1. Section 310, par. b, of the Transportation Act, 1920, which
provides that the Railroad Labor Board, in case of failure to
comply with its subpoena to testify, may invoke the aid of "any
United States district court," and that such court may thereupon
order the witness to comply with the subpoena, etc., is to be
construed consistently with the general rule limiting jurisdiction
of a district court
in personam (as distinguished from
venue) to the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or
in which he can be found. P.
268 U. S.
622.
2. Hence, a district court, in a suit brought by the Board to
compel attendance of a witness, does not acquire jurisdiction over
his person by service of its process in another district even
though that of the witness' residence.
Id.
3 F.2d 488 reversed.
Page 268 U. S. 620
Jurisdictional appeal from a decree of the district court
overruling a motion to quash service of original process in a suit
brought by the Railroad Labor Board to require the defendant to
appear before it as a witness, and ordering him so to appear and to
testify.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Transportation Act Feb. 28, 1920, c. 91, § 310, par. a, 41 Stat.
456, 472, authorizes the Railroad Labor Board, "for the efficient
administration of the functions vested in" it, to require by
subpoena
"the attendance of any witness . . . from any place in the
United States at any designated place of hearing, and the taking of
a deposition before any designated person having power to
administer oaths."
Paragraph b provides:
"In case of failure to comply with any subpoena [to testify] or
in case of the contumacy of any witness appearing before the Labor
Board, the Board may invoke the aid of any United States district
court. Such court may thereupon order the witness to comply with
the requirements of such subpoena, or to give evidence touching the
matter in question, as the case may be."
Pursuant to paragraph a, the Board issued a subpoena to
Robertson, a citizen and inhabitant of Cleveland, Ohio, commanding
him to appear at its offices in Chicago, Illinois, on a day named,
to testify concerning a dispute then being inquired into. The
subpoena was served upon
Page 268 U. S. 621
Robertson at Cleveland by the United States Marshal for the
Northern District of Ohio. Robertson did not personally attend as
commanded. But, on the day named, he appeared specially by his
attorney and, challenging the jurisdiction of the Board over him,
declined to appear and testify. Thereupon this suit was begun by
the Board in the Federal Court for Northern Illinois, Eastern
division, pursuant to paragraph b.
The bill prayed that Robertson, the sole defendant, be ordered
to appear before the Labor Board "at a time and place to be fixed
by" it and make "full answer to any and all pertinent questions
relating" to the matter under investigation, and for any other
proper relief. The court issued, in the form customary in equity, a
summons, directing the defendant to appear and answer. This summons
was likewise served upon Robertson personally at Cleveland by the
United States Marshal for the Northern district of Ohio. By his
attorney, he again appeared specially and moved to quash the
service on the ground that, being an inhabitant of Ohio and served
there, he was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court
for Illinois. The motion was overruled; Robertson then moved to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit; this motion was also overruled; Robertson
declined to plead further, and a final decree was entered directing
him
"to appear before the Railroad Labor Board, upon due notice by
said Board at a time and place to be designated therein, there to
testify, to give evidence, and to give full, true, and complete
answer and response to any and all pertinent and relevant questions
then and there propounded to him"
concerning the subject matter of the inquiry. 3 F.2d. 488. The
case is here on appeal under § 238 of the Judicial Code, the
questions of jurisdiction having been duly certified. Whether the
court acquired jurisdiction over Robertson is the only question
requiring decision.
Page 268 U. S. 622
Robertson contends that, by the term "any United States district
court" Congress meant any such court "of competent jurisdiction,"
and that, under the applicable law, no district court is of
competent jurisdiction to compel a defendant to obey its decree
except that of the district of which he is an inhabitant or of one
in which he is found. The Board contends that Congress intended by
the phrase to confer not only liberty to invoke the aid of the
court for any district, but power to compel the person named as
defendant to litigate in the district selected by the Board,
although he is not a citizen or inhabitant of it and is not found
therein. The question presented is one of statutory construction.
Congress clearly has the power to authorize a suit under a federal
law to be brought in any inferior federal court. Congress has
power, likewise, to provide that the process of every district
court shall run into every part of the United States.
Toland v.
Sprague, 12 Pet. 300,
37 U. S. 328;
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 98 U. S.
569,
98 U. S. 604.
But it has not done so either by any general law or in terms by §
310 of Transportation Act 1920. The precise question is whether it
has impliedly done so by that provision.
In a civil suit
in personam, jurisdiction over the
defendant, as distinguished from venue, implies, among other
things, either voluntary appearance by him or service of process
upon him at a place where the officer serving it has authority to
execute a writ of summons. Under the general provisions of law, a
United States district court cannot issue process beyond the limits
of the district.
Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S.
476;
Ex part Graham, 3 Wash. 456. And a
defendant in a civil suit can be subjected to its jurisdiction
in personam only by service within the district.
Toland v.
Sprague, 12 Pet. 300,
37 U. S. 330.
Such was the general rule established by Judiciary Act Sept. 24,
1789, c. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79, in accordance with the practice
at the common law.
Piquet v. Swan,
Page 268 U. S. 623
5 Mason, 35, 39
et seq. And such has been the general
rule ever since.
Munter v. Weil Corset Co., 261 U.
S. 276,
261 U. S. 279.
No distinction has been drawn between the case where the plaintiff
is the government and where he is a private citizen. [
Footnote 1]
Section 51 of the Judicial Code is a general provision
regulating venue. The part pertinent here is that, with certain
inapplicable exceptions,
"no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against
any person by any original process or proceeding in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant. [
Footnote 2]"
It is obvious that jurisdiction, in the sense of personal
service within a district where suit has been brought, does not
dispense with the necessity of proper venue. It is equally obvious
that proper venue does not eliminate the requisite of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. The general provision as to venue
contained in Judicial Code, § 51, has been departed from in various
specific provisions which allow the plaintiff, in actions not local
in their nature, some liberty in the selection of venue. [
Footnote 3] Unrestricted choice was
conferred upon the Labor Board by the section of Transportation
Page 268 U. S. 624
Act 1920, here involved (§ 310). So far as venue is concerned,
there is no ambiguity in the words "any United States district
court."
Congress has also made a few clearly expressed and carefully
guarded exceptions to the general rule of jurisdiction
in
personam stated above. In one instance, the Credit Mobilier
Act March 3, 1873, c. 226, § 4, 17 Stat. 485, 509, it was provided
that writs of subpoena to bring in parties defendant should run
into any district. This broad power was to be exercised at the
instance of the Attorney General in a single case in which, in
order to give complete relief, it was necessary to join in one suit
defendants living in different states.
United States v. Union
Pacific Railroad, 98 U. S. 569. Under
similar circumstances, but only for the period of three years,
authority was granted generally by Act Sept.19, 1922, c. 345, 42
Stat. 849, to institute a civil suit by or on behalf of the United
States, either in the district of the residence of one of the
necessary defendants or in that in which the cause of action arose,
and to serve the process upon a defendant in any district. The
Sherman Act (Act July 2, 1890, c. 647, § 5, 26 Stat. 209, 210),
provides that when "it shall appear to the court" in which a
proceeding to restrain violations of the act is pending "that the
ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before
the court," it may cause them to be summoned although they reside
in some other district. The Clayton Act (Act Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323,
§ 15, 38 Stat. 730, 737), contains a like provision. But no act has
come to our attention in which such power has been conferred in a
proceeding in a Circuit or district court [
Footnote 4] where a private citizen is
Page 268 U. S. 625
the sole defendant and where the plaintiff is at liberty to
commence the suit in the district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or in which he can be found. [
Footnote 5]
As the Railroad Labor Board is charged generally with the
adjustment of disputes between carriers and their employees, it may
prove desirable to hold hearings at any place within the United
States, and power to do so was expressly conferred. The Board may
demand answers or the production of documentary evidence from one
who attends such a hearing. The contumacy of a witness
Page 268 U. S. 626
appearing before the Board in any designated place of hearing
was thus one contingency for which it was necessary to make
provision. Congress also granted to the Labor Board in explicit
language the broad power of compelling a person to come from any
place in the United States to any designated place of hearing to
furnish evidence. [
Footnote 6]
The refusal of such person, who might be in any district in the
United States, to comply with such a subpoena was obviously a
second contingency to be provided for. Unrestricted liberty of
venue in invoking the aid of a district court, referred to before,
was clearly essential to the complete exercise of the Board's
powers and the effective performance of its functions. Moreover,
this unrestricted choice cannot subject to undue hardship any
defendant actually found within the district in which the suit is
brought. But no reason is suggested why Congress should have wished
to compel every person summoned either to obey the Board's
administrative order without question or to litigate his right to
refuse to do so in such district, however remote from his home or
temporary residence, as the Board might select. The Interstate
Commerce Commission, which, throughout 38 years, has dealt in many
different ways with most of the railroads of the United States, has
never exercised, or asserted, or sought to secure for itself such
broad powers.
Page 268 U. S. 627
We are of opinion that, by the phrase "any district court of the
United States," Congress meant any such court "of competent
jurisdiction." The phrase "any court" is frequently used in the
federal statutes, and has been interpreted under similar
circumstances as meaning "any court of competent jurisdiction."
[
Footnote 7] By the general
rule, the jurisdiction of a district court
in personam has
been limited to the district of which the defendant is an
inhabitant or in which he can be found. It would be an
extraordinary thing if, while guarding so carefully all departure
from the general rule, Congress had conferred the exceptional power
here invoked upon a board whose functions are purely advisory
(
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Labor Board, 261 U. S.
72;
Pennsylvania R. Co. System Federation No. 90 v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 267 U. S. 203),
and which enters the district court not to enforce a substantive
right, but in an auxiliary proceeding to secure evidence from one
who may be a stranger to the matter with which the Board is
dealing. We think it has made no such extension by § 310 of
Transportation Act 1920. It is not lightly to be assumed that
Congress intended to depart from a long established policy.
Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.
S. 375,
264 U. S. 384;
In re East River Towing Co., 266 U.
S. 355,
266 U. S.
367.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
United States v. Union Pacific R. Co., 98 U. S.
569,
98 U. S. 601;
United States v. Crawford, 47 F. 561.
[
Footnote 2]
See Galveston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gonzales, 151 U.
S. 496;
Macon Grocery Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 215 U. S. 501;
Male v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 240 U. S.
97.
Compare In re Hohorst, 150 U.
S. 653;
Stone v. United States, 167 U.
S. 178,
167 U. S. 182;
Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100. The
rule applies even where it may result in barring the jurisdiction
of every federal court because all the defendants are indispensable
parties.
Shields v.
Barrow, 17 How. 130,
58 U. S.
140-142;
Barney v. Baltimore
City, 6 Wall. 280;
Swan Land & Cattle Co.
v. Frank, 148 U. S. 603.
Compare 62 U. S.
Meredith, 21 How. 489;
Camp v. Gress, 250 U.
S. 308,
250 U. S. 311,
250 U. S. 314;
Judicial Code, §§ 50, 52.
[
Footnote 3]
See, for example, Judicial Code, §§ 43, 44, 45, 48; Act
March 4, 1909, c. 320, § 35, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084; Act Oct. 15,
1914, c. 323, § 12, 38 Stat. 730, 736; Act June 5, 1920, c. 250, §
33, 41 Stat. 988, 1007; Act Sept. 7, 1916, c. 451, § 31, 39 Stat.
728, 738.
[
Footnote 4]
Even the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is subject to the
territorial limitation.
Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S.
516,
91 U. S. 517.
Although the adjudication in one district brings the property of
the bankrupt wherever situated into custodia legis (
Lazarus v.
Prentice, 234 U. S. 263),
that court cannot issue an order upon a person in another district,
not a party to the proceeding, to deliver it up.
See Acme
Harvester Co. v. Beekman Lumber Co., 222 U.
S. 300,
222 U. S. 311;
In re Geller, 216 F. 558;
Progressive Building &
Loan Co. v. Hall, 220 F. 45;
In re United States
Chrysotile Asbestos Co., 253 F. 294. Ancillary proceedings are
brought in the other district.
Babbit v. Dutcher,
216 U. S. 102.
Resort is likewise had to ancillary proceedings to secure the
evidence of a person living in another district.
Elkus,
Petitioner, 216 U. S. 115.
The commerce Court created by Act of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36
Stat. 539, could issue process through the United States. P. 541.
Upon its repeal by Act Oct. 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219,
220, it was provided that the process of the applicable district
court might "run, be served, and be returnable anywhere in the
United States," but the venue of suits in the district courts was
narrowly limited.
See Illinois Central R. Co. v. Public
Utilities Comm'n, 245 U. S. 493;
Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.
S. 557,
249 U. S. 563;
Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. v. United States,
263 U. S. 528,
263 U. S. 535.
Compare Vicksburg, etc., Ry. Co. v. Anderson-Tully Co.,
256 U. S. 408;
Graustein v. Rutland R. Co., 256 F. 409.
[
Footnote 5]
Under Materialmen's Act Aug. 13, 1894, c. 280, 28 Stat. 278, as
amended by Act Feb. 24, 1905, c. 778, 33 Stat. 811, the action on
the bond in the name of the United States must be brought in the
district in which the contract was to be performed. This Court has
held that jurisdiction of the persons of the defendants may be
secured by service of process upon them in whatever district they
may be found.
United States v. Congress Construction Co.,
222 U. S. 199,
222 U. S. 203.
Compare suits by a national bank against the Comptroller
of the Currency. Judicial Code, § 49;
First National Bank v.
Williams, 252 U. S. 504,
252 U. S.
509.
[
Footnote 6]
Compare Act March 2, 1793, c. 22, § 6, 1 Stat. 333,
335; Rev.Stat. § 876, as amended by Act Sept.19, 1922, c. 344, 42
Stat. 848; also Act Feb. 10, 1891, c. 128, 26 Stat. 743; Act July
15, 1913, c. 6, § 5, 38 Stat. 103, 106; Act Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311,
§ 9, 38 Stat. 717, 722; Act Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, § 13, 38 Stat.
730, 736; Act Sept. 8, 1916, c. 463, § 706, 39 Stat. 756, 797; Act
Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886; Act Oct. 6, 1917, c.
105, 40 Stat. 398, 399; Act Oct. 22, 1919, c. 80, § 105, 41 Stat.
297, 300; Act June 10, 1920, c. 285, § 4(g), 41 Stat. 1063, 1067;
Act Nov. 23, 1921, c. 136, § 1308, 42 Stat. 227, 310; Act Sept. 21,
1922, c. 369, § 6(b), 42 Stat. 998, 1002; Act June 2, 1924, c. 234,
§ 1004, 43 Stat. 253, 340; Act June 7, 1924, c. 320, § 8, 43 Stat.
607, 609.
[
Footnote 7]
Rev.Stat. § 4284;
Ex parte Slayton, 105 U.
S. 451;
In re Louisville & Cincinnati Packet
Co., 223 F. 185; Rev.Stat. § 2103;
United States v.
Crawford, 47 F. 561.
Compare Rev.Stat. § 1042;
United States v. Mills, 11 App.D.C. 500, 504, 507. The
phrase has been used in other statutes in conferring the right to
invoke judicial aid in compelling attendance as a witness.
See statutes in
note 6
supra.