the said devisees, the lands described in the bill fell to the
plaintiff. In due course, the government surveyed and fixed the
front and side lines of the grant, but it seems that neither of
these lines touched Lake Maurepas, nor was it included between
them. When, in 1885, the State of Louisiana, claiming adversely to
the City of New Orleans under the swampland grant of March 2, 1849,
9 Stat. 352, c. 87,, raised the question before the General Land
Office as to what depth the claims were entitled, the Surveyor
General of Louisiana, to whom the matter had been referred, decided
that the grant should extend to Lake Maurepas and the Amite River,
by extending its lower side line back to said water boundary. On
appeal to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, the decision
of the Surveyor General was affirmed, but on further appeal to the
Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Lamar, he decided, on January 6,
1888, that the depth of the grant should be determined by a
straight line drawn through the center of the grant from the front
to the rear, terminating at the point of intersection of a line
drawn at right angles thereto, so as to touch the lowest point of
the southern shore of Lake Maurepas.
The matter was referred to the Surveyor General of Louisiana,
who directed the defendant, Paine, as deputy surveyor, to examine
carefully the southern shore line of Lake Maurepas, and if entirely
satisfied from reliable evidence that there had been a change in
said shoreline since the grant was made, in 1769 he was to run the
line according to such location, and not according to its then
location. These instructions were approved by the Commissioner of
the General Land Office under date of March 4, 1890. The defendant,
the deputy surveyor, proceeded under these instructions, and
satisfied himself that the southern shoreline of Lake Maurepas had,
for an indefinite time, been a moving line, slowly extending itself
south and southwest; but as to where the shore line was in 1769 he
could form no definite conclusion.
"The only thing which seemed certain is that it was a long way
from where it now is, and in fixing upon the distance . . . , I
have tried to adopt a location which would probably give the
Page 147 U.S. 263
claims all the depth they are entitled to without extending them
so far as some of the evidence would require."
The bill averred that this survey was approved by the Surveyor
General, and was forwarded to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office,
"and thereupon, and in due official course, the said surveys of
the said R. B. Paine were duly paid for by the United States,
including his said survey and location of said back line of said
Dupard grant."
This survey seems, however, never to have been formally
approved, and on May 14, 1891, Mr. Chandler, then Acting Secretary
of the Interior, wrote to the Commissioner of the General Land
Office saying that he found nothing in the decision of the
department of January 6, 1888, to indicate that it was the
intention of the Secretary to authorize an investigation as to
whether the shore of the lake had been changed since 1769, but, on
the contrary, it seemed to be clearly indicated that the southern
shore of the lake as it now exists should be fixed absolutely as
the starting point, and determine the back line of the said grant.
"You will instruct the Surveyor General accordingly." In pursuance
of this, the Commissioner of the General Land Office instructed the
Surveyor General to enter into a new contract with some competent
deputy for the establishment of the back line from the southern
shore of the lake as it now exists, and thereupon a new contract
was entered into with the defendant, Paine, for a resurvey upon the
basis of such instructions. Thereupon plaintiff filed this bill to
enjoin such resurvey.
A restraining order was issued upon the filing of the bill, and
a day fixed for the hearing of the motion for an injunction. A
demurrer being filed to the bill, the case was brought to a hearing
upon bill and demurrer, and a decree entered denying the injunction
and dismissing the bill. 49 F. 12. From this decree an appeal was
taken and allowed to the circuit court of appeals, by which court
the decree of the circuit court was affirmed, and an appeal allowed
to this Court. 51 F. 833.
Page 147 U.S. 264
MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the facts in the foregoing
language, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case turns upon the power of the court to enjoin the action
of an officer of the Land Department in relocating the boundaries
of a land grant, and an injunction is demanded upon the theory that
a former survey of the same line had been examined, approved, and
paid for, and that the rights of the plaintiff to the lands
included in such survey had thereby become vested.
In
Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, decided at
the present term,
ante 147 U. S. 165, we
had occasion to examine the question as to when a court was
authorized to interfere by injunction with the action of the head
of a department, and came to the conclusion that it was only where,
in any view of the facts that could be taken, such action was
beyond the scope of his authority. If he were engaged in the
performance of a duty which involved the exercise of discretion or
judgment, he was entitled to protection from any interference by
the judicial power. In that case, it appeared that the only remedy
of the plaintiff was to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from
revoking his approval of a certain map, which operated as a grant
of land. His contemplated action amounted, in effect, to the
cancellation of a land patent.
So in this case, if it were made to appear that the former
survey had been completed and approved in such manner that all the
lands included within the lines of the former survey had become
vested in the plaintiff, it is possible that it might be entitled
to an injunction against any act which would have the effect of
disturbing or unsetting a title thereby acquired. But the
difficulty here is that the facts do not exhibit such a case. It
appears that the first survey was made under the direction of the
Surveyor General, who was himself acting under instructions from
Mr. Lamar, then Secretary of the Interior, which instructions in
his opinion authorized him to direct the defendant, Paine, to
ascertain the shore line of Lake Maurepas as it existed in 1769,
the date of the grant, and his
Page 147 U.S. 265
instructions to defendant, which were most careful and explicit
as to the method of locating this line, were found to be
satisfactory by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, who
also approved his contract with the defendant for the survey upon
the basis of these instructions. Defendant proceeded to act upon
these instructions and to locate the line as near as he could
ascertain the southern shore of the lake to have been in 1769. His
report of this survey seems to have been forwarded to the
Commissioner of the General Land Office, but never to have been
formally approved.
The only record evidence upon this subject consists of three
letters -- one from the Commissioner of the Land Office to the
Surveyor General, of January 23, 1891, in which he acknowledges the
receipt of the duplicate plat and transcript of field notes of
defendant's survey, and also of certain protests, affidavits, and
letters, and in closing his correspondence says:
"In view of the foregoing and of the condition expressed in the
contract allowing partial payments as the survey progresses, I
hereby accept the survey, as far as herein considered, and as the
several points of objection to the acceptance of some of the lines
established in this survey, as set forth in the protests above
mentioned, will necessarily demand a further consideration by this
office, you are directed to withhold the filing of the triplicate
plats in the local Land Office until you are further advised in
regard thereto."
The second letter is from the Acting Secretary of the Interior
to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, under date of May
14, 1891, in which, speaking of the decision of Mr. Lamar, the
former Secretary of the Interior, he says:
"I find nothing in this decision to indicate that it was the
intention of the Secretary to authorize an investigation as to
whether the shore of the lake had been changed since 1769, but, on
the contrary, it seems to be clearly indicated that the southern
shore of the lake, as it now exists, should be fixed absolutely as
the starting point to determine the back line of said grant. You
will instruct the Surveyor General accordingly."
This letter does not indicate, as contended, a reversal of the
action of Mr. Lamar, his predecessor in office, but merely that he
put a different interpretation
Page 147 U.S. 266
upon his decision from that of the Surveyor General, under whose
instructions the defendant had acted. The last letter was written
by the Acting Commissioner of the Land Office to the Surveyor
General, May 21, 1891, and states that
"this line was run by Deputy Surveyor Ruffin B. Paine, under his
contract No. 1, dated November 11, 1889, under instructions of your
predecessor, and
was accepted by this office to the extent of
payment for the work, it having been done in accordance with
his instructions;
but the plats were withheld from filing,
awaiting the decision of the department as to the correctness
of the instructions in view of the original decision of the
Department in this case dated January 6, 1888. It is unnecessary to
enter into the details of the instructions issued by your
predecessor, or of the work performed by his deputy in pursuance
thereof, as they form a part of the files of your office, and you
are no doubt familiar with them. It is sufficient to state that the
enclosed decision directs that the southern shore of the lake as it
now exists shall be fixed absolutely as the starting point to
determine the back line of the aforesaid claims. This necessitates
the rejection of the survey executed by Paine as to the
establishing of this line, and you will enter into a new contract
with some competent deputy for its establishment as now directed by
the Department."
It is quite evident from this correspondence that the first
survey was never formally approved by the Secretary of the Interior
or the Commissioner of the Land Office, and that no title ever
vested in the plaintiff to the lands included in this survey,
though defendant, having obeyed his instructions, was, of course,
entitled to his pay. If the department was not satisfied with this
survey, there was no rule of law standing in the way of its
ordering another. Until the matter is closed by final action, the
proceedings of an officer of a department are as much open to
review or reversal by himself or his successor as are the
interlocutory decrees of a court open to review upon the final
hearing.
Fourinquet v.
Perkins, 16 How. 82. Thus, in
Gaines v.
Thompson, 7 Wall. 347,
74 U. S. 352,
it was held that the action of the Secretary of the Interior
directing the Commissioner of the Land Office to cancel an entry of
land was within
Page 147 U.S. 267
the exclusive control of the department, and that the court had
no jurisdiction or authority to interfere with the exercise of this
power by injunction. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr.
Justice Miller stated the general doctrine to be
"that an officer to whom public duties are confided by law is
not subject to the control of the courts in the exercise of the
judgment and discretion which the law reposes in him as a part of
his official functions. Certain powers and duties are confided to
those officers, and to them alone, and however the courts may, in
ascertaining the rights of parties in suits properly before them,
pass upon the legality of their acts after the matter has once
passed beyond their control, there exists no power in the courts,
by any of its processes, to act upon the officer so as to interfere
with the exercise of that judgment while the matter is properly
before him for action."
The case under consideration is not unlike that of
Statesbury v. United States, 146 U.
S. 196, decided at the present term, in which a decision
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, authorizing the refunding
of certain taxes, which was reported to the Secretary of the
Treasury for his consideration and advisement, was held by the
court not to have been a final decision, but to have been subject
to a revision by the Secretary. Obviously, the decision of the
Surveyor General, approving the act of his deputy, was not a
finality, since the papers were forwarded by him to the
Commissioner of the Land Office, and by him to the Secretary of the
Interior for final approval. So long as there was a superior
officer whose approval was contemplated by law or the regulations
of the Department, no approval by a subordinate officer would
operate as a finality. In this particular, the case is readily
distinguishable from that of
United States v.
Stone, 2 Wall 525, in which the Secretary of the
Interior attempted to annul the action of his predecessor in
issuing certain land patents by revoking them. It is not at all
improbable that the proper location of the back line of this grant
may hereafter become the subject of judicial inquiry; but at
present, while the matter is still pending before the Land
Department and the officers are bringing to bear upon it their own
judgment and discretion,
Page 147 U.S. 268
we have no right to interfere with their action by injunction.
This case is within that large number cited in
Noble v. Union
River Logging Railroad in which it was held that the judicial
power will not interpose by mandamus or injunction to limit or
direct the action of departmental officers in respect to pending
matters within their jurisdiction and control.
The decree of the court of appeals affirming the decree of the
circuit court dismissing the plaintiff's bill is therefore
Affirmed.