2. The federal inheritance tax law is constitutional, and must
prevail over any conflicting provisions of state laws or
constitutions. P.
273 U. S.
17.
3. The constitutional requirement of uniformity in excise
taxation (Art. I, § 8, cl. 1) is satisfied when, by the provisions
of a tax law, the rule of liability under it is the same in all
parts of the United States. P.
273 U. S.
17.
4. The fact that the provisions of the federal act allowing
deduction of state inheritance taxes in computing the federal tax
cannot be availed of in Florida, since that state, by her
constitution, is forbidden to tax inheritance, does not sustain an
allegation that the federal tax will directly injure her revenue by
inducing the withdrawal of property from the state. P.
273 U. S.
17.
5. A state can not, as
parens patriae, represent her
citizens in a suit to protect them from unconstitutional
inequalities alleged to result from a federal tax law. P.
273 U. S. 18.
Leave to file bill denied.
Upon a rule to show cause why the petition of the State of
Florida to file a bill of complaint in this Court should not be
granted. The proposed bill sought to enjoin the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue from attempting
to collect federal inheritance taxes in Florida.
Page 273 U. S. 15
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Florida seeks leave to file a bill of complaint
against the defendants, citizens of other states, to enjoin them
from attempting to collect in Florida inheritance taxes imposed by
§ 301 of the Revenue Act of 1926, c. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 69, 70. A rule
upon the defendants to show cause why such leave should not be
granted was issued and answered.
The complaint alleges that, under the Constitution of Florida,
no tax on inheritances can be levied by the state or under its
authority; that, by § 301 of the act referred to, certain graduated
taxes are imposed on the estates of decedents subject to the
following provision:
"The tax imposed by this section shall be credited with the
amount of any estate, inheritance, legacy, or succession taxes
actually paid to any state or territory or the District of Columbia
in respect of any property included in the gross estate. The credit
allowed by this subdivision shall not exceed 80 percentum of the
tax imposed by this section, and shall include only such taxes as
were actually paid and credit therefor claimed within three years
after the filing of the return required by § 304."
It is further alleged that the defendants are officers of the
United States, and are seeking to enforce the provisions of § 301;
that citizens of Florida have died since the act was passed,
leaving estates subject to taxation under the terms of that
section; that defendants have required and are requiring the legal
representatives of such decedents to make returns under that
section, and, unless such action is restrained, it will result in
the withdrawal from Florida of several million dollars per annum,
and thus diminish the revenues of the state derived
Page 273 U. S. 16
largely from taxation of property therein; that the state is
directly interested in the matter, because it raises by taxation a
sufficient amount of revenue to pay the expenses of the state
government otherwise than by imposing inheritance taxes or taxes on
incomes, and that the provisions of the said section constitute an
invasion of the sovereign rights of the state and a direct effort
on the part of Congress to coerce the state into imposing an
inheritance tax and to penalize it and its property and citizens
for the failure to do so. It is further alleged that the state is
directly interested in preventing the unlawful discrimination
against its citizens which is effected by § 301, and in protecting
them against the risk of prosecution for failure to comply with the
enforcement provisions of the act; that the several states, except
Florida, Alabama, and Nevada, levy inheritance taxes, but, by
reason of the provisions of its Constitution, Florida cannot place
its citizens on an equality with those of the other states in
respect of the tax in question, and therefore the tax is not
uniform throughout the United States, as required by § 8 of Article
I of the federal Constitution.
The allegations of the bill suggest two possible grounds upon
which the asserted right of complainant to invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court may be supported: (a) that the state is directly
injured because the imposition of the federal tax, in the absence
of a state tax which may be credited, will cause the withdrawal of
property from the state, with the consequent loss to the state of
subjects of taxation, and (b) that the citizens of the state are
injured in such a way that the state may sue in their behalf as
parens patriae. Neither ground is tenable.
While judicial relief sometimes may be granted to a
quasi-sovereign state under circumstances which would not
justify relief if the suit were between private parties
(
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.
S. 230,
206 U. S.
237), nevertheless it must appear that the state has
suffered
Page 273 U. S. 17
a wrong furnishing ground for judicial redress or is asserting a
right susceptible of judicial enforcement. The mere fact that a
state is the plaintiff is not enough.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins.
Co., 127 U. S. 265,
127 U. S. 287;
Oklahoma v. A., T. & Santa Fe Ry., 220 U.
S. 277,
220 U. S. 286,
220 U. S.
289.
The act assailed was passed by Congress in pursuance of its
power to lay and collect taxes, and, following the decision of this
Court in respect of the preceding act of 1916,
New York Trust
Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345,
must be held to be constitutional. If the act interferes with the
exercise by the state of its full powers of taxation or has the
effect of removing property from its reach which otherwise would be
within it, that is a contingency which affords no ground for
judicial relief. The act is a law of the United States, made in
pursuance of the Constitution, and therefore the supreme law of the
land, the Constitution or laws of the states to the contrary
notwithstanding. Whenever the constitutional powers of the federal
government and those of the state come into conflict, the latter
must yield.
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.
S. 339,
100 U. S. 346;
Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591,
161 U. S. 606;
Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U. S. 410,
188 U. S. 428;
Lane County v.
Oregon, 7 Wall. 71,
74 U. S. 77.
The contention that the federal tax is not uniform, because
other states impose inheritance taxes while Florida does not, is
without merit. Congress cannot accommodate its legislation to the
conflicting or dissimilar laws of the several states, nor control
the diverse conditions to be found in the various states, which
necessarily work unlike results from the enforcement of the same
tax. All that the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl. 1) requires is
that the law shall be uniform in the sense that, by its provisions,
the rule of liability shall be alike in all parts of the United
States.
The claim of immediate injury to the state rests upon the
allegation that the act will have the result of inducing potential
taxpayers to withdraw property from the state,
Page 273 U. S. 18
thereby diminishing the subjects upon which the state power of
taxation may operate. The averment to that effect, however, affords
no basis for relief, because not only is the state's right of
taxation subordinate to that of the general government, but the
anticipated result is purely speculative and, at most, only remote
and indirect.
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,
194 U. S. 48,
194 U. S. 68-70.
If, as alleged, the supposed withdrawal of property will diminish
the revenues of the state,
non constat that the deficiency
cannot readily be made up by an increased rate of taxation. Plainly
there is no substance in the contention that the state has
sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, any direct
injury as the result of the enforcement of the act in question.
See In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443,
123 U. S. 496;
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447,
262 U. S.
488.
Nor can the suit be maintained by the state because of any
injury to its citizens. They are also citizens of the United
States, and subject to its laws. In respect of their relations with
the federal government,
"it is the United States, and not the state, which represents
them as
parens patriae when such representation becomes
appropriate, and to the former, and not to the latter, they must
look for such protective measures as flow from that status."
Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra, p.
262 U. S.
485-486.
It follows that leave to file the bill of complaint must be
denied.
Rule discharged, and leave denied.