1. Conclusions of a state supreme court based upon questions of
federal law wrongly determined, and acted upon, require a reversal
of the judgment and remand of the cause for further
proceedings.
Page 274 U. S. 545
2. Laws of Arkansas, when extended over the Indian Territory by
Congress, carried with them the settled constructions placed upon
them by the Arkansas courts, and, so construed, became in effect
laws of the United States as though originally enacted by Congress
for the government of the Territory. P.
274 U. S.
549.
3. Under § 3509 of Mansfield's Digest of the Statutes of
Arkansas, as extended to the Indian Territory, a proceeding by a
guardian to sell land of his Choctaw Indian wards, allotted under
the Choctaw-Chickasaw Supplemental Agreement in the name of their
deceased ancestor, was an original proceeding -- not ancillary to
that in which the guardian was appointed -- and was properly begun
in the United States Court for that Territory of the judicial
district in which the land was situate, and, under the Oklahoma
Enabling Act, upon creation of that state, the cause was properly
transferable to a county court of a county included within the
former district in which it was begun and embracing in part the
land, although that was not the district in which the guardian was
appointed. P.
274 U. S.
551.
4. The seven-year limitation prescribed by § 4471 of Mansfield's
Digest upon suits to recover land began to run from the taking of
possession by one who continued in open peaceful possession for the
allotted time, though claiming under void muniments. P
274 U. S.
553.
5. Rights of action arising in the Indian Territory before the
admission of Oklahoma as a state remained subject to the Arkansas
statute of limitations. P.
274
U. S. 554.
114 Okla. 9
reversed.
Certiorari (271 U.S. 638) to a judgment of the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma directing a final decree for the respondents herein, in
their suit to establish against the petitioner their claim of title
to allotted Choctaw lands.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This controversy concerns title to lands allotted after her
death to Emma Patterson, a Choctaw Indian. Once
Page 274 U. S. 546
within the Southern Judicial District of Indian Territory, they
are now in Murray, Stephens, and Carter Counties, Oklahoma. By
original complaint presented to the Murray County District Court
February 21, 1920, respondents here -- William M. Patterson,
surviving husband of Mrs. Patterson, and their five children --
alleged that, although petitioner, U. Sherman Joines, had held
actual and peaceful possession of the lands since July 5, 1907, the
legal title thereto was in them, and they asked an appropriate
decree establishing their rights.
Mrs. Patterson, resident of the Central Judicial District,
Indian Territory, died there May 14, 1906, leaving five minor
children, born, respectively, 1894, 1897, 1900, 1903, and 1905. Her
surviving husband, father of these children and a white man, was
appointed guardian for them by the United States Court, Central
District, sitting at Durant (now in Bryan County, Oklahoma).
Thereafter, April 24, 1907, he petitioned the United States Court
for the Southern District, sitting at Ardmore (now in Carter
County, Oklahoma), to sell the lands. May 2, 1907, that court
authorized the sale, and on the following October 8, the guardian
filed his report, showing sale of them at public outcry July 5,
1907, for $2,000 to U. Sherman Joines, petitioner here, the highest
bidder. He also stated that, acting as their guardian, he had
conveyed to Joines all interest of the minors in the lands.
October 5, 1907, purporting to act as guardian, Patterson
undertook by deed to convey to Joines all the minors' interest in
the lands. Since then, Joines had held open and adverse
possession.
July 14, 1913, the County Court, Carter county, Oklahoma, after
reciting its succession to the United States Court sitting at
Ardmore, undertook to confirm the sale made in 1907. August 5,
1913, Patterson, purporting to act as guardian, again undertook by
deed to convey to
Page 274 U. S. 547
petitioner the minors' right, title, and interest in and to the
lands. This deed recited the court proceedings during 1907 and the
guardian's action thereunder, including his report of sale; also
the 1913 order of confirmation by the Carter County Court. It
further stated that court was
"authorized to be any and all things herein which the said
United States Court for the Southern District of the Indian
Territory, sitting at Ardmore, could have done."
The District Court for Murray County heard the present cause
without a jury upon an agreed statement of facts, and held:
That William M. Patterson acquired a life estate by curtesy in
the lands, which had been barred by the seven-year statute of
limitations in force within Indian Territory October 5, 1907.
That, by putting Joines into possession of the lands and
allowing him to retain this for 14 years without complaint,
Patterson estopped himself from asserting any claim thereto.
That the United States Court for the Southern District of Indian
Territory had jurisdiction to authorize sale by the guardian of the
minor's interest, and confirmation thereof by the County Court,
Carter County, Oklahoma, was not void.
That the adult children and heirs are barred by the statute of
limitations from asserting any claim to the lands.
An appropriate decree adjudging the issues for Joines
followed.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma first upheld the
trial court, but, after a rehearing, it disapproved all the
above-stated conclusions, reversed the judgment, and directed final
decree for respondents here.
Patterson v. Joines, 114 Okl.
9.
The Supreme Court accepted and acted upon at least two
conclusions which we think are erroneous: (1) That the proceeding
in the United States Court at Ardmore
Page 274 U. S. 548
to sell the lands was merely ancillary to the main guardianship
matter at Durant, in the Central district, and therefore should
have been transferred to Bryan, not to Carter, County. (2) That the
Arkansas seven-year statute of limitations -- § 4471, Mansfield's
Digest -- did not commence to run against William M. Patterson and
in favor of Joines when the latter took possession, since no
interest passed to him, the court proceedings and the guardian's
deed being wholly insufficient to give even color of title. These
conclusions were based upon questions of federal law wrongly
determined. They were acted upon by the court below. We must
therefore reverse its judgment and remand the cause for further
proceedings.
See Whitehead v. Galloway, 249 U. S.
79.
Section 30, Act of May 2, 1890, c. 182, 26 Stat. 81, 94, as
amended by the Act of March 1, 1895, c. 145, 28 Stat. 693, divided
Indian Territory into three judicial districts -- Northern,
Central, and Southern -- and defined their limits. Section 31
extended over it certain general laws of Arkansas as published in
Mansfield's Digest. Among these were Chapters 20, 49, 73, and 97,
relating, respectively, to the common and statute law of England,
descent and distribution, guardians, curators and wards, and
limitations.
Section 32 of the same Act provided that "county," in the laws
of Arkansas so extended, should mean judicial division (afterwards
district), and "Indian Territory" might be substituted for "State
of Arkansas."
Section 22, Act of Congress approved July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32
Stat. 641, 643 -- the Choctaw-Chickasaw Supplemental Agreement --
provided:
"If any person whose name appears upon the rolls, prepared as
herein provided, shall have died subsequent to the ratification of
this agreement and before receiving his allotment of land the lands
to which such person would have been entitled if living shall be
allotted in his name, and shall,
Page 274 U. S. 549
together with his proportionate share of other tribal property,
descend to his heirs according to the laws of descent and
distribution as provided in chapter forty-nine of Mansfield's
Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas:
Provided, that the
allotment thus to be made shall be selected by a duly appointed
administrator or executor."
When extended over Indian Territory, the specified laws of
Arkansas carried the settled constructions placed upon them by
courts of that state. So construed, they became, in effect, laws of
the United States as though originally enacted by Congress for
government of the territory.
Willis v. Eastern Trust &
Banking Co., 169 U. S. 295,
169 U. S. 307;
James v. Appel, 192 U. S. 129,
192 U. S. 135;
Gidney v. Chappel, 241 U. S. 99,
241 U. S. 102.
See also Byrd v. State, 99 Okl. 165.
Oklahoma, with boundaries including Indian Territory, came into
the Union November 16, 1907. The Enabling Act, approved June 16,
1906, c. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 277, as amended by the Act of March 4,
1907, c. 2911, 34 Stat. 1286, 1287, directed:
"Sec.19. That the courts of original jurisdiction of such state
shall be deemed to be the successor of all courts of original
jurisdiction of said territories and as such shall take and retain
custody of all records, dockets, journals, and files of such courts
except in causes transferred therefrom, as herein provided; the
files and papers in such transferred cases shall be transferred to
the proper United States circuit or district court, together with a
transcript of all book entries to complete the record in such
particular case so transferred."
"Sec. 20. That all causes, proceedings, and matters, civil or
criminal, pending in the district courts of Oklahoma Territory, or
in the United States Courts in the Indian Territory at the time
said territories become a state, not transferred to the United
States circuit or district courts in the State of Oklahoma, shall
be proceeded
Page 274 U. S. 550
with, held, and determined by the courts of said state, the
successors of said district courts of the Territory of Oklahoma and
the United States Courts in the Indian Territory, with the right to
prosecute appeals or writs of error to the supreme or appellate
court of said state, and also with the same right to prosecute
appeals or writs of error from the final determination in such
cases made by the supreme or appellate court of such state to the
Supreme Court of the United States as is provided by law for
appeals and writs of error from the supreme [or] final appellate
court of a state to the Supreme Court of the United States."
The Constitution of Oklahoma provides:
"Section 1 ['Schedule']. No existing rights, actions, suits,
proceedings, contracts, or claims shall be affected by the change
in the forms of government, but all shall continue as if no change
in the forms of government had taken place. And all processes which
may have been issued previous to the admission of the state into
the Union under the authority of the Territory of Oklahoma or under
the authority of the laws in force in the Indian Territory shall be
as valid as if issued in the name of the state."
"Section 2. All laws in force in the Territory of Oklahoma at
the time of the admission of the state into the Union which are not
repugnant to this constitution and which are not locally
inapplicable shall be extended to and remain in force in the State
of Oklahoma until they expire by their own limitation or are
altered or repealed by law."
"Section 23. When this Constitution shall go into effect, the
books, records, papers, and proceedings of the probate court in
each county, and all causes and matters of administration and
guardianship, and other matters pending therein, shall be
transferred to the county court of such county, except of Day
County, which shall be
Page 274 U. S. 551
transferred to the County Court of Ellis County, and the county
courts of the respective counties shall proceed to final decree or
judgment, order, or other termination in the said several matters
and causes as the said probate court might have done if this
Constitution had not been adopted. The district court of any
county, the successor of the United States Court for the Indian
Territory, in each of the counties formed in whole or in part in
the Indian Territory, shall transfer to the county court of such
county all matters, proceedings, records, books, papers, and
documents appertaining to all causes or proceedings relating to
estates:
Provided, that the legislature may provide for
the transfer of any of said matters and causes to another county
than herein prescribed."
Section 3509, Mansfield's Digest:
"When it shall appear that it would be for the benefit of a ward
that his real estate or any part thereof be sold or leased and the
proceeds put on interest, or invested in productive stocks, or in
other real estate, his guardian or curator may sell or lease the
same accordingly upon obtaining an order for such sale or lease
from the court of probate of the county in which such real estate
or the greater part thereof shall be situate."
Sections 3510 and 3511 prescribe the procedure for such
causes.
Reid v. Hart, 45 Ark. 41, 46, 48 (1885), distinctly
holds that the court of the county wherein lies real estate
belonging to a ward is the proper tribunal to entertain an
application for its sale by his guardian. The opinion declares:
"There had, however, been provisions made for the sale of lands,
on the application of administrators and executors, for the payment
of debts. They were adopted early in our state history, being found
in the Revised Code (Section 147), and remained in force until the
adoption of the Civil Code of 1868. They required that the
application for such an order should be made to the probate court
of the county
in which the lands are situate. The
Page 274 U. S. 552
Act of December 23, 1846, enlarged the scope of purposes for
which such sales might be made, and associated 'guardians' with
personal representatives (
ubi supra), but made no change
as to the tribunal. It may fairly be inferred that, by this
association, the legislature contemplated that guardians should
conform to the same rule, and make their applications for the sale
of lands in the county where they lay. . . . This is law to this
day, and has been brought forward into Mansfield's Digest, § 3509.
This displays a system by which we endeavor to supply the omission
in the Act of 1846, which fails to designate the probate court
meant, by reasoning from the organic unity of the whole
system."
And see MaHarry v. Eatman, 29 Okl. 46, 53.
Under the statute thus construed, the court for the Southern
Judicial District, Indian Territory, at Ardmore, had jurisdiction
of the guardian's petition to sell. The cause there was not merely
ancillary to the original guardian proceeding in the Central
District, wherein Patterson was appointed. It had the status of an
independent suit.
The Enabling Act directed that causes pending in the United
States courts for Indian Territory should be proceeded with and
determined by the successor courts of Oklahoma. As we understand
the opinion below, the court recognized that, if the guardian's
suit for sale, begun at Ardmore, was an original and independent
one, transfer of it to the Carter County Court for further action
was proper. We think it was an original proceeding, and therefore
was transferred to the proper court for further action according to
the rights of the parties.
See Dewalt v. Cline, 35
Okl.197, and
Bailey v. Jones, 96 Okl. 56.
Joines went into open, peaceful possession of the allotted lands
October 5, 1907, when the following parts of Chapter 97,
Mansfield's Digest, were in force:
Page 274 U. S. 553
"Section 4471. No person or persons, or their heirs, shall have,
sue, or maintain any action or suit, either in law or equity, for
any lands, tenements, or hereditaments but within seven years next
after his, her or their right to commence, have, or maintain such
suit shall have come, fallen, or accrued, and all suits, either in
law or equity, for the recovery of any lands, tenements, or
hereditaments shall be had and sued within seven years next after
title or cause of action accrued, and no time after said seven
years shall have passed. . . ."
"Section 4476. No action for the recovery of real property, when
the plaintiff does not claim title to the lands, shall be brought
to maintained when the plaintiff or his testator or intestate has
been five years out of possession."
Under the settled construction given to the seven-year statute
of limitations by the courts of Arkansas, it began to run against
Patterson when Joines took possession.
"So long as a man is in possession of land, claiming title,
however wrongfully and with whatever degree of knowledge that he
had no right, so long the real owner is out of possession in a
constructive as well as an actual sense. It is of the nature of the
statute of limitation, when applied to civil actions, in effect, to
mature a wrong into a right by cutting off the remedy. To warrant
its application in ejectment, the books require color of title, by
deed or other documental semblance of right in the defendant, only
when the defense is founded on a constructive adverse possession.
But neither a deed nor any equivalent muniment is necessary where
the possession is indicated by actual occupation and any other
evidence of an adverse claim exists. The muniment is but one
circumstance by which to make out an adverse possession."
Ferguson v. Peden, 33 Ark. 150, 155;
Jacks v.
Chaffin (1879), 34 Ark. 534, 541;
Logan v. Jelks, 34
Ark. 547, 549.
Page 274 U. S. 554
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma seems definitely to have approved
the doctrine that rights of action arising in Indian Territory
prior to statehood remained subject to the Arkansas statute of
limitations.
Patterson v. Rousney, 58 Okl. 185, 202;
Davis v. Foley, 60 Okl. 87, 88.
And see U.S. Fidelity,
etc., Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 49 Okl. 398, 408;
Sandlin
v. Barker, 95 Okl. 113, 117.
Considering our conclusions in respect of the two federal
questions already dealt with and views long accepted by the court
below, it seems unnecessary for us now to consider other points
relied on by counsel.
Reversed.