In completing the rolls of members of the Five Civilized Tribes
pursuant to the Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137,
the Secretary of the Interior had jurisdiction, on March 4, 1907,
to revoke without notice his approval of a report of the
Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes in favor of applicants
for enrollment;
Page 253 U. S. 210
and such applicants cannot secure their enrollment through
mandamus upon the suggestion that the revocation was due to
mistake.
Cf. Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.
S. 249.
48 App.D.C. 169 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a petition for a writ of mandamus to require the
Secretary of the Interior to place the names of the petitioners
upon the rolls of the members of the Creek Nation. The petition was
dismissed by the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and the
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We are not called
upon to consider the antecedent facts of the petitioners' case, as
all that is material can be stated in a few words. Rights as a
member of the Nation depend upon the approved rolls. March 4, 1907,
was fixed by statute as the time when the rolls were to be
completed by the Secretary of the Interior and his previously
existing jurisdiction to approve enrollment then ceased. Act of
April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 2, 34 Stat. 137, 138. Before that date,
the petitioners had on file an application for enrollment, hearings
had been had before the proper tribunal, a favorable report had
been made to the Secretary, and the Secretary had written a letter
to the Commissioner to the Five Civilized Tribes, saying, "Your
decision is hereby affirmed." But, on the last day, March 4, 1907,
the Secretary addressed another communication to the same official
rescinding the former letter to
Page 253 U. S. 211
him and reversing his decision. It was ordered that, if the
petitioners' names were on the rolls, they should be stricken off.
The Secretary gave no reasons for his action, but it is suggested
that he acted under mistakes of law and fact, and it is argued
that, when the first letter was written, the petitioners' rights
were fixed.
The last is the only point in the case, and, with regard to
that, it is argued that this reversal of the first decision without
a hearing was a denial of due process of law. It is not denied that
the Secretary might have declined to affirm the decision below in
the first instance, and, that having been his power, the only
question is when it came to an end. While the case was before him,
he was free to change his mind, and he might do so nonetheless that
he had stated an opinion in favor of one side or the other. He did
not lose his power to do the conclusive act, ordering and approving
an enrollment,
Garfield v. Goldsby, 211 U.
S. 249, until the act was done.
New Orleans v.
Paine, 147 U. S. 261,
147 U. S. 266;
Kirk v. Olson, 245 U. S. 225,
245 U. S. 228.
The petitioners' names never were on the rolls. The Secretary was
the final judge whether they should be, and they cannot be ordered
to be put on now upon a suggestion that the Secretary made a
mistake or that he came very near to giving the petitioners the
rights they claim.
Judgment affirmed.