1. An order made by a division of the Interstate Commerce
Commission being operative, unless stayed by the division or the
full Commission pending a rehearing by the latter (amended Act to
Regulate Commerce, §§ 16a, 17 ), a suit to enjoin enforcement of
such an order is within the jurisdiction of the district court, and
whether relief should be denied until the plaintiff, through
application for rehearing, shall have exhausted the administrative
remedy is a matter of judicial discretion. P. 265 U. S.
2. In a proceeding under § 15(6) of the amended Interstate
Commerce Act in which the Commission readjusted the divisions of
joint rates as between a carrier and its several immediate
Page 265 U. S. 275
the other carriers participating in the joint rates, whose
shares were left unchanged, were not necessary parties. P.
265 U. S.
3. In determining just divisions, the Commission must consider
relative cost of service; whether a particular carrier is an
originating, intermediate or delivering line; the efficiency of
operation of each carrier; the revenue it requires for operation
expenses, taxes and a fair return; public importance of the
transportation services involved, and any other facts which would
ordinarily, without regard to mile haul, entitle one carrier to a
greater or less proportion than another. P. 265 U. S.
4. The financial needs of a weaker road may also be taken into
consideration in determining divisions of joint rates.
5. The mere fact that increased divisions allowed a carrier were
measured by percentages of the revenues of the several connecting
carriers from the joint traffic does not establish that the
division is unjust or guided solely by relative financial ability.
P. 265 U. S.
6. An order increasing the divisions of a carrier is not
arbitrary merely because the corresponding decreases are confined
to the carriers immediately connecting with it, these having the
right to apply for further readjustment as between themselves and
remoter carriers. P. 265 U. S.
7. An order of the Commission is not invalidated by the mere
admission as evidence of matter which in judicial proceedings would
be incompetent. P. 265 U. S.
8. But a finding without evidence is beyond the power of the
9. Reports of carriers on the Commission's files cannot be
treated as evidence when not introduced as such, in a proceeding
which, though initiated by the Commission primarily to protect the
public interest, may result in an order in favor of one carrier as
against another. Id.
10. Rule XIII of the Commission does not purport to relieve the
Commission from introducing, by specific reference, such parts of
the reports of carriers, properly on file, as it wishes to treat a
evidence. P. 265 U. S.
11. The right of carriers to insist that consideration by the
Commission of matter not in evidence invalidates its order is not
lost by their submission of the case without argument or their
consent to omission of a tentative report by the examiner.
12. A general notice given at the hearing by an examiner that
the Commission would rely upon voluminous annual reports
Page 265 U. S. 276
filed with the Commission by plaintiff carrier pursuant to law,
tantamount to no notice whatever of evidence used
against them. P. 265 U. S.
13. The divisions of joint rates may be determined on the basis
of individual rates and divisions, shown by tariffs and division
sheets and found sufficiently typical in character and ample in
quantity to justify findings as to each division of each rate of
every carrier involved (New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184
but it cannot be inferred, because the joint rates and divisions
between particular carriers work injustice in the aggregate, that
each particular division of each rate is unjust and in like
proportion. P. 265 U. S.
288 F. 102 affirmed.
Appeal from a decree of the district court perpetually enjoining
the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce
Page 265 U. S. 278
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal by the United States and the Interstate
Commerce Commission from a decree of the Federal
Page 265 U. S. 279
Court for Kansas which perpetually enjoined the enforcement of
an order made by the Commission, on August 9, 1922, under § 15(6)
of the Interstate Commerce Act as amended by Transportation Act
1920, c. 91, § 418, 41 Stat. 456, 486. The order relates to the
divisions of interstate joint rates on traffic interchanged, within
the United States, by the Kansas City, Mexico & Orient system
with 13 carriers whose lines make direct connection with it. The
order provides that, on all such interchanged traffic, the existing
divisions of these carriers shall be reduced by a fixed percent,
and that the Orient shall receive the amount so taken from its
connections. [Footnote 1
order also directed the Orient and the connecting carriers to make,
at stated intervals, reports of the financial results of the
divisions ordered, permitted any carrier to except itself from the
order, in whole or in part, by proper showing, and retained
jurisdiction in the Commission "to adjust on the basis of such
reports the divisions herein prescribed or stated, if such
adjustment shall to us seem proper." Kansas City, Mexico &
Orient Divisions, 73 I.C.C. 319, 329.
The order was entered after an investigation into the financial
needs of the Orient system undertaken by the
Page 265 U. S. 280
Commission in April, 1922, pursuant to an application of the
receiver of the Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Railroad Co. and
an affiliated Texas corporation. It appeared (and was not denied)
that the public interest demanded continued operation of the
railroad; that the revenues were insufficient to pay operating
expenses; that the operation was being efficiently conducted, and
that, unless relief were afforded by increasing the Orient's
division of joint rates and/or otherwise, operation would have to
be suspended and the railroad abandoned. [Footnote 2
] The 13 carriers who brought this suit
participated in the investigation undertaken by the Commission, and
supplied certain statistical information requested of them. But
they introduced no evidence before the Commission, and the case was
submitted there without argument. None of the connecting carriers
made application to be excepted from the order. Nor did any of them
apply for a rehearing. Before the effective date of the order, this
suit was begun. On application for a temporary injunction, it was
heard by three judges, pursuant to the Act of October 22, 1913, c.
32, 38 Stat. 208, 220, and a temporary injunction was granted. Upon
final hearing, motions of the defendants to dismiss the bill were
denied, the injunction was made permanent, and a rehearing was
refused. 288 F. 102.
The Commission moved, in the district court, to
dismiss the bill on the ground that the suit was premature. The
contention is that, under the rule of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210
orderly procedure required that, before invoking judicial review,
Page 265 U. S. 281
carriers should have exhausted the administrative remedy
afforded by a petition for rehearing before the full Commission.
The investigation and order were made not by the whole Commission,
but by division 4. [Footnote 3
The order of a division has "the same force and effect . . . as if
made . . . by the Commission, subject to rehearing by the
Commission." Interstate Commerce Act as amended, § 17(4). Any party
may apply for such rehearing of any order or matter determined. §
16a. Meanwhile the order may be suspended either by the division or
by the Commission. In this case, the order, by its terms, was not
to become effective until 37 days after its entry. There was
consequently ample time within which to apply for a rehearing and a
stay before the plaintiffs could have been injured by the
Division 4 consists of four members. There are eleven members on
the full Commission. Under these circumstances, what is here called
a rehearing resembles an appeal to another administrative tribunal.
An application for a rehearing before the Commission would have
been clearly appropriate. [Footnote
] The objections to the validity of the order now urged are in
part procedural. They include
Page 265 U. S. 282
questions of joinder of parties, of the admissibility of
evidence, and of failure to introduce formal evidence. Most of the
objections do not appear to have been raised before the division.
If they had been, alleged errors might have been corrected by
action of that body or by the full Commission. The order involved
also a far-reaching question of administrative power and policy
which, so far as appears, had never been passed upon by the full
Commission, and was not discussed by these plaintiffs before the
division. In view of these facts, the trial court would have been
justified in denying equitable relief until an application had been
made to the full Commission, and redress had been denied by it.
But, in the absence of a stay, the order of a division is
operative, and the filing of an application for a rehearing does
not relieve the carrier from the duty of observing an order.
] Despite the
failure to apply for a rehearing, the court had jurisdiction to
entertain this suit. Prendergast v. New York Telephone
Co., 262 U. S. 43
262 U. S. 48
Compare Chicago Rys. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission,
277 F. 970, 974. Whether it should have denied relief until all
possible administrative remedies had been exhausted was a matter
which called for the exercise of its judicial discretion. We cannot
say that, in denying the motion to dismiss, the discretion was
The plaintiffs contend that the order is void
because only a part of the carriers who participated in the joint
rates were made parties to the proceedings before the Commission.
Section 15(6) provides that, where existing divisions are found to
"unjust . . . as between the carriers parties thereto . . . ,
the Commission shall, by order, prescribe the just, reasonable and
equitable divisions thereof to be received by the several
Page 265 U. S. 283
More than 170 carriers participated in the joint rates in
question. Of these, only 39 carriers, whose roads lie wholly west
of the Mississippi river, were made respondents before the
Commission. The argument is that all who are parties to the through
rates are necessarily interested in the divisions of those rates;
that failure to join some is not rendered immaterial by the fact
that the order made affects directly only those before the
Commission, since it would be open to a carrier whose division is
reduced, to seek contribution later by a proceeding to readjust the
divisions as between it and other carriers who were not parties to
the original case, and that an order under this section is invalid
unless it disposes completely of the matter in controversy. This
argument is answered by what was said in New England Divisions
Case, 261 U. S. 184
261 U. S.
-202. The order, in terms, affects only the 13
carriers whose lines connect directly with the Orient system. Only
their divisions were reduced. The shares of all others who
participated in the joint rates were left unchanged. All
participating carriers might properly have been made respondents.
But that was not essential, for it was not necessary that all
controversies which may conceivably arise should be settled in a
single proceeding. There was no defect of parties in the proceeding
before the Commission. [Footnote
Page 265 U. S. 284
The plaintiffs contend that the order is void
because made on a basis which Congress did not and could not
authorize. [Footnote 7
argument is that Transportation Act 1920 requires earnings under
joint rates to be divided according to what is fair and reasonable
as between the parties; that what is so must be determined by the
relative amount and cost of the service performed by each of the
several railroads, and that the Commission, ignoring this basis of
apportionment and making the determination in the public interest,
gave to the needy Orient system larger divisions merely because the
connection carriers were more prosperous. Relative cost of service
is not the only factor to be considered in determining just
divisions. The Commission must consider also whether a particular
carrier is an originating, intermediate or delivering line; the
efficiency with which the several carriers are operated; the amount
of revenue required to pay their respective operating expenses,
taxes, and a fair return on their railway property; the importance
to the public of the transportation service of such carriers, and
other facts, if any, which would, ordinarily, without regard to
mileage haul, entitle one carrier to a greater or less proportion
than another of the joint rate. [Footnote 8
] It is settled that, in determining what the
divisions should be, the Commission may, in the public interest,
take into consideration the financial needs of a weaker road, and
that it may be
Page 265 U. S. 285
given a division larger than justice merely as between the
parties would suggest "in order to maintain it in effective
operation as part of an adequate transportation system," provided
the share left to its connections is "adequate to avoid a
confiscatory result." Dayton-Goose Creek Ry. Co. v. United
States, 263 U. S. 456
263 U. S. 477
New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
, 261 U. S.
-195. It was not contended before the Commission that
a reduction of the carriers' divisions would reduce their rates
below what is compensatory. [Footnote 9
] There is in the record no evidence on which it
could be determined that any of the divisions ordered will result
in confiscatory rates. And there is nothing in the order which
prohibits rate increases. Compare United States v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 263 U. S. 515
263 U. S.
The assertion is made that the Commission was guided solely by
the relative financial ability of the several carriers. In support
of this assertion, it is pointed out that the increase ordered of
the Orient's share was measured not by a percentage of its own
divisions, as in New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
, but by a percentage of the revenues of the
several connecting carriers from the joint traffic. [Footnote 10
] It does not follow that such a
basis of division would necessarily be unjust to the connecting
carriers. The position of the Orient as the originating carrier, or
as the delivering carrier, or as an indispensable
Page 265 U. S. 286
intermediate carrier, might be such that the connecting carrier
could not get the traffic but for the service which the Orient
renders, and that this factor, together with others ignored in the
existing divisions, would require the precise change directed to
render the divisions just and reasonable as between the parties. It
is also pointed out that the contributions to be made by the
connecting carriers bore a direct relation to their prosperity. But
it does not appear that the Commission based its finding solely on
the financial needs of the Orient and the financial condition of
the connecting carriers.
Invalidity of the order is urged on the further ground that the
Commission made the incidental fact of physical connection with the
Orient the sole test for determining which carriers should have
their divisions reduced, and that such action is clearly arbitrary.
It is true that the order affects, in terms, only the 13 carriers
whose lines have direct connection with the Orient; but it does not
follow that the action was arbitrary. These connecting carriers
have a demonstrable interest in having the operation of the Orient
continued. Other carriers doubtless have an interest, but it is
less certain. It is open to any of these 13 carriers to institute
proceedings before the Commission with a view to securing a partial
distribution of their burden among other connecting carriers.
Compare United States v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
263 U. S. 515
263 U. S. 526
The basis of division adopted by the Commission is not shown to be
in any respect inconsistent with the rule declared in New
England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184
is it shown that the Commission ignored any factor of which
consideration is required by the act.
The plaintiffs contend that the order is void
because it rests upon evidence not legally before the Commission.
It is conceded that the finding rests, in part,
Page 265 U. S. 287
upon data [Footnote 11
taken from the annual reports filed with the Commission by the
plaintiff carriers pursuant to law; that these reports were not
formally put in evidence; that the parts containing the data relied
upon were not put in evidence through excerpts; that attention was
not otherwise specifically called to them, and that objection to
the use of the reports under these circumstances was seasonably
made by the carriers, and was insisted upon. The parts of the
annual reports in question were used as evidence of facts which it
was deemed necessary to prove, not as a means of verifying facts of
which the Commission, like a court, takes judicial notice. The
contention of the Commission is that, because its able examiner
gave notice that "no doubt it will be necessary to refer to the
annual reports of all these carriers," its Rules of Practice
matter in the reports to
Page 265 U. S. 288
be used as freely as if the data had been formally introduced in
The mere admission by an administrative tribunal of matter
which, under the rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings, would be deemed incompetent does not invalidate its
order. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird,
194 U. S. 25
194 U. S. 44
Spiller v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
253 U. S. 117
253 U. S. 131
Compare Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.
, 263 U. S. 157
But a finding without evidence is beyond the power of the
Commission. Papers in the Commission's files are not always
evidence in a case. New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184
261 U. S. 198
note 19. Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not introduced
as such. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88
227 U. S. 91
Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258
the proceeding had been, in form, an adversary one commenced by the
Orient system, that carrier could not, under rule XIII, have
introduced the annual reports as a whole. For they contain much
that is not relevant to the matter in issue. By the terms of the
rule, it would have been obliged to submit copies of such portions
as it deemed material, or to make specific reference to the exact
portion to be used. The fact that the proceeding was technically an
investigation instituted by the Commission
Page 265 U. S. 289
would not relieve the Orient, if a party to it, from this
requirement. Every proceeding is adversary, in substance, if it may
result in an order in favor of one carrier as against another. Nor
was the proceeding under review any the less an adversary one
because the primary purpose of the Commission was to protect the
public interest through making possible the continued operation of
the Orient system. The fact that it was on the Commission's own
motion that use was made of the data in the annual reports is not
of legal significance.
It is sought to justify the procedure followed by the clause in
rule XIII which declares that the "Commission will take notice of
items in tariffs and annual or other periodical reports of carriers
properly on file." But this clause does not mean that the
Commission will take judicial notice of all the facts contained in
such documents. Nor does it purport to relieve the Commission from
introducing, by specific reference, such parts of the reports as it
wishes to treat as evidence. It means that, as to these items,
there is no occasion for the parties to serve copies. The objection
to the use of the data contained in the annual reports is not lack
of authenticity or untrustworthiness. It is that the carriers were
left without notice of the evidence with which they were in fact
confronted, as later disclosed by the finding made. The requirement
that, in an adversary proceeding, specific reference be made is
essential to the preservation of the substantial rights of the
parties. [Footnote 13
The right of the carriers to insist that the consideration of
matter not in evidence invalidates the order was not lost by their
submission of the case without argument and
Page 265 U. S. 290
by their acquiescing in the suggestion that the presentation of
a tentative report by the examiner be omitted. While the course
pursued denied to the Commission the benefit of that full
presentation of the contentions of the parties which is often
essential to the exercise of sound judgment, it cannot be construed
as a waiver by the carriers of their legal rights. The general
notice that the Commission would rely upon the voluminous annual
reports is tantamount to giving no notice whatsoever. The matter
improperly treated as evidence may have been an important factor in
the conclusions reached by the Commission. The order must therefore
be held void.
A further objection of the carriers should be
considered. They point out that the record does not contain any
tariffs showing the individual joint rates, or any division sheets
showing how these individual joint rates are divided, nor any
information concerning the amount of service performed by the
Orient and its several connections under such individual joint
rates. As justification for this omission, it is argued that there
are in the record exhibits, furnished by the several carriers,
containing data from which the Commission could reach a conclusion
as to whether or not the divisions, taken as a whole, were
equitable as between the Orient and its several connections;
] that, in a
general rate case, evidence
Page 265 U. S. 291
"deemed typical of the whole rate structure" will support a
finding as to each rate in the structure by raising a rebuttable
presumption concerning each rate; that typical "evidence" in this
sense means not evidence directly representative of every
individual rate, but evidence tending to show the general
situation; that a like presumption arises in a division case; that
the data dealing with the traffic in the aggregate, which was
furnished by the exhibits constituted such typical evidence; that,
in this proceeding, information concerning individual rates and
divisions was not essential, and that the course pursued by the
examiner is in substance that upheld in the New England
Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184
261 U. S.
The argument is not sound. The power conferred by Congress on
the Commission is that of determining, in respect to each joint
rate, what divisions will be just. Evidence of individual rates or
divisions, said to be typical of all, affords a basis for a finding
as to any one. But averages are apt to be misleading. It cannot be
inferred that every existing division of every joint rate is unjust
as between particular carriers because the aggregate result of the
movement of the traffic on joint rates appears to be unjust. These
aggregate results should properly be taken into consideration by
the Commission, but it was not proper to accept them as a
substitute for typical evidence as to the individual joint rates
and divisions. In the New England Divisions Case,
and division sheets were introduced which, in the opinion of the
Commission, were typical in character and ample in quantity, to
justify the findings made in respect to each division of each rate
of every carrier. A like course should have been pursued in the
proceeding under review.
The percentage of the reduction prescribed in respect to the
several carriers ranges from 10 to 30 percent. Thus, the Missouri
Pacific's division was shrunk 20 percent. It was estimated that the
resulting reduction of its revenues would be $115,789.22. That
amount, added to the existing share of the Orient on this traffic,
would increase its division, on weighted average, over 14 percent.
The Texas & Pacific's division was also shrunk 20 percent. The
estimated resulting reduction of its revenues would be $121,140.81.
But that amount, added to the existing share of the Orient on this
traffic, would increase its division about 25 percent. The order
differs from that upheld in New England Divisions Case,
261 U. S. 184
which prescribed a percentage increase of the division of the New
England roads and directed that the amount of the increase be taken
from the existing shares of the several connecting carriers.
These needs had been the subject of repeated enquiries by the
Commission in connection with the granting and the renewal of a
loan from the United States under § 210 of Transportation Act,
1920. Loan to Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Railroad, 65 I.C.C.
265; 67 I.C.C. 23; Loans to the Receiver of
Kansas City, Mexico & Orient Railroad, 70 I.C.C. 639;
Interstate Commerce Act as amended, § 17; Annual
Report of the Commission (1920) pp. 3-6; The Chicago Junction
Case, 264 U. S. 258
Rules of Practice before the Commission, 1916, pp.
16, 23; 1923, pp. 18, 28. For instances of cases which were heard
by a division and later reheard by the Commission, see
I. Dupont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Houston & Brazos Valley R.
Co., 47 I.C.C. 221; 52 I.C.C. 538; Rockford Paper Box Board Co. v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 49 I.C.C. 586; 55 I.C.C. 262;
Steinhardt & Kelly v. Erie R. Co., 52 I.C.C. 304; 57 I.C.C.
369; Quinton Spelter Co. v. Fort Smith & Western R. Co., 53
I.C.C. 529; 61 I.C.C. 43; Empire Steel & Iron Co. v. Director
General, 56 I.C.C. 158; 62 I.C.C. 157; John Kline Brick Co. v.
Director General, 63 I.C.C. 439; 77 I.C.C. 420.
Interstate Commerce Act as amended, § 16a.
The case is wholly unlike those in which it is held that, where
a shipper attacks a through rate, all participating carriers must
be made respondents, even though the through rate is made up of
separately established elements. The complainant may wish to direct
his attack only against one of these. But it is only the through
rate which is in issue. It may be reasonable although one of its
elements is not. It must stand or fall as an entirety. See
Stevens Grocer Co. v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry.
Co., 42 I.C.C. 396, 398; McDavitt Bros. v. St. Louis, Brownsville
& Mexico Ry. Co., 43 I.C.C. 695; La Crosse Shippers' Assn. v.
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 43 I.C.C. 605, 607; E.
I. Dupont de Nemours Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 43 I.C.C. 227.
Star Grain & Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co., 14 I.C.C. 364, 371; Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce
v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 46
I.C.C. 547, 556; Johnson & Son v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.
Co., 51 I.C.C. 518, 520.
Compare Southern Pacific Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 219 U. S. 433
219 U. S. 443
New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
, 261 U. S. 189
United States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 263 U.
, 263 U. S.
Compare New England Divisions Case, 261 U.
, 261 U. S.
-195; Wichita Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock
Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 81 I.C.C. 513, 517.
These joint rates had been recently raised. Increased Rates,
1920, Ex parte 74, 58 I.C.C. 220. There was reductions later.
Reduced Rates, 1922, 68 I.C.C. 676; 69 I.C.C. 138.
This, they illustrate by an hypothetical case of a $1 rate from
a station on the Orient to a station on the Santa Fe for which
existing divisions are 20 cents to the Orient and 80 cents to the
Santa Fe. An increase of the Orient's division 25 percent would
have reduced the Santa Fe's division only 6 1/4 percent, while the
order made, by reducing the Santa Fe's division 25 percent,
increases that of the Orient 100 percent
These include for each of the carriers the data showing for the
year freight tons, one mile; passengers, one mile; all revenue car
miles; all revenue train miles; the total operating revenue; total
operating expenses; net revenue and investment in road and
equipment -- and they involved calculation of the respective gross
revenues per ton mile, per car mile, per train mile; operating
expenses per train mile, per car mile, per ton mile; net revenue
per ton mile, per car mile, per train mile; the return per $1,000
of investment, on the gross revenue, the net revenue, and the
railway operating income; the percentage of return on the gross
revenue, the net revenue and the operating income. The net railway
operating income for each of the lines is in the record.
Rule XIII, as in force prior to the revision of December 10,
1923, provides, in part:
"Where relevant and material matter offered in evidence is
embraced in a document containing other matter not material or
relevant and not intended to be put in evidence, such document will
not be received, but the party offering the same shall present to
opposing counsel and to the Commission true copies of such material
and relevant matter, in proper form, which may be received in
evidence and become part of the record."
"In case any portion of a tariff, report, circular, or other
document on file with the Commission is offered in evidence, the
party offering the same must give specific reference to the items
or pages and lines thereof to be considered. The Commission will
take notice of items in tariffs and annual or other periodical
reports of carriers properly on file with it or in annual,
statistical, or other official reports of the Commission. When it
is desired to direct the Commission's attention to such tariffs or
reports upon hearing or in briefs or argument, it must be done with
the precision specified in the second preceding sentence. In case
any testimony in other proceedings than the one on hearing is
introduced in evidence, a copy of such testimony must be presented
as an exhibit. When exhibits of a documentary character are to be
offered in evidence, copies should be furnished opposing counsel
for use at the hearing."
Its observance will not hamper the Commission in the performance
of its duties. For, if the materiality of some fact in a report is
not discovered by the Commission until after the close of the
hearing, there is power to reopen it for the purpose of introducing
The exhibits showed for the year 1921, the volume of traffic
moving on joint rates and interchanged between the Orient and each
of its direct connections; the part of the joint service performed
by the Orient and the part performed by its connection; the revenue
arising from the joint service, and how that revenue was divided.
For example: the exhibits showed that, during 1921, the Santa Fe
and the Orient interchanged 26,278 tons of freight; that, with
respect to such freight, the Orient performed 8,162,294 ton-miles
of transportation and the Santa Fe 5,793,098 ton-miles; that the
revenue arising from this joint service was $218,827.71, of which
the Orient received $106,889.59 and the Santa Fe $111,938.12; that
the per ton-mile revenue of the Orient was 1.309 cents and the per
ton-mile revenue of the Santa Fe 1.932 cents.