1. When the district court and circuit court of appeals agree
upon all material facts, this Court will consider them only so far
as needful to pass on questions of law. P.
270 U. S.
381.
2. The statutes of South Dakota (Rev.Code 1919, §§ 8458
et
seq., §§ 8467, 8470) contain no provision by which the cost of
reconstructing or maintaining existing drainage works may be
assessed on lands which were not embraced within or assessed in
connection with the project as originally established. P.
270 U. S.
383.
3. It is the duty of the federal courts, in suits brought in or
removed to the district courts, to decide for themselves all
relevant questions of state law, including the meaning of the state
statutes where they have not been clearly and decisively passed
upon by the state court. P.
270 U. S.
387.
Page 270 U. S. 379
4. Questions involving the federal Constitution, giving the
federal court jurisdiction, need not be passed upon when the case
is decided by applying the state law. P.
270 U. S.
387.
5. Suits in the federal court to enjoin state officials from
equalizing benefits of drainage work and making assessments of the
cost
held not premature, but within equitable jurisdiction
where the ground of the suits was the invalidity of the whole
proceedings, and not merely inequality in apportionment of
benefits, and where the effects of the proceedings would be to
establish liens on plaintiffs' lands, clouding the titles, and
subject them to liability for future assessments. P.
270 U. S.
387.
6. The remedy in such cases afforded by § 8465 of So.Dak.Code,
1919, does not appear to be coextensive with the relief afforded by
equity.
Id.
7. The test of equity jurisdiction in a federal court is the
inadequacy of the remedy on the law side of that court, and not the
inadequacy of the remedies afforded by the state courts. P.
270 U. S.
388.
8. It does not appear that the law of South Dakota affords a
remedy, in cases like the present, by payment of the assessment and
suit to recover it back, which could be availed of in the federal
court, or that such remedy, if available, would not entail a
multiplicity of suits. P.
270 U. S.
388.
9. Where the legal remedy under the state law is uncertain, the
federal court (having jurisdiction as such of the case) has
jurisdiction in equity to enjoin illegal assessments. P.
270 U. S.
389.
10. Jurisdictional amount
held involved in suits
against a board to enjoin illegal apportionments and assessments of
cost of drainage work, where the board had made tentative
assessments against plaintiffs in excess of that amount and the
basis of the suits was want of jurisdiction to make such
apportionments and assessments. P.
270 U. S.
389.
11. Plaintiffs
held not estopped to question the
legality of proceedings to extend drainage assessments to their
land outside the drainage area because of their relation to the
proceeding or to the construction before they had knowledge of the
purpose so to extend the assessments. P.
270 U. S.
389.
12. A bill by a city to restrain the laying of drainage
assessments under a law of its own state as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment is too unsubstantial to confer jurisdiction on
a federal court, since the Amendment does not restrain the power of
the state and its agencies over its municipal corporations. P.
270 U. S.
389.
297 F. 710 affirmed in part, reversed in part.
Page 270 U. S. 380
Appeals from decrees of the circuit court of appeals which
affirmed decrees of the district court (282 F. 364) in favor of
four railroad companies, a power company, and a city in six suits
brought by them to enjoin a board of county commissioners and
certain state officers of South Dakota from extending apportionment
of benefits and assessments of costs of a drainage project to
outside lands.
MR. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Separate suits were brought by the several appellees, in the
United States district court for South Dakota, to enjoin the county
commissioners, the auditor, and the treasurer of Minnehaha County,
South Dakota, from making any apportionment of benefits or
assessments of costs affecting the property of the several
appellees, for
Page 270 U. S. 381
the construction or repair of a drainage system in the area
within the county embraced in a project known as "Drainage Ditch
No. 1 and 2."
In all of the suits except No. 99, there was diversity of
citizenship. In each it was alleged that an amount in excess of the
jurisdictional requirement was in controversy, and in each it was
alleged that proceedings purporting to be had under the South
Dakota drainage statutes, with respect to the lands of the
appellees, were unauthorized and void, and that those statutes and
proceedings denied to appellees due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws in contravention of the Constitution of the
United States. The suits were tried together, and a decree was
given for the plaintiffs by the district court.
Chicago, R.I.
& P. R. Co. v. Risty, 282 F. 364. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, on appeal, affirmed the decree
(
Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 297 F. 710), and
the cases are brought here on appeal. Jud.Code, §§ 128, 241, before
Act of February 13, 1925;
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban
R. Co., 244 U. S. 499,
244 U. S. 508.
Petition for certiorari was denied, 266 U.S. 622.
The two courts below agree as to all material facts. We
accordingly consider them here only so far as is needful to pass on
questions of law.
United States v. State Investment Co.,
264 U. S. 206,
264 U. S.
211.
In 1907, the Board of County Commissioners of Minnehaha County,
acting under the constitution and laws of the state, established
"Drainage Ditch No. 1," extending from a point north of the City of
Sioux Falls, thence south, and then to the east of Sioux Falls, 3
miles in all, to the Big Sioux River, into which it emptied. From
the main ditch, a spur ditch was extended northwest to a point near
the Big Sioux River, which from that point passes to the southwest
and thence flows east, forming a loop about the principal part of
the City of Sioux Falls, and finally flows through the city on its
easterly side in a northeasterly direction.
Page 270 U. S. 382
In 1910, the Board of County Commissioners established Drainage
Ditch No. 2, extending northerly from the north terminus of Ditch
No. 1 for a distance of 12 miles. The two ditches thus formed one
continuous ditch, draining agricultural lands lying to the north of
the city. Both ditches, and the assessment districts in connection
with them, are conceded to have been lawfully established.
In 1916, the river broke through its banks into the area drained
by the spur ditch, and, uniting with the flood water flowing from
the river through Ditch No. 2, flooded the main ditch, No. 1,
washed out and destroyed a spillway on Ditch No. 1, and in its
uncontrolled flow to the river caused extensive damage. There was
danger that the river, by its flow through the ditch, would be
diverted from its natural course, cutting off the city's water
supply and causing other damage to the city and to individuals.
In August, 1916, a proceeding was instituted by petition to the
Board of County Commissioners, purporting to be pursuant to
statute,
"to reconstruct and improve Drainage Ditches Nos. 1 and 2 . . .
and to pay therefor by an assessment upon the property, persons and
corporations benefitted."
This proceeding resulted in resolutions of the commissioners
purporting to establish "drainage district No. 1 and 2" and
providing for the construction of the proposed ditch. The location
fixed for it, however, was identical with that of the old ditches
No. 1 and No. 2. The county commissioners then caused the
previously established Ditch No. 1 and Ditch No. 2 to be diked,
cleaned out, and widened and deepened at certain points; the river
to be straightened, and the spillway to be reconstructed so as to
continue and safeguard the flow of water through Ditch No. 1 and
Ditch No. 2. The cost was approximately $255,000.
Proceedings were then had by the County Commissioners for the
assessment of benefits to defray the expenses thus incurred. The
assessments of benefits were extended
Page 270 U. S. 383
to areas not embraced in the assessment districts of Ditch No. 1
and Ditch No. 2, as previously established, and resulted in the
assessment of benefits now complained of, made against all the
appellees, some of whom did and some of whom did not own land
within the area originally assessed for the establishment of Ditch
No. 1 and Ditch No. 2. When the present suits were commenced,
notice had been given to the appellees of a tentative assessment of
benefits to their land, and of a proceeding to be had to equalize
benefits before final assessments for the cost of construction.
Both courts below found that the Drainage Ditch No. 1 and 2 was
not a new project, but was in fact identical with the previously
established ditches No. 1 and No. 2, that no new or additional
drainage was established, and that the only purpose of the
proceedings was to provide for the maintenance and repair of the
previously established ditches by assessing the cost on tracts not
included within the area originally assessed for their
construction. For these reasons, among others, both courts held
that the proceedings had by the Board of County Commissioners to
apportion and assess benefits on land outside the original drainage
districts were unauthorized and void under the statutes of South
Dakota. In this, we think they were right.
Section 8458 of the South Dakota Revised Code of 1919 provides
that the Board of County Commissioners
"may establish and cause to be constructed any ditch or drain;
may provide for the straightening or enlargement of any watercourse
or drain previously constructed, and may provide for the
maintenance of such ditch, drain or watercourse. . . ."
Section 8476 provides that the powers conferred for establishing
and constructing drains
"shall also extend to the include the deepening and widening of
any drains
Page 270 U. S. 384
which have heretofore been or may hereafter be constructed,"
and that no proceedings shall be had under this section "except
upon notice and the other procedure prescribed herein for the
construction of drains."
The procedure prescribed by the South Dakota statutes embraces
two distinct schemes or methods for carrying into effect the
authority of the Board of County Commissioners. The one relates
exclusively to the establishment and construction of proposed
drainage; the other to assessments for further costs and
maintenance of drainage already established. With reference to the
establishment of proposed drainage, it is provided that the board
shall act only on petition of a landowner affected by the "proposed
drainage" (§ 8459), and, upon the filing of the petition, the board
shall cause the "proposed route" of the drainage to be inspected
and, if necessary, surveyed (§ 8460). It is required to hold a
hearing on notice describing the proposed drainage (§ 8461), and,
after hearing, the drainage "may be established" in accordance with
the petition or the findings of the board (§ 8462). After the
establishment of the drainage, the board is required to determine
"the proportion of benefits of the proposed drainage," and to fix a
time and place for equalization of benefits, on notice describing
the land affected by the "proposed drainage," and to state the
proportion of benefits fixed for each tract, benefits being
considered
"such as accrue directly by the construction of such drainage or
indirectly by virtue of such drainage being an outlet for
connection drains that may be subsequently constructed."
Section 8463. Following equalization of benefits as prescribed,
the board is authorized to make an assessment against each tract,
"in proportion to the benefits as equalized," for the purpose of
paying damages and the cost of establishment, which are stated to
include all the expenses "incurred or to be incurred that in any
way contributed or will contribute to the establishment or
construction
Page 270 U. S. 385
of the drainage." All assessments are made perpetual liens upon
the tracts assessed (§ 8464).
The only provisions contained in the statutes for equalization
of benefits are those found in the sections referred to, which have
to do with the establishment of proposed drainage. By § 8477, all
drains, when constructed, are in charge of the Board of County
Commissioners, who are made responsible for keeping them open and
in repair. The statutory provisions which deal with assessments for
further costs of construction and for maintenance are found in §§
8467 and 8470, the material portions of which are printed in the
margin.
* It will be
observed that there is no provision for the assessment or
equalization of benefits in connection with the procedure provided
in those sections for assessing for further costs of construction
and maintenance. No such provision is required, for, by the
Page 270 U. S. 386
express terms of § 8467, the procedure for making assessments
for the additional cost of construction is like that provided for
the first assessment for construction (§ 8464) after the
equalization of benefits has been had under § 8463, and, by § 8470,
assessments for maintenance are to he made "upon the landowners
affected in the proportions determined for such drainage." Both
sections clearly contemplate that assessments for additional
construction and for maintenance are to be made upon those lands
which are already embraced within the drainage project, and on
which the proportion of benefits has been determined by
equalization proceedings had after the establishment of the
original project.
The statutes of South Dakota contain no provision for assessing
the cost of reconstruction or maintenance of an existing drainage
project except in the two sections last referred to, and they make
no provision for assessing such costs upon lands not embraced
within or assessed in connection with the drainage as originally
established. Whether the cost of construction work actually done on
Ditch No. 1 and Ditch No. 2 and involved in this litigation be
regarded as additional costs of construction or as cost of
maintenance, or partly one and partly the other, there is no
statutory authority for assessing that cost on lands not included
in the original drainage district.
By § 8489, it is provided that:
"If any proceeding for the location, establishment or
construction of any drain . . . has been . . . voluntarily
abandoned . . . for any cause, the Board of County Commissioners
may nevertheless . . . locate a drain . . . under the same of
different names and in the same or different locations from those
described in the . . . abandoned proceeding under the provisions of
this article."
But the original proceedings for the establishment and
construction of Ditch No. 1 and Ditch No. 2 were not abandoned, and
the proceedings had for levying the assessments now
Page 270 U. S. 387
in question were not framed or conducted on that theory. They
were consequently without authority in law, and could not affect
the rights of appellees.
While there are expressions in the opinion in
Gilseth v.
Risty, 46 S.D. 374, decided after these suits were begun,
which, standing by themselves, might be regarded as supporting the
view that the proceedings now in question were authorized by the
statutes of South Dakota, the court clearly rested its decision
upon other grounds. It is the duty of the federal courts, in suits
brought in or removed to the district courts, to decide for
themselves all relevant questions of state law, and while they will
follow the decisions of state courts as to the interpretation of a
state statute, we do not think that the case of
Gilseth v.
Risty, supra, so clearly or decisively passed upon the
question here involved as to control our decision.
Kuhn v.
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349;
Barber v. Pittsburgh, etc., Railway, 166 U. S.
83,
166 U. S. 99.
And see Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin,
268 U. S. 458.
As our decision in these cases turns on the construction and
application of the state law, we do not pass upon the
constitutional questions raised.
See Bohler v. Callaway,
267 U. S. 479,
267 U. S. 489;
Chicago G. W. Ry. v. Rendall, 266 U. S.
94,
266 U. S. 97-98.
They are, however, questions of substance, and sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction to pass on the whole case.
Greene v.
Louisville & Interurban R. Co., supra; Chicago G. W. Ry. v.
Kendall, supra; Bohler v. Callaway, supra.
The objections to the exercise of equity jurisdiction in these
cases require no extended comment. When the appellees filed their
bills, the drainage project had been completed and construction
warrants had been issued for the work done; benefits apportioned to
the lands of the appellee had been tentatively fixed and notice of
a hearing for the equalization of benefits had been given. The
steps next in order after the hearing would have been the
Page 270 U. S. 388
assessment of costs of construction and the filing of copies of
the assessment with the county treasurer, which would have
established a lien on the property assessed (§ 8464). As the
principal ground for appellees' suits was the invalidity of the
whole proceeding, and not merely inequality in apportionment of
benefits, and as the effect of the proposed equalization would have
been to bring the lands of appellees into the newly established
drainage district and subject them to future assessments for
construction costs and for maintenance, the threatened injury was
imminent, and the suits were not premature. The assessment, if
made, would have established a lien on the appellees' property
which would be a cloud on title, to say nothing of the fact that
the effect of the pending proceeding would have been to subject
their property to future assessments; hence, the case was one for
equitable relief unless there was a plain and adequate remedy at
law.
Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576;
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Osborne, 265 U. S.
14. The remedy by appeal to the state court under § 8469
does not appear to be coextensive with the relief which equity may
give. In any event, it is not one which may be availed of at law in
the federal courts, and the test of equity jurisdiction in a
federal court is the inadequacy of the remedy on the law side of
that court, and not the inadequacy of the remedies afforded by the
state courts.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.
S. 466;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Osborne,
supra.
It does not appear that the state law affords a remedy by
payment of the assessment and suit to recover it back which, if it
exists, can be availed of in the federal courts,
Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U. S. 481,
229 U. S. 486,
or that such remedy, if available, would not entail a multiplicity
of suits. It is not suggested that § 6826 of the state code, which
permits suits to recover taxes and forbids injunctions to restrain
their collection, has any
Page 270 U. S. 389
application to assessments for drainage. In
Gilseth v.
Risty, supra, the supreme court of the state evidently did not
deem that section applicable, as it did not rely upon it in denying
relief. The legal remedy under the state law being uncertain, the
federal court has jurisdiction in equity to enjoin the assessment.
Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 255 U.
S. 288.
The objection that it was not shown that these cases involve the
jurisdictional amount is unsubstantial. The court below found that
the amount due on outstanding construction warrants was
approximately $300,000, and that the tentative apportionment of
benefits, if undisturbed, would result in assessments for amounts
ranging from $6,000 to $50,000 against the lands of the appellees.
As the substantial basis of the suits was want of jurisdiction in
the Board of County Commissioners to make the apportionment and
assessment, we think the jurisdictional amount was necessarily
involved.
Appellees are not estopped to seek the relief which was granted
because of any relations which they may have had to the proceedings
or to the construction work which had been carried on before notice
of the tentative apportionment of benefits. The decrees of the
district court, which remain undisturbed, enjoin the assessments
and further proceedings only so far as they affect lands lying
outside of the original assessment areas of Ditch No. 1 and Ditch
No. 2. As none of the appellees could have had any notice of the
proposal to assess lands lying outside of these areas until the
published notice of the apportionment of benefits, their previous
conduct cannot estop them from seeking the relief granted. Other
objections were made to the decrees below, but they are not of
sufficient gravity to require notice here.
There is no diversity of citizenship in No. 99, the appellee in
that case being the city of Sioux Falls, a South Dakota municipal
corporation. Nor was any substantial
Page 270 U. S. 390
federal question raised by the bill of complaint in that suit.
The power of the state and its agencies over municipal corporations
within its territory is not restrained by the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.
S. 182,
and see Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil Co.,
250 U. S. 394. The
decree in that case must therefore be reversed, and the cause
remanded with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's bill.
No. 99 reversed and remanded.
Nos. 95, 96, 97, 98, and 100 affirmed.
*
"Sec. 8467. Assessments for Further Costs. At any time after the
damages arising from the establishment and construction of such
drainage are paid and the lands for such drainage are taken,
assessments may be made for further costs and expenses of
construction. If the contractors are required and agree to take
assessment certificates or warrants for their services, assessments
need not be made until the completion of the work, when an
assessment shall be made for the entire balance of cost of
construction . . . , and notice of such assessment shall be given
by the Board of County Commissioners in all respects as provided
for the first assessment. And such assessment and the certificates
issued thereon shall be in like manner perpetual liens upon the
tracts assessed, interest-bearing and enforceable as such first
assessment and certificates. . . . In any case, in the discretion
of the board, several assessments may be made as the work
progresses. . . ."
"Sec. 8470. For the cleaning and maintenance of any drainage
established under the provisions of this article, assessments may
be made upon the landowners affected in the proportions determined
for such drainage at any time upon the petition of any person
setting forth the necessity thereof. . . . Such assessments shall
be made as other assessments for the construction of drainage,
certificates may be issued thereon and such assessments and
certificates shall be liens . . . in all respects as original
assessments. . . ."