1. The clause in Jud.Code, §§ 24, 256 relating to causes arising
under the maritime law and " saving to suitors in all cases the
right to a common law remedy where the common law is competent to
give it" is not limited to rights recognized by the maritime law as
existing in 1789 when the clause was first adopted, but includes
rights brought into that law by subsequent legislation, if of a
kind to be readily enforced in actions
in personam in the
course of the common law. P.
271 U. S.
560.
2. State courts have jurisdiction concurrently with federal
courts in actions brought by seamen under § 20 of the Seamen's Act,
as amended by the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, to recover damages
for personal injuries. P.
271 U.S.
561.
3. In providing that "[j]urisdiction in such actions shall be
under the court of the district in which the defendant employer
resides or in which his principal office is located," the Act
regulates venue, and does not deal with jurisdiction as between
state and federal courts.
Id.
239 N.Y. 590 affirmed.
Page 271 U. S. 558
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York,
entered on affirmance by the court of appeals, awarding damages
against the railroad company in an action for negligence resulting
in the death of plaintiff's intestate while employed as a seaman on
defendant's ship.
Page 271 U. S. 559
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action by the personal representative of a deceased
seaman against the owner of the ship whereon he was serving at the
time of his death, to recover damages for the death on the ground
that it was caused by the owner's negligence in providing an unfit
lighting appliance to be used by him in his work. The right of
action was based on § 20 of the Seamen's Act of 1915, c. 153, 38
Stat. 1164, as amended by § 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
c. 250, 41 Stat. 988. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by
the highest court of the state, and the defendant brings the case
here.
The sole question presented is whether state courts may
entertain such actions, the defendant's contention being that they
are cognizable only in the federal district courts.
Amended § 20,
* as heretofore
construed, changes the prior maritime law of the United States by
giving to seamen injured through the negligence of their
employers,
Page 271 U. S. 560
and to their personal representatives where the injuries result
in death, the rights given to railway employees and their personal
representatives by the Employers' Liability Act of 1908 and its
amendments.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375. And the procedural provisions therein have been
construed, when read in connection with §§ 24 (third) and 256
(third) of the Judicial Code, and in the light of constitutional
rules respecting admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, to mean that
the new substantive rights may be asserted and enforced either in
actions
in personam against the employers in courts
administering common law remedies, with a right of trial by jury,
or in suits in admiralty in courts administering remedies in
admiralty, without trial by jury, but always taking the changed
maritime law as the basis and measure of the rights asserted.
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra.
The sections of the Judicial Code just cited, while investing
the federal district courts with jurisdiction "exclusive of the
courts of the several states" of all "civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction," contain an excepting clause expressly
"saving to suitors in all cases the right to a common law remedy
where the common law is competent to give it." This clause is a
continuation of a like clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
always has been construed as permitting substantive rights under
the maritime law to recover money for service rendered, or as
damages for tortious injuries, to be asserted and enforced in
actions
in personam according to the course of the common
law.
Chelentis v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 247 U.
S. 372,
247 U. S. 384;
Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra, p.
264 U. S.
388-390. And it uniformly has been regarded as
permitting such actions to be brought in either the federal courts
or the state courts, as the possessor of the right may elect.
Leon v.
Galceran, 11 Wall. 185,
78 U. S. 188;
Schoonmaker v. Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118;
Chappell
v.
Page 271 U. S. 561
Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132,
128 U. S. 134;
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.
S. 255;
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U. S. 109,
264 U. S.
123.
In so saying, we must be understood as fully recognizing what
often has been held in other cases -- that the saving clause does
not include suits
in rem or other forms of proceeding
unknown to the common law.
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411,
71 U. S. 431;
The Hine v.
Trevor, 4 Wall. 555,
71 U. S. 571;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
244 U. S. 218.
But an action
in personam to recover damages for tort is
one of the most familiar of the common law remedies, and it is such
a remedy at law that is contemplated by amended § 20 of the
Seamen's Act and invoked in this case.
The defendant insists that the saving clause refers only to
rights recognized by the maritime law as existing in 1789, when the
clause first was adopted, and therefore does not include rights
brought into the maritime law by subsequent legislative changes. We
think the clause has a broader meaning, looks to the future as well
as the past, and includes new as well as old rights, if only they
are such as readily admit of assertion and enforcement in actions
in personam according to the course of the common law.
This is the view that was taken in
Steamboat
Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522,
83 U. S.
533.
The defendant also points to the provision in amended § 20
saying,
"Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the
district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his
principal office is located,"
and argues therefrom that Congress has manifested a purpose to
restrict the enforcement of the newly given rights to the federal
district courts. The provision is not aptly worded to express that
purpose, and, taken alone, is confusing. We think it falls short of
that certainty which naturally would be manifested in making an
intended departure from the long prevailing policy evidenced by
Page 271 U. S. 562
the saving clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and in the two
sections of the Judicial Code, and that the more reasonable view is
that it is intended to regulate venue, and not to deal with
jurisdiction as between federal and state courts.
Panama R. Co.
v. Johnson, supra, pp.
264 U. S. 384,
264 U. S. 391;
Re East River Co., 266 U. S. 355,
266 U. S. 368;
Engel v. Davenport, ante, p.
271 U. S. 33.
We well might have rested our decision here on the conclusion
reached in
Engel v. Davenport, where we said:
"It is clear that the state courts have jurisdiction
concurrently with the federal courts, to enforce the right of
action established by the Merchant Marine Act as a part of the
maritime law."
But, out of deference to the elaborate presentation of the
question in this case, we have stated and dealt with the several
points advanced as making for a different conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"Sec. 20. That any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in
the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an
action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in
such action all statutes of the United States modifying or
extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees shall apply, and in case of the death
of any seaman as a result of any such personal injury, the personal
representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at
law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all
statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of
action for death in the case of railway employees shall be
applicable. Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court
of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which
his principal office is located."