1. A decision of the highest court of a state excluding maritime
contracts from the operation of a state statute, not as a matter of
statutory construction, but due to its opinion that the federal
Constitution so requires, present a constitutional question
reviewable here. P.
264 U. S.
120.
2. Under the provision of the Judicial Code (§ 24, par. 3)
vesting the district court with exclusive jurisdiction of all civil
causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction but saving to suitors
the right of a common law remedy, a state may confer upon its
courts jurisdiction to specifically perform an agreement for
arbitration, valid by the general maritime law and by the law of
the state, which is contained in a charter party made in the state
and which, by its terms, is to be performed there. P.
264 U. S.
122.
233 N.Y. 373 reversed.
Certiorari to a judgment of the Supreme Court of New York
entered on a judgment of the New York Court of Appeals reversing a
judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court which had
affirmed an order of the Supreme Court, in New York County, by
which the present respondent was directed to proceed to arbitration
under its contract contained in a charter party, executed in New
York, whereby a vessel was chartered to the petitioner by the
respondent
Page 264 U. S. 118
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Arbitration Law of New York, enacted April 19, 1920, c. 275,
and amended March 1, 1921, c. 14, declares that a provision in a
written contract to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising between the parties "shall be valid, enforceable and
irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract." It authorizes the Supreme
Court, or a judge thereof, to direct, upon the application of a
party to such an agreement, that the arbitration proceed in the
manner so provided; to appoint an arbitrator for the other party in
case he fails to avail himself of the method prescribed by the
contract, and to stay trial of the action if suit has been begun.
The law applies to contracts made before its enactment if the
controversy arose thereafter.
Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib
& Houlberg, 230 N.Y. 261, 270-271. Prior to this statute,
an agreement to arbitrate was legal in New York. and damages were
recoverable for a breach thereof.
Haggart v. Morgan, 5
N.Y. 422, 427. But specific performance of the promise would not be
enforced, the promise could not be pleaded in bar of an action, and
it would not support a motion to stay.
Finucane Co. v. Board of
Education, 190 N.Y. 76, 83. These limitations upon the
enforcement of a promise to arbitrate had been held to be part of
the law of remedies.
Meacham v. Jamestown,
Page 264 U. S. 119
etc., R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 352. The purpose of the
statute was to make specific performance compellable. 230 N.Y. 261,
269. Whether agreements for arbitration of disputes arising under
maritime contracts are within the scope of the statute, and
whether, if so construed and applied, the state law conflicts with
the federal Constitution, are the questions for decision.
Proceeding under the Arbitration Law, the Red Cross Line applied
to the supreme court of the state, on April 12, 1921, for an order
directing the Atlantic Fruit Company to join with it in the
arbitration of a dispute arising out of the charter of the
steamship
Runa. The substantive claim was that the master
had not prosecuted the voyage with the utmost dispatch, and hence
that certain amounts paid by the charterer should be returned. The
charter party, which had been executed in New York on November 28,
1919, contained the following provision:
"That, should any dispute arise between owners and charterers,
the matters in dispute shall be referred to three persons in New
York, one to be appointed by each of the parties hereto and the
third by the two so chosen; their decision, or that of any two of
them, shall be final, and, for the purpose of enforcing any award,
this agreement may be made a rule of court. . . ."
Before instituting this proceeding, the Red Cross Line had duly
appointed its arbitrator, but the Atlantic Fruit Company had
refused to appoint the one to be named by it. The court ordered the
latter company to proceed to arbitration as provided in the
contract, and to appoint its arbitrator by a day fixed. This order
was affirmed by the Appellate Division without opinion. Its
judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which stated that
the controversy between the parties is one of admiralty; that,
under Article III, § 2, of the federal Constitution, and § 256, cl.
3, of the Judicial Code,
Page 264 U. S. 120
such controversies are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts, and that the state had no power to compel the
charter owner to proceed to arbitration.
Matter of Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 233 N.Y. 373. The case is here on
writ of certiorari under § 237 of the Judicial Code, as amended.
260 U.S. 716.
Respondent contends that the petition should be dismissed for
lack of a federal question. The argument is that the Court of
Appeals held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the
Arbitration Law does not extend to controversies which are within
the admiralty jurisdiction, and that the substantive claim sought
to be enforced is so cognizable. The claim to recover an amount
paid under a charter party as charter hire is within the admiralty
jurisdiction.
Morewood v.
Enequist, 23 How. 491. If that court had construed
the Arbitration Law as excluding from its scope controversies which
are within the admiralty jurisdiction, the construction given to
the state statute would bind us, and there would be no occasion to
consider the constitutional question presented.
Quong Ham Wah
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 255 U.
S. 445;
Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.
S. 503,
259 U. S. 510.
An expression used by the Court of Appeals lends some color to
respondent's contention. 233 N.Y. 373, 381. But a reading of the
whole opinion shows that the state court excluded maritime
contracts from the operation of the law, not as a matter of
statutory construction, but because it thought the federal
Constitution required such action.
Compare State Industrial
Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U.
S. 263. We proceed therefore to the consideration of the
constitutional question.
The federal courts, like those of the states and of England,
have, both in equity and at law, denied, in large measure, the aid
of their processes to those seeking to enforce
Page 264 U. S. 121
executory agreements to arbitrate disputes. They have declined
to compel specific performance,
Tobey v. County of
Bristol, 3 Story, 800, 819-826; [
Footnote 1] or to stay proceedings on the original cause
of action. Story, Equity Jurisprudence, § 670. They have not given
effect to the executory agreement as a plea in bar, except in those
cases where the agreement, leaving the general question of
liability to judicial decision, confines the arbitration to
determining the amount payable or to furnishing essential evidence
of specific facts, and makes it a condition precedent to the cause
of action.
Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Insurance
Co., 136 U. S. 242,
136 U. S. 255;
Martinsburg & Potomac R. Co. v. March, 114 U.
S. 549. But an agreement for arbitration is valid even
if it provides for the determination of liability. If executory, a
breach will support an action for damages.
Hamilton v. Home
Insurance Co., 137 U. S. 370,
137 U. S.
385-386. If executed -- that is, if the award has been
made -- effect will be given to the award in any appropriate
proceeding at law, or in equity.
Karthaus
v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 222;
Burchell
v. Marsh, 17 How. 344;
Bayne v.
Morris, 1 Wall. 97. And, although there is no
federal legislation on the subject, an executory agreement, however
comprehensive, will, if made a rule of court, be
Page 264 U. S. 122
enforced in courts of the United States by any appropriate
process.
Heckers v.
Fowler, 2 Wall. 123. [
Footnote 2]
In admiralty, also, agreements to submit controversies to
arbitration are valid. Reference of maritime controversies to
arbitration has long been common practice. [
Footnote 3]
Houseman v. Schooner North
Carolina, 15 Pet. 40,
40 U. S. 45. The
insertion in a charter party of a provision for such settlement of
disputes arising thereunder was practiced at least as early as the
eighteenth century.
Thompson v. Charnock, 2 Durnford &
East, 139. For breach of an executory agreement, a libel for
damages will lie. [
Footnote 4]
An executory agreement may be made a rule of court.
United States v.
Farragut, 22 Wall. 406,
89 U. S. 419;
Kleine v. Catara, 2 Gall, 61.
Page 264 U. S. 123
An award will be given full effect. [
Footnote 5] the agreement, whether executory or executed,
cannot be enforced in admiralty by specific performance, merely
because that court lacks the power to grant equitable relief.
The Eclipse, 135 U. S. 599,
135 U. S. 608.
[
Footnote 6] The executory
agreement (perhaps in deference to the rule prevailing at law and
in equity) will not be given effect as a bar to a libel on the
original cause of action. The reluctance of the admiralty court to
lend full aid goes, however, merely to the remedy. The substantive
right created by an agreement to submit it disputes to arbitration
is recognized as a perfect obligation. [
Footnote 7]
By reason of the saving clause, state courts have jurisdiction
in personam, concurrent with the admiralty courts, of all
causes of action maritime in their nature arising under charter
parties. Judiciary Act Sept. 24, 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77;
Judicial Code, § 24, par. 3;
Leon v.
Galceran, 11 Wall. 185;
Schoonmaker v.
Gilmore, 102 U. S. 118;
Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132;
De Lovio v. Boit, 2 Gall. 398, 475. The "right of a common
law remedy," so saved to suitors, does not, as has been held in
cases which presently will be mentioned, include
Page 264 U. S. 124
attempted changes by the states in the substantive admiralty
law, but it does include all means other than proceedings in
admiralty which may be employed to enforce the right or to redress
the injury involved. It includes remedies
in pais, as well
as proceedings in court; judicial remedies conferred by statute, as
well as those existing at the common law; remedies in equity, as
well as those enforceable in a court of law.
Knapp, Stout &
Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638,
177 U. S. 644
et seq.; Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Machine Co.,
237 U. S. 303. A
state may not provide a remedy
in rem for any cause of
action within the admiralty jurisdiction.
The Hine
v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555;
The Glide,
167 U. S. 606.
But, otherwise, the state, having concurrent jurisdiction, is free
to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it
sees fit. New York therefore had the power to confer upon its
courts the authority to compel parties within its jurisdiction to
specifically perform an agreement for arbitration which is valid by
the general maritime law, as well as by the law of the state, which
is contained in a contract made in New York and which, by its
terms, is to be performed there.
This state statute is wholly unlike those which have recently
been held invalid by this Court. The Arbitration Law deals merely
with the remedy in the state courts in respect of obligations
voluntarily and lawfully incurred. It does not attempt either to
modify the substantive maritime law or to deal with the remedy in
courts of admiralty. The Workmen's Compensation Laws involved in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.
S. 205,
Clyde Steamship Co. v. Walker,
244 U. S. 255,
Peters v. Veasey, 251 U. S. 121, and
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149, were declared invalid because their provisions
were held to modify or displace essential features of the
substantive maritime law. In
Union Fish Co. v. Erickson,
248 U. S. 308, the
state statute did not deal with the substantive maritime law. It
was held invalid because, as construed
Page 264 U. S. 125
and applied, it attempted to modify the remedial law of the
admiralty courts. The state statutes involved in all the other
cases were declared valid. Those giving the substantive right to
recover for negligence resulting in death were upheld because they
merely supplemented the substantive maritime law, and did not
conflict with any essential feature of it.
Western Fuel Co. v.
Garcia, 257 U. S. 233;
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Kierejewski,
261 U. S. 479.
See also Steamboat Co. v.
Chase, 16 Wall. 522;
Sherlock v. Alling,
93 U. S. 99,
93 U. S. 104;
The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398;
La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95,
210 U. S. 138.
The Workmen's Compensation Laws involved in other cases were upheld
because their provisions, as applied, were found not to be in
conflict with any essential feature of the general maritime law.
Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.
S. 469;
Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt
Co., 259 U. S. 263. No
state statute was involved in
Chelentis v. Luckenbach,
247 U. S. 372. The
Court held there that, under the general maritime law, the seaman
had no substantive right to recover; that this rule of substantive
maritime law applied whether he sued in the state courts or in the
court of admiralty, and that the Seaman's Act of 1915 (38 Stat.
1164) did not change this rule of substantive law. In no case has
this Court held void a state statute which neither modified the
substantive maritime law, nor dealt with the remedies enforceable
in admiralty.
As the constitutionality of the remedy provided by New York for
use in its own courts is not dependent upon the practice or
procedure which may prevail in admiralty, we have no occasion to
consider whether the unwillingness of the federal courts to give
full effect to executory agreements for arbitration can be
justified. [
Footnote 8]
Reversed.
Page 264 U. S. 126
[
Footnote 1]
Mr. Justice Story said (p. 821):
"Courts of equity do not refuse to interfere to compel a party
specifically to perform an agreement to refer to arbitration,
because they wish to discourage arbitrations as against public
policy. On the contrary, they have and can have no just objection
to these domestic forums, and will enforce, and promptly interfere
to enforce their awards when fairly and lawfully made, without
hesitation or question. But when they are asked to proceed farther
and to compel the parties to appoint arbitrators whose award shall
be final, they necessarily pause to consider whether such tribunals
possess adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a
right to compel a reluctant party to submit to such a tribunal, and
to close against him the doors of the common courts of justice,
provided by the government to protect rights and to redress
wrongs."
[
Footnote 2]
See also Thornton v.
Carson, 7 Cranch 5961;
Carnochan
v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 446;
Lutz v.
Linthicum, 8 Pet. 165;
The
Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 5 How. 83;
New York & Cumberland R.
Co. v. Myers, 18 How. 246;
Newcomb v.
Wood, 97 U. S. 581,
97 U. S. 583.
The practice of making the agreement for arbitration a rule of
court was introduced by Stat. 9 & 10 William III, c. 15.
See Russell on Arbitrators (5th ed.) 52.
[
Footnote 3]
In England, maritime controversies were settled by arbitration
as early as 1320. Selden Society, Select Pleas in the Court of
Admiralty, vol. 1, pp. xxii, xxiii. After the establishment of that
court (about 1340,
ibid., xiv), arbitration became a
common mode of settling disputes in shipping cases.
"The parties appear to have usually executed a bond or entered
into recognizance in the admiralty court to execute the award;
there are several suits to enforce such a bond or to compel
performance of the award."
Id., lxix; lxi; [1539] p. 90; [1540] p. 101; Vol. 11
[1548] p. 18; [1571] p. lxx; [1573] p. lxxi; [1575] p. 39; [1589]
p. 44.
The phraseology of the arbitration clause here in question is
identical with that contained in the common form of the time
charter party long in use. Scrutton, Charter Parties and Bills of
Lading (1886) pp. 268, 270. The form appears as clause 15 of the
charter party executed in New York in 1886 which was involved in
Compania Bilbania v. Spanish-American Light & Power
Co., 146 U. S. 483.
[
Footnote 4]
See Ross v. Compagnie Commerciale, etc., 45 F. 207,
208;
Munson v. Straits of Dover, 99 F. 787; 102 F. 926;
Aktieselskabet, Korg-Og, etc. v. Rederiaktiebolaget,
Atlanten, 250 F. 935, 937.
[
Footnote 5]
See McConnochie v. Kerr, 9 F. 50, 57-58;
Toledo
S.S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co., 184 F. 391, 401;
Hannevig
v. Sutherland, 256 F. 445.
[
Footnote 6]
Admiralty is likewise unable to afford relief by way of
reformation of a marine contract,
Andrews v. Essex Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 3 Mason 6, 16; or to set it aside for fraud,
Dean v. Bates, 2 Woodb. & M. 87, 90; or to establish
an equitable title in a ship; or to take an account among part
owners,
Kellum v. Emerson, 2 Curt. 79, 82; or to put an
equitable owner of a ship into possession,
Kynoch v. The
Propeller S.C. Ives, Newb.Ad. 205, 211. In all such cases, as
in the case of specific performance, the relief must be sought in a
court of equity.
[
Footnote 7]
See United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake
Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006;
Aktieselskabet, Etc. v.
Rederiaktiebolaget, etc., Atlanten, 232 F. 403, 405;
The
Eros, 241 F. 186, 191.
[
Footnote 8]
See The Atlanten, 252 U. S. 313,
252 U. S. 315;
United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum
Co., 222 F. 1006;
Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof
Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, 250 F. 935;
Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 276 F. 319.
The separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS.
This controversy arose out of a charter party dated November 28,
1919, a maritime contract, which contains a clause providing for
the settlement of disputes by arbitration. 233 N.Y. 373.
Parties to such agreements contract with reference to the
maritime law; consequent rights and liabilities depend upon its
rules and are the same in all courts, admiralty or state. This
general doctrine, definitely stated in
Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, has
been reaffirmed and applied again and again.
Clyde S.S. Co. v.
Walker, 244 U. S. 255;
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.
S. 372;
Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U. 308;
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149;
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia,
257 U. S. 233;
Grant Smith-Porter Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.
S. 469;
Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger,
259 U. S. 255;
Industrial Comm'n v. Nordenholt Co., 259 U.
S. 263;
Osaka Shosen Kaisha v. Lumber Co.,
260 U. S. 490;
Great Lakes Co. v. Kierejewski, 261 U.
S. 479.
No admiralty court would enforce the arbitration clause of the
charter party before us; their accepted policy forbids.
Accordingly, it was not obligatory upon the parties. The law of the
sea became part of their agreement.
But it is said under the local law a state court may enforce
arbitration, and thus effectuate the provision, although
unenforceable in admiralty, since the statute relates to the remedy
and not to substantive rights. In Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, an
admiralty cause, we refused to give effect to the state statute of
frauds, holding that the parties had contracted with reference to
maritime law, not the local enactment. Here also, the effort is to
modify an agreement made with reference to the general rules of
maritime law by applying the local law. Certainly this could not be
done in an admiralty court;
Page 264 U. S. 127
no more should it be possible under state practice. If
Union
Fish Co. v. Erickson had been before a state tribunal, the
applicable rule would have been the same, and would have required
enforcement of the contract notwithstanding the local statute.
Obligations under maritime contracts do not vary with the
tribunal.
Fifty years ago, this Court pointed out the essential
relationship between rights and remedies.
Von
Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535,
71 U. S.
552.
"Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means
of enforcement. Without the remedy, the contract may, indeed, in
the sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to
fall within the class of those moral and social duties which depend
for their fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The
ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of
the obligation, which is guaranteed by the Constitution against
invasion. The obligation of a contract 'is the law which binds the
parties to perform their agreement.'"
Under the guise of providing remedies, no state state statute
may add to or take from the obligations imposed by the contract
within the admiralty jurisdiction. The doctrine concerning the
general maritime law announced here over and over again forbids. If
state courts can enforce provisions for compulsory arbitration
contrary to the policy of the admiralty courts, what will become of
the uniformity of maritime rules which the Constitution undertook
to establish?
-----
Judicial Code, § 256, endows the district court with exclusive
jurisdiction
"of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy
where the common law is competent to give it."
The remedy saved must relate to some right or liability given or
imposed by maritime law -- certainly not one which that law
does
Page 264 U. S. 128
not recognize. Furthermore, common law remedy is the thing
excepted from the exclusive jurisdiction, not a remedy wholly
unknown to that law.
The Moses
Taylor, 4 Wall. 411,
71 U. S.
430-431, distinctly announced this construction:
"The cognizance of civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, vested in the district courts by the ninth section of
the Judiciary Act, may be supported upon like considerations. It
has been made exclusive by Congress, and that is sufficient, even
if we should admit that, in the absence of its legislation, the
state courts might have taken cognizance of these causes. But there
are many weighty reasons why it was so declared. 'The admiralty
jurisdiction,' says Mr. Justice Story,"
"naturally connects itself, on the one hand, with our diplomatic
relations and the duties to foreign nations and their subjects,
and, on the other hand, with the great interests of navigation and
commerce, foreign and domestic. There is, then, a peculiar wisdom
in giving to the national government a jurisdiction of this sort
which cannot be yielded, except for the general good, and which
multiplies the securities for the public peace abroad, and gives to
commerce and navigation the most encouraging support at home."
"The case before us is not within the saving clause of the ninth
section. That clause only saves to suitors 'the right of a common
law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it.' It is
not a remedy in the common law courts which is saved, but a common
law remedy. A proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty
courts, is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a
proceeding under the civil law. When used in the common law courts,
it is given by statute."
The same view is approved by
The Hine
v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555,
71 U. S. 571;
The Glide, 167 U. S. 606,
167 U. S.
616-617, and
Knapp, Stout & Co. v.
McCaffrey, 177 U. S. 638,
177 U. S. 644,
177 U. S.
648.
Page 264 U. S. 129
The latter cause "was clearly one
in personam to
enforce a common law remedy." The opinion carefully points out that
the state court enforced such a remedy and, further (p.
177 U. S.
640), that not until 1866,
The Moses Taylor,
was the exclusive character of admiralty jurisdiction brought to
this Court's attention. Earlier opinions must be read accordingly,
with
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen and the uniformity of
maritime rules in mind.
Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry &
Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303,
237 U. S. 308,
follows
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey.
Even where permitted by local law, state courts cannot entertain
proceedings
in rem for the reason stated by the
Moses
Taylor:
"A proceeding
in rem, as used in the admiralty courts,
is not a remedy afforded by the common law; it is a proceeding
under the civil law. When used in the common law courts, it is
given by statute."
The same reason inhibits state courts from enforcing any remedy
not recognized at common law when the controversy is within the
admiralty cognizance. Common law remedies are within the saving
clause, and no others. It is not enough that one has been provided
by statute.
The Hine v. Trevor (p.
71 U. S. 571)
declares:
"But it could not have been the intention of Congress, by the
exception in that section, to give the suitor all such remedies as
might afterwards be enacted by state statutes, for this would have
enabled the states to make the jurisdiction of their courts
concurrent in all cases by simply providing a statutory remedy for
all cases. Thus, the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts
would be defeated."
This negatives the suggestion that the remedy of the saving
clause includes any means other than proceedings
in rem
which may be provided for the enforcement of rights or to redress
injuries.
Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177
U. S. 648, clearly affirms that the thing saved to
suitors is the right of a common law remedy:
"The true distinction between
Page 264 U. S. 130
such proceedings as are and such as are not invasions of the
exclusive admiralty jurisdiction is this: if the cause of action be
one cognizable in admiralty, and the suit be
in rem
against the thing itself, though a monition be also issued to the
owner, the proceeding is essentially one in admiralty. If, upon the
other hand, the cause of action be not one of which a court of
admiralty has jurisdiction, or if the suit be
in personam
against an individual defendant, with an auxiliary attachment
against a particular thing or against the property of the defendant
in general, it is essentially a proceeding according to the course
of the common law, and within the saving clause of the statute
(sec. 563) of a common law remedy. The suit in this case being one
in equity to enforce a common law remedy, the state courts were
correct in assuming jurisdiction."
I can find no authority for the broad claim that the "right of a
common law remedy" extends to any and all means other than
proceedings
in rem which may be employed to enforce rights
or redress injuries, including remedies
in pais as well as
proceedings in court, those conferred by statute as well as those
existing at common law. Neither
Knapp, Stout & Co. v.
McCaffrey nor
Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry supports
it. It conflicts with
The Hine v. Trevor, and is clearly
opposed by the reason advanced in
The Moses Taylor for
excluding proceedings
in rem from state courts.
The court below has held [
Footnote
2/1] that the New York Arbitration Law, c. 275, Laws N.Y.1920,
[
Footnote 2/2] provides "a
statutory
Page 264 U. S. 131
legal remedy of a character unknown to the common law . . .
declares a new public policy and abrogates an ancient rule." This
statutory remedy is not of the common law, nor were the proceedings
under review instituted to enforce such a remedy, as was
Knapp,
Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey. See Southern Pacific Co. v.
Jensen.
-----
If petitioner is right why may not a state require the parties
to any maritime contract to submit their controversies to varying
methods of arbitration, and thus introduce the very discord which
framers of the Constitution intended to prevent by adopting general
maritime rules as laws of the United States. Also, why may it not
apply other than common law remedies to controversies within
admiralty jurisdiction contrary to plain congressional enactment
and repeated decisions of this Court?
To announce principles is not enough; they should be followed. I
think opinions of this Court led the conclusion of the court below,
and require affirmation of its judgment.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Matter of Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 230 N.Y.
261, 269.
[
Footnote 2/2]
"Sec. 2. A provision in a written contract to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between the parties to
the contract, or a submission hereafter entered into of an existing
controversy to arbitration pursuant to title eight of chapter
seventeen of the Code of Civil Procedure, shall be valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."