Under §§ 246, 273, 496 and 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure of
the Philippine Islands, the Supreme Court of the Islands may review
the evidence touching the amount of an award reported by
commissioners and accepted by the Court of First Instance in a
condemnation case, and may find a different amount upon a
preponderance of the evidence and modify the judgment accordingly
if a motion for new trial has been made and exceptions taken as
provided in the last-mentioned section. P.
250 U. S.
24.
This Court will accept a construction placed by the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands upon a local statute if not clearly
erroneous,
Page 250 U. S. 23
and will assume that that court duly considered and weighed the
testimony and commissioners' report on the facts. P.
250 U. S.
27.
This Court cannot examine questions of fact in a case coming
from the Philippine court on writ of error.
Id.
32 Phil.Rep. 286 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
A case of eminent domain exercised by the railroad company to
condemn twelve small parcels of land in Lucena, Province of
Tayabas, Philippine Islands, in accordance with the petition of the
railroad company.
In accordance with the statutory provisions, three commissioners
were appointed to hear the parties and inspect the properties. They
subsequently reported that the parties had been heard and that
they, the commissioners, had inspected the properties and examined
the same "inch by inch."
They made further detail of their proceedings, set forth certain
causes for the increase in value of the properties in the four or
five years preceding the hearing, even before the coming of the
railroad to the town "so that the value of land near Cotta was
quoted at P2.00 up per square meter, according to the importance
and situation of the land," but that the railroad had "undoubtedly
greatly influenced the rise in the prices of the same lands." They
reported, however, that, taking into consideration all the
circumstances, benefits to the railroad and others, they
unanimously fixed the values of the pieces of property
Page 250 U. S. 24
belonging to the parties who were first impleaded in the cause.
These values it is not necessary to give, nor to designate the
properties to which they were attached, for the reason that the
ownership of the properties, part before and part after the
rendition of the commissioners. report, had become vested in the
Tayabas Land Company.
In accordance with the report, judgment was rendered in favor of
the land company for P81,412.75, with interest at the rate of 6%
from the date of taking possession of the land.
Motions for new trials were denied, and the case was taken to
the Supreme Court of the Islands by the railroad company, and that
court modified the judgment by reducing the award for one of the
parcels, containing 16,094 square meters, to the sum of P6,500 and
the damages for the remaining parcels were fixed at the same
proportionate amount.
The land company says, however, that
"the prime question involved in this entire case is in the last
analysis one of value -- that is, what is a fair value of the land
taken by the railroad company for its railroad station at
Lucena?"
That indeed is the ultimate inquiry, but it depends, according
to other contentions, upon the power of the Supreme Court over the
report of the commissioners and to review and consider the
evidence. In other words, the weight that was to be given to the
report of the commissioners as a matter of fact and law under § 246
of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Islands and to the findings
of the Court of First Instance under §§ 273 and 497 of the same
Code.
Section 273 describes the elements that must be considered in
determining in a case where "the preponderance or superior weight
of the evidence on the issues involved lies," and § 497 provides
for the extent of the power of the Supreme Court to review and
dispose of the case on appeal,
Page 250 U. S. 25
and it is contended that the Supreme Court was bound, as the
Court of First Instance was, to decide by the preponderance of the
evidence determined in the same way. This may be conceded, and to
what extent the Supreme Court satisfied the requirement of the
section we shall presently consider after we have given attention
to the more insistent contention based on § 246, which reads as
follows:
"Upon the filing of such report in court, the court shall, upon
hearing, accept the same and render judgment in accordance
therewith, or, for cause shown, it may recommit the report to the
commissioners for further report of facts, or it may set aside the
report and appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report
in part and reject it in part, and may make such final order and
judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to
the exercise of his rights under the law, and to the defendant just
compensation for the land so taken, and the judgment shall require
payment of the sum awarded as provided in the next section, before
the plaintiff can enter upon the ground and appropriate it to the
public use."
It will be observed that an alternative power is presented
either to accept the report and render judgment in accordance
therewith or to make other dispositions of it or upon it, the
latter, however, in a very general way. And the absence of detail
encourages and gives some plausibility to controversy, but it is
resolved, we think, against the contention of the land company by
the analysis of the Supreme Court of the section. The court points
out, quoting the section, that "it may accept the report in part
and reject it in part," and it observed that that situation alone
might limit its, the court's, power if it were not
"also empowered to make such final order as shall secure to the
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his rights
under the law, and
Page 250 U. S. 26
to the defendant just compensation for the land so taken."
A comprehensive power, we may instantly say, and one required to
be exercised and adequate when exercised to pass upon and finally
adjudge the designated rights. And it gives facility to the
statute, substitutes for circumlocution and delay directness and
expedition, qualities that a statute of eminent domain should
possess.
The court further pointed out that the "final
order and
judgment' were reviewable by it by means of a bill of exceptions in
the same way as any other `action,'" and decided besides that § 496
of the Code was applicable. That section gives power in the
exercise of appellate discretion to "affirm, reverse, or modify any
final judgment, order, or decree of the Court of First Instance."
And this discretion, the Supreme Court in the present case decided,
extends to cases of eminent domain, and, where § 497 of the Code
providing for motions for new trial had been complied with, it, the
court, might
"examine the testimony and decide the case by a preponderance of
the evidence, or, in other words, retry the case on the merits and
render such order or judgment as justice and equity may
require."
The final conclusion of the court was, rejecting the contention
of appellants, that it had power "to change or modify the report of
the commissioners by increasing or decreasing the amount of the
award" if the facts of the case justified. And it was the
conclusion of the court that the facts so justified; and, after a
review of prior cases, it rejected the contention that its
conclusion was in conflict with them.
It will be observed, therefore, that the court considered that
it was under the same obligation to determine the case by the
preponderance of the evidence as was the Court of First Instance,
and, discharging its obligation -- that is, in determining upon the
weight of the evidence -- its estimate of the values of the
properties taken by the railroad was different from that of the
Court of First Instance.
Page 250 U. S. 27
We are brought back, therefore, to the consideration of § 246
and the contention of appellants that, under it, the Supreme Court
had transcended its powers in reducing the values found and
reported by the commissioners, and "erred in holding as a matter of
law that appellants were not entitled to recover the amount fixed
by the commissioners," they being the tribunal to hear the evidence
and view the premises, and that, under § 246, their report being
filed, the court was required "upon hearing to accept the same and
render judgment in accordance therewith," there being no cause
shown, it is contended, for recommitting the report or exercising
any of the other alternatives permitted by the section.
But, as we have seen, as to its power of action upon the report
of the commissioners, the court differed radically with the land
company, and if we should, in deference to the land company's
contention, admit there is ambiguity in § 246, we should be unable
nevertheless to reverse the ruling of the Supreme Court of the
Islands upon the local statutes, and we must assume the court gave
consideration to all of the testimony and estimated the weight to
be assigned to the report and to the declaration of the
commissioners that they had examined "inch by inch" the properties
involved. We say this only in passing. The case is here on writ of
error, and we cannot examine questions of fact.
Santos v. Roman
Catholic Church, 212 U. S. 463;
Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.
S. 302,
218 U. S. 308;
Harty v. Victoria, 226 U. S. 12;
Gauzon v. Campania General, etc., 245 U. S.
86.
Errors of law besides those stated above are asserted. For
instance, the company contends that the court used the evidence
that had been introduced to prove title as evidence of value, and,
further, assigned too much strength to it. Both propositions are
too intimately associated with and dependent upon the whole case to
be estimated in separation. The court's consideration, therefore,
or its
Page 250 U. S. 28
judgment upon them, we cannot disturb. Indeed, the contention of
the land company is but an instance of its broader contention of
want of power in the Supreme Court to review the findings of the
Court of First Instance or to disregard the report of the
commissioners. Accepting the decision of the court upon those
propositions, we necessarily affirm its judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS concurs in the result.