Where coal, requisitioned by the Fuel Administration for the
Railroad Administration, was paid for by the latter at prices fixed
in contracts between certain carriers, which it took over, and the
coal owner,
held:
(a) That the owner's claims against the Railroad Administration,
reserved in the requisition, for the difference between the price
paid and the greater price then fixed generally by the Fuel
Administration, were causes of action arising out of the
possession, use, and operation of the carriers by the President
within Transportation Act § 206a, authorizing suit against the
agent appointed by him. P.
263 U. S. 539.
(b) Under Jud.Code § 154, the institution and pendency of such
actions in the district court prevents prosecution of an appeal
pending here from an earlier judgment of the Court of Claims
rejecting a claim against the United States on the same cause.
Id.
(c) This prohibition of § 154 cannot be avoided upon the ground
that the later actions were brought to avoid the time limitation of
the Transportation Act.
Id.
Appeal to review 57 Ct.Clms. 607 dismissed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing a
petition.
Page 263 U. S. 538
MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
Page 263 U. S. 539
Appellant sued in the Court of Claims for a balance alleged to
be due for coal delivered to the United States. Sometime prior to
the delivery, appellant had entered into contracts with certain
railroad companies to supply them with coal for specified periods
of time and at stated prices. Upon the passing of the railroads
into the control of the government by virtue of the President's
proclamation of December 26, 1917, 40 Stat. 1733, the Railroad
Administration claimed the right to enforce these contracts. The
right was denied, whereupon the Fuel Administration requisitioned
the coal "without prejudice to your [appellant's] right to assert a
claim against the Railroad Administration or these various railroad
companies" for any amount claimed to be legally payable. The
Railroad Administration paid the prices fixed by the contracts,
asserting that these were the measure of its liability. The general
price for coal theretofore fixed by the Fuel Administration was
more than the contract price, and this action was for the
difference. The court below sustained a demurrer to the petition
and dismissed it. After the rendition of judgment and before the
appeal to this Court, appellant brought actions in the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against James
C. Davis, as Agent for the President under the Transportation Act
of 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, the causes of action therein set
forth being the same as that set forth in the present case. These
alleged causes of action arose out of the possession, use, and
operation by the President of the railroads in question and come
within the provisions of § 206(a) of the act, c. 91, 41 Stat.
461.
The government has submitted a motion to dismiss the appeal
relying upon the provisions of § 154 of the Judicial Code, which
reads:
"No person shall file or prosecute in the Court of Claims, or in
the Supreme Court on appeal therefrom,
Page 263 U. S. 540
any claim for or in respect to which he or any assignee of his
has pending in any other court any suit or process against any
person who at the time when the cause of action alleged in such
suit or process arose, was, in respect thereto, acting or
professing to act, mediately or immediately, under the authority of
the United States."
At the time the alleged causes of action arose, the President
was acting under the authority of the United States, and the
actions being against an agent appointed by and acting for him,
fall within the terms of the statute just quoted. It is urged,
however, that the actions were brought,
ex necessitate
rei, because they were about to become barred by expiration of
the statutory period of limitation, and that, for this and other
reasons, the case is not within the spirit of § 154, properly
construed. But the words of the statute are plain, with nothing in
the context to make their meaning doubtful; no room is left for
construction, and we are not at liberty to add an exception in
order to remove apparent hardship in particular cases.
See Amy
v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 320;
St. Louis, Iron Mountain, etc., Railway Co. v. Taylor,
210 U. S. 281,
210 U. S. 295;
United States v. First National Bank, 234 U.
S. 245,
234 U. S.
259-260.
Appeal dismissed.
