meaning of and reasons underlying that
part of § 15 italicized above appears in Morgantown & Kingwood
Divisions, 40 I.C.C. 509, 510:
"The provision dates back to the time when the Commission, under
§ 15 of the original act, had no authority to deal with rates
except upon formal complaint. It now constitutes a part of that
section, as amended, which gives us power to require, after hearing
either upon formal complaint or in a proceeding instituted on our
own motion, the establishment and maintenance of joint rates lower
than the aggregate of the intermediate rates or joint rates already
in effect, or proposed by the carriers in tariffs under suspension.
It does not come into play until, as a condition precedent, the
Commission has made some requirement
Page 276 U. S. 119
after full hearing. The reason therefor, as we understand it, is
to provide a means of determining which carrier, or to what extent
each carrier, shall bear an enforced reduction or participate in an
approved increase in the existing or proposed through charge. In
other words, the Commission, in creating a joint rate or in
reducing a joint rate below what had been established voluntarily
or is proposed by the carriers, having brought about a situation
different from that as to which their agreement applied and not in
contemplation when the agreement was made, is to have the power to
complete what it has undertaken, in case the carriers themselves do
not find it possible to agree upon the divisions of the new
rate."
"The language of the act [1917] seemed to indicate that the
authority was to be exercised only when the parties failed to agree
among themselves, and only in supplement to some order fixing the
rates."
New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
S. 184.
The occasion for the changes incorporated in § 15(6), Act 1920,
were pointed out before the House Committee by Interstate Commerce
Commissioner Clark, July 16, 1919 (House Hearings, Return of
Railroads, etc., vol. 1, p. 29). He said:
"There has been a good deal of difference of opinion, both
inside and outside of the Commission, as to its powers under the
present act. The act now authorizes the Commission to establish
joint rates, and says that, if the carriers are not able to agree
on a division of the rates so prescribed, the Commission may
determine those divisions and its decision relative thereto shall
become effective as a part of the original order and as of the date
upon which the rates became effective. But there have come up
questions as to divisions of rates which had not been prescribed by
the Commission and which had become unsatisfactory to one or
possibly more than one carrier.
Page 276 U. S. 120
The Commission originally held that it did not have jurisdiction
to prescribe the divisions of a joint rate that had not been
prescribed by it. Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions,
supra. Thereafter, the dissatisfied carrier could bring
that question at issue by filing a revocation of its concurrence in
the rates, or, if it happened to be a carrier that published the
rates, by filing a cancellation of them. That was frequently
protested, often suspended by the Commission, and, upon hearing, it
developed that the only difficulty was their differences as to
divisions of rates. Requiring them by order to continue the rates
was, in effect, establishing those rates as joint rates, and we
thereupon proceeded to prescribe the divisions, if they could not
agree."
"Later, by a majority vote, the Commission decided that it had
power to prescribe the divisions even if it had not prescribed the
rates (Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 49 I.C.C. 540), but
that has not as yet come to rest through any final
adjudication."
"Under this amendment, the Commission would be authorized to
prescribe the divisions of the joint rates, fares, and charges as
between the carriers, whether it prescribed the rates or not, and
it is provided that if it be a rate, fare, or charge that has been
prescribed by the Commission, it may then, by order, make its
division of that rate retroactive to the date upon which the rate
prescribed by it became effective; but as to rates not prescribed
by the Commission, its order prescribing the divisions of the rate
would be effective only from the effective date of the order."
Reporting in behalf of the House Committee (November 10, 1919,
H.R. vol. 2, Reports on Public Bills), Chairman Esch said:
"Section 417 amends § 15 of the commerce act so as to give the
commission power not only to fix the maximum
Page 276 U. S. 121
rate, but to fix the particular rate to be charged, or the
maximum, or the minimum, or the maximum and minimum. . . ."
"The amendment also increases the powers of the Commission in
regard to making of through routes and joint rates, authorizing it
to prescribe the joint rate or the maximum, or the minimum, or the
maximum and minimum. The Commission is authorized to prescribe just
and reasonable divisions of joint rates among the several carriers,
and where the joint rate was fixed by the Commission and the
divisions are found to have been unjust, the Commission may
determine what would have been the just division thereof, and
require adjustment to be made."
Section 15(6) should be construed in the light of the recognized
difficulties. Under the earlier act, a clear distinction was made
between joint rates "agreed upon" and those "determined and
prescribed" by the Commission after full hearing "to be thereafter
observed." The Commission had power to declare proper divisions of
those in the latter category by order "which shall take effect as
part of the original order" -- that is, from the date the rate was
prescribed. Whether it could determine divisions of agreed rates
for the future was not clear, but certainly it could not require
readjustments of divisions of such rates for past periods.
Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions, 40 I.C.C. 509; 49 I.C.C. 540,
551. Section 15(6) established the right to prescribe future
divisions of agreed rates, but we think the studied purpose was to
grant no power to require readjustments of past receipts from
agreed joint rates. Theretofore, power in respect of past divisions
existed only when rates had been determined and prescribed after
full hearing -- that is, where the Commission had passed upon the
reasonableness of the rate and required observance. Obviously a
carrier may have
Page 276 U. S. 122
assented to a through rate only because of the divisions
accorded to it; to permit the Commission to change this arrangement
as to past transactions would be exceedingly harsh, if not wholly
unreasonable. Ordinarily, divisions of a particular rate are not of
public interest if the rate itself is reasonable. Probably aware of
hardships under the old rule, the new act shortened the time during
which readjustment might be required -- limited its beginning to
the commencement of investigation or filing of complaint.
In support of the retroactive provision of the present order,
counsel say that joint rates between the Brimstone Company and
connecting carriers were made under authority of Ex Parte 74, 58
I.C.C. 220, and Matter of Reduced Rates, 68 I.C.C. 676, and
therefore were "established pursuant to a finding or order of the
Commission." But mere general permission or suggestion concerning
rates for all carriers, without consideration of the reasonableness
of any particular rate, is not the "finding or order" referred to
by § 15(6). We think that refers to one which, after full hearing,
determined and prescribed a rate thereafter to be observed. The
contrary view would place substantially all presently existing
rates in the class with particular rates established by order of
the Commission after full hearing, subject them to retroactive
adjustments, and thus destroy the practical value of the
distinction which Congress carefully preserved.
The power to require readjustments for the past is drastic. It
may reasonably exist in cases where the particular rate has been
approved by the Commission after full hearing; it ought not to be
extended so as to permit unreasonably harsh action without very
plain words. The general findings and permission of Ex parte 74 and
Matter of Reduced Rates did not approve or fix any particular rate
and certainly did not determine and prescribe the rates divisions
of which are here under consideration.
Page 276 U. S. 123
Neither case approved
"any specific rate as reasonable, in itself, or as properly
adjusted with respect to other rates nor did it justify in advance
any rate which might be published as a result thereof."
In them the Commission was dealing with the whole body of rates
throughout the country -- were looking at the general level of all
rates -- and the propriety of the rates to which the Brimstone
Company was party was not the subject of particular investigation
or consideration.
See Morgantown & Kingwood Divisions,
40 I.C.C. 511; Globe Soap Co. v. A. & S. Ry. Co., 40 I.C.C.
121; Steel & Tube Co. v. Director General, 61 I.C.C. 526.
Section 15(1), Transportation Act 1920, authorizes the
Commission, after full hearing, to determine and prescribe joint
rates to be thereafter observed. Section 15(3) permits the
Commission, after full hearing, to establish joint rates "and the
divisions of such rates, fares, or charges as hereinafter
provided." And § 15(6) authorizes readjustments of divisions
already received only when the joint rate was established pursuant
to a finding or order of the Commission. Such finding or order must
have been under § 15(1) or (3), after full hearing in respect to
the specific rate. This construction will insure compliance with
the purpose of Congress by requiring the Commission, upon full
hearing, to pass upon the particular rate before divisions for the
past can be directed. Mere permission to increase or diminish all
rates according to the general needs of carriers throughout the
country is not enough.
The decree below must be reversed. The cause will be remanded
there for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES and MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
The lines of the Louisiana Western Railroad are part of the
Southern Pacific System.
[
Footnote 2]
Transportation Act 1920:
"Sec. 15a [added February 28, 1920]."
"(2) In the exercise of its power to prescribe just and
reasonable rates, the Commission shall initiate, modify, establish,
or adjust such rates so that carriers as a whole (or as a whole in
each of such rate groups or territories as the Commission may from
time to time designate) will, under honest, efficient,and
economical management and reasonable expenditures for maintenance
of way, structures, and equipment, earn an aggregate annual net
railway operating income equal, as nearly as may be, to a fair
return upon the aggregate value of the railway property or such
carriers held for and used in the service of transportation:
Provided, that the Commission shall have reasonable
latitude to modify or adjust any particular rate which it may find
to be unjust or unreasonable, and to prescribe different rates for
different sections of the country."